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Thesis abstract 
 
 
This thesis addresses the implementation of sustainable development in the legal frameworks 
of regional integration agreements (RIAs). Sustainable development is reaffirmed as one of 
the main priorities of the international community, while poverty eradication and the 
integration of socio-environmental concerns into all governance levels remain the most 
pressing challenges to its implementation. Furthermore, the role of law is considered 
fundamental for sustainable development, but there remains a lack of analysis of how legal 
frameworks are effectively advancing this objective, particularly at the regional sphere. 
  
In this regard, the thesis focuses on the laws and policies of two of the most important RIAs 
in force, the European Union and MERCOSUR, with a twofold objective: 1) to analyze how 
RIAs can provide enabling legal frameworks for the promotion of sustainable development, 
going beyond trade liberalization and serving as a building block between multilateral goals 
and their implementation at the national level; 2) to provide case studies of norms and policies 
developed at the regional level addressing a) poverty eradication and social justice within 
their internal spheres; b) trade policies and instruments that more effectively integrate socio-
environmental objectives. The research undertaken also has a comparative element that 
enables the consideration of whether the EU, a more developed regional organization, can 
provide lessons to MERCOSUR in advancing these specific issues. 
  
The conclusions show that the legal frameworks of RIAs can facilitate the effective 
translation of sustainable development goals into concrete norms and policies, bridging the 
divide between a multilateral system of standard-setting with low implementation power and 
national states with weakened capacity to deal independently with these issues. The RIAs 
studied have been developing procedural innovations such as 'impact assessment' instruments, 
substantive innovations, such as regional development funds aiming to promote social 
cohesion internally, and trade instruments that integrate development concerns in their 
external relations, such as preferential trade systems (GSP) linked to socio-environmental 
issues and trade agreements that include 'trade and sustainable development' chapters. It also 
provides evidence that, despite their institutional differences, the development of sustainable 
development laws and policies within the EU has followed a path that can provide valuable 
insights for MERCOSUR. Finally, the thesis argues that, despite the tensions that might arise 
between the implementation of these regional measures and the multilateral trade system 
rules, regional action might be a way to cope with the difficulty of reaching a global 
agreement while also more adequately reflecting local concerns. The challenge is to assure 
coherence and consistency with the international goals but, given the importance of 
promoting a more sustainable development process, this is a task worth pursuing.  
  
 
Keywords: international law; sustainable development; trade; regional integration 
agreements; regional development policy; principle of integration; sustainability impact 
assessment (SIA); European Union; MERCOSUR.  
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Introduction 
 
Gathered at the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development / Rio+20 in June 
2012, the Heads of State and Government and high-level representatives of the United 
Nations renewed the international community’s commitment to sustainable development as 
one of its main, if not its most important objective in order to ensure the promotion of an 
economically, socially and environmentally sustainable future for our planet and for present 
and future generations. In addition, the eradication of poverty has been declared the greatest 
global challenge facing the world today, and an indispensable requirement for sustainable 
development. Therefore, the need to mainstream sustainable development at all governance 
levels, integrating economic, social and environmental aspects and recognizing their 
interlinkages to achieve sustainable development in all its dimensions has been highlighted as 
the most important task to be faced in this challenge. The question remains, though, as to how 
to perform this gigantic feat? Attempting to answer this question from a legal perspective is 
the overarching aim of this thesis. 
 
1. Background: the ‘global governance’ challenge  
 
“For me, global governance describes the system we set up to assist human 
society to achieve its common objectives in a sustainable manner, that is, with 
equity and justice. Growing interdependence requires that our laws, our social 
norms and values, our mechanisms for framing human behavior be examined, 
debated, understood and linked together as coherently as possible. This, in my 
view, is the prerequisite for genuinely sustainable development in economic, 
social and environmental terms”. (‘Global governance in the steps of William 
Rappard’, Pascal Lamy, Secretary General of the WTO, speech delivered on 
March 15th, 2010.)’ 
 
The global governance challenge is the background of this thesis, and the quote above 
summarizes much of the framework that underlies the analysis it aims to promote. The use of 
the expression ‘global governance’ has become widespread and commonly designates a 
system of rules, policies and values that go beyond the traditional forms of government in 
order to regulate and pursue the common objectives of humanity, such as environmental 
protection, peace, and the global economic system (including trade, investment, the monetary 
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and financial systems).1 But global governance is not just considered as a system, it is also, 
and perhaps above all, a challenge related to several issues.  
 
The transformations occurring gradually in the system of international relations due to global 
phenomena such as globalization and interdependence have impacted on different aspects of 
the international scenario. Not only have information and communications systems become 
globalized, but so have the challenges related to our everyday lives, a change visible in our 
growing interdependence. We are increasingly noticing the local effects of global problems, 
and global effects of local problems. For instance, global economic problems such as the 
recent financial crisis have highlighted the interconnectedness of global economies, especially 
in the post-liberal market economy era. In addition, global social problems are increasingly 
interconnected, as poverty seems to be a persistent and challenging problem which leads to all 
sorts of other problems: health problems and epidemic diseases; security problems, as poverty 
tends to lead to conflict, also related to economic problems; environmental problems, as 
poverty impacts negatively on pollution; migration problems; and difficulty in the 
implementation and protection of human rights, representing global moral standards that are 
not globally enforced. Additionally, global environmental problems that often have local 
origins and global impacts, such as pollution and GHG released into the atmosphere, do not 
respect boundaries; deforestation and destruction of ecosystems affect the local and global 
climate – such as in the case of the Amazon; commodities problems and provision of food 
and natural materials (timber, minerals, oil/gas) as non renewable resources leading to food 
security and energy supply challenges. Finally, a problem that might lead to an increase in all 
the others- the population boom: according to the UN,2 by the end of the century the planet 
might hold more than 10 billion individuals, which would pose a serious challenge to 
sustainable development for us all. Above all, the global governance challenge represents a 
challenge of justice: a challenge to achieve more equity within the international community, 
based on solidarity and the equitable redistribution of rights, duties, benefits and burdens.   
 
These changes towards globalization and interdependence have led to the creation of new 
concepts that aim to explain and respond to such challenges. Several of them concern what 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See for an earlier reference EO Czempiel/ J Rosenau, Governance without government: order and change in 
world politics, Cambridge University Press, 1992; also D Held, A McGrew (eds.),  
Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002; AM 
Slaughter, A New World Order, Princeton University Press, 2004; T. G. Weiss, ‘Governance, Good Governance 
and Global Governance: conceptual and actual challenges’, Third World Quarterly, Volume 21, Issue 5, 2000.	  
2 http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=38253&Cr=population&Cr1 	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are nowadays considered as global public goods due to their interest to all peoples, such as 
peace, a clean environment and a fair international trade system;3 others are considered as 
common goals of the international community, such as the promotion of a sustainable 
development process, which involve several interconnected issues.4  
 
Such global phenomena are also related to a change in the institutional and political scenario, 
in which a gradual shift away from the traditional idea of an international society of nations 
and towards that of an international community has taken place. This has altered the balance 
of international relations, weakening the role of the state as the main actor in international 
relations and favoring the emergence of new actors, blurring the lines between the internal 
and external affairs of states and the international scenario, and generating a process of 
diffusion of power - which implies a change in the notion of power and in the distribution of 
power among actors. 5  The paradox of a globalized and interdependent international 
community with global challenges and common objectives is the lack of a formal global 
governance structure to deal with such issues. On the other hand, there is one instrument that 
aims to fulfill this role, which is international law. 
 
2. A changing International Law: evolution in purpose, scope and structure 
 
In the present scenario, the role of international law has also changed. Public international law 
(IL) refers to the body of rules and norms that govern the interaction between states, as well 
as other international persons.6 The rationale for the existence of such a system can be 
explained in three different ways: IL works as the law of nations, given the interest of states 
to follow similar rules or apply like standards in their domestic legal order, such as in 
international commercial transactions; second, in a ‘Grotian’ sense, it is justified due to states’ 
interest in reciprocally limiting their own liberties so as to respect sovereignty and justify 
non-interference in internal matters; third, and most importantly, it is instrumental to states 
and other actors as a means of promoting common international goals.7 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 I. Kaul, et al., Global public goods: international cooperation in the 21st century, Oxford University Press, 
1999.	  
4 One example is the establishment of sustainable development as the first priority of the United Nations for 
2011, in a speech delivered by Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon, February 2011, 
http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=5034. 	  
5 C. Arenal, ‘La  nueva sociedad mundial y las nuevas realidades’, Cursos de Derecho Internacional y 
Relaciones Internacionales, Bilbao, Servicio Ed. de la Universidad del País Vasco, 2002.	  
6 C. Joyner, International law in the 21st century: rules for global governance, Rowman & Littlefield 2005, p. 4. 	  
7 M. Janis, International Law, Wolters Kluwer, 2008, p. 8	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This threefold justification for the existence of International Law runs parallel to the 
transformations which have occurred in international relations, to which this system of rules 
attempts to respond. Firstly, IL has changed in regard to the actors to which it attributes legal 
personality and which affect its functioning. States have been regarded as the major actors 
with rights and duties in international relations since the ‘Peace of Westphalia’ treaties in 
1648, in a world that -until recently- was dominated by an ‘international society’ of states. 
Nevertheless, the state of world affairs has changed, and to appreciate the current situation 
one must consider other actors operating in the international sphere and affecting the 
development of international rules. Among the actors with recognized international legal 
personality, states are still foremost, but international organizations, multinational 
corporations, non-governmental organizations and even individuals - to different extents – are 
part of what is now referred to as the ‘international community’. Thus, while IL is still made 
majorly by and addressing states, as the international relations that connect all states have 
changed, IL has evolved from a system that merely safeguards the pacific coexistence of 
states to one that tries to guide states and other relevant actors in the promotion of different 
objectives that emerge at the international level. The interaction of these actors in the 
international community has necessitated vast and often rapid changes in international legal 
rules to keep pace with these new realities.8 
 
Secondly, IL has seen a considerable evolution in scope, which has been expanded from the 
safeguarding of co-existence and sovereignty to the regulation of common objectives such as 
peace, human rights, security and environmental protection. This has lead to the creation of 
specialized branches that aim to regulate such common goals. Despite the existence of general 
norms of IL in the form of custom and jus cogens, the international system is thus not a 
uniform, general body of norms, but marked by special, transnational, legally grounded 
relationships called regimes: these are defined in international relations theory as implicit or 
explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ 
expectations converge in a given area.9 These regimes have evolved based on the common 
concern regarding specific issues, such as the protection of the oceans and the environment, 
the creation of an international trading system, the enforcement of human rights, etc. In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 C. Joyner, op. cit. p. 24.	  
9 S. Krasner, ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables’, in S. Krasner, 
International Regimes, Cornell University Press.	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practice, they comprise rules of IL, international agreements, international organizations and 
compliance mechanisms, and coordinated, cooperative regulation of activities in the 
respective areas of concern.10 While this specialization in different branches has enabled IL to 
progress and reach consensus among actors in relation to specific areas, it has also led to 
debates about fragmentation and collision among these regimes, which can at times 
jeopardize the progress of the system as a whole and the achievement of broader objectives 
going beyond the specific rationale of each regime.11 This is the case regarding the promotion 
of sustainable development, as will be discussed below. Regimes are therefore understood 
here in a broad sense, including rules, norms and principles affecting the behavior of 
concerned actors in the processes of international relations, and considering a notion of 
governance, as opposed to a more traditional vision of government and rigid notions of 
regulation.  
 
Thirdly, IL nowadays not only aims to produce binding legal rules that create obligations 
through the traditional form of treaty-making between states, but also works through what has 
been deemed ‘soft law’ in order to codify the conduct or opinion of states and other actors 
regarding desirable paths to follow on specific matters. Despite their lack of binding power, 
these ‘halfway normative measures’ are considered an important development which enables 
governments to assume uncustomary obligations that are usually too ambiguously formulated 
to be deemed as acceptable hard law; they also permit the formulation of quasi obligations in 
a precise and constrictive form that would not be acceptable under a binding treaty. In this 
way, these norms are understood to contribute to solidifying the international legal order.12  
 
Considering the transformations which have occurred in the international scenario and within 
the structures of IL, the question of the ultimate purpose of IL also emerges, especially when 
one considers the issues of fragmentation. In this regard, it is argued that IL has entered into a 
‘post-ontological era’, and that the most important questions that must be answered about IL 
now concern three fundamental issues related to its purpose and functioning: effectiveness, 
enforcement and, most importantly, fairness. While the first two are justified due to the 
problems in the functioning of IL as a system that is at times too complex and does not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 C. Joyner, op. cit, 27-28. 	  
11 See, in this regard, M. Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the 
diversification and expansion of International Law, Report of the study group of the International Law 
Commission, United Nations General Assembly, A/CN.4/L.682, 2006. 	  
12 C. Joyner, op. cit, 27-28. 	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deliver expected results, the justification of the fairness inquiry is related to the very 
overreaching objective that IL should pursue, and this justification is given on substantive and 
procedural grounds: the fairness of IL will be judged first by the degree to which the rules 
satisfy the participants’ expectations of justifiable distribution of costs and benefits, and 
secondly by the extent to which the rules are made and applied in accordance with what the 
participants perceive as a right process; these two aspects of fairness -substantive, as 
distributive justice, and procedural, as a right process – can sometimes be conflicting. The 
procedural aspect is related to the legitimacy of law; the substantive, to its effectiveness in 
dealing with the problems that IL is supposed to regulate – ever wider in scope, as the 
international (or now increasingly transnational) community evolves and changes. Legitimacy 
and justice are thus two aspects of fairness, with a procedural or moral perspective, which 
combine in order to clarify this new and important goal that international law should aim for, 
which is to achieve fairness at the global level.13  
 
Within this system, it is argued that sustainability is emerging as a core value of the 
international community and therefore has also been progressively encompassed by IL as a 
guiding principle.14 As will be seen in the coming chapters, the pursuit of fairness is also 
central to the concept of sustainable development which, as will be argued, has become a 
guiding principle for and one of the main objectives of the international community. The 
means through which IL has attempted to deal with this concept are also related to fairness in 
many ways, in its substantive and procedural aspects. Nevertheless, the lack of a central 
authority to implement an overarching objective/principle such as sustainable development 
leads to a problem of implementation.  
 
The argument of this thesis is that a sub-level of governance, the regional level, might provide 
an effective way of resolving this problem by working as a bridge between global goals and 
challenges and their implementation at the national level. The legal aspect of this argument is 
the extent to which the legal frameworks of regional integration blocs – ultimately regional 
trade agreements – have integrated sustainable development, and how this integration has 
been done.     
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 T. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 5-24. 	  
14 N. Schrijver and the Hague Academy of International Law, The evolution of sustainable development in 
international law: inception, meaning and status, Martinus Nijhoff , 2008.	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3. Focus of the thesis: the implementation of sustainable development in regional trade 
agreements 
 
The changing framework of international relations has favored the establishment of new 
forms of ‘global governance’ during the last century, notably in the period after World War II, 
which witnessed the creation of several multilateral organizations whose scope was to 
promote better responses to global challenges, such as the United Nations, the ‘Bretton 
Woods Institutions’ and the World Trade Organization, dealing with issues such as 
environmental, social and economic governance. In addition to IOs, other less 
institutionalized forms of governance have emerged, such as the G8 and the G20, gatherings 
of states that meet to provide ‘ad hoc’ solutions to issues such as financial governance; other 
types of government networks are also recognized as being part of the governance system.15 
 
In parallel to these attempts to provide multilateral governance, regional integration 
agreements have also proliferated and have become a consolidated phenomenon worldwide.16 
Regional blocs started fundamentally with the creation of free trade areas, but the scope of 
regionalism has evolved over time to encompass other policy objectives such as 
environmental protection and social cohesion. Moreover, several regional blocs have 
developed a stronger external dimension and started to play a role as global actors, 
performing an innovative form of governance recognized as ‘interregionalism’.17  
 
In this regard, the agendas of regional blocs have also included issues such as the promotion 
of sustainable development. This can be said to be the case for the European Union, 
considered nowadays as the most advanced project of regional integration, and which has 
incorporated sustainable development as a guiding principle in its legal system and as an 
objective for its internal and external policies. In addition, the bloc supports the idea that 
regional integration is a means of promoting this goal worldwide, which can be perceived in 
its relations with other actors, such as the ‘Common Market of the South – MERCOSUR’.  
MERCOSUR also aims to promote sustainable development, although in a much less 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 A.M. Slaughter, op cit.	  
16 A. Winters, Regional integration and development, World Bank; Oxford University Press, 2003, notes that 
regional integration has been one of the major developments in international relations, especially during the last 
decade, with virtually every country in the world nowadays being part of at least one regional or multilateral 
integration scheme; in addition, there is a trend towards deeper levels of integration and the regulation of issues 
other than trade, such as security, development and environmental issues. 	  
17 F. Söderbaum. ‘The EU as a global actor and interregionalism’. 	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straightforward way: having been created with the goal of establishing a common market, but 
having as rationale the promotion of development with social justice, this evolving integration 
project also promotes several issues which are relevant to the goals of sustainability.  
 
This thesis aims to provide a legal perspective on the links between regional integration and 
sustainable development, and an analysis of the extent to which regional integration projects 
can be a tool for the promotion of this objective/principle. Taking a legal perspective, the 
thesis considers there to be a gap between the international and national spheres: international 
norm making and standard setting institutions with weak enforcement power, and national 
authorities unable to act independently and efficiently implement the international 
agreements. The thesis then aims to explore the argument that regional integration can be a 
means of promoting sustainable development through the creation of legal frameworks which 
bridge between the national and international spheres, promoting not only economic growth 
through trade liberalization but also rules and policies that go beyond trade matters and 
integrate social justice and environmental protection. RIAs can be, in this sense, building 
blocks for global development governance, between a weak multilateral system of standard 
and rule setting with low enforcement and implementation powers, and national states with 
weakened sovereignty and a lack of capacity to deal independently with these issues. This 
will be explored by analyzing two regional blocs, the European Union and MERCOSUR, 
their own policies and objectives, and their relations with each other. 
 
4. Methodological remarks 
 
This thesis will be primarily analytical, using primary sources at the international and regional 
level, as well as literature on international and communitarian law, political science and 
economics, in order to provide the framework and develop important points on the subject 
matter. The method is primarily one of teleological interpretation in considering the scope and 
meaning that was embedded in the rationale of creating the rules under analysis, to understand 
the problems as a whole and be able to provide critical analysis and, when appropriate, 
normative proposals for improvement. Furthermore, the interpretation will include a historical 
analysis that is fundamental in order to understand these underlying objectives and their 
evolution. The thesis provides an in-depth analysis of how development has evolved as a 
subject in international law and how sustainable development has become a guiding principle 
on this matter; also of how the legal and policy frameworks on sustainable development have 
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evolved both in the EU and MERCOSUL and how they currently function. The thesis is also 
normative in assessing how these frameworks could be improved in order to make a stronger 
contribution to sustainable development, and also how initiatives in either bloc could inspire 
better regulation in the other.  
 
The decision to focus more heavily on the implementation of sustainable development in 
relation to the positive action taken by the regional blocs rather than from a more 
jurisdictional perspective, such as through the case law of different judicial bodies, can be 
justified for two reasons. Firstly, on the basis of a belief that the development needs and, 
furthermore, the implications of the principle of sustainable development, as will be argued, 
should be achieved by the positive action of stakeholders rather than by corrective means, 
such as litigation. Courts certainly have a fundamental role to play in the interpretation and 
advancement of legal norms that have soft law origins such as the principle of sustainable 
development. Nevertheless, its implementation requires action, not only correction. Secondly, 
because there is a gap in the literature concerning the implementation of sustainable 
development from this perspective, particularly relating to regional blocs, and the thesis aims 
to fill this gap.   
 
5. Structure of the thesis 
 
The thesis is composed of six chapters, divided into two structural blocs. The first bloc, 
composed of the first three chapters, is more descriptive in nature and aims to provide an 
analytical framework for the analysis undertaken in the three subsequent chapters. 
Nevertheless, it has also an analytical component in the sense that it aims to stress one 
particular view regarding the global governance of sustainable development and to make a 
statement about what this represents based on document and literature review, but also on the 
personal views of the author, having worked for an international organization for some 
months after the writing of a large part of the thesis and been privileged to attend relevant 
international events, such as Rio+20. This first section ultimately pinpoints the failures in the 
implementation of sustainable development and suggests that regional integration blocs can 
provide a valuable alternative for implementing these commitments within their governance 
structure.  
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The second bloc, composed of chapters 4 to 6, takes a more pragmatic view in analyzing 
selected policies of the EU and MERCOSUR regarding the creation of legal and institutional 
frameworks which promote issues linked to sustainable development. Chapters 4 and 5 
provide a historical view on how these policies have evolved, how they currently function, 
how they are linked and how they can be assessed, taking into consideration the points made 
in the first three chapters; moreover, a comparative analysis between the two blocs is carried 
out, aiming to identify issues which can be taken as the best examples – especially 
considering that the EU has come a greater distance in developing a legal/institutional 
structure and MERCOSUR, in many ways, seems to be taking similar steps. Nevertheless, the 
aim here is not to present the EU as a model of integration or otherwise, but rather, by 
identifying useful insights, to make constructive criticism and suggest lessons that can be 
learned and courses of action, taking into account the – in the author’s view – inflexible 
geopolitical, socio-economic and cultural differences between the two blocs.  
 
6. Brief outline of the chapters: 
 
Chapter 1 addresses the integration of sustainable development in international law. Firstly, 
the conceptualization of development outside the legal sphere is discussed, showing its 
evolution from an idea of economic growth, centered on the state, to one of the enhancement 
of human welfare, centered on the individual. International law has encompassed these issues, 
and a new branch of law dealing specifically with issues related to development has been 
recognized. ‘International Development Law’ firstly attempted to foster development through 
international economic relations, particularly regarding issues related to developing countries, 
and then gradually evolved towards human development in the form of human rights. This 
movement later merged with the environmental movement, bringing about the idea of 
sustainable development which was encompassed by international law in a twofold manner: 
firstly as a growing body of principles in the intersection of three regimes of IL: international 
economic law, international environmental law and international human rights law; secondly, 
as an interstitial norm, guiding decision and rule making. This norm became a guiding notion 
for international law in the field of development, but faces an implementation challenge, 
which will be further discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
Chapter 2 discusses how the lack of a coherent regime in international law to implement 
sustainable development poses a challenge for the achievement of its two main objectives: 
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intra-generational equity, focusing particularly on poverty reduction and social cohesion, and 
the integration of sustainable development into norms and policies. International law is still 
marked by different regimes which influence development, although two particular regimes 
could be pointed out: the international development cooperation regime and the special 
provisions related to development in the international trade regime. Nevertheless, these 
regimes face challenges in implementation and effectiveness, and a discussion regarding the 
role that RIAs can play is presented. Firstly, the legal basis of establishing RIAs as sub-
regimes of the GATT/WTO is presented, then the rationale of expanding RIAs towards 
positive policies and the promotion of other policy areas, and finally the role that they play in 
international relations.  
 
Chapter 3 presents the framework of the EU and MERCOSUR projects of integration, 
emphasizing that these two blocs have as a common core objective the formation of a 
common market – something the EU has already completed and deepened, while 
MERCOSUR still faces challenges in its implementation. Nevertheless, these two projects 
have been able to reach beyond the trade sphere, creating a legal framework enabling them to 
establish norms and policies related to the promotion of sustainable development. One 
underlying question that this Chapter aims to address, by providing an analytical framework 
which will inform the case study in Chapter 6, is whether -and to what extent- the EU can be 
considered a model for MERCOSUR, not in its institutional structures, but rather in the way it 
created norms and policies to pursue the shared goal of promoting sustainable development.  
 
Chapter 4 addresses regional integration and regional development, aiming to demonstrate 
how RIAs can work for the promotion of development within their internal borders, being 
expressions of the principle of equity – in its aspect of distributive justice and social cohesion. 
This is addressed through a case study of the regional policy of the EU and the structural fund 
of MERCOSUR. The aim is to analyze how the regional policy of the EU has been 
transformed over the years to encompass the (also evolving) strategies of the bloc regarding 
development and other issues, and how sustainable development has been included in this 
regard. Furthermore, comparative analysis is undertaken involving the newly created initiative 
in MERCOSUR, which could provide interesting insights regarding both development 
strategies and the functioning of the blocs as a whole.  
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Chapter 5 analyzes regional integration and international development by showing how 
regional blocs are entering into a third stage of evolution and are also playing a role in 
international relations. The chapter analyzes the trade and development policies of the EU, 
which started with a limited common commercial policy and evolved towards a 
comprehensive trade policy linked to overarching external action objectives, using 
sophisticated instruments, which also led to the creation of an independent, but interrelated, 
development cooperation policy. The focus of the analysis though is a case study of five of 
the EU’s major trade agreements, and how they have been integrating sustainable 
development through procedural and substantive measures, respectively ‘sustainability impact 
assessment’ procedures and the progressive inclusion of ‘trade and sustainable development 
chapters’. The agreements analyzed are the EU-Chile Association Agreement, the EU-
CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement, the EU-South Korea Free Trade 
Agreement, the EU-Central America Association Agreement, and the EU-Peru/Colombia 
Free Trade Agreement. In addition, an analysis of the incipient common commercial policy of 
MERCOSUR is presented, showing that while the project still focuses much more on trade 
liberalization, without a strong normative basis such as that of the EU, some development 
concerns are being integrated into its wide net of trade agreements, such as special and 
differential treatment according to the developmental level of the party, technical cooperation 
measures, as well as an incipient system of trade preferences for the least developed countries.  
 
Finally, Chapter 6 presents an extended case study analyzing the relationship between the 
EU and MERCOSUR, and how sustainable development concerns are integrated in it. The 
core of the analysis is the negotiation of the Association Agreement between the two parties, 
which, when research began, the author had hoped would be signed by the time of 
submission. Nevertheless, the assessment of the parties’ relationship and the negotiation 
process, including the SIA undertaken by the EU and also taking stock of the case studies 
undertaken in Chapter 5, allow some conclusions to be drawn in the sense that the EU’s 
relationship with MERCOSUR, while marked by different strategies related to the integration 
of sustainable development, is also influenced by clashes with political strategies and 
challenging issues related to the multilateral sphere. This case study is thus instrumental in 
bringing up more general considerations about the implementation of sustainable 
development in regional trade agreements, and also the value of regions as building blocks for 
the creation of regulatory regimes that implement broader international goals in a more 
specific context – or interregionalism. 
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Chapter 1. Sustainable development and International Law 
 
The Introduction of this thesis provided a discussion of how sustainable development became 
a mainstream goal of the international community. Moreover, it highlighted the changing 
rationale of International Law (IL) as a body of rules and norms governing the interaction 
between states, as well as between other international actors.1 This rationale can be explained 
in three different ways: IL works as the law of nations, given the interest of states to follow 
similar rules or apply like standards in their domestic legal orders, such as in commercial 
transactions; secondly, in a ‘Grotian’ sense, it is justified due to states’ interest in reciprocally 
limiting their own liberties in order to respect sovereignty and justify non-interference on 
internal matters; thirdly, and most significantly, states have found it helpful as a means of 
achieving common international goals.2  
 
This threefold justification for the existence of IL runs parallel to the transformations which 
have occurred in international relations, to which this system of rules attempts to respond. 
Firstly, IL has changed in regard to the actors to which it attributes legal personality and 
which affect its functioning, and while it is still made majorly by and addressing states, it has 
also evolved from a system that merely safeguards the pacific coexistence of states, to a 
system that tries to guide states and other relevant actors in the different objectives that 
emerge at the international level. Secondly, IL has seen a considerable evolution in scope, 
expanding from the safeguarding of co-existence and sovereignty to the regulation of 
common objectives such as peace, human rights, security and environmental protection. 
Thirdly, IL nowadays not only aims to produce legal rules that create obligations through the 
traditional, state led form of treaty-making with binding power, but also works increasingly 
through ‘soft law’ in order to codify the conduct or opinions of different actors regarding 
desirable paths to follow. In this way, these norms are understood to contribute to solidifying 
the international legal order.3  
 
Bearing these observations in mind, IL is more instrumental than ever to the international 
community in the globalized, interdependent international relations that characterize the 
international scenario, as a system of norms and procedures that aim to regulate common 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 C. Joyner, International law in the 21st century: rules for global governance, Kluwer Law, 2005, p. 4. 	  
2 M. Janis, International Law, Wolters Kluwer, 2008, p. 8.	  
3 C. Joyner, op. cit, 24.	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goals and objectives. Within this system, sustainability is emerging as a core value of the 
international community, and therefore has also been progressively encompassed by IL as a 
guiding principle.4 Nevertheless, despite the growing body of norms and principles and the 
proliferation of regimes regulating different aspects of international relations, the globalized 
world lacks both a centralized global governance system and an authority with 
implementation powers. This can be observed in the subject matter which is the focus of the 
next section, the promotion of development as a common goal of the international 
community.  
 
This chapter addresses the conceptualization of sustainable development in international law. 
The aim here is not to critique the concept of sustainable development, but rather to provide a 
normative basis for the discussion of the implementation of this concept in the following 
chapters. There is a significant body of literature dealing with this problematique, and the 
goal of this thesis is not to engage in the debate as to whether sustainable development is a 
positive or negative concept, but by assessing the existing legal instruments, literature and 
current state of the international debate, to make a positioning statement of what sustainable 
development means and how it should be viewed within the legal sphere. In order to do so, 
this chapter firstly establishes an analytical framework that will be fundamental to the 
subsequent chapters, examining the concept of development broadly, as well as how 
sustainable development was created as a guiding principle in this field. Secondly, it 
addresses how IL encompassed the promotion of sustainable development as an objective of 
the international community. Finally, it makes the arguments that, while not fully recognized 
as a customary norm of international law, the normative elements of sustainable development 
clearly make it an objective and a guiding principle of the international community, and that 
implementation is currently the main challenge to this principle. 
 
1. Introduction: the concept of development  
 
The promotion of development is an objective that interests the whole of the international 
community, given both the wide range of interconnected issues that influence it and the 
distribution of its effects. In this regard, IL has encompassed issues related to the promotion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 N. Schrijver and the Hague Academy of International Law, The evolution of sustainable development in 
international law: inception, meaning and status, Martinus Nijhoff , 2008.	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of development as a common goal. Nevertheless, the concept of development emerges not 
from legal but rather from economic theories, and in order to analyze IL in relation to 
development, it is firstly necessary to clarify what this concept means in a broad sense. 
 
It is argued that the concept of development has evolved over time from a ‘traditional view’ 
towards a more ‘modern view’. Each of these approaches leads to a different understanding of 
the relationship between the concept of development and the ways in which it is regulated by 
IL, and these differences are said to revolve around three main points: 5  (i) whether 
development is purely an economic issue or should be viewed more holistically so that other 
issues, such as human rights and environmental protection, are seen as integral parts of the 
development process; (ii) the central subject of this process and the role that the state should 
play;6 and (iii) the conceptualization of IL itself. Both of these approaches to the concept of 
development are briefly addressed below.  
 
1.1 The traditional view of development 
 
Development has traditionally been associated with economic growth and, for a long time, 
was treated as an issue separate from other problems in society and understood primarily as 
an economic process pursued through specific economic policies and projects. Social, 
environmental and political implications were recognized, but treated as externalities. 
According to this view, the state, as the actor with decision-making responsibility for the 
broader aspects of projects or policies, is the key subject of the development process, and 
there is a sharp distinction between national and international law, since this view of 
development is consistent with traditional notions of sovereignty. By treating social, political 
and environmental factors as externalities, this perspective implicitly defines the scope of 
state sovereignty in regard to other actors in development, making clear that decisions relating 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 D Bradlow, ‘Differing conceptions of development and the content of International Development International 
Development Law’, South African Journal on Human Rights, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2005.	  
6 More specifically, whether the state should have the primary role in decision-making relating to development 
policy and projects and also about the scope and nature of the responsibilities of the various actors involved in 
the planning, construction and operation of development projects and in the design and implementation of 
development policy: the state, which approves development projects and makes and implements development 
policy; project sponsors, who may be the private sector, the public sector or the state itself; project contractors, 
which includes those public and private sector institutions which provide the financing, goods and services for 
the design, construction and operation of development projects and for the implementation of development 
policies; and individuals and communities that are directly or indirectly affected, in both positive and negative 
ways by particular policies and projects and their representatives.	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to the social, political and environmental consequences of development should be taken by 
the sovereign and that those decisions should be respected by other actors.  
 
This classic view of development has been losing ground over the past few decades, as the 
changes in international relations have undermined its basic premises through the emergence 
of relevant actors other than states, the interconnectedness and interdependence of economic 
growth with other issues and the fact that other forms of regulation besides the classic forms 
of international law are necessary -and already widely used- in global governance, thus 
calling for a more comprehensive view of the development process. 
 
1.2 The modern view of development 
 
Modern theories have expanded the concept of development and promoted a holistic 
approach, integrating development with social, cultural, political and environmental issues. 
Economist Amartya Sen is the most prominent figure of this movement, and his revolutionary 
work, recognized by the Nobel Prize in Economics, had great impact on the conceptualization 
of development. He understands development as freedom, and the expansion of people’s 
freedom as the primary end and the principal means of development. Freedom is understood 
as the expansion of people’s capabilities to achieve the kind of lives they envision for 
themselves; as a goal, it empowers people by enhancing their capabilities; as a means, it 
fosters development because of the instrumental effectiveness that particular kinds of 
freedoms have in promoting freedoms of other kinds.7 
 
According to Sen, in the conceptualization of development as freedom, highlights seven 
features: (i) it must go beyond economic growth: although income growth is an important 
means to expand freedom, poverty is seen not only as the lack of economic power, but also as 
the deprivation of capabilities; (ii) freedom is seen as an inclusive process that encompasses 
political, economic and social aspects; (iii) the individual is seen as the main subject of the 
development process (even though main responsibilities are given to states), and empowering 
people by enhancing their freedom should be a basic step to development; (iv) it establishes a 
system of goals and rights in the development process; (v) it tries to establish a middle path 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 A Sen, Development as freedom. 1999, Oxford University Press, p. 1-54. The author highlights five different 
types of ‘instrumental freedoms’ that have an important role to play in enhancing the capabilities of a person: 
political freedom, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees and security. He also states 
that there is empirical evidence that these freedoms are mutually reinforcing.	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between the concept of free market versus state authority, and between the ideas of efficiency 
and equity; (vi) it highlights the importance of public participation of all actors involved in 
and affected by development policies; and (vii) it highlights the importance of democracy as 
the only way of representing the interests of all the actors involved.  
 
This approach differs greatly from the traditional angle, having a narrower view of the state’s 
role and emphasizing the empowerment of the individual as the central element of 
development, which represents important progress in the sense of having a comprehensive 
vision of all aspects that influence the development process. Nevertheless, critics suggest that 
although Sen succeeds in elaborating a more adequate concept of development, he fails to 
provide the means to implement these changes into the social structures and processes that 
inhibit its realization. 8  A similar conclusion can be reached regarding IL relating to 
development which, as will be seen below, ultimately faces a challenge of implementation. 
 
2. Development and International Law 
 
IL has long been concerned with the regulation of international economic relations, including 
issues broadly defined as relating to development and actors involved in the development 
process. In this regard, literature has recognized a new branch of law - international 
development law (IDL) - which deals with the rights and duties of actors involved in the 
development process.9 Notwithstanding, as there is no general consensus about the concept of 
development, a ‘traditional’ and a ‘modern’ model of IDL are recognized, according to 
traditional or modern conceptions of the development process. ‘Traditional IDL’ focuses on 
economic growth and deals with international economic law issues, and the ‘modern model of 
IDL’, based on a more holistic vision of human development, includes economic, 
environmental and social areas of international law.10 As will be argued below, these notions 
are bound nowadays by the emergence of the principle of sustainable development as an 
objective and a guiding principle.  
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 B Chimni, ‘The Sen Conception of Development and Contemporary International Law Discourse: Some 
Parallels’, The Law and Development Review, 2008. 	  
9 Which shall not be confused with the ‘law and development movement’ initiated in the United States in the 
1960s, the guiding assumption of which was that law is central to the development process – mainly the rule of 
law, and which aimed at improving development and generating social and political change through legal 
reform, at the national level.	  
10 D Bradlow, op cit.	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2.1 International economic law and development 
 
Based on traditional views of development, IDL initially focused on international economic 
issues as a branch of International Economic Law (IEL), dealing with legal aspects of 
international trade, finance and investment that related to the challenges faced by developing 
countries.11 After World War II, a movement inspired by Latin-American theorists aimed to 
generate new legal rules relating to core international economic issues, attempting to change 
the situation of economic dependence of the (in many cases newly politically independent) 
developing countries. It was, to some extent, a reaction to the fundamental principles of 
international law that were considered harmful to more fragile economies, such as pacta sunt 
servanda and property rights, said to keep developing countries stuck in a status quo of unjust 
colonial relations. The main motivation behind these measures was the demand for equity in 
dealings with the international economic system in a post-colonial era, in which the political 
realities changed and this had to be mirrored by changes in the economic structure. However, 
the idea of equity had a differentiation inherent to it, being, in a way, a paradox, to the extent 
that initially sovereignty and equality were extremely important for newly created developing 
countries that wanted to safeguard their independence from former colonies. Nevertheless, it 
became clear that treating countries whose internal socio-economic situations and ability to 
participate in international economic relations differed so greatly as equals was not ultimately 
just. Thus, a claim for differentiation began to emerge on the basis of treating countries 
differently based on their differing development levels.12 
 
These efforts were reflected in several initiatives taken at the international level, such as the 
proposal to establish a ‘New International Economic Order’13 and the proclamation of a right 
to economic self-determination.14 Specifically in the area of trade, a specialized body was 
created within the United Nations to deal with trade related development issues, the United 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 AH Qureshi, AR Ziegler, International economic law. Sweet & Maxwell, 2007.	  
12 D Bradlow, op cit. 	  
13 Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, UNGA Res. 3201, which states that 
States ‘shall correct inequalities and redress existing injustices’ and ‘make it possible to eliminate the widening 
gap between the developed and developing countries’. The ideas of the NIEO never became binding obligations, 
though, given the disagreements between the developing and developed countries. 	  
14 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, UNGA Res 3281, UN Doc. A/9631 (1975), which calls for 
the establishment of a new international economic order designed to remove major hurdles to economic 
development in developing countries.	  
Chapter	  1	  
	   19	  
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 15 which promoted the definition 
of a norm exempting developing countries from the reciprocal obligations of trade 
liberalization (the ‘enabling clause’), institutionalizing “special and differential treatment” 
(SDT) provisions agreed in the GATT and leading to the establishment of the Generalized 
System of Preferences (GSP, analyzed further in Chapter 2). In relation to investment, issues 
such as nationalization, compensation, the treatment and responsibilities of investors and the 
resolution of disputes between investors and host states were among the main concerns. 
Finally, in the international financial area, the main issues concerned rules on access to 
capital, debt renegotiation, the operations of the ‘Bretton Woods Institutions’ and foreign 
aid.16  
 
In this traditional form of IDL, issues outside the economic sphere such as the social, 
environmental, cultural and political aspects of development have limited roles and are seen 
as externalities.17 These norms of IEL are usually based on binding international treaties and 
legal obligations that address states as beneficiaries, and as those responsible for 
implementation.   
 
2.2 A shift towards ‘human development’ 
 
More recent economic theories, like Sen’s work, have expanded the concept of development 
and advocated a holistic approach, integrating social, cultural, political and environmental 
issues into the development agenda. A ‘modern’ approach to IDL reflects these ideas, aiming 
to promote norms and policies that are economically, environmentally and socially concerned 
with the rights and responsibilities of developing and industrialized states towards each other 
and to other actors in the international scenario.18 These norms are, nevertheless, usually 
expressed through ‘soft law’ documents that are not binding, as opposed to the more usual 
‘hard law’ instruments that characterize ‘traditional IDL’. This can be taken as a sign that this 
expansion in the conceptualization of development, while achieving a rhetorical consensus 
and representing a shift in the discourse of the international community regarding the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was established in 1964 as a 
'permanent intergovernmental body to deal with trade, investment and development issues, especially regarding 
developing countries and assist them in their efforts to integrate into the world economy on an equitable basis' 
(official website information, see: www.unctad.org).  	  
16 D. Bradlow, op cit.	  
17 This can be perceived, for instance, in the debate regarding the discussion of environmental or human rights 
issues at the WTO and the inclusion of sustainable development in the preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement. 	  
18 D. Bradlow, op cit	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desirable paths to follow, has not convinced states to accept binding obligations to implement 
such duties.   
 
The foundations of this approach were laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, which recognizes that human rights comprise both civil and political rights (Articles 1 
to 21), and economic, social, and cultural rights (articles 22 to 28), and expresses a 
commitment to the realization of a “just international and social order” (Article 28); the UN 
Charter, according to which there must be cooperation for the achievement of these goals 
(Arts. 1 and 55), and in the international covenants regarding fundamental civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural rights as binding and inalienable rights of the individual.19  
 
This view was later expressly encompassed by international law through the Declaration on 
the ‘Right to Development’ (DRD) in 1986 by the UN General Assembly.20 The DRD 
describes development as a “comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process 
that aims at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of all 
individuals on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in development and 
in the fair distribution of benefits resulting therefrom” (emphasis added). Article 1 reaffirms 
this broader concept by stating that “the right to development is an inalienable human right by 
virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute 
to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights 
and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized”. By defining development as a process but 
also as a human right with many interconnected aspects, the DRD transposed into 
international law the concerns generated by the modern vision of development, such as those 
raised by Sen’s work.21  
 
Four main ideas can be extracted from the DRD: (i) the right to development is a human right, 
and human rights in general are reaffirmed as a means and as a condition to the realization of 
such rights, considering that “all human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible and 
interdependent”; (ii) the human right to development is a right to a process of development in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ICCPR and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, ICESCR. 	  
20 Declaration of the ‘Right to Development’, UNGA Resolution 41/128, December 4th 1986. The DRD was not 
adopted by unanimity, but by a vast majority, the United States being the only country to vote against its 
approval, with abstention from six European countries.	  
21 In fact, it is argued that there is a parallel between modern IDL and Sen’s vision of development; see B. 
Chimni, at 7 above.	  
Chapter	  1	  
	   21	  
which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized; (iii) the meaning of 
exercising these rights implies the participation of all the individuals concerned in the 
decision-making and the implementation of the process, which should be transparent and 
accountable, and that individuals must have equal opportunity of access to the resources for 
development and receive fair distribution of its benefits; (iv) finally, this process creates a 
system of rights/goals and obligations, distributed on duty-holders: individuals are holders of 
both rights and obligations, having the right to participate in the development process and 
decision-making of their community, and the obligation to contribute to this process, 
implying a moral duty to respect other individuals’ rights; states have the responsibility to 
realize the process of development through appropriate development policies at the national 
level; at the international level, states and other international actors are obliged to cooperate in 
order to promote the realization of the development process on the basis of solidarity and 
equity. In addition, the DRD is founded on the notion that the right to development implies a 
claim to a social order based on equity and justice: while not denying the importance of 
income and output, which enhance the expansion of resources and the opportunities for 
development, the development process must be realized in a manner that ensures fair 
distribution and equality in terms of access to these resources and that expands the 
fundamental freedoms of individuals; it thus proposes a qualitatively different approach, in 
which considerations of equity and justice are primary determinants of development.22 
 
The DRD is a soft law document, thus not legally binding, but it paved the way towards 
global recognition of this new approach.23 Some years later, the right to development was 
unanimously proclaimed as a human right in the 1993 UN World Conference on Human 
Rights and its Vienna Declaration of Human Rights,24 which reaffirmed it as “a universal and 
inalienable right and an integral part of fundamental human rights”. Despite the 
(rhetorically) universal support for the right to development, several questions may be raised 
regarding this ‘rights approach’ to development. For instance, doubts remain as to whether 
granting individual rights is the best means of addressing problems of collective action such 
as development, particularly when the lack of a binding instrument to enforce a human right 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 A. Sengupta, ‘On the Theory and Practice of the Right to Development’, (2002) Human Rights Quarterly 24, 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 837-889.	  
23 In fact, it should be highlighted that the main opponent to this approach was the United States of America, 
which voted against the DRD. See, in this regard, S Marks, ‘The Human Right to Development: between 
rhetoric and reality’, Harvard Human Rights Journal 17, 2004. 	  
24 Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, UNGA Declaration 157/23, Article 10. 	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means justiciability is also lacking.25 On the other hand, some positive aspects may also 
highlighted, such as the consideration of the right to development as the “sum of all other 
human rights”, building bridges and working for the integration of the different categories of 
human rights so as to connect the rights of individuals, peoples and developing countries, 
while still allocating the responsibility of implementation to national states, which in turn can 
request assistance from the international community, thus creating a system.26  
 
Regardless of the debate about the adequacy of a ‘rights based approach’ to development and 
the lack of binding instruments obliging countries to follow developmental standards, the 
modern vision of development has a normative content which has influenced IDL towards a 
change in the structure of global governance, fostering a commitment to place the individual 
at the center of development law and policy making, by promoting all human rights that 
secure freedom – the idea of social justice. In addition, while the state is maintained as the 
main actor responsible for implementation in relation to its own citizens, this conception of 
development also determines the enhancement of an international system of cooperation for 
development, through support for the development of other states and their citizens. In the 
influence of this normative shift lies the relevance of these documents, in the building of 
political support and international consensus towards coordinated action. In fact, this rights 
based approach has been losing space to a softer way of promoting common development 
goals, in line with the new roles ascribed to IL, as addressed in the introduction to this 
Chapter.  
 
2.3 A move towards ‘sustainability’ 
 
In parallel to this holistic approach to the development debate, concerns related to 
environmental protection and the need to ensure that the development process is carried out 
within the limits of the Earth’s natural resources has gradually become another mainstream 
concern. The environmental agenda over time exerted strong influence on the development 
debate, and ultimately led to the conception of sustainable development. In fact, many of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 See, in this regard, S Marks and B Andreassen (eds.), Development as a Human Right – Legal, Political and 
Economic Dimensions, (Intersentia 2010); particularly the chapter by Marks, in which he highlights the fact that, 
despite the disagreement regarding the legal recognition of the RTD, the normative input that it gave to the 
elaboration of norms and policies at the international level should be more in focus – page 98. For a more critical 
approach, J Grugel, ‘Do rights promote Development?’, Global Social Policy, 2009, pp. 79-98.  	  
26 N. Schrijver and the Hague Academy of International Law, The evolution of sustainable development in 
international law: inception, meaning and status, Martinus Nijhoff, 2008.	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central ideas of sustainable development were initially related to environmental concerns as 
opposed to economic interests, but gradually expanded to encompass social justice issues too, 
thus enlarging the scope of the concept from environmental sustainability to the sustainability 
of the (human) development process.  
 
During the post-WWII period the conservation of natural resources gained strength as a 
concern of the international community, but environmental issues became the focal point on a 
large scale for the first time only in the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment (UNCHE).27 The main outcome of the conference was a statement of principles, 
the ‘Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment’,28 which expressed the idea that “the 
protection and improvement of the human environment is a major issue which affects the well 
being of peoples and economic development throughout the world”. Among the Stockholm 
principles, some became consolidated in IL over time: principle 14, which recognizes the 
“need to reconcile the conflicts between the needs of development and the need to protect and 
improve the environment”, and principle 21, which declares that “states have, in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign 
right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the 
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause 
damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction”, which became a duty not to damage the environment, even if in a transboundary 
context.  
 
In addition to the recognition of human impact on the environment, the conference had two 
other important outcomes: the creation of the UN Environmental Program (UNEP) in 1972,29 
aiming to coordinate environmental policies worldwide, and in 1983, the creation of the 
World Commission on the Environment and Development (WCED),30 with a mandate to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 D. Bodansky, The art and craft of international environmental law (Harvard University Press 2010) notes that 
even though it was not the first major conference focusing on the environment, it was the first to receive high 
levels of political attention and popular interest; it was the first major UN theme convention; in addition, 
developing countries were brought into the debate, which had previously been conducted by developed states. 
See also J. Brunnée, ‘The Stockholm Declaration and the Structure and Processes of International Environmental 
Law’, in 2009) in A. Chircop, T. MecDorman, (eds.), The Future of the Ocean Regime Building: Essays In 
Tribute To Douglas M. Johnston, pp. 41-62, Kluwer Law, 2008.	  
28 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Human Environment, UNGA A/CONF.151/26, available at 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm. 	  
29 UNGA Resolution 2997 (XXVII) 1972.	  
30 UNGA Resolution 38/161, 1983. The mandate of the WCED was stated as: “(a) To propose long-term 
environmental strategies for achieving sustainable development to the year 2000 and beyond; (b) To recommend 
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propose ways of action. In 1987 the WCED published the report ‘Our Common Future’,31 
providing the most widely known definition of sustainable development as “development that 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs; it contains two key concepts: the concept of needs, in particular the essential 
needs of the world’s poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and the idea of 
limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the environment’s 
ability to meet present and future needs; and as a process of change in which the exploitation 
of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of technological development, and 
institutional change are all in harmony and enhance both current and future potential to meet 
human needs and aspirations”. Moreover, in Annex 1 to the report, a set of proposed general 
principles, rights and responsibilities were outlined, among which was the statement that all 
human beings have a right to “an environment adequate for their health and well being”, and 
that states have a duty to “ensure that conservation is treated as an integral part of the 
planning and implementation of development activities and provide assistance to other States, 
especially to countries of the global South, in support of environmental protection and 
sustainable development”. This influential report led the UN to recognize that sustainable 
development “should become a central guiding principle of the organization itself, of 
governments and enterprises”,32 and the concept was further developed through a series of 
international conferences that were fundamental to the creation of IDL norms and 
instruments.  
 
A second global conference of much bigger proportions was convened in 1992 with 
sustainable development as its focus, the UN Conference on Environment and Development 
in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (UNCED). The UNCED had three main outcomes: the first was the 
‘Rio Declaration’,33 another non-binding instrument that nevertheless placed sustainable 
development as a recognized principle within the international political agenda. Building on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
ways in which concern for the environment may be translated into greater co-operation (…) and lead to the 
achievement of common and mutually supportive objectives which take account of the interrelationships 
between people, resources, environment and development; (c) To consider ways and means by which the 
international community can deal more effectively with environmental concerns; (d) To help to define shared 
perceptions of long-term environmental issues and of the appropriate efforts needed to deal successfully with the 
problems of protecting and enhancing the environment, a long-term agenda for action during the coming 
decades, and aspirational goals for the world community;”	  
31 Report of the WCED to the UNGA, recognized by UNGA Resolution 42/187, available at http://www.un-
documents.net/wced-ocf.htm.  	  
32 UNGA Resolution A/RES/42/187.  	  
33 Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development, UN Report A/CONF.151/26. Afterwards, the GA 
issued a resolution endorsing the declaration and the Agenda 21, urging the international community to take the 
provisions into account and calling for a follow up of the agreements, UNGA Resolution A/RES/47/190.    	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the Stockholm declaration, it proclaimed that human beings are the center of concern for 
sustainable development and also laid out a series of principles that should guide this 
objective and “a new and equitable global partnership (…) to implement it”. The Rio 
principles expressed a series of substantive and procedural measures to be taken at all levels 
of governance. Among these, the following may be seen in terms of substantive measures: 
Principle 4, determining that environmental protection should be an integral part of the 
development process; Principle 5, supporting international cooperation to combat poverty 
worldwide; Principles 6 and 7, supporting special considerations to developing countries and 
‘common but differentiated responsibilities’; Principle 8, determining the change of 
unsustainable patterns of production and consumption; Principle 11, determining the 
enactment of effective environmental legislation and Principle 13, asking for the development 
of law relating to environmental liability; and Principles 15 and 16, determining a 
precautionary approach to environmental issues and the ‘polluters pay’ principle. Principle 
10, requiring means of enabling public participation in decision-making and access to justice; 
and 17, calling for the use of environmental impact assessment procedures may be seen in 
terms of procedural measures. ‘Agenda 21’, a plan of action envisioning measures to 
implement these commitments globally, regionally and locally complemented the Rio 
Declaration.34 
 
The other two major outcomes of the conference were two international binding agreements, 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CDB) and the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). These documents, while expressly mentioning 
sustainable development as a rationale and an objective, don’t give a substantive definition of 
the meaning of the concept. Thus, beyond the mainstreaming of the concept of sustainable 
development, the significance of the Rio Conference lay in the shift in focus away from 
human impact on the environment towards the recognition of environmental protection and 
the advancement of development as equally important objectives. This highlighted a shift in 
the ecological movement itself, from the idea of ecological conservation, to acceptance of the 
fact that human interference with nature is inevitable, and thus prescribing ways in which this 
relationship can be balanced inn order to secure environmental sustainability. Nevertheless, 
critics have pointed to two of the summit’s main failures: firstly, the fact that social 
development and poverty tended to be seen as part of the process of economic development, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Agenda 21, UNGA Document A/CONF/151.26.	  
Chapter	  1	  
	   26	  
and that human rights, including social, economic, and cultural rights were not clearly a part 
of the program. 35  In addition, no binding agreement was reached in relation to the 
enforcement or implementation of these commitments. The ‘UN Commission on Sustainable 
Development’ (CSD)36  was created to follow up by monitoring and reporting on the 
implementation of the agreements at the local, national, regional and international levels, but 
the model adopted with Agenda 21 left the task of elaborating national strategies of 
sustainable development to the states themselves, leading to divergent and incoherent 
implementation and no enforcement authority at the global level. This model still influences 
the governance of sustainable development, as is further discussed below. 
 
2.4 An integrated approach to development 
 
Despite these critical aspects, after the Rio Declaration sustainable development became a 
mainstream concept on the political agenda and the scope of the subsequent international 
debates reflected this more holistic vision of development, including economic, 
environmental and social aspects. At the same time, from the end of the 1990s an emphasis on 
poverty eradication and inequality – the social justice sphere - gained strength, together with 
concerns about the implementation and coordination aspects of agreements.  
 
In the year 2000, the UN hosted the 55th Session of the General Assembly, called the 
‘Millennium Summit’, whose final document, the Millennium Declaration37  included a 
commitment to making the right to development a reality for everyone and to freeing the 
entire human race from want”,38 but also went beyond that, establishing a framework for an 
ambitious global strategy to address developmental needs. The declaration can be divided into 
two main parts: section I established a set of fundamental values and principles that should 
guide “international relations in the twentieth-first century”, including the principles of the 
UN Charter and also the values of freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, respect for nature 
and shared responsibility among the nations of the world for economic and social 
development, peace and security; subsequent sections II to VIII seek to “translate these 
shared values into actions” by identifying key objectives: peace, security and disarmament 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 M.C. Cordonier Segger, Sustainable development law: principles, practices and prospects, Oxford University 
Press, 2004, p. 29.	  
36 Section IV, Chapter 38, article 38.11.	  
37 UNGA Resolution A/RES/55/2, http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals. 	  
38 Article 11.	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(section II); development and poverty eradication (section III); protection of the ‘common 
environment’ (section IV); promoting human rights, democracy and good governance (section 
V); protection of the most vulnerable peoples in the world (section VI); meeting the special 
needs of Africa (section VII) and strengthening the UN system (section VIII).  
 
In 2001 the Secretary General presented a report39 stating that the international community 
had just emerged “from an era of commitment and must now enter an era of implementation, 
in which it mobilizes the will and resources needed to fulfill the promises made”, and a “road 
map to set out in detail how these commitments could be fulfilled”. After consultations 
between members of the UN and representatives of leading international organizations such 
as the IMF, OECD and the World Bank, targets and respective indicators were identified with 
a view to developing ‘millennium development goals', having section III of the Millennium 
Declaration, on 'development and poverty eradication', as a main reference. A plan of action 
was established through a framework of eight main goals (further subdivided into 18 targets 
with indicators of assessment), which became known as the ‘Millennium Development Goals’ 
(MDGs). These are (i) to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; (ii) to achieve universal 
primary education; (iii) to promote gender equality and empower women; (iv) to reduce child 
mortality; (v) to improve maternal health; (vi) to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other 
diseases; (vii) to ensure environmental sustainability; and (viii) to develop a global 
partnership for development.40  
 
While the Millennium Declaration and the MDGs are also ‘soft law’ documents, thus not 
creating legally binding obligations for States, extensive links can be seen between the MDGs 
and human rights provisions , and in fact each of the Goals is connected to one or more 
human right.41 Thus, given the fact that the MDGs represent political commitments, whereas 
human rights provisions are legally binding obligations, the promotion of the MDGs can also 
be viewed as a form of reinforcing human rights, being thus relevant to the development 
process, and human rights enforcement can be viewed as a form of pursuing these goals. As 
has been argued, “if this Declaration is read together with other instruments that are now 
regarded as the International Bill of Rights, like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Covenant on Economic, Social, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 UN GA Resolution A/RES/56/326, paragraphs 1 to 11.	  
40 Annex to the Resolution 56/326, pages 55 to 58.	  
41 See, for instance, the document ‘Human rights and the Millennium Development Goals: making the link’ 
published by the United Nations Development Program, available at www.undp.org.  	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Cultural Rights, and if it is seen as a document on human rights evolving from the process of 
the human rights movement, it can be given an interpretation that can be most helpful for its 
realization”.42  
 
In addition, the MDGs have been extremely influential in relation to the definition of the 
development agenda since their creation. Although progress towards the MDGs’ 2015 target 
is lagging severely behind,43 they are considered fundamental in the shaping of “international 
development debates by institutionalizing the consensus on ending poverty, reshaping 
‘development’ to mean ending poverty – rather than transforming economic structures and 
creating capacity for sustainable growth - and helping define poverty as multidimensional 
deprivation, including dimensions such as education, health and environment”. 44 
Furthermore, they have led to the organization of several subsequent conferences and the 
negotiation of increases in development aid expenditure and coordination, financial and 
technical cooperation, trade liberalization and debt relief.45   
 
The implementation of Agenda 21 and the principles of the Rio Declaration, together with the 
MDGs process, were reaffirmed at another major international conference, the World Summit 
on Sustainable Development (WSSD) held in Johannesburg, South Africa in 2002. This 
conference had the objective of taking stock of progress and was attended by several thousand 
participants from governmental and non-governmental spheres, demonstrating the importance 
of the topic on the political agenda. Despite its proportions, the WSSD was criticized for 
being ultimately political and not resulting in conceptual changes of comparable significance 
to those at previous summits: Stockholm and Rio represented shifts of paradigm at a global 
level, the former by setting the environment as a major concern, the latter by setting the 
environment and development (not ‘or’ development) as equal goals; furthermore, the MDGs 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 A Sengupta, op. cit.	  
43 The MDG Declaration set the year 2015 as the deadline for the achievement of the targets, but, as can be seen 
from the last ‘MDG Progress Chart’ (a periodic report published by the UN, available at 
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/reports.shtml), in most cases “progress is insufficient to reach the target if 
prevailing trends persist”. See also the ‘MDG monitor’, http://www.mdgmonitor.org/browse_goal.cfm.	  
44 S Fukuda-Parr, Should global goal-setting continue, and how, in the post-2015 era? DESA Working Paper No 
117 ST/ESA/2012/DWP/117, July 2012, pp 2-3.	  
45 Among these, the most important ones are: The International Conference on Financing for Development, held 
from 18-22 March 2002 in Monterrey, Mexico by the UN to address financing for development as a way to 
implement the MDGs and the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 2005 and its follow up meetings.	  
In relation to the Mexico conference, although there was no real expectation of a binding commitment, there 
were some important outcomes: one was the recognition of the goal to increase ODA level to 0.7 per cent of 
GDP; in addition, there was a general sense in developing countries’ delegations of the importance of good 
governance practices in addition to receiving development aid.	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had emphasized poverty eradication. In addition, the conference produced no binding 
agreement or new institution. 
 
The main relevance of WSSD, though, lies in the fact that its outcome document, the 
Johannesburg Declaration, sent the political agenda on sustainable development back to its 
origins, highlighting that the sustainability of the development process should be reinforced at 
local, national, regional, and global levels based on “the interdependent and mutually 
reinforcing pillars of sustainable development — economic development, social development 
and environmental protection. Poverty eradication, changing unsustainable patterns of 
production and consumption, and protecting and managing the natural resource base of 
economic and social development are overarching objectives of, and essential requirements 
for, sustainable development”. 46 Thus, the WSSD documents focused on an integrated 
environmental, social and development agenda, with strong attention paid to poverty 
eradication and human rights – building upon the objectives of the MDGs. Moreover, the 
format of the implementation plan was much more comprehensive than Agenda 21, inclusive 
of new focal areas, cross-cutting issues, cooperation and funding commitments.47  
 
All of these documents form the normative basis of the ‘modern IDL’, which focuses first of 
all on ‘human development’, having the individual as the main subject of the development 
process, as opposed to state centered notions of development. Furthermore, modern IDL is 
based on a holistic vision of the development process, emphasizing the need to integrate 
economic and social development and environmental protection. Thus, modern IDL is formed 
by norms within the international economic law, international environmental law and human 
rights law regimes, expanding the traditional scope of IDL. However, the question remains as 
to how to effectively implement the integration of these areas of law.  
 
2.5 The status of sustainable development in international law 
 
Despite its normative appeal and its widespread recognition, there is no binding definition of 
sustainable development in IL, as most of the documents referring to its meaning at the 
international level are ‘soft law’. This leads to debate regarding its legal status as a principle 
of international law and concerning its potential implications, and also poses a challenge, as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Declaration and JPOI	  
47 MC Segger, op cit, pg. 28-31. 	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the regimes that exist in international law relating to the economic, environmental and social 
spheres have no original, explicit rules for the balancing of other objectives. 
 
i) The aim of International economic law is primarily to promote economic development 
objectives, for example, the rationale behind the international trade system is to liberalize 
trade, but it also includes investment, the international financial system, competition and 
economic integration law.  
ii) The aim of International Social Law is primarily to protect the individual by safeguarding 
human rights, based on the UDHR (customary IL), but also comprising the ICCPR and 
ICESCR (binding law) and other soft law declarations such as the DRD; Labor law in the 
form of ILO conventions and International humanitarian law such as the Geneva conventions 
of 1949 and additional protocols of 1977; and international social development agreements on 
specific sectors such as food, water, population and development, housing, women’s rights, 
and health. In this field, instruments are usually resolutions and declarations that are not 
legally binding, since some are areas considered to fall under national sovereignty.  
iii) Finally, international environmental law aims primarily at the preservation, protection and 
conservation of the environment, but also on its ‘sustainable use’. These objectives are 
pursued through a series of principles, some of which are recognized as customary 
international law and others which remain as ‘soft law’, with some embedded in multilateral 
environmental agreements (MEAs). Among these, the ‘climate change’ regime built around 
the UNFCCC, the ‘biodiversity regime’ built around the CDB, the ‘ozone layer regime’ built 
around the Montreal Protocol and others feature as prominent areas. 
 
As these areas of law and their sub-regimes have different rationales, and in the absence of an 
international body that performs a governance function, the existence of a norm prescribing 
the integration of objectives is of great importance. While the doctrine still rejects sustainable 
development as a formal principle of international law, some defend it as a recognized 
customary norm.48 In the middle ground stand others who defend it as a different kind of 
norm which became part of international law operating in different ways, even if without a 
binding character. Nico Schrijver, recognizing that international law functions as a system of 
values and norms but also as a regulatory framework for the conduct of States, international 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 V Lowe, ‘Sustainable development and unsustainable arguments’, in A. Boyle and D Freestone (eds.) 
International law and sustainable development: past achievements and future challenges, Oxford, 1999, pg. 64, 
is probably one of the most skeptical commentators, noting that sustainable development can hardly be seen as a 
norm or a set of norms, which nevertheless do have potential and influence, especially in adjudication.	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organizations, transnational corporations and citizens, considers that sustainability is 
emerging as a core value of the international community, and functions not only in a 
declaratory and programmatic way, but also by providing the instruments of law that can be 
used to produce more action-oriented programs and rules: “in the field of sustainable 
development, international law often functions, at a high political level, as an instrument to 
record agreed basic principles and prudent courses of action in a legal document, more than 
to codify what is occurring in accordance with a generally accepted ‘opinio juris’ in the 
practice of States and international organizations”.49 
 
Going further, Marie Claire Cordonier-Segger argues that, although it is not possible to 
consider sustainable development as a binding principle or a customary norm of international 
law - the lack of normative certainty and absence of justiciable standards of review suggesting 
that states are bound by a legal obligation to develop sustainably - neither it is accurate to 
describe it as only a vague policy goal, devoid of normative value. She suggests that 
sustainable development in international law can be understood in a twofold manner: firstly, 
as a growing body of law, an emerging area of international law in its own right, given the 
substantive amount of legal instruments that are based on its normative assumptions or were 
created to implement them (or both); ‘sustainable development law’ is a set of substantive and 
procedural norms at the intersection of international economic, social and environmental law, 
which helps to reconcile these separate fields. In addition, it can be considered as a different 
type of norm in its own right, as a ‘meta-principle’ acting upon other existing principles and 
rules, exercising a type of interstitial normativity, requiring the reconciliation and balancing 
of the conflicting interests of economic growth, environmental protection and social justice 
for present and future generations: “The substantive aspect of this interstitial norm is the 
requirement that all three sets of priorities be reflected in the substantive outcomes of a given 
dispute or conflict. Viewed in this way, SD helps to curb the worst social and environmental 
excesses of nations in economic development activities; it coordinates the internalization of 
otherwise externalized objectives. It can exert an immense gravitational pull when used by 
States as they negotiate treaties, or by judges as they seek ways to reconcile other conflicting 
norms and principles”.50 In addition, she suggests that, despite the fact that much can be 
gained from a more coherent concept of sustainable development, this is not by all means 
negative: firstly, because soft law instruments are easier to negotiate in comparison to binding 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 See, in this regard, N. Schrijver, op cit.	  
50 MC Codornier-Segger, op cit, pp. 45-50 and 368-71.	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instruments, and this helps in achieving consensus and setting the path to action; and 
secondly, because the changing nature of international law is accommodating the changes in 
international relations, wherein several types of actor apart from states may exert influence, 
thus this kind of standard setting, through UN summits for instance, allows for the 
participation of various sectors of society, as was the case in the UNCED and WSSD.  
 
Despite the lack of consensus regarding its legal status, the importance of sustainable 
development, as both an objective and a guiding principle recognized by and widely spread 
within the international community, and encompassed by international law is apparent based 
on just one of its capacities– that as an instrument with which to pursue the common goals of 
the international community. Sustainable development is an objective of achieving a balance 
between the competing spheres of the development process; and a guiding principle that 
encompasses a set of substantive and procedural tools with which to do this. 
 
In an attempt to clarify the legal aspects of what sustainable development implies, the 
International Law Association (ILA) created a committee to work on the legal aspects of 
sustainable development, and in 2002 the committee released the ‘New Delhi Declaration on 
the Principles of International Law Related to Sustainable Development’.51 The declaration 
begins by stating, in the preamble, that “sustainable development is now widely accepted as a 
global objective and that the concept has been amply recognized in various international and 
national legal instruments, including treaty law and jurisprudence at international and 
national levels and that it should be integrated into all relevant fields of policy in order to 
realize the goals of environmental protection, development and respect for human rights”. It 
then provides a list of seven principles that work at the intersection of international economic, 
environmental and social law, some firmly established as principles of international law, 
others less recognized or emerging as international norms, which provide legal tools to 
implement the commitments to sustainable development. These principles are listed below, 
not in their original order but according to the relevance attributed to them within the scope of 
this thesis, and the role they play in dealing with sustainable development’s main challenges. 
In this regard, the two most relevant principles are equity and integration: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 ILA Resolution 3/2002: New Delhi Declaration Of Principles Of International Law Relating to Sustainable 
Development , in ILA, Report of the Seventieth Conference, New Delhi (London: ILA, 2002), available at: 
http://www.ila-hq.org. 	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i) Principle 2: Equity - inter and intra generational. Both sub-principles of equity are central to 
the attainment of sustainable development, particularly given that its main challenge is 
considered to be the eradication of poverty. Intra-generational equity refers to the right of all 
peoples within the current generation to fair access to the Earth’s natural resources and, in the 
context of sustainable development, is related to the right to development, thus including the 
duty to cooperate for the eradication of poverty as well as the duty to cooperate for global 
sustainable development and the attainment of equity in relation to the development 
opportunities of people in developing countries. It implies that while it is the primary 
responsibility of the State to aim for conditions of equity within its own population and to 
ensure the eradication of poverty as a minimum, all States which are in a position to do so 
have a further responsibility, as recognized by the Charter of the United Nations and the 
MDGs, to assist other states in achieving this objective. Thus, it supports the international 
system of development cooperation. Inter-generational equity refers to rights of future 
generations to be able to meet their own needs for survival, just as the current one does, and 
to enjoy a fair amount of the common goods, and is thus expressed by the sustainability 
component of the principle. Even if these duties – to provide development cooperation and 
ensure the rights of future generations – have not achieved the status of binding legal 
obligations, equity as a principle of justice is, on the other hand, both a fundamental goal and 
principle of IL, as discussed in the first section of this Chapter, and an intrinsic component of 
the sustainable development concept. 
 
Duncan French52 states that justice itself as a goal of the international community and of 
international law is more ancient than the idea of sustainable development and, as a means of 
elucidating fairness in human interaction, is not necessarily reliant upon or measured by the 
sustainability of mankind’s use of the natural environment. Nevertheless, the issues of global 
justice and sustainable development are increasingly being considered as mutually supportive 
objectives, as “a society cannot be sustainable if it is not just”. In fact, the idea of 
development itself contains notions of justice, at national and international levels: fairness 
within a society and solidarity between societies globally. In addition, many of the ideas that 
are central to sustainable development incorporate belief in justice/fairness: equity, common 
but differentiated responsibilities, cooperation, and thus justice should frame the pervading 
discussions in the field. He argues that the interplay between equity, fairness and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 D French, Sustainable development and the instinctive imperative of justice in the global order, in French 
(ed.) ‘Global Justice and Sustainable Development’, Brill, Leiden/Boston, 2010.  	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sustainability is central to the discourse on how justice and sustainable development interact, 
and that there are four ways in which this interaction takes place: firstly, in the consideration 
of the environment as something to be distributed, which requires fairness; secondly, in the 
consideration of justice as functional for the purpose of sustainability: fair societies achieve 
sustainability more easily, even if it is not always a win-win relationship and trade-offs have 
to be made, highlighting the subordinate nature of justice to sustainability; thirdly, in the idea 
of justice for the environment, taking it as something to be protected for its own sake; finally, 
the consideration of sustainability as a condition for justice: justice is primarily an 
anthropocentric concept, but must be viewed in the context of ecological sustainability given 
the interdependence of man and nature.  
 
Justice is often mentioned as referring only to the equitable application of norms and 
objectives. Nevertheless, this is just one element of a much more complex understanding of 
the relationship between global justice and sustainable development. In this regard, French 
stresses three relevant types of justice: 
 
1. Corrective justice: the basis for differentiated treatment of unequal parties; 
2. Distributive justice: the basis for intra-generational justice, divided into four different 
approaches: (i) at the micro level, bearing the costs of changing to sustainable patterns, and 
the costs of implementation of global commitments in developing countries by developed 
countries; (ii) macro redistribution, as changes occur in the international relations system to 
allow more inclusivity in the distribution of wealth and power; (iii) environmental 
redistribution, implying a change to more sustainable production and consumption patterns, 
above all in developed countries; and (iv) intergenerational distribution. 
3. Finally, procedural fairness: requirements that decision-making must be reasoned, 
transparent and inclusive. This aspect has an inherent tension: a fair outcome will not 
necessarily be a consequence of a fair process or vice-versa, but while procedural justice 
alone cannot ensure substantive justice, it can greatly assist in the ownership and legitimacy 
of the outcome reached, such as happens in ‘impact assessment procedures’. 
 
Thus, it can be inferred that global justice requires the implementation of the normative 
imperatives contained within the principle of sustainable development, and that the principle 
itself relies on justice considerations as a basis for its rationale. Given these considerations, 
the principle of equity can be claimed as the most important normative component of 
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sustainable development, making a strong case for IL and particularly IDL to actively engage 
in creating the mechanisms to implement these goals. 
 
ii) Principle 7: integration and interrelationship of human rights and social, economic and 
environmental objectives. This principle reflects the interdependence of the social, economic, 
financial, environmental and human rights aspects of principles and rules of international law 
relating to sustainable development, as well as the interdependence of the needs of present 
and future generations. It requires all levels of governance – global, regional, national, sub-
national and local – and all sectors of society to integrate these aspects as an essential element 
for the achievement of sustainable development. 
 
The ILA itself considered integration to be the backbone of sustainable development, and in 
fact the remaining principles listed below have significance within the context of integrating 
the concerns they represent at all policy levels. Integration is thus, like equity, a major 
normative element of sustainable development, and is also related to its objectives, but less in 
the sense of having a concrete goal (like a more just society or the eradication of poverty, 
within a country or globally) and more in the sense of moving towards the obligation to give 
equal consideration to all aspects of development at every level of governance and decision-
making. 
 
From a systematic perspective, the integration element of sustainable development essentially 
requires different streams of international law to be treated in an integrated manner. This has 
implications, for instance, as a harmonizing influence on the effects of the fragmentation of 
international law, discussed above, in the resolution of conflicts.53 In addition, integration has 
a role to play not only in the corrective, dispute settlement side of the implementation of 
sustainable development, but also in its positive side, i.e. in the design and implementation of 
rules and policies. In this regard, integration can take place through several different means, 
such as procedural ‘impact assessment’ instruments that aim to integrate sustainability 
concerns ex-ante the decision of a policy measure, in its implementation and follow up; and 
also through substantive measures aiming to integrate the often separate economic, 
environmental and social objectives of a legal measure or policy. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 C. Voigt, Sustainable development as a principle of international law: resolving conflicts between climate 
measures and WTO law, Martinus Nijhofff, 2009, p. 306-308.	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Thus, the principles of equity and integration are considered in this thesis as the two main 
normative elements and objectives of the overarching principle of sustainable development. 
The remaining principles of the ILA Declaration are instrumental to the achievement of these 
goals: 
 
Principle 1: The duty of States to ensure sustainable use of natural resources. This is a 
relatively well-established principle, recognizing that states have the sovereign right to 
manage their own natural resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental 
policies, as well as the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or 
control do not cause significant damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond 
the limits of national jurisdictions. States have a duty to manage natural resources, including 
those within their own territories or jurisdictions, in a rational, sustainable and safe way so as 
to contribute to the development of their peoples, and to take the needs of future generations 
into account in determining the rate of use of natural resources. 
 
Principle 3:  the common but differentiated attribution of responsibility to all actors involved 
in the development process, mainly states, according to their level of development. This 
principle implies that all states have a duty to cooperate in the achievement of global 
sustainable development and the protection of the environment. International organizations, 
corporations (particularly transnational corporations), non-governmental organizations and 
civil society should cooperate and contribute to this global partnership. Corporations also 
have responsibilities pursuant to the polluter-pays principle. The differentiation of 
responsibilities, while principally based on the extent to which a state has contributed to the 
emergence of environmental problems, must also take into account the economic and 
developmental situations of the state. The special needs and interests of developing countries 
and of countries with economies in transition, particularly with regard to the least developed 
countries and those affected adversely by environmental, social and developmental 
considerations, are recognized. 
 
Developed countries bear a special burden of responsibility in reducing and eliminating 
unsustainable patterns of production and consumption and in contributing to capacity-
building in developing countries, inter alia by providing financial assistance and access to 
environmentally sound technology. In particular, developed countries should play a leading 
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role and assume primary responsibility in matters of relevance to sustainable development. 
One example is the differentiated obligations of the parties in the UNFCCC/Kyoto regime.  
 
Principle 4:  the precautionary approach to human health, natural resources and ecosystems. 
This commits states, international organizations and civil society to avoid human activity 
which may cause significant harm to human health, natural resources or ecosystems, even in 
light of scientific uncertainty, including: (a) accountability for harm caused (including, where 
appropriate, state responsibility); (b) planning based on clear criteria and well-defined goals; 
(c) the use of ‘impact assessment procedures’ to consider all possible means of achieving an 
objective (including, in certain instances, not proceeding with an envisaged activity); and (d) 
in respect of activities which may cause serious, long-term or irreversible harm, establishing 
an appropriate burden of proof in relation to the person or persons carrying out (or intending 
to carry out) the activity. Precautionary measures should be based on up-to-date and 
independent scientific judgment, should be transparent and should not result in economic 
protectionism. Transparent structures should be established which involve all interested 
parties, including non-state actors, in the consultation process. Appropriate review by a 
judicial or administrative body should be available. While the principle of prevention, based 
on known risks, is more firmly established in international law, the precautionary principle, 
although used in several legal instruments, has less recognition.  
 
Principle 5: public participation and access to information and justice. This is considered a 
condition for responsive, transparent and accountable governments, as well as for the active 
engagement of equally responsive, transparent and accountable civil society organizations, 
including industrial concerns and trade unions, and requires effective protection of the human 
right to hold and express opinions and to seek, receive and impart ideas. It also requires a 
right of access to appropriate, comprehensible and timely information held by governments 
and industrial concerns on economic and social policies regarding the sustainable use of 
natural resources and the protection of the environment, without the imposition of undue 
financial burdens upon those applying for such information and, with due consideration for 
privacy and for protection of business confidentiality, requires access to effective judicial or 
administrative procedures in the state where the measure has been taken to bring such a 
measure and to claim compensation. 
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Principle 6: good governance. This commits states, international organizations and other 
authorities to the following: (a) to adopt democratic and transparent decision-making 
procedures and financial accountability; (b) to take effective measures to combat corruption; 
(c) to respect the principle of due process in their procedures and to observe the rules of law 
and human rights; (d) to implement a public procurement approach according to the WTO 
Code on Public Procurement. It requires also gender equality, corporate social responsibility 
and socially responsible investments as conditions for the existence of a global market aiming 
to achieve the fair distribution of wealth among and within communities. 
These principles, while not definitive in conceptualizing the obligations and rights stemming 
from sustainable development, have been influential in the conceptualization of ‘sustainable 
development law’.54  As stated by Duncan French, “international law can play a constitutive 
as well as an instrumental role. It possesses an inherent capacity to clarify the nature and 
extent of wider political objectives. It can convert political compromise into a normative 
outcome, thus furthering political consensus and reinforcing societal values. The principles of 
sustainable development (…) can be interpreted, to a greater or lesser extent, as supporting 
this process. Whether they are primarily considered as substantive, procedural or 
adjudicatory (…) such principles are undoubtfully influencing the legal understanding of 
sustainable development, despite being, for the most part, inchoate”.55  
 
This character of sustainable development as an interstitial norm is exemplified in its 
portrayal in a number of international judicial decisions.56 Reference should first of all be 
made to the International Court of Justice. In earlier cases, such as New Zealand v. France 
Nuclear Tests Case (1995), the Court pronounced that its Order was “without prejudice to the 
obligations of states to respect and protect the natural environment”. In its Advisory Opinion 
to the UN General Assembly on The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the 
Court made reference to Principle 24 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 For a more detailed analysis of the sub-principles of sustainable development, see MC Segger, op cit., pgs. 95-
171; and H. C. Bugge and C. Voigt, Sustainable development in international and national law: what did the 
Brundtland report do to legal thinking and legal development, and where can we go from here? Avosetta series, 
2008, pp. 141-162.	  
55 D French, International Law and Policy of Sustainable Development, Manchester University Press 2005, pg. 
72. 	  
56 The decisions referred to here were selected on the basis of their relevance to the topic of sustainable 
development and, given length constraints, only a short summary and relevant information will be provided. For 
a more comprehensive review and other relevant decisions, see especially the Reports of the International Law 
Association’s conferences on sustainable development, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010, available at www.ila-
hq.org.  	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Development (on protection of the environment in times of armed conflict), and proclaimed 
that “[t]he existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States or of areas beyond national 
control is part of the corpus of customary international law relating to the environment”.57 
 
In its judgment in the case concerning the Gabcikovo- Nagymaros project between Hungary 
and Slovakia (1997) however, the Court placed emphasis and elaborated more substantively 
on both the right to development and sustainable development.58 In this case, Hungary and 
Slovakia were in contention about an agreement which had been reached to build a dam on 
the Danube River, and which was then considered to be terminated by the former on 
environmental grounds.  The Court considered that Hungary had no legal right to terminate 
the agreement and that Slovakia was entitled to continue building the dam. What is interesting 
in relation to the present topic, however, was the attention paid by the Court to the relevance 
of sustainable development as a norm of environmental law that, even if developed after the 
signature of the agreement, brought new obligations to the parties, such as that of continuing 
assessment of the impact of the project on the river: “Throughout the ages, mankind has, for 
economic and other reasons, constantly interfered with nature. In the past, this was often 
done without consideration of the effects upon the environment. Owing to new scientific 
insights and to a growing awareness of the risks for mankind - for present and future 
generations - of pursuit of such interventions at an unconsidered and unabated pace, new 
norms and standards have been developed, set forth in a great number of instruments during 
the last two decades. Such new norms have to be taken into consideration, and such new 
standards given proper weight, not only when States contemplate new activities but also when 
continuing with activities begun in the past. This need to reconcile development with 
protection of the environment is aptly expressed in the concept of sustainable development. 
For the purposes of the present case, this means that the Parties together should look afresh 
at the effects on the environment of the operation of the Gabcikovo power plant. In particular 
they must find a satisfactory solution for the volume of water to be released into the old bed of 
the Danube and into the side-arms on both sides of the river. It is not for the Court to 
determine what shall be the final result of these negotiations to be conducted by the Parties. It 
is for the Parties themselves to find an agreed solution that takes account of the objectives of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 ILA Report 2002, www.ila-hq.org. 	  
58 Case concerning the Gagcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), ICJ Reports 1997. Records available 
at: www.icj.cij.org, para 140-141, emphasis added. 	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the Treaty, which must be pursued in a joint and integrated way, as well as the norms of 
international environmental law and the principles of the law of international watercourses.” 
 
The opinion of Vice-President Judge C.H. Weeramantry became famous for its 
straightforward support of sustainable development. He found it necessary to clarify his 
reasoning in voting the way he did – with the majority – since he did not agree with the 
justifications given in the judgment. He begins by stating that “had the possibility of 
environmental harm been the only consideration to be taken into account in this regard, the 
contentions of Hungary could well have proved conclusive. Yet there are other factors to be 
taken into account - not the least important of which is the developmental aspect (…). The 
Court must hold the balance even between the environmental considerations and the 
developmental considerations raised by the respective Parties. The principle that enables the 
Court to do so is the principle of sustainable development. The Court has referred to it as a 
concept in paragraph 140 of its Judgment. However, I consider it to be more than a mere 
concept, but as a principle with normative value which is crucial to the determination of this 
case. Without the benefits of its insights, the issues involved in this case would have been 
difficult to resolve. (…) Moreover, this is the first occasion on which it has received attention 
in the jurisprudence of this Court. When a major scheme, such as that under consideration in 
the present case, is planned and implemented, there is always the need to weigh 
considerations of development against environmental considerations, as their underlying 
juristic bases - the right to development and the right to environmental protection - are 
important principles of current international law. (…) It is clear that a principle must be 
followed which pays due regard to both considerations. Is there such a principle, and does it 
command recognition in international law? 1believe the answer to both questions is in the 
affirmative. The principle is the principle of sustainable development and, in my view, it is an 
integral part of modern international law. It is clearly of the utmost importance, both in this 
case and more generally. I would observe, moreover, that both Parties in this case agree on 
the applicability to this dispute of the principle of sustainable development. (…) Their 
disagreement seems to be not as to the existence of the principle but, rather, as to the way in 
which it is to be applied to the facts of this case (Reply of Hungary, para. 1.45). The problem 
of steering a course between the needs of development and the necessity to protect the 
environment is a problem alike of the law of development and of the law of the environment. 
Both these vital and developing areas of law require, and indeed assume, the existence of a 
principle which harmonizes both needs. To hold that no such principle exists in the law is to 
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hold that current law recognizes the juxtaposition of two principles which could operate in 
collision with each other, without providing the necessary basis of principle for their 
reconciliation. The untenability of the supposition that the law sanctions such a state of 
normative anarchy suffices to condemn a hypothesis that leads to so unsatisfactory a result. 
Each principle cannot be given free rein, regardless of the other. The law necessarily 
contains within itself the principle of reconciliation. That principle is the principle of 
sustainable development. This case offers a unique opportunity for the application of that 
principle, for it arises from a Treaty which had development as its objective, and has been 
brought to a standstill over arguments concerning environ- mental considerations. (…) Other 
cases raising environmental questions have been considered by this Court in the context of 
environmental pollution arising from such sources as nuclear explosions, which are far 
removed from development projects. The present case thus focuses attention, as no other case 
has done in the jurisprudence of this Court, on the question of the harmonization of 
developmental and environmental concepts.” Furthermore, he recognizes the right to 
development as a consolidated part of human rights, and states that: “after the early 
formulations of the concept of development, it has been recognized that development cannot 
be pursued to such a point as to result in substantial damage to the environment within which 
it is to occur. Therefore development can only be prosecuted in harmony with the reasonable 
demands of environmental protection. Whether development is sustainable by reason of its 
impact on the environment will, of course, be a question to be answered in the context of the 
particular situation involved. It is thus the correct formulation of the right to development 
that that right does not exist in the absolute sense, but is relative always to its tolerance by the 
environment. The right to development as thus refined is clearly part of modern international 
law. It is compendiously referred to as sustainable development.” In addition, he refuses the 
view of sustainable development as merely a concept, and went a few steps further: “the 
principle of sustainable development is thus a part of modern international law by reason not 
only of its inescapable logical necessity, but also by reason of its wide and general 
acceptance by the global community. The concept has a significant role to play in the 
resolution of environmentally related disputes. The components of the principle come from 
well-established areas of international law - human rights, State responsibility, 
environmental law, economic and industrial law, equity, territorial sovereignty, abuse of 
rights, good neighborliness - to mention a few. It has also been expressly incorporated into a 
number of binding and far-reaching international agreements, thus giving it binding force in 
the context of those agreements. It offers an important principle for the resolution of tensions 
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between two established rights. It reaffirms in the arena of international law that there must 
be both development and environmental protection and that neither of these rights can be 
neglected”.59  
 
The judgment became a landmark in this field, both for the recognition of sustainable 
development as an interstitial norm, and for the different level of recognition as a principle of 
international law, giving parameters to help to balance the development and environmental 
considerations of a project, as well as for entailing obligations which were not envisaged in 
the agreement, such as the need to continuously carry out assessments of the impact of the 
project on the environment. On the other hand, the Court refused to determine what precise 
obligations the parties were under in this regard. Thus, despite the absence of an international 
body responsible for the enforcement and implementation of these obligations, criticisms 
were raised due to the Court’s hesitation in taking a bolder step and acting as the center of 
international guidance in the field.  
 
More than ten years later, another prominent judgment brought these issues back to the 
Court’s attention, but the way in which they were tackled did not change substantively. In the 
‘Pulp Mills Case’ (Argentina/Uruguay), the Court was called upon to resolve a dispute 
concerning the installation of a pulp mill on the banks of the Uruguay River, which separates 
the two countries.60 In 1975, Argentina and Uruguay concluded the Statute of the River 
Uruguay, the purpose of which was the establishment of joint mechanisms for the optimal and 
rational utilization of the river. The Statute established a Commission for the management of 
the river, the Administrative Commission of the River Uruguay. Argentina complained that 
the pulp mills authorized by Uruguay on the Uruguayan side of the river would cause 
environmental damage to the river and to Argentine territory. The Court decided that Uruguay 
had breached a procedural obligation contained in the 1975 Statute, namely the obligation to 
inform the Commission and Argentina of planned activities involving the river. The Court 
also decided that Argentina had failed to prove that significant environmental damage would 
occur. Therefore, the operation of the mill could continue. This decision is particularly 
interesting given the considerations of the Court on three aspects:   
 
(i) the scope of the concept of sustainable development: The 1975 Statute of the River 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Case Slovakia v Hungary, page 88 and following, emphasized. 	  
60 Case concerning Pulp Mills on the Banks of the Uruguay River (Argentina/Uruguay), ICJ Reports 2010. 	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Uruguay does not mention sustainable development as one of its objectives. However, as the 
treaty includes provisions for the prevention of pollution and the protection of the aquatic 
environment, the Court seems to interpret ‘optimal and rational utilization’ as similar to 
sustainable development: “The Court considers that the attainment of optimum and rational 
utilization requires a balance between the Parties' rights and needs to use the river for 
economic and commercial activities on the one hand, and the obligation to protect it from any 
damage to the environment that may be caused by such activities, on the other”. The 
Judgment also explicitly refers to sustainable development in the Court’s analysis of the 
relationship between the procedural and substantive obligations contained in the 1975 Statute 
of the River Uruguay. Argentina asked the Court to find that Uruguay had violated the 
procedural obligations established in the Statute of the River Uruguay and that a breach of the 
procedural obligations implied also a breach of the substantive obligations. It is in relation to 
this argument that the Court addressed sustainable development, invoking the principle to 
stress that there is no necessary link between procedural and substantive obligations, because 
the reconciliation between environmental protection and the attainment of economic 
development may take different forms, and that it is up to the Parties to choose which form of 
reconciliation best accommodates their particular interests, as they had agreed in their Statute. 
The Court decided that Uruguay had violated its obligation to inform and notify, but that this 
violation did not mean it had violated its obligation to protect the river. This shows that the 
Court did not view sustainable development as an operative rule of international law on the 
basis of which, and in the absence of other rules, it could decide on the legality or illegality of 
State behavior. This is not to say that sustainable development could not have a normative 
role to play in the interpretation and application of other rules of law. But it seems that the ICJ 
itself was not willing to evaluate whether a particular type of development was indeed 
sustainable as such. The international legal system lacks a central authority capable of 
imposing such public interest rules on states. In the context of this case, this explains why the 
Court, in the absence of an agreement between the Parties, did not have sufficient power to 
establish a system of risk management, which the Parties had neglected to include in the 1975 
Statute of the River Uruguay. The Statute of the River Uruguay contains procedural and 
substantive obligations in relation to the protection of the river, but the Parties did not agree 
that the violation of the procedural obligations would entail ipso facto prohibition from 
continuing with the planned activities.  
 
(ii) the need to perform impact assessment procedures. The 1975 Statute included no 
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obligation to assess environmental impact when a planned activity is liable to cause harm. 
The parties’ obligation was to inform and notify each other about activities likely to cause 
harm to the river environment. However, the Court found that an environmental impact 
assessment to fulfill the obligation of precaution was a necessity, and also considered it a 
requirement under general international law in relation to activities that pose a risk of 
environmental harm. Nevertheless, it recognized that the scope and content of an 
environmental impact assessment must be determined by each State.  
 
(iii) Finally, another relevant point was the Court’s refusal to be a ‘risk assessment body’. 
Argentina interpreted the 1975 Statute as establishing a framework for cooperation between 
the Parties in which the International Court of Justice would play the role of final decision-
maker should the Parties fail to reach agreement. The Court refused to assume this role, and 
while some of the Judges considered that the Court had missed an opportunity to approach an 
environmental dispute in a forward-looking and prospective manner, the Court did not engage 
in this capacity of, without clear indications from the Parties, allowing the environmental 
concerns of one Party to become a temporary veto to all development objectives and the use 
of a shared watercourse. 61  
 
Despite these interesting points, this judgment seems to reaffirm that, even ten years after the 
views expressed in the Hungary/Slovakia Case, the Court is still unwilling to present a more 
bold or normative argument for the implementation of sustainable development considering 
the procedural obligations it entails, such as the due balancing of development and 
environmental issues, and the need to exercise integrative instruments, such as impact 
assessment procedures. Nevertheless, the Court does not determine the substantive content of 
such norms; this must be done at the national level. Even though the interpretations of 
sustainable development in these cases were careful, and did not portray the principle as a 
mandatory rule, there was little hesitation in stating that this norm exerts a type of 
normativity, imposing obligations on the parties involved and guiding decision-making by 
raising considerations that would not otherwise have been raised.  
 
Sustainable development emerges from these instruments and decisions as a concept that 
encompasses two main normative assumptions: a horizontal/policy dimension that has 
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reoriented the relationship between development and the environment, prescribing that the 
development process should be carried out in a way that allows for economic development 
while also assuring environmental protection and social justice - placing the individual as the 
main subject of the development process through human rights; in addition, the inter-
generational/temporal dimension, represented by the ‘sustainability’ component, translated as 
the need to ensure the rights of future generations to meet their needs, just like the current 
one. These normative assumptions also have two major related normative goals: to promote 
equity and the eradication of poverty, and the integration of socio-environmental 
considerations into all governance levels. In this regard, despite the criticism and the 
uncertainty regarding its legal status, it is in this capacity for guidance that the significance of 
sustainable development can be fully perceived, both as an objective, in achieving balance 
between the competing spheres of the development process, and as a guiding principle 
encompassing a set of substantive and procedural tools recognized by and widely 
incorporated into IL.  
 
3. The way forward? An implementation challenge 
 
The global governance for sustainable development was reviewed in another major 
conference in 2012, also held in Rio de Janeiro, known as Rio+20. It marked not only the 20th 
anniversary of the UNCED in 1992, but also marked 40 years since the Stockholm 
Conference of 1972, the beginning of a series of international conferences. These 
international conferences have been fundamental to international law-making, and also to the 
creation, dissemination and mainstreaming of the concept of sustainable development within 
the international community, as analyzed above. Rio+20 represented the continuation of this 
process, aiming to take stock of what had been achieved and to draw the international 
community’s attention to the urgent need to review and reset the agenda towards sustainable 
development. At the same time, it also witnessed the diminishing ability of the international 
community to reach binding common targets, continuing the trend towards more soft, action-
plan oriented outcomes. 
 
The objective of the Conference was to secure renewed political commitment to sustainable 
development, to assess the progress and the remaining gaps in the implementation of the 
outcomes of the major summits on sustainable development, and to address new and 
emerging challenges, focusing particularly on two: to promote a move towards a ‘green 
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economy in the context of sustainable development’, and the ‘institutional framework for 
sustainable development’.62 The road to Rio+20 was marked by skepticism and disagreement. 
In relation to the agenda, despite the widespread criticism after the conclusion of the 
Conference, the preparatory works had anticipated only a modest outcome in terms of binding 
commitments, so in this regard it was not surprising. Further, the two focal points of the 
Conference reflected this disagreement: (1) a transition to a green economy in the context of 
sustainable development; and (2) the institutional framework for sustainable development. 
Rather than creating common ground for agreement, these themes are themselves 
controversial. 
 
The ‘green economy’ is a concept which was launched by UNEP in 2008 as an economic 
model to improve human well-being and social equity, while significantly reducing 
environmental risks and ecological scarcities: “In its simplest expression, a green economy is 
low carbon, resource efficient, and socially inclusive. In a green economy, growth in income 
and employment should be driven by public and private investments that reduce carbon 
emissions and pollution, enhance energy and resource efficiency, and prevent the loss of 
biodiversity and ecosystem services. (…) The key aim for a transition to a green economy is to 
eliminate the trade-offs between economic growth and investment and gains in environmental 
quality and social inclusiveness. The main hypothesis (…) is that the environmental and 
social goals of a green economy can also generate increases in income, growth, and 
enhanced well-being. (…) The concept of a green economy does not replace sustainable 
development; but there is a growing recognition that achieving sustainability rests almost 
entirely on getting the economy right. (…) Investments in renewable energy, for example, will 
have to pay special attention to the issue of access to clean and affordable energy. Payments 
for ecosystem services, such as carbon sequestration in forests, will need to focus more on 
poor forest communities as the primary beneficiaries. The promotion of organic agriculture 
can open up opportunities, particularly for poor small-scale farmers who typically make up 
the majority of the agricultural labor force in most low-income countries, but will need to be 
complemented by policies to ensure that extension and other support services are in place. 
(…) A green economy must not only be consistent with that objective (the MDG poverty 
eradication), but must also ensure that policies and investments geared towards reducing 
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environmental risks and scarcities are compatible with ameliorating global poverty and 
social inequity”.63   
 
The green economy agenda implies a departure from many accepted practices in key sectors 
of the economy, recognizing that ‘business as usual’ economic practices cannot respond to 
global challenges such as climate change, loss of biodiversity and the remaining inequality 
around the world. The UNEP report thus proposes a new kind of economic development for 
both developed and developing countries, which involves greening eleven key sectors of the 
economy: agriculture, fisheries, water, forests, energy, manufacturing, waste, buildings & 
construction, transportation, tourism, and cities. It also proposes innovative solutions to 
complex challenges that are fundamentally linked to the manner in which economic 
development is framed and guided by policymakers. The basic premise is that economic 
development that is coupled with improved human well-being and environmental protection 
will result stable economic growth. Numerous actors have important roles in this process of 
change, especially businesses and the private sector. Governments and policy-makers can 
play a key role in ‘kick-starting’ financing for the green economy, as well as in creating and 
implementing laws and policies that will guide and support the transition to a green economy 
in each sector.64 This concept is thus both ambitious and promising in its aim to promote 
sustainable development through a new economic model by helping to build an economic 
system based on environmental sustainability while still providing livelihood opportunities. In 
this regard, it is seen as a better alternative for international cooperation, in comparison to  
development aid, as it aims to build an economic system that can work for the sustainable 
development of all nations. At the same time, it is highly controversial, given (i) that there is 
no clear definition of what it means, its scope being very broad; (ii) the unclear relationship 
with sustainable development, and the fear of a return of focus to the economic sphere; (iii) 
the fear that it might lead to ‘green protectionism’ and new conditionalities in ODA and 
investment patterns. In this regard, there is a division between UNEP and the developed 
countries -including the EU- and the developing countries -especially amongst the G77 
members- on how to deal with the GE concept.65  	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64 In this regard, see International Development Law Organization – IDLO and Centre for International 
Sustainable Development Law - CISDL, Green Economy for Sustainable Development: Compendium of Legal 
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65 K. Jakob et all, Green Economy Discourses in the Run Up to Rio 2012, Environmental Policy Research 
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Considering the institutional framework, several proposals have been discussed, such as: (i) 
how to strengthen the existing environmental treaties by promoting more precise goals and 
dynamic voting procedures, such as qualified majority; (ii) bridging the existing treaty 
frameworks mainly in order to enhance the environmental and social spheres in the economic 
governance frameworks such as the WTO and financial institutions; (iii) filling the regulatory 
gaps in international governance on key points such as green technologies, food, water and 
energy; (iv) upgrading the status of UN bodies such as UNEP and the UNCSD to the level of  
more specialized agencies like UNICEF or UNDP and strengthening their relevance and 
powers, particularly considering the participation of governmental ministries other than 
environmental in the deliberation processes of such bodies; (v) fostering new regulatory tools 
at the national level, based on best practices; (vi) strengthening cooperation, especially 
regarding adaptation to the already inevitable effects of climate change.66   
 
Other issues also raised concerns, such as the absence of a more ambitious mandate in terms 
of binding commitments; the momentum, given that Rio+20 took place in the context of the 
international financial crisis, in which the resources earmarked for social and environmental 
issues face challenges; and the timing of the Conference coinciding with the G20 Summit in 
Mexico,67 which many international leaders chose to attend instead of flying to Rio de 
Janeiro, and which stole some of the media attention during that period. These factors might 
indicate that, notwithstanding the international community’s alleged commitment towards 
promoting sustainable development as a holistic objective and greening the global economy, 
the ‘traditional’ economic and financial aspects of development still occupy the highest 
priority on the agenda.  
 
Despite the controversial issues noted above, Rio+20 was still the largest conference ever 
organized by the UN. Some 100 Heads of State and government, along with approximately 
50,000 representatives from non-governmental organizations, the private sector and civil 
society were present. The magnitude of these numbers is not only of statistical relevance, but 
is also a testament to the extent to which the main topic of the Conference, sustainable 
development, has become widespread within all social sectors on a global scale. In fact, the 
Rio+20 gathering was a three-layered process, representing different ways in which 
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governments and international organizations, the private sector and civil society participated 
in shaping the global agenda and providing ways forward:  
 
i) the UN Global Compact Corporate Sustainability Forum 
 
Launched in 2000, the United Nations Global Compact is both a policy platform and a 
framework for engaging companies in sustainability and responsible business practices. As a 
multi-stakeholder leadership initiative, it seeks to align business operations and strategies 
with ten principles in human rights, labor, environmental and anti-corruption issues. With 
8,700 corporate signatories in 135 countries, it is the world’s largest voluntary corporate 
responsibility initiative.68 In this regard, the Global Compact convened the ‘Rio+20 Corporate 
Sustainability Forum: Innovation and Collaboration for the Future We Want’, from 15-18 
June 2012, seeking to “bring greater scale and quality to corporate sustainability practices, as 
a critical contribution to sustainable development” and also “as a showcase for innovation and 
collaboration (…) designed to be a launching ground for widespread action”. The Forum had 
around 2,500 participants and featured over 100 sessions focusing on six themes: energy and 
climate; water and ecosystems; agriculture and food; social development; urbanization and 
cities; and economics and finance.  
 
The Forum Outcome document, presented to the UN Secretary-General, outlined leading 
corporate practices in the mentioned areas, as well as an appendix of approximately 200 
commitments to action announced by corporate leaders, representing both individual and 
collective action in social, economic and environmental areas. Further, innovative policy 
initiatives were developed including, for example: the endorsement by 200 CEOs of Brazilian 
companies of ‘Business Contributions to the Promotion of a Green And Inclusive Economy’, 
which laid out 10 commitments to be made by the end of 2012; the launch of a new corporate 
policy framework to assist companies in the development, implementation and disclosure of 
policies and practices related to ecosystems and biodiversity; the launch of a ‘Social 
Enterprise Investment Framework’, designed for large corporations, institutional investors 
and governments interested in incubating and scaling up for-profit start-ups and small 
enterprises with social and environmental missions; the announcement by 16 companies and 
other stakeholders in the food and agriculture sectors that they will lead the development of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 See: http://www.unglobalcompact.org. 	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global voluntary business principles on good practice and policy for sustainable agriculture; 
the endorsement of over 70 businesses, governments and international organizations with 
regard to the ‘Green Industry Platform’, an initiative to mainstream environmental and social 
considerations into corporate operations through efficient use of energy and raw materials, 
innovative practices and applications of new green technologies; the introduction of a global 
Water Action Hub, the world’s first online platform uniting companies, governments, civil 
society organizations and other stakeholders on water management projects; a commitment by 
five stock exchanges – NASDAQ OMX, BM & FBOVESPA (Sao Paulo, Brazil), the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange, the Istanbul Stock Exchange and The Egyptian Exchange – 
representing over 4,600 companies, to promote sustainable investment – a first step towards 
broader sustainability disclosure and performance by listed companies; and a Declaration for 
Higher Education Institutions, endorsed by over 260 major business schools and universities 
around the world, committing to incorporate sustainability issues into teaching, research, and 
their own management and organizational activities.69 These announcements represent the 
growing recognition of the role that the private sector – including finance – can play in 
building a green economy and being active and supportive of governments in the pursuit of 
sustainable development. 
 
ii) The ‘People’s Summit of Rio+20 for Social and Environmental Justice’ 
 
The ‘People’s Summit of Rio+20 for Social and Environmental Justice’70 was a major 
gathering of civil society groups that happened in parallel to the main UNCSD events. It was 
attended by around 20,000 people from around the world, organized into five major plenaries: 
1 – Rights, Social and Environmental Justice; 2 – In defense of common goods and against 
commodification; 3 – Food sovereignty; 4 – Energy and Extractive; and 5 – Work: For 
Another Economy and New Paradigms for Society. As its outcome, the Summit produced a 
Final Declaration, which argued in favor of the “defense of the commons, against the 
commodification of life”. 71  While some of the arguments put forward in the plenary 
discussions and even in the final document might seem somewhat vague or utopian, the major 
positive outcome of the Summit has been the fact that it represents the extent to which the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Overview and Outcomes of the Corporate Sustainability Forum, available at: 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/upcoming/RioCSF/RioCorpSustForum_Outcome_21June12
.pdf. 	  
70 The official website of the People’s Summit is: http://cupuladospovos.org.br/en. 	  
71 Available at: http://cupuladospovos.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/FinalDeclaration-ENG.pdf. 	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discussion of sustainable development, and the need for whole societal change that it implies, 
has also become disseminated within civil society and above all within youth groups, who are 
ultimately those that will have to deal with these issues in the future. 
 
iii) The UNCSD 
 
The UNCSD itself was also an event of significant proportions, involving several layers of 
activities. At its core was the gathering of Heads of State and country delegations which 
aimed to provide decisions on the main topics of discussion; these plenary sessions were 
circumvented by a myriad of activities taking place outside the negotiation rooms, involving 
‘side events’ organized by States, International Organizations, NGOs, and Media/activists, 
that illustrate the widespread and massive interest and momentum that Rio+20 had 
generated.72 The focus of the analysis here, though, will be the outcome document, as an 
instrument of soft law and decision-making.  
 
The Outcome Document of Rio+20, named ‘The Future We Want’, was adopted by 
unanimity even before the end of the Conference, and was later endorsed by the General 
Assembly.73 It consists of a 53-page text divided into six main sections: 1 – Our Common 
vision: a statement of principles and values by UN Members; 2 – Renewing Political 
Commitment: statements that take stock and reaffirm the processes that led towards Rio+20; 3 
– Green Economy in the context of sustainable development: this was the first of the two 
themes of Rio+20 and the common vision and means of implementation of this objective are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 More than 500 on-site side events organized by Governments, Major Groups, Organizations from the UN 
system and other International Organizations took place during the Prepcom period, (13-15 June), the 
Sustainable Development Dialogue Days (16-19 June) and the Summit (20-22 June). Among these, of special 
mention are the Sustainable Development Dialogues, organized by the Government of Brazil in collaboration 
with the UN, which were an innovative mechanism of promoting civil society inputs to the conference, 
something new in the history of UN Conferences. The Dialogues created a participatory process for 
representatives of civil society that aimed to bring a number of Recommendations to the Heads of State and 
governments, to be presented at the Round Tables during the High Level segment of the Conference. They 
gathered 100 panelists in 10 panels focused on key themes on the international agenda for sustainable 
development: (1) unemployment, decent work and migrations; (2) sustainable development as an answer to the 
economic and financial crises; (3) sustainable development for fighting poverty; (4) the economics of sustainable 
development; (5) forests; (6) food and nutrition security; (7) sustainable energy for all; (8) water; (9) sustainable 
cities and innovation; and (10) oceans. The debates had an average audience of over 1,300 people, representing 
the final point of a process of consultation that began in April and gathered thousands of participants in open 
discussions over the Internet. Over 63,000 people from 193 countries cast nearly 1.4 million votes, and a total of 
100 recommendations were discussed by the panelists, from which 30 were selected. See: 
http://www.uncsd2012.org/index.php?page=view&nr=596&type=13&menu=23. 	  
73 UN Document A/66/L.56, UNGA 66th Session, July 24th 2012. Available at: 
 http://www.uncsd2012.org/thefuturewewant.html. 	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discussed in this section; 4 – Institutional Framework for Sustainable Development: the 
second theme of Rio+20 is discussed in relation to the three dimensions of sustainable 
development; 5 – Framework for action and follow up: several cross-cutting key areas of 
action for sustainable development are discussed, namely poverty eradication, food security 
and nutrition and sustainable agriculture, water and sanitation, energy, sustainable tourism, 
sustainable transport, sustainable cities and human settlements, health and pollution, 
promotion of full employment, decent work for all and social protection, oceans and seas, 
Small Island Developing States (SIDS), Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Landlocked 
Developing Countries, Africa, regional efforts, disaster risk reduction, climate change, 
forests, biodiversity, desertification, land degradation and drought, mountains, chemicals and 
waste, sustainable consumption and production, mining, education, gender equality and 
women’s empowerment, and also the establishment of ‘Sustainable Development Goals’ by 
2015; 6 – Means of Implementation: presents areas for implementing the issues above 
through finance, technology transfer, capacity building, trade and voluntary commitments. 
 
‘The Future We Want’ is a typical ‘soft-law’ document, mainly containing action plans with 
vague commitments, which is evidenced by the language commonly used: there is wide use of 
action verbs such as (we) acknowledge, emphasize, invite, recognize, reaffirm, welcome and 
urge, and very few stronger statements such as ‘we determine’ or ‘we request’. While it 
reaffirms “the importance of freedom, peace and security, respect for all human rights, 
including the right to development and the right to an adequate standard of living, including 
the right to food, the rule of law, gender equality, the empowerment of women and the overall 
commitment to just and democratic societies for development” (para. 8), and values such as 
“democracy, good governance and the rule of law, at the national and international levels, as 
well as an enabling environment” are affirmed as essential for sustainable development (para. 
10), when dealing with specific issues, the language used is less assertive. Some of the main 
provisions of the Outcome Document are summarized below, starting with the decisions taken 
with respect to the two main focal points of the Conference: the green economy and the 
institutional framework for sustainable development.  
 
a) The green economy in the context of sustainable development  
 
The Outcome Document did little to clarify the contours of this concept, although it did try to 
address the two main concerns of most stakeholders: the conceptual ambiguity related to 
Chapter	  1	  
	   53	  
sustainable development, especially regarding how it is to be a tool and not a replacement of 
one; and also the economic/commercial implications of the adoption of the green economy as 
a main policy goal, namely the fear of green protectionism and new green conditionalities. 
The language used is vague, affirming that “there are different approaches, visions, models 
and tools (…) to achieve sustainable development” and that “(…) we consider green economy 
in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication as one of the important 
tools available for achieving sustainable development and that it could provide options for 
policymaking but should not be a rigid set of rules.” Nevertheless, it expressly states that 
green economy policies should be consistent with international law, should effectively avoid 
unwarranted conditionalities and unilateral actions outside national jurisdiction and should 
not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or disguised restriction on 
international trade (paras. 56-58). Finally, in a more action-oriented fashion, it invites the UN, 
in cooperation with donors and international organizations, to coordinate and provide 
information upon request on, inter alia, “toolboxes and/or best practices in applying policies 
on green economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication at all 
levels”; “models or good examples of policies on green economy in the context of sustainable 
development and poverty eradication”; “Methodologies for evaluation of policies on green 
economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication” (para 66). This 
represents less than was expected by some stakeholders, such as the European Union, which 
had released a ‘Green Economy Roadmap’74 including timetables and indicators that are not 
reflected in the text. Despite these downsides, such as not providing a legal statement of the 
concept of the green economy, the Outcome Document supported a less imposing and more 
cooperative approach in implementing green economy policies, which are certainly 
fundamental in dealing with key issues such as the modification of production and 
consumption patterns and the transition to a more sustainable lifestyle, also requiring the 
participation of all relevant stakeholders from public, private and civil society sectors.  
 
b) Institutional Framework for Sustainable Development 
 
There were many issues on the table concerning what could be done to strengthen the 
international framework for promoting sustainable development, all of which have not been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Available at: http://www.uncsd2012.org/index.php?page=view&type=510&nr=240&menu=20. 	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tackled.75 Two decisions deserve to be highlighted though: the decision to create a High Level 
Forum to replace the Sustainable Development Commission (SDC), with the power to 
deliberate, coordinate and resolve, with the potential to provide more coherence in the global 
progression towards sustainable development. It is expected that the Forum will be convened 
for the first time at the 68th Session of the General Assembly, in 2014 (paras. 84-86). 
Moreover, an improvement process for the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) has 
been introduced in order for it to have universal membership, a regular United Nations budget 
and greater powers, such as those required for coordination of the environmental pillar and for 
managing operational aspects and schedules (para. 87). Furthermore, it was agreed to 
establish an intergovernmental process to create a sustainable development financing strategy 
based on innovative mechanisms (para. 255). Finally, it requested the UN to identify options 
for a facilitation mechanism that promotes the development, transfer and dissemination of 
clean and environmentally sound technologies (para. 273). This is a fundamental issue for 
which a multilateral solution has still not been found,76 despite its relevance in several spheres 
such as in the mitigation of climate change, in adaptation strategies for developing countries 
and in green economy policies, so the fact that the Secretary General was requested to make 
recommendations in this regard for the 68th Session of the General Assembly at least 
provides the process with a timeline.  
 
c) The decision to establish ‘Sustainable Development Goals’ (SDOs) 
 
Building on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), another relevant decision was the 
determination of a process leading to the definition of the SDOs, which had to start in 2012 
and would be presented to the Sixty-Eighth Session of the General Assembly in 2014 by 
means of a Resolution (paras. 245-251). The MDGs, despite their unbinding nature, have 
served as a framework for development efforts since their creation over a decade ago, setting 
global and national priorities at all levels that have led to progress in many countries, 
particularly towards the goals of eradicating poverty and improving access to primary 
education.77 Thus there were high expectations before the Summit in relation to the SDGs and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 See, in this regard, Policy Brief 3, Earth System Governance Project, available at: 
http://www.ieg.earthsystemgovernance.org/news/2011-09-27/policy-brief-institutional-framework-sustainable-
development. 	  
76 In this regard, see A. Latif, Intellectual Property Rights and Green Technologies from Rio to Rio: An 
Impossible Dialogue?, Policy Brief No. 14, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, 2012. 	  
77 For an updated report on the implementation of the MDGs, see 
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/mdg/mdg-reports/.  	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some of the proposals that were made, such as the original Zero Draft text, and later the 
proposals brought by Colombia (with Peru and the United Arab Emirates) and the European 
Union, which detailed a list of key priority areas. In this regard, it was disappointing that the 
Outcome Document did not propose thematic areas or principles that should underpin the 
development of the SDGs. However, the recently published report by the UN System Task 
Team to the UN Secretary-General on the ‘Post 2015 Development Agenda’ addresses this 
issue, recommending that both the goals and targets should be organized along key 
dimensions: economic, social, environmental and peace and security, and that this should be 
aligned with the Rio+20 outcomes.78 One should bear in mind that these are slow decision-
making processes, also remembering that some time was needed before the eight MDGs were 
agreed, so it remains to be seen how the matter will evolve over the next months. 
 
d) Voluntary Commitments 
 
Finally, another initiative worth mentioning was the establishment of a mechanism for the 
registry of voluntary commitments (recognized in para. 283). As part of the action-based and 
participatory orientation of the Conference, stakeholders were invited to make commitments 
focusing on delivering concrete results for sustainable development on a voluntary basis. All 
commitments had to be specific, measurable, funded, new (or an extension of an existing 
commitment) and needed to cover at least one of the areas of sustainable development 
established for this purpose, and will be monitored by the UN as regards their 
implementation. By the end of the Conference, over 700 voluntary commitments were 
announced by governments, UN system & IGOs, the private sector, civil society and NGOs, 
representing more than US$500 billion in action towards sustainable development.79 These 
voluntary commitments have been compiled into an online registry managed by the Rio+20 
Secretariat, aiming to initiate a new bottom-up approach towards the advancement of 
sustainable development. As mandated by the Conference outcome, this registry of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 United Nations System Task Team on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda Review of the contributions of 
the MDG agenda to foster development: lessons for the Post 2015 UN Development Agenda (New York, 2012), 
available from http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/beyond2015.shtml. For assessments of the uneven progress 
towards the MDGs, see The Millennium Development Goals Report 2011 (United Nations publication, Sales 
No. E.11.I.10), available from: http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/11_MDG%20Report_EN.pdf. 	  
79 Examples include: planting 100 million trees by 2017; greening 10,000 square km of desert; saving 1 
Megawatt-hour of electricity per day; empowering 5,000 women entrepreneurs in green economy businesses in 
Africa; establishing a Masters program on sustainable development practice; developing an Environmental 
Purchasing Policy and Waste Minimization & Management strategy; recycling 800,000 tons per year of PVC by 
2020, etc. 	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commitments will continue to welcome registrations and to deliver information as to the 
follow-up processes.80  
 
Rio+20 was thus not only an intergovernmental conference, but also an international 
gathering of unprecedented proportions focusing on the issue of sustainable development. The 
evaluation of these outcomes, however, has been uneven. Exemplifying the thinking of 
several leaders that participated in the Summit, Mr. Nassir Abdulaziz al-Nasser, UNGA 
President, declared that “[b]y adopting this resolution today, we are opening a new 
chapter. Rio+20 is not an end but a new beginning” and that “Rio in 1992 and Johannesburg 
in 2002 put sustainable development on the map, but Rio+20 has defined a new vision of 
development for the future, which will be equitable and inclusive and will take into account 
the limits of our planet.” 81 On the other hand, there has also been severe criticism, especially 
in the media, with some commentators arguing that the Summit could be called ‘Rio minus 
20’ instead.82 In fact, in response to the Outcome Document, more than a thousand interest 
groups signed a petition entitled The Future We Don’t Want.83 Nevertheless, such negative 
impressions could be indicative of a misguided focus, both regarding the scope of the 
Outcome Document, and also regarding the function of international gatherings of this kind.  
 
As discussed above, IL nowadays has a lot to do with setting common goals of the 
international community, even if through ‘soft law’ documents which, despite their non-
binding character, have set the agenda and path for action over the years. Despite the fact that 
the Outcome Document contains no major binding commitments, it – together with the 
substantive participation at the Summit – does renew a series of commitments for the sake of 
sustainable development. In this regard, it is important to consider that goals like sustainable 
development are not achieved by legal rules alone: without the existence of political will in 
the implementation of the goals that it represents there is no chance of securing any lasting 
reform. Thus legal commitments are not a substitute for a wholesale societal change.84 The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 For more information, see: http://www.uncsd2012.org/voluntarycommitments.html. 	  
81 See: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/ga11264.doc.htm.	  
82 Commentators such as Kumi Naidoo, Greenpeace International Executive Director, declared that Rio+20 “has 
turned into an epic failure. It has failed on equity, failed on ecology and failed on economy”, and Jim Leape, 
international director general of World Wildlife Fund, protested, “It’s pathetic. It’s appalling. If this becomes the 
final text the last year has been a colossal waste of time”; further, as many as 100,000 activists and students 
joined a protest in Rio after the release of the final document to express their discontent. See: 
http://reason.com/archives/2012/06/21/rio-20-earth-summit-greens-fail-to-get-t. 	  
83 An online petition is open for signature, currently featuring more than 2.000 signatures in August 2012, see: 
http://www.ipetitions.com/petition/the-future-we-dont-want/. 	  
84 D. French, Global Justice and Sustainable Development, 2010.  	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quality – and numbers – of participation of youth, women and older people; the voluntary 
commitments; the concern about accountability and education; civil society taking the lead; 
the opportunities and challenges presented by the implementation of existing binding legal 
international documents, these elements make ‘The Future We Want’ a document which 
should be seen as a point of departure for future action. 
 
Furthermore, regarding the use of international conferences or the arguable failure of 
multilateralism as a system of international decision-making, represented by the lack of 
binding commitments at major events such as Rio+20 or the Conference of the Parties of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COPs), or even the stalemate in 
the conclusion of the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization, one should consider that 
these issues coexist with the emergence of a different framework for coordination within the 
international community, one in which ‘soft law’ forms of agreement and new actors such as 
regional and local organizations and the private sector are becoming increasingly relevant. 
This is illustrated by the numerous events that took place at the Rio+20 Conference. 
Ambitious and binding agreements on a global scale are nowadays very difficult to achieve, 
largely because of the increased complexity of the matters at stake and the emergence of 
several centers of power. This does not mean that multilateralism is no longer of use. On the 
contrary, conferences such as Rio+20 are now much more than just meetings of governments, 
but rather a multitude of parallel events, discussions and presentations by various segments of 
civil society, business sectors and subnational governments, like municipalities and states, 
and the actions and commitments made by these new actors are more ambitious for, as well as 
being fundamental to, the complex process of making development a more sustainable 
process.  
 
In this new context, as another commentator has argued, a new multilateralism is being 
presented as an ongoing process: multi-institutional multilateralism, in which the potential to 
provide coordination and the power of the media for mainstream issues in the global agenda 
are fundamental.85 The UNCSD might not have provided a unanimous solution to what future 
we want as a global society, but it provided a solid foundation on which international law can 
be built as an instrument to enable us to overcome our common challenges. The main 
challenge now is to implement all these provisions. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 LF do Amaral, A Era do Multilateralismo Multi-institucional, in Pontes 8:4 (2012), International Centre for 
Trade and Sustainable Development Geneva, available at: http://www.ictsd.org. 	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4. Concluding remarks 
 
Some conclusions can be drawn from the issues discussed in this chapter. The background to 
the analysis made here was formed by the changes occurring in the international scenario, 
which imposed modifications in the means of conduct of international relations, and also in 
international law, which regulates relations amongst the international community and the 
achievement of its common goals. Nowadays, in a context of globalization, interdependence 
and global challenges, several types of actor coexist with states in the international 
community, new ways of promoting global governance have emerged, and issues that were 
previously seen as pertaining to the national sphere of regulation have now become common 
goals at the international level. In this framework, the international community has taken the 
promotion of development as a common objective.  
 
The concept of development has evolved, being nowadays increasingly understood as a 
process of human development or of enhancing human capabilities and promoting 
opportunities, while promoting the balance between economic growth, environmental 
protection and social justice through substantive means, through legislation and policies, and 
procedural means, through access to justice and information, public participation and impact 
assessment. In this process, the individual is supposed to be at the center, both as the 
subject/holder of human rights and as an active participant through public participation and 
access to justice. While international organizations and other actors play an important role in 
the development of normative standards, the state is still seen as the main actor responsible 
for the implementation of development policies. In fact, the state is committed to a double 
role: to promote development polices and provide for the welfare of its population at the 
national level and, as part of the international community, to support a fair global system and 
provide assistance to the least developed countries in their efforts. In this regard, while much 
has been said about the loss of national sovereignty, some retain the view that it is still a 
fundamental cornerstone of international relations, but must now be viewed in an improved 
way, such as the idea of a responsible sovereignty, both to individuals and to the 
environment.86 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 See, in this regard, AM Slaughter, A new world order, in which she proposes that a more effective global 
governance could be achieved not by the strengthening of supranational or intergovernmental governance 
institutions, but rather by the improvement of an existing ‘network of government officials’, thus keeping the 
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The role of IL in this process is still ambiguous. As stated in the introduction, one of the 
major roles ascribed to IL nowadays is the promotion of the common goals of the 
international community, taking into account the fairness of global relations. Development 
was encompassed by law in this regard, in a first place, as an objective to provide rules that 
would respond to the needs of economic development and to the claims of a fairer 
international system (the traditional IDL). Furthermore, a more normative type of 
international law has gradually developed, aiming to promote human development, in the 
sense of promoting human rights and safeguarding the environmental sustainability that is 
fundamental to human life (modern IDL).  
 
In this framework, sustainable development has emerged as a concept that encompasses two 
main normative dimensions: a horizontal/policy dimension represented by the reorientation of 
the idea of development, prescribing that the development process should focus on the needs 
of human beings and the realization of human rights, rather than solely on the promotion of 
the economic development of the state; and an inter-generational/temporal dimension that 
determines the need to make this process sustainable, allowing for economic development 
while also assuring environmental protection and social justice and ensuring the rights of 
future generations to meet their needs for a decent life, just as the current one does. It works 
thus as a guiding principle that orients the balancing of these - still competing - objectives.  
 
The status of sustainable development as a customary norm of IL in its own right is still 
disputed, however, as there is no binding definition of sustainable development and its 
‘founding instruments’ and plans of implementation are ‘soft law’. At the same time, it 
certainly exists as a principle with normative content exerting influence in IL, be it in the 
drafting of legal instruments at all levels of governance, or in the resolution of disputes. In 
this regard, an ‘international law of sustainable development’ is highlighted by several 
scholars as a system of substantive and procedural principles of international law that work at 
the intersection of the international economic, environmental and social regimes, working to 
promote this goal and this integration of objectives.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
state as the basis of international relations, for reasons of accountability, democratic legitimacy and 
implementation. In regard to a renewed idea of sovereignty, Inge Kaul proposes a concept of ‘responsible 
sovereignty’, I Kaul, Global Public Goods.	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This poses a challenge of implementation, above all regarding the policy and rule-making 
sphere – as distinct from the adjudication element of the functions performed by this 
principle, since most of the sub-principles forming ‘SD law’ are well shaped or are in the 
process of being shaped by legal debate. This challenge is in a way a paradox: on the one 
hand, as stated by Segger, “if globalization is to be harnessed and channeled toward 
sustainability, collective, binding principles and instruments are essential; IL is needed in 
order to govern the intersections between conflicting global priorities and norms in this area, 
to ensure a balanced outcome; The emerging law of sustainable development law (…) 
provides ways to address these critical challenges”.87 On the other hand, she states that 
sustainable development is “a social and political construct, not a scientific blueprint that can 
be applied in the same way in each set of circumstances”.88 Moreover, as stated by French,89 
goals such as sustainable development and global justice are “not achieved by legal rules 
alone: it is the existence of political will in the implementation of any understanding of justice 
that will be pivotal in securing any lasting reform. Thus, a legal framework may be a 
necessary element of justice, but not a substitute for a wholesale societal change, and, even 
though justice and sustainable development might lack normative precision, they are not 
devoid of a fundamental core, which states could use if they so wish.”90  
 
These observations, read together with the insights from the ICJ judgments quoted above, 
lead to the conclusion that the widespread claims that sustainable development has become an 
‘umbrella concept’ encompassing almost anything and has thus lost its relevance, are wrong. 
There is a clear idea of what sustainable development implies, the problem seems to rest in 
how to enforce and implement it, given that implementation is to be decentralized by the 
states. In this regard, there is no fixed ‘recipe’ as to how, for instance, environmental laws 
should be drafted, or how procedural guarantees of public participation and access to justice 
are to be safeguarded within the national legal framework. The question then is how to build 
blocs from the national systems towards the achievement of multilateral/international goals.  
 
From a legal perspective, there is no international regime set up to deal specifically with the 
promotion of development or to implement the goals of the sustainable development 
principle. The most important regime in this regard is the international economic regime, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Op cit, pg. 369.	  
88 Ibid, pg. 5. 	  
89 Op cit.	  
90 D French, op cit. 	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within it, the trade regime based on the WTO and its legal rules. This system is well grounded 
in binding agreements and enforced at the international level. On the other hand, these 
regimes are still relatively closed to the inclusion of objectives of other regimes, as is evident 
in discussions of environmental or human rights issues at the WTO. In addition, international 
regimes of environmental and social law – including human rights, labor law, etc. – have been 
created. These regimes are based on a less concrete framework in relation to the economic 
regime, as some of the sub-regimes are based on binding instruments, while others work on 
the basis of international standards developed by international organizations and implemented 
on a voluntary basis by states. Moreover, none of those regimes has a development rationale 
as such: the promotion of human rights serves the purpose of putting the individual at the 
center of the development process, while effective environmental legislation serves the 
purpose of assuring the protection of the environment, which is not per se -at least not at this 
point- a human right, but rather a collective right of all mankind. Furthermore, the procedural 
aspects aim to assure means of enabling society’s contribution to the process through access 
to judicial remedies and public participation, thus incorporating the reality that development 
is a process rather than a goal that can be achieved and maintained, and thus needs to be 
constantly updated and discussed by the members of society, at all levels of governance. 
Finally, an incipient regime of development cooperation can be observed, which nevertheless 
is based much less on binding obligations and targets than on national or regional foreign 
policy making.  
 
It is within the framework analyzed above that this thesis aims to discuss the role of the 
regional sphere in the promotion of development. Regional blocs are fundamentally 
agreements that aim to create trade liberalization schemes, to greater or lesser extents, and 
have a development rationale of promoting an increase in trade as a means of promoting 
economic development and welfare. Gradually, as these regional blocs have evolved, other 
issues have been included in the mandate, as will be discussed in the forthcoming chapters. In 
this regard, regional blocs are a part of the international economic regime, as the WTO 
regulation foresaw the formation of regional agreements which would form part of the 
multilateral. In addition, the regional sphere is also seen as a means of implementing the 
internationally agreed goals of sustainable development. Agenda 21, the JPOI and the Rio+20 
Outcome Document mention the regional level as an important part of their implementation 
plans, as a fundamental sphere of governance. Given the weak capacity of centralized 
standard-setting and feeble capacity of enforcement at the international level, regulation at a 
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regional level might work more easily to fill this gap, by building legal frameworks that 
encompass issues from the international agenda and transform them into binding goals in the 
regional sphere.  
 
The next Chapter analyzes sustainable development implementation through two international 
regimes, the development cooperation regime and the trade regime, as well as how regional 
integration agreements might provide an alternative governance level for the promotion of 
this objective. 
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Chapter2. Regional integration and development: the rationale and legal framework  
 
This chapter aims to analyze the relationship between regional integration and development, 
and the justification of regional integration agreements as relevant governance frameworks 
for the promotion of sustainable development, particularly relating to the implementation of 
its two most important principles: equity and poverty eradication; and integration of economic 
development, environmental protection and social justice.  
 
This analysis will start by examining the international governance framework for sustainable 
development, specifically the two most important international regimes for the promotion of 
this objective: the development cooperation system, as an expression of the principles of 
equity and solidarity; and the international trade system which, being the most important 
regime aimed at the promotion of development, is also the most important framework in 
which the integration of sustainable development should occur. The argument will be made 
that these regimes still face serious drawbacks relating to the implementation of sustainable 
development, and that regional integration can be an alternative means to fill this gap.  
Therefore, the rationale of establishing regional blocs is addressed, together with the role they 
might play as a sphere of governance, considering their role in establishing a legal framework 
that refers to, but goes beyond, the multilaterally agreed legal arrangements.  
 
1. Introduction: a global development regime?  
 
As discussed in the introductory part of Chapter 1, IL has evolved from a set of rules aiming 
to safeguard a peaceful existence for the nations of the world, to a more complex set of 
regimes that not only aim to promote those objectives, but also to regulate the promotion of 
the common objectives of the international community. In this context, one of the main 
challenges of IL is to promote more fairness within the international community, a goal that 
should intersect all others. At the same time, development has become an important goal to be 
jointly promoted by the international community and the promotion of this objective has been 
encompassed by IL in different ways. Further, a normative statement of what the development 
process should be(come) has been inscribed by IL in the principle of sustainable development, 
which has emerged as one of the most important and widely diffused ideas of our time and, 
while not attaining the status of a binding norm of IL, has been recognized as legally 
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significant and as a principle aimed, at its core, precisely towards IL’s main challenge: the 
promotion of fairness, both intra and intergenerational.    
 
Despite the fact that IL has encompassed the promotion of development as an objective of the 
international community, and that sustainable development has emerged as a normative 
principle providing objectives and tools to achieve this end, no international regime has been 
set up specifically to pursue this goal. There are other regimes that focus on the promotion of 
issues related to what development is understood to mean, such as international economic 
relations including trade and finance, an international human rights regime and an 
international environmental regime, each with their own rationale and specific sub-regimes; in 
addition, a sort of regime could be observed for the promotion of development cooperation. 
Further, while considered a principle having normative influence in international law, 
sustainable development as it now stands represents no binding or specific obligations.  
 
Considering this lack of an institutionalized (sustainable) development regime, the rule-
setting, implementation and enforcement of development objectives and norms are 
decentralized, between the multilateral institutions and governance frameworks that produce 
those norms, and the national state, as the actor ultimately responsible for implementation 
using its own system of governance. This poses several problems: on the one hand, the 
number of international organizations and other actors which are involved with development 
initiatives or have an impact on development is considerable. These organizations perform the 
task of setting international standards and normative visions of what development should be, 
but this system lacks coherence, enforcement and predictability. At the same time, leaving the 
implementation to states creates a paradox: developing countries, which are the main 
beneficiaries of development policies but are also responsible for their implementation 
locally, often have limited resources and lack the capacity to undertake the development 
measures envisioned; this decentralized implementation leaves room for incoherence and 
inobservance of these commitments. Moreover, many of IDL’s desired effects as an 
international development regime gravitate towards the ideas of improving ‘development 
status’ or granting special treatment to developing countries, but the definition of this 
category of countries is not very clear.  
 
In this regard, three main types of international regime related to the promotion of 
development will be highlighted in this chapter, identifying the role of the main international 
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actors involved in the development agenda, the type of influence and regulation they provide 
and the type of development model that is emphasized in these regimes: (i) the incipient 
regime of international development cooperation, led by the UN, the World Bank and the 
OECD. This regime is based on the international framework established to enable developed 
countries to provide assistance to developing countries – especially the least developed 
(although ‘South-South cooperation’ has recently increased, changing this scenario); (ii) the 
international economic regime, particularly the international trade regime, which provides an 
institutionalized framework for the promotion of economic growth -and its growing 
relationship with broader definitions of development; and finally, (iii) the role of regional 
integration agreements, both as sub-sections of the trade regime, and in their role of gradually 
encompassing issues related to the promotion of broader (sustainable) development goals  
 
2. The International Development Cooperation System 
 
The provision of what is understood as development cooperation, be it in the form of 
technical or financial aid, is a widely diffused custom within the international community. 
The USA was among the first nations to offer development aid in the period after WWII, but 
nowadays there are several donors that operate either in a bilateral or multilateral framework. 
More recently, however, a type of regime organizing the provision of aid internationally has 
been set up. This system is based on some norms which define who is to give assistance and 
who is entitled to benefit, as well as the quantity and quality of the aid. Further, the rationale 
of this regime seems to be concerned with the improvement of the development status of 
developing countries, especially those least developed among them. Despite these elements, 
these norms are mostly soft-law commitments and great flexibility can be observed. There 
follows an analysis of the main actors involved and the progress achieved so far in this 
regime.  
 
2.1 The United Nations 
 
The UN is the foremost international organization of our time and the main multilateral 
engine for creating international rules. According to Art. 1 of the UN Charter, the purposes of 
the organization are: 1. to maintain international peace and security; 2. to develop friendly 
relations among nations based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal 
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peace; 3. to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an 
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging 
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, 
sex, language, or religion; and 4. to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the 
attainment of these common ends. In addition, Art. 55 states the objectives of international 
economic and social cooperation that should be promoted by the UN: a) higher standards of 
living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development; b) 
solutions to international economic, social, health, and related problems, and international 
cultural and educational cooperation; and c) universal respect for, and observance of, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion.  
 
As can be inferred, the UN is first and foremost a peace and security organization, which 
nevertheless has created a system that promotes development. Based on the decentralized 
approach put forward by Art. 56, separate organizations were set up to deal with the different 
issues listed, such as health, education and culture, agriculture, finance, etc. But institutional 
decentralization did not facilitate the adoption of a common approach to the development 
issue. On the contrary, the lack of coordination on development within the whole UN system 
became a major concern and, partially in response, the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) was created to coordinate efforts at the level of recipient countries.1 Based on this 
framework, the UN plays two important roles: norm and standard setting in the different 
regimes of international law, having been a central organizer of the ‘human development’ 
concept expressed in the right to development, as well as in the formulation of the concepts 
and rules of sustainable development; and in the creation of the human rights and 
environmental law regimes. In this field, the UN plays a role in standard setting through 
concepts, guidelines, recommendations, agreements etc.; furthermore, in monitoring the 
implementation of these standards, which is in most cases delegated to member states; and in 
the conceptualization of developing countries.  
 
i) The UN and rule making 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 K de Feyter, ‘World Development Law – Sharing Responsibility for Development’, Intersentia, 2001 p. 80-
102. 	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Formal consideration of IL rules within the UN falls primarily to the General Assembly 
(UNGA) which, while not possessing explicit authority to create or enforce legal norms 
without the consent of member states, contributes to prescriptive IL by the adoption of 
resolutions concerning issues under the UN Charter. Within the UNGA, two main bodies are 
used to promote development and codification, the 6th Committee and the International Law 
Association (ILA). The 6th Committee is entrusted with legal issues of concern to the UNGA, 
and can make reports on these topics, draft international conventions, etc. The ILA is 
composed of a wide group of international jurists and is entrusted with the codification of IL, 
functioning as a study and composition group to discuss, design and draft IL that is then 
submitted for debate in the UNGA and presented to the international community for 
consideration, often as multilateral agreements.2  
 
UNGA Resolutions, while non-binding, have greatly influenced IL in different ways: they 
have frequently served as bases for subsequent treaties signed under UN auspices, largely due 
to their bold and assertive quality; they have contributed to clearly defining certain general 
principles of IL for state practice; they have been used by developing countries as vehicles to 
introduce new concepts to the international community, with the aim of eventually attaining 
the status of general principles of IL; they can function as instruments to distill and crystallize 
the international community’s consensus regarding a customary norm into a tangible form. 
State practice then becomes the main factor determining whether the content gives rise to new 
norms or remains merely a recommendation for action.3 In addition to providing rules of IL 
through the UNGA, other branches of the UN play a role in developing norms, such as UNEP 
and ILO, while others still are involved in monitoring, reporting, and proposing new means of 
action, such as the UNCSD.  
 
ii) Defining a ‘developing country’ 
 
The UN plays a relevant role in defining the concept of ‘developing countries’. Even though 
there is no general consensus about this concept and no binding definition, the UN definition 
is most widely used. Being that the UN has been the most prominent actor promoting 
development as an objective of the international community, it seems natural that it is also  
charged with evaluating how its members relate to the concept of development that has been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See www.hq-ila.org. 	  
3 C. Joyner, International law in the 21st century: rules for global governance, Kluwer Law, 2005, p.86-95.	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established. Various UN bodies are involved in the development process,4 but the Committee 
for Development Policy is in charge of issuing the standards of development. This is a 
subsidiary body of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) which draws up a list of 
‘least developed countries’ (LDCs) to be reviewed every three years. The criteria used for this 
definition is comprehensive, using a combination of indicators and attempting to assess the 
various aspects of development, while also opening up the possibility for countries to upgrade 
from the categories, according to their performance in the period observed.  
 
The initial criteria for designating a country as ‘least developed’ was established in 1971, and 
required a low per capita gross domestic product (GDP) and structural impediments to 
growth. The presence of these impediments was indicated by manufacturing having a small 
share of total GDP (at the time under the assumption that a high level of industrialization was 
a structural characteristic of developed or ‘advanced’ countries), as well as by a low literacy 
rate (indicating the extent of development of the country’s human capital). A number of 
improvements to these criteria have been made since then. In its latest triennial review of the 
list of Least Developed Countries in 2006, the CPD used three criteria for identification: a 
low-income criterion, based on a three-year average estimate of the gross national income 
(GNI) per capita (under US$745 for inclusion, above $900 for graduation); a human capital 
status criterion, involving a composite Human Assets Index (HAI) based on indicators of: (a) 
nutrition: percentage of population undernourished; (b) health: mortality rate for children 
aged five years or under; (c) education: the gross secondary school enrolment ratio; and (d) 
adult literacy rate; as well as an economic vulnerability criterion, involving a composite 
Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI) based on indicators of: (a) population size; (b) 
remoteness; (c) merchandise export concentration; (d) share of agriculture, forestry and 
fisheries in gross domestic product; (e) homelessness owing to natural disasters; (f) instability 
of agricultural production; and (g) instability of exports of goods and services. To be added to 
the list, a country must satisfy all three criteria. In addition, since the fundamental meaning of 
the LDC category, i.e. the recognition of structural handicaps, excludes large economies, the 
population must not exceed 75 million. To become eligible for graduation, a country must 
reach threshold levels for graduation for at least two of the aforementioned three criteria, or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 In 1997, the UN established the ‘UN Development Group’, which unites the 32 UN funds, programs, agencies, 
departments, and offices that play a role in development, and whose “objective is to deliver more coherent, 
effective and efficient support to countries seeking to attain internationally agreed development goals, including 
the Millennium Development Goals”. See http://www.undg.org/. 	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its GNI per capita must exceed at least twice the threshold level, and the likelihood that the 
level of GNI per capita is sustainable must be deemed high.5 
 
Moreover, since 1990 the UNDP has been publishing an annual report which has established 
a system of classification for developed and developing countries and focuses on ‘human 
development’ -the Human Development Report (HDR)- with an assessment of four composite 
indices for human development— the Human Development Index, the Gender-related 
Development Index, the Gender Empowerment Measure, and the Human Poverty Index, and 
provides data for analysis and policy recommendations. This initiative attempts to measure all 
aspects of development that the UN has stated in its documents, such as the MDGs.6 
 
iii) Building consensus  
 
Despite being present in the customs of countries and international organizations, 
development cooperation has been included in international law in instruments that were 
elaborated under the UN in order to coordinate and qualify the process. Among these, the first 
achievement was reached in 1970 when the UN General Assembly adopted a Resolution7 
including the goal that “[e]ach economically advanced country will progressively increase its 
official development assistance to the developing countries and will exert its best efforts to 
reach a minimum net amount of 0.7% of its gross national product at market prices by the 
middle of the Decade.” This Resolution overcame an impasse that had lasted a decade within 
UNCTAD, the OECD and the World Bank to establish an internationally agreed threshold for 
development assistance, and the definition was tightened in 1972 by the addition of a 
minimum level of grant element that loans would have to meet to qualify as ODA.8 
 
Later on, the 1990 UNGA Declaration on International Economic Cooperation9 proclaimed a 
“strong commitment to a global consensus to promote urgently international economic co-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Information retrieved from the website of the CDP: http://www.un.org/esa/policy/devplan. Particularly in 
relation to the ‘least developed countries’ (LCDs), special support measures have been taken both from the aid 
donor community, including bilateral donors and multilateral organizations, as well as from the special treatment 
accorded to them by certain multilateral and regional trade agreements. See, in this regard, CDP’s Handbook on 
the Least Developed Country Category, available at: 
http://www.un.org/esa/policy/devplan/cdppublications/publications.htm	  
6 Information retrieved from the website of the UNDP: http://hdr.undp.org/en. 	  
7 UNGA Resolution 2626 (XXV), 24 October 1970, paragraph 43.	  
8 OECD, History of the 0.7% ODA Target, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/16/38/45539274.pdf. 	  
9 UNGA Declaration A/RES/S-18/3, May 1st 1990. 	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operation for sustained growth of the world economy and, in particular, to the revitalization 
of economic growth and development of the developing countries so as to realize the basic 
right of all human beings to a life free from hunger, poverty, ignorance, disease and fear”, 
affirming that “the international community has a responsibility to give strong support to the 
efforts of the developing countries to solve their grave economic and social problems through 
the creation of a favourable international economic environment”. The Declaration was 
important to the extent that it stated standard principles, such as a more open international 
trading system; stable commodity prices; reduction of debt and increased development aid; 
and added new emphasis on developmental thinking, mentioning human rights, good 
governance issues, and the creation of a sound national and international environmental 
policy, but it didn’t lead to any binding commitments. 
 
The Millennium Declaration reaffirmed the support for an international framework for 
development cooperation in Goal 8 and its proclaimed global partnership for development, 
reaffirming the goals of having 0.7% of the total number of OECD countries receiving ODA 
and 0.15% classified as LDCs, but also establishing a determination of: a proportion of ODA 
to basic social services (basic education, primary health care, nutrition, safe water and 
sanitation); a proportion of ODA that is unallocated; a proportion of ODA for the 
environment in small, developing island states; and a proportion of ODA for the transport 
sector in landlocked countries. Subsequent international documents were based on this 
framework, chiefly the 2002 Monterrey Conference on financing for development and the 
2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which enshrined five principles to maximize 
efforts: ownership, alignment, harmonization, results and mutual accountability. This 
framework has since been guiding the international system of development cooperation. 
 
2.2 The international economic institutions 
 
The ‘Bretton Woods’ institutions and the OECD play key roles in standard setting, 
implementation and aid delivery for development. A brief examination of the role played by 
each of them is conducted below.  
 
i) The ‘Bretton Woods Institutions’ 
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The two major financial institutions, called the Bretton Woods institutions after the US city 
where the agreement establishing them was signed in 1944, are the IMF and the World Bank 
group. Although they became specialized agencies of the UN after an agreement signed in 
1947, their functioning differs from other UN agencies, both in the independence of their 
activities from the central UN bodies and in their membership regulation, which is based on 
quotas or respective contribution rather than on equal membership.  
 
a) The World Bank Group is the biggest lending institution worldwide, but in its own words, 
is “not a bank in the ordinary sense but a unique partnership to reduce poverty and support 
development”. It is composed of four main bodies: the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD), which counts 185 member countries -nearly all of the countries in 
the world; The International Development Association (IDA)10 which has 168 members; the 
International Finance Corporation, which has 181 members; the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency, with 173 members; and the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes, which has 143 members.  
 
The WB uses classification as a means of deciding its loan policy,11 and this is done 
according to four income groups, established on a yearly basis: low income countries with 
GNI per capita of US$975 or less; lower middle income countries with GNI per capita of 
between US$976 and US$3,855; upper middle income countries with GNI per capita of 
between US$3,856 and US$11,905; and high income countries with GNI per capita above 
US$11,906. The Bank decides its lending policy according to this classification. The IBRD 
aims to reduce poverty in middle-income and creditworthy poorer countries, while the IDA 
focuses exclusively on low income countries, and while IDA loans are concessional, interest-
free loans and grants for programs aiming to boost economic growth and improve living 
conditions, IBRD loans are non-concessional.  In providing financial assistance, the Bank 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 IDA is the body of the WB that works with the needs of poor countries. It complements the World Bank's 
other lending arm — the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) - which serves middle-
income countries with capital investment and advisory services. The IDA is responsible for providing long-term, 
interest-free loans to the world's poorest countries, and its loans address primary education, basic health services, 
clean water supply and sanitation, environmental safeguards, business-climate improvements, infrastructure and 
institutional reforms. These projects are intended to pave the way towards economic growth, job creation, higher 
incomes and better living conditions.	  
11 IDA Articles of Agreement, art. V, section 1. Use of Resources and Conditions of Financing: (a) The 
Association shall provide financing to further development in the less-developed areas of the world included 
within the Association's membership, available at www.worldbank.org/ida/.	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”focuses on achievement of the Millennium Development Goals that call for the elimination 
of poverty and sustained development”. 
 
b) The International Monetary Fund’s mandate differs from that of the WB in the sense that 
its efforts are not concentrated in the ‘developing world’. Nevertheless, it is the main 
international agency overlooking financial and monetary issues and, in this regard, is also 
involved with international efforts to achieve the MDGs, contributing “to this effort (MDGs) 
through its advice, technical assistance, and lending to countries, as well as its role in 
mobilizing donor support. Together with the World Bank, it assesses progress toward the 
MDGs through an annual Global Monitoring Report” 12. 
 
ii) The OECD 
 
The main operation of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) in relation to development issues is the work of the ‘Development Assistance 
Committee’ (DAC) which, since 1969, has been the OECD’s forum for major development 
aid donors that “work together to increase the effectiveness of their common efforts to support 
sustainable development”.13 According to the DAC website, the DAC List of ODA 
Recipients shows all countries and territories eligible to receive aid from its members.  These 
consist of all low and middle-income countries, except G8 members, EU members and 
countries with a set date for entry into the European Union. Membership of the OECD does 
not affect eligibility to receive ODA, as several OECD members have been on the DAC list 
for many years and continue to receive ODA, but no DAC members are on the list. The DAC 
revises the list every three years and countries that have exceeded the high-income threshold 
for three consecutive years at the time of the review are removed. The list presents countries 
and territories in groups: LDCs, as defined by the United Nations; and all other ODA 
recipients, according to their Gross National Income (GNI) per capita as reported by the 
World Bank. The DAC ODA list is designed for statistical purposes, helping to measure and 
classify aid and other resource flows originating in DAC countries.  According to the OECD, 
this list is not designed as a guide to eligibility for aid or other preferential treatment, but most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 See, in this regard, D. Driscoll ‘The IMF and the World Bank: how do they differ?’ available at: 
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/differ/differ.htm. 	  
13 OECD website, www.oecd.org; for the DAC list, www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclist.  	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of its Member States nevertheless use the list as the basis for their development cooperation 
policies.14  
 
In the early 1990s the DAC began to consider the coherence of development policies, and 
since then progress has been made in analyzing policy coherence for development, with 
several reports having identified the constraints on coherence, yet a framework within which 
to evaluate progress and fine-tune the methodology for assessing policy convergence remains 
to be completed. The OECD regularly evaluates the aid from DAC members through a peer 
review process (using experts from other countries), based on country reports made every four 
years. Since the early 1990s these reviews have taken policy coherence into account and, 
using examples of ‘good practices’, have presented recommendations to members for 
optimizing coherence. Progress has been examined with regard to three stages in improving 
policy coherence for development: (i) set objectives, make political commitments to improve 
the coherence of foreign policy towards developing countries and define strategic 
orientations. Most DAC countries have already moved beyond this stage. The EU, the 
Netherlands and Sweden have placed policy coherence at the center of a global approach to 
development; (ii) develop the mechanisms for coordinating policies and establishing a 
dialogue between ministries with a view to increasing synergy and reducing incoherence. The 
progress made by DAC countries in this field varies. Quite a diverse range of mechanisms 
have been set up, ranging from simple, informal coordination to systematic analysis of the 
implications of bills of law on development; (iii) control, analyze and inform the public and 
elected officials.15  
 
Despite the fact that development cooperation has made some progress in reducing poverty, 
improving literacy rates and battling certain diseases, several difficulties still mark the system. 
The MDGs are still out of reach, the amount of ODA still falls short of the objectives set by 
the UN and furthermore, much of what is counted as ODA does not go towards poverty 
reduction. Increasing the effectiveness of aid requires a genuine political commitment from 
the parties involved in development so as to transform the rationale behind North-South 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 For example, the EU; see EU Consensus 2005 in Chapter 4.	  
15 G. Perroulaz et all, ‘Trends and issues in international development cooperation’, Revue internationale de 
politique de développement 1/2010, http://poldev.revues.org/142. 	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relations, and increasing the coherence of donor countries’ policies is still a condition for 
reaching development goals.16 
 
2.3 South- South Cooperation 
 
One distinctive characteristic of the development cooperation system is that, since the 1990s, 
a group of emerging developing countries, which for a long time had been targets of 
development cooperation, have also started to become donors. According to the UN, 
“developing countries have the primary responsibility for promoting and implementing South-
South cooperation, not as a substitute for but rather as a complement to North-South 
cooperation, and in this context reiterating the need for the international community to 
support the efforts of the developing countries to expand South-South cooperation”. In 1974, 
the UNGA17 endorsed the establishment of a special unit within UNDP to promote technical 
cooperation among developing countries. With the endorsement of the Buenos Aires Plan of 
Action (BAPA) for Promoting and Implementing Technical Cooperation among Developing 
Countries by the General Assembly in 1978, the Special Unit was strengthened in order to 
fulfill its primary mandate: to promote, coordinate and support South-South and triangular 
cooperation globally and within the United Nations system.18  
 
Later, by Resolution 58/220 of 23 December 2003, the General Assembly decided to declare 
19 December as United Nations Day for South-South Cooperation, and endorsed the BAPA. 
The Assembly also urged all relevant United Nations organizations and multilateral 
institutions to intensify their efforts to effectively mainstream the use of South-South 
cooperation in the design, formulation and implementation of their regular programs and to 
consider increasing their allocations of human, technical and financial resources supporting 
South-South cooperation initiatives. 
 
One example of multilateral effort in this regard is the fund called the Facility for Poverty and 
Hunger Alleviation, established by India, Brazil and South Africa (the so called IBSA 
countries) as a group of major developing countries, which “facilitates the execution of human 
development projects to advance the fight against poverty and hunger in developing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Ibid. 	  
17 Resolution 3251 (XXIX), 1974.	  
18 UN Special Unit for South-South Cooperation: http://ssc.undp.org/content/ssc/about/Background.html. 	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countries” and has as its main objectives to “alleviate poverty and hunger in nations of the 
South; to develop best practices in the fight against poverty and hunger by facilitating the 
execution of replicable and scalable projects in interested countries of the global south; to 
pioneer and lead by example the South-South cooperation agenda; to build new partnerships 
for development.” It operates “through a demand driven approach. Governments requesting 
support by this fund initiate discussions with focal points appointed among IBSA countries’ 
officers around the world. These focal points submit proposals to the IBSA board of directors 
for review. If a proposal receives favorable review, UNDP’s Special Unit for South-South 
Cooperation, which acts as the fund manager and board of directors’ secretariat, initiates 
contact with a potential executing agency to advance a project formulation, and to facilitate 
the project’s implementation. IBSA projects are executed through partnerships with UNDP, 
national institutions or local governments. Important concerns of IBSA partners in the design 
of their projects include capacity building among projects’ beneficiaries, build-in project 
sustainability and knowledge sharing among Southern experts and institutions.”19  
 
2.4 Remarks 
 
It is apparent that a regime has been set up in order to regulate the provision of international 
development cooperation. This regime works through a set of norms, some more concrete 
than others:  
 
i) a definition of goals: broadly speaking, development cooperation is to aid countries which 
are less developed in order to overcome their handicaps. While the international community 
has made a commitment at the UN to pursue the MDGs through an enhanced ODA system, 
the countries that are to benefit from this system are defined on soft terms: the UN defines 
what constitutes a LDC; the WB has additional development classification; these parameters 
are used as guidelines for the majority of donors united at the OECD forum, which is 
nevertheless a non-binding standard, as development cooperation is one of the issues that 
most countries consider as an important matter of sovereignty and is strongly influenced by 
political factors, despite the rhetorical commitments made at the international level.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 http://tcdc2.undp.org/IBSA/Default.aspx. 	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ii) In addition, there is also a prevalent economic component in the consideration of what 
developmental needs are to be addressed by ODA, as GNI per capita is one of the most 
important factors determining ODA recipients. Although there are several ways in which 
donors aim to condition ODA, such as through environmental and social standards set by the 
WB and the OECD on financial and technical aid, this is still only one side of the problem, as 
it addresses the remedies provided, but does not set more refined criteria for selecting the 
recipients and thus considering other handicaps apart from economic disadvantage.  
 
iii) Finally, there is a commitment on how much is to be delivered: a commitment that 0.7% 
of developed countries’ GDP should be donated as ODA, but this is a soft law norm that has 
not been fulfilled to date – ODA levels are currently at an average of 0.4%, as reported by the 
OECD. 
 
Based on this soft framework, development cooperation is still falling behind in delivery of its 
promises, and despite the fact that, for the first time, an international consensus has been 
reached that human development should be the primary objective of aid, defined through the 
MDGs and reinforced at the International Conference on Financing for Development in 
Monterrey, Mexico, where an agreement was reached to make aid one of the building blocks 
of a new ‘global partnership’ for poverty reduction, the designation of development aid 
remains a markedly political issue within the constituencies of each donor country. 
Furthermore, in spite of the commitment of most developed countries to the ‘0.7% of GNI’ 
rule, the contributions still do not meet the cost of the world’s development challenges. The 
US$129 billion committed in 2010 was 76% of the estimated cost of achieving the MDGs. 
Developed countries have consistently failed to meet their stated pledges, including those of 
the G-8 at Gleneagles in 2005 (to increase aid by US$50 billion a year by 2010), the European 
Union (to increase aid from 0.43 percent of gross national income to 0.56 percent) and the 
United Nations (the long-standing target of 0.7 percent of gross national income). In this 
regard, the ‘Human Development Report’ of 2005 highlighted that while international aid 
could be one of the most effective weapons in the war against poverty, representing an 
investment as well as a moral imperative, pointing to the need for it to be renovated and 
reshaped, particularly regarding three conditions for effective aid: sufficient quantity; better 
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quality (delivered on a predictable, value for money basis with low transaction costs); and 
country ownership.20 
 
3. The integration of sustainable development within the international trade regime  
 
International trade can have a significantly positive effect on economic growth and 
development. The notion that trade – free trade, unencumbered by government restrictions – 
is welfare-enhancing is one of the most fundamental doctrines in modern economics, dating 
back at least to Adam Smith and David Ricardo. But the subject has always been marked by 
controversy because the issue facing most countries is not a binary choice of autarky (no 
trade) or free trade, but rather a choice from a spectrum of trade regimes with varying degrees 
of liberalization.21  
 
The international trade regime and its framework organization, the WTO, are not respectively 
a development regime or a development organization, but their main objective, the 
progressive liberalization of international trade, is one of the major factors of economic 
growth and has had an important impact on the development process. The signature of the 
GATT in 1947 was a landmark in international economic relations – alongside with the 
Bretton Woods institutions created some years earlier, it marked the transition from a politics-
based to a rule-based international trade system. The rationale of the GATT though was not to 
liberalize trade completely, but rather to achieve a compromise between the parties in order to 
achieve ‘freer trade’.  
 
As commentators have stated, the ‘terms of trade theory’ is most the accepted founding 
rationale for trade agreements not in the domestic sphere but in international externalities: 
trade is of interest to all nations, and unilateral tariff-setting leads to a prisoner’s dilemma-
type situation: in a trade negotiation, parties will aim to reduce tariffs to the politically 
optimum level, and reciprocity is the driving force; reciprocal tariff reductions take place to 
internalize the externalities related to tariff imposition and to guarantee market access. The 
GATT followed this rationale: it was an international negotiation to exchange reciprocal tariff 
concessions. At the time, there was an International Trade Organization project which never 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 UNDP, Human Development Report 2005, International Cooperation at a crossroads: aid, trade and security in 
an unequal world, 2005, available at www.hdr.undp.org. 	  
21 J. Stiglitz, Fair Trade for All, Oxfor University Press, 2005. 	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came into being, and in the absence of the ratification of the ITO, only the GATT entered into 
force, functioning as a de facto trade organization until the WTO was established in 1995. 
The GATT set out the regime for goods trading around some basic rules: (i) discipline in both 
trade and domestic instruments, given that both affect trade; (ii) the discipline of trade 
instruments regard the negotiation of tariff binding, which is reciprocal, and the prohibition of 
quantitative restrictions (import and export) and export subsidies; regarding tariffs, all 
members are required to apply them in a non-discriminatory way, which is known as the 
most-favored nation principle (MFN); (iii) members are required not to discriminate between 
domestic and foreign products which are alike through domestic instruments, which is known 
as the national treatment principle (NT); (iv) there are some exceptions to those rules, such as 
in the cases of dumping, and also in the cases listed in art. XX, discussed further below. Thus, 
the GATT was about reducing the one form of protection of domestic production that it 
allows, the tariffs applied by member states. It is thus a negative integration contract, as 
members are free to unilaterally define their policies that might affect trade – or in fact 
development, apart from what has been negotiated, such as environmental, social or 
competition policies.22  
 
After the signature of the GATT, seven rounds of negotiations occurred before the eighth 
GATT round — known as the Uruguay Round — was launched in September 1986 in Punta 
del Este, Uruguay. The Final Act concluding the Uruguay Round and officially establishing 
the WTO regime was signed on April 15, 1994 during the ministerial meeting at Marrakesh, 
Morocco, and hence is known as the Marrakesh Agreement. The GATT remained as the 
WTO's umbrella treaty for trade in goods, but its acquis was also incorporated as a result of 
the Uruguay Round negotiations; however, it is not the only legally binding agreement 
included via the Final Act at Marrakesh; about 60 agreements, annexes, decisions and 
understandings were adopted. The agreements fall into a structure with six main parts: The 
Agreement Establishing the WTO; Goods and investment — the Multilateral Agreements on 
Trade in Goods including the GATT 1994 and the Trade Related Investment Measures; the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS); the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS); Dispute settlement (DSU) and Reviews of 
governments' trade policies (TPRM). Thus the advent of the WTO expanded the areas 
regulated by the trade system.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 P Mavroidis et all, The Law of the World Trade Organization (WTO): Documents, Cases and Analysis, 
Thomson/West, 2010, p. 44-60. 	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In addition, the WTO to a greater extent acknowledged its own impact on development issues, 
and when it was established as the main result of the Uruguay Round, the preamble of its 
Constitutive Agreement stated that, besides the openness of the global market, the WTO 
should aim to guarantee sustainable development and promote “positive efforts designed to 
ensure that developing countries, and especially the least developed among them, secure a 
share in the growth of international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic 
development”.23 While the goal of sustainable development has been expressly incorporated, 
WTO law is not concerned with a comprehensive ordering of the ‘development process’, but 
rather more restrictively with the regulation of a particular economic activity – international 
trade – which indeed has far-reaching implications as an important component of the 
‘development process’, but is nevertheless only a single component thereof, among several.24 
This is significant in the consideration of the WTO as a development regime, and partially 
explains the difficulties of integrating new development issues, such as environmental 
concerns. Nevertheless, there are several aspects of WTO law that are in some way related to 
development. 
 
3.1 The ‘legalization’ of development at the WTO  
 
The ‘legalization’ of development at the WTO, that is, the creation of legal rules concerning 
development as an issue to be addressed through WTO law, apart from providing a rule-based 
regime for international trade as one of the motors of the world economy and thus being a 
catalyst for development, can be interpreted in two ways. The first relates to the introduction 
of legal norms concerning special and differential treatment (SDT) of developing countries in 
the WTO system. The second concerns the attempts to bring non-traditional development 
themes such as trade and environment into the WTO’s sphere, that is, making issues such as 
environmental protection a concern of the organization and thus giving them legal value in 
trade disputes, for instance.  
 
There are two legal rules establishing exceptions to the general framework of the GATT 
regime for non-discrimination (MFN): the measures determining SDT to developing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO in 1994.	  
24 T Broude, Elements of the Principle of Integration in WTO Jurisprudence: Another Look at the Shrimp Cases, 
Report of the International Law Association Conference in Toronto, 2006. 	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countries, and art. XXIV, which allows for preferential treatment when countries form a Free 
Trade Area (as will be explored further below). Regarding SDT provisions, there are around 
145 rules in the WTO legal system that establish differentiated treatment for developing 
countries and are deemed as a development regime within this system, and are grouped 
together in five categories:25   
 
(i) Better access to developed countries’ markets, such as the ‘enabling clause’. The idea of 
granting developing countries preferential tariff rates in the markets of industrialized 
countries was originally presented at the first UNCTAD conference in 1964, and was adopted 
at UNCTAD II in 1968, with the statement that “the objectives of the generalized, non-
reciprocal, non-discriminatory system of preferences in favor of developing countries, 
including special measures in favor of the least advanced among the developing countries, 
should be to increase their export earnings; to promote their industrialization; and to 
accelerate their rates of economic growth”. This clause led to the establishment of the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), schemes in preference-giving countries whereby 
selected products originating in developing countries are granted reduced or zero tariff rates 
over the MFN rates. In 1971, the GATT parties approved a waiver for Article I of the General 
Agreement for 10 years in order to authorize the GSP scheme (part IV of GATT on Trade and 
Development, which includes provisions on the concept of non-reciprocity in trade 
negotiations between developed and developing countries). Later, the decision was made to 
adopt the 1979 Enabling Clause, Decision of the Contracting Parties of 28 November 1979 
(26S/203), entitled ‘Differential and more favorable treatment, reciprocity and fuller 
participation of developing countries’, creating a permanent waiver to the MFN clause to 
allow preference-giving countries to grant preferential tariff treatment under their respective 
GSP schemes.26 These schemes are nevertheless non-contractual and non-reciprocal, and it is 
the preference-giving country that decides which developing countries will benefit from the 
preferences.  
 
In addition to the GSP scheme, in 1988 a ‘Global System of Trade Preferences among 
Developing Countries (GSTP)’ was established in the framework of the UNCTAD, entering 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 A. Alavi, Legalization of development in the WTO : between law and politics. Global trade law series Kluwer 
Law International, chapter 3, ‘developing countries special status in the GATT and WTO’. 	  
26 UNCTAD website: www.unctad.org. There are currently 13 national GSP schemes (notified to the 
UNCTAD): Australia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Canada, Estonia, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, 
the Russian Federation, Switzerland, Turkey and the USA.	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into force on 19 April 1989 and notified to the WTO on 25 September 1989. Under this 
scheme, participating developing countries can grant each other the same kind of SDT 
treatment. The GSTP received further support in December 2010 with the conclusion of the 
Sao Paulo Round of negotiations, with 11 countries making commitments on tariff reductions. 
This will be discussed further in Chapter 5 in the context of the MERCOSUR trade and 
development policies.  
 
 (ii) Relaxation of criteria for developing countries to comply with WTO rules, such as Article 
27.2 of the Agreement on Subsidies. 
 
(iii) Rules instructing other members or WTO organs to safeguard the interests of developing 
countries, such as the dispute settlement bodies, or article 15 of the Antidumping Agreement; 
 
(iv) Transitional periods to implement WTO rules, such as art. 65.2 of the TRIPS Agreement; 
 
(v) Technical assistance to developing countries, such as art. XXV.2 of the GATS.  
 
In general, these provisions have three main functions or general aims: assisting developing 
countries in increasing their involvement in world trade; assisting developing countries in 
using the system itself; and enabling developing countries to implement the agreements by 
recognizing their special needs. Despite the existence of these rules, the ‘development regime’ 
as identified by Alavi is deemed as unclear, often lacking coherence and binding force, as 
well as not giving practical advantage to developing countries.27  
 
Moreover, there is no official definition of development at the WTO, and furthermore neither 
the WTO agreement nor the GATT regimes have come up with a precise legal definition for 
the term ‘developing country’.28 The organization recognizes as LDCs those countries which 
have been designated as such by the UN, but the basic method of designating a developing 
country is ‘self-designation’. According to the WTO, “there are no WTO definitions of 
‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries. Members announce for themselves whether they are 
’developed’ or ‘developing’ countries. However, other members can challenge the decision of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 A. Alavi, op. cit. 	  
28 F. Cui, ‘Who Are the Developing Countries in the WTO?’, The Law and Development Review: Vol. 1: No. 1, 
Article 7, 2008.	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a member to make use of provisions available to developing countries”.29 These factors show 
that, despite the fact that the WTO deals with development issues, from a legal point of view 
the ‘legalization’ of development, represented in the SDT provisions, is still weak, and that 
politics still play a strong role in this sphere.30  
 
3.2 The integration of non-trade issues in the WTO: environmental and social concerns 
 
Beyond having a special set of rules addressing developing countries, the WTO also has other 
rules that deal with broader development issues. The preamble to the GATT in 1947 stated 
that among its objectives were raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a 
large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand; and developing the 
full use of the resources of the world and expanding the production and exchange of goods. 
These goals are related to increased social welfare and aim for economic prosperity. But in 
1994 the Marrakesh Agreement’s preamble seemed to have expanded these goals, stating that 
the organization sought to “expand the production of and trade in goods and services, while 
allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of 
sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to 
enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with [the Parties’] respective needs 
and concerns at different levels of economic development”, and additionally, mentioned the 
“need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the 
least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade 
commensurate with the needs of their economic development.” The Doha Ministerial 
Declaration, drafted in 2001, is even more definitive on the idea of a broader conception of 
the goals of the trading system. Paragraph 1 recalls the economic prosperity objectives 
outlined above, referring to trade’s contribution to economic growth, development and 
employment. Paragraph 2 recalls the Marrakesh objective related to equity, and the need for 
‘positive efforts’ focused on developing countries. Paragraph 3 goes further, noting the 
particular challenges faced by LDCs, and pledging that the WTO will ‘play its part’ in 
international efforts to address those challenges. Paragraph 6 recalls the Marrakesh objective 
related to the environment, and goes even further to identify sustainable development as an 
objective of the members. It asserts that safeguarding an open, non-discriminatory trading 
system and pursuing sustainable development can and must be mutually supportive.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d1who_e.htm.  	  
30 A Alavi, op. cit.	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Despite the written declarations by WTO Members and GATT contracting parties to 
sustainable development, the actual legal framework did not reflect this commitment and the 
declared objective of the multilateral system of trade was to contribute to economic prosperity 
by means of liberalizing trade and ensuring non-discrimination. The revised WTO objectives 
are broader, aiming at a conception of social welfare that also values equity: if some are 
missing out on the benefits of economic prosperity, then that is a matter for concern. It also 
values the environment, as evidenced by the Members’ commitment to have the WTO protect 
and preserve it. However it is not clear where the boundaries lie in the broad social welfare 
landscape between those areas that the Members consider to be the WTO’s mandate, and 
those areas that they consider important in achieving that mandate, but are also seen as the 
primary responsibility of others. To help answer this question, it is worth noting the 
similarities between the objective of sustainable development and the objectives of the WTO. 
Economic prosperity is a necessary (but not sufficient) prerequisite to sustainable 
development that meets the needs of the present, and constitutes the economic leg of the stool. 
A commitment to the environment corresponds to the Brundtland Report’s provision about 
sustainability, and constitutes the environmental leg, and concern for the particular needs of 
the poor in developing countries corresponds to the emphasis on the needs of the poor, and 
most closely resembles the social leg. The comparison can be pushed too far, however, 
particularly in the area of development where the WTO’s objectives center on economic 
development and poverty alleviation. While these are fundamental building blocks of 
development, they are not its entirety. This is illustrated by reference to the Millennium 
Development Goals, the first of which relates to poverty alleviation and hunger, but the rest of 
which include such elements as education, gender equality, health and nutrition, and 
environmental sustainability. As commented, it would thus be too much to say that the WTO 
was committed to achieving sustainable development, but rather it would seem that the WTO 
aims to contribute to the achievement of sustainable development through its activities and 
within its mandate, to achieve an open, non-discriminatory international regime of trade in 
goods and services.31  
 
The actual legal provision that deals with issues related to sustainable development is GATT 
Article XX, which lays down the General Exceptions, a number of specific instances in which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 A. Cosbey, ‘A sustainable development roadmap for the WTO’, International Institute for Sustainable 
Development, 2009, available at www.iisd.org. 	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WTO members may be exempted from GATT rules. Two exceptions are of particular 
relevance to development: paragraphs (b) and (g) of Article XX. Pursuant to these two 
paragraphs, WTO members may adopt policy measures that are inconsistent with GATT 
disciplines, but necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health (paragraph (b)), or 
relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources (paragraph (g)).  GATT Article 
XX on General Exceptions consists of two cumulative requirements. For a GATT-
inconsistent environmental measure to be justified under Article XX, a member must perform 
a two-tier analysis proving first that its measure falls under at least one of the exceptions (e.g. 
paragraphs (b) to (g), two of the ten exceptions under Article XX), and then that the measure 
satisfies the requirements of the introductory paragraph (the ‘chapeau’ of Article XX), i.e., 
that it is not applied in a manner which would constitute “a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail”, and is not “a disguised 
restriction on international trade”.   
 
These rules are nevertheless very broad, and their meaning has been clarified over the years in 
the case law of the WTO. The first relevant case in this regard was opened before the WTO, 
under the GATT regime, the US-Tuna and Canada – Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, in 
which export restrictions justified under environmental conservation were deemed 
incompatible with art. XX(g) in the absence of similar provisions in the national sphere. 
Following, the two ‘tuna/dolphin’ cases were the first to test the legitimacy of using 
environmental issues in production methods as justification for trade restrictions. Here the 
panel held that the measures at stake (a USA prohibition on the import of tuna from Mexico 
caught without using devices to prevent the by-catch of dolphins) failed to comply with art. 
XX(b) and (g), since they did not pass the necessity test and aimed primarily to impose 
standards on another country, whereas the rationale of the legal rules was to allow trade 
measures primarily aimed at restrictions within the imposing country; in the second case, 
while similar, the panel held that art. XX(g) is not restricted to measures located within the 
territory of the imposing state, but must not be coercive. 32  
 
With the establishment of the WTO and its Dispute Settlement System, the case-law evolved 
and began to show a less restrictive application of GATT rules and more environmental 
sensitivity. In the US-Gasoline case, the Appelate Body (AB) changed the interpretation used 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/edis04_e.htm. 	  
Chapter	  2	  	  
	   85	  
by GATT panels with the ‘primary aim’ rationale to a ‘substantial relationship’ between the 
measure and its alleged goal; it found that the challenged measure was thus related to the 
conservation of a natural resource – clean air – but at the end denied the justification under 
art. XX(g) because of discrimination between national and foreign products regarding the 
choice of baseline.33 The landmark case though was the US-shrimp/turtle case, which 
overturned the jurisprudence of the tuna/dolphin case, lending legitimacy to actions against 
other nations because of refusal to conform to production processes unilaterally specified by 
another WTO member, which are not considered WTO inconsistent per se; in its 
interpretation of art. XX(g), the AB found that the term ‘exhaustible natural resources’ must 
be interpreted in light of new environmental law principles such as sustainable development, 
as recognized in the preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement; it also prescribed a series of 
measures to fulfill the chapeau of art. XX: it should not depend so much on the primary aim 
of the measure, but rather on whether the measure is reasonably related to the ends; however 
it found the measure at stake to be unjustifiable, given that it had a coercive effect on another 
member’s policy without taking into account the conditions prevailing there; and also failed 
to negotiate a cooperative solution before adopting the measure.34 Significantly, the objective 
of sustainable development was referred to by the AB in two separate legal instances: first, for 
the purpose of interpreting the Article XX(g) exception as substantively concerned with 
environmental protection (para. 129); and second, for the purpose of accepting environmental 
protection as the basis for a trade restriction that is not "unjustifiable or arbitrary 
discrimination" under the chapeau of Article XX GATT (paras. 152 et seq.). In other words, 
environmental protection for the purpose of sustainable development was adopted as the 
baseline for examining whether the US legislation was an abuse of the environmental 
exception, in the sense that it overstepped the ‘line of equilibrium’ between the right of one 
Member to invoke the exception and the substantive trade rights of other Members (para. 
159). This balance of rights and exceptions informed by the objective of sustainable 
development is concordant with the Principle of Integration: environmental protection is 
integrated with other development factors, and is not considered in isolation from them.35  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Panel Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 
1996); Appellate Body Report, United States — Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996). 	  
34 Panel Report, United States––Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R (May 
15, 1998) [hereafter Shrimps I Panel Report]; Appellate Body Report, United States –– Import Prohibition of 
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998). 	  
35 T Broude, op cit.	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Other relevant cases are the ‘Asbestos case’, important in defining the requirement for a 
measure under art. XXb and the like product definition; 36 and the ‘Brazil/retreated tyres case’, 
which is relevant due to the interpretation of a measure in light of art. XXb, the assessment of 
whether discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable should be made in light of the objective of 
the measure, the effects of discrimination being irrelevant.37 Based on these cases, some 
points can be made: in the change of take between tuna/dolphin and shrimp/turtle, there seems 
to be an indication that there is no jurisdictional limitation to measures under art. XX – even 
though in the latter case the AB did not rule on the art. XX chapeau, but on part (g). 
Regarding the chapeau of art. XX, the measure at stake must not be arbitrarily discriminatory 
in countries where the same conditions prevail – measures must allow comparable 
effectiveness; there must not be unjustifiable discrimination; no disguised restriction is 
allowed on international trade.  
 
These decisions show that sustainable development issues have made their way into the WTO 
legal system, being recognized and relevant as legitimate objectives to be pursued by member 
states, including in relation to trade policy.38 Nevertheless, these cases show that the WTO’s 
rationale is clearly to safeguard the trade regime, which is its ultimate objective; these other 
goals are justifiable, insofar as they do not represent unnecessary discrimination, but it seems 
like the actual promotion of sustainable development, and especially its integrative 
component, would require an even more sensitive interpretation of trade rules. If it is true that 
the later cases such as shrimp/turtle have shown that the AB recognized the environmental 
objective of the defendant and deemed the measure at stake unjustifiable given that it could 
have been achieved in a less restrictive way, the rationale of the regime is to subject the 
environmental and social aspects of the matter to its trade logic, which is the main goal to 
safeguard.  
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos- Containing Products, 
WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000); Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos 
and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001).	  
37 Panel Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/ DS332/R (June 12, 2007); 
Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 
2007) 	  
38 See for a broad analysis of these cases and the integration of sustainable development in the WTO, M.C. 
Cordonier Segger and M. Gehring, Sustainable Development in World Trade Law, Kluwer Law International, 
2005.	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3.3 The specialized committees 
 
In addition to directly setting rules concerning broader development issues, the WTO has also 
created specialized committees that deal with ‘Trade and Environment’ (CTE) and ‘Trade and 
Development’ (CTD). The CTE was set up by the 1994 Marrakesh Ministerial Decision on 
Trade and Environment, with a mandate to identify the relationship between trade measures 
and environmental measures in order to promote sustainable development, and make 
appropriate recommendations on whether any modifications of the provisions of the 
multilateral trading system were required, compatible with the open, equitable and non-
discriminatory nature of the system. It was given a 10-point mandate foreseeing issues on 
which it should make “appropriate recommendations on whether any modifications of the 
provisions of the multilateral trading system are required”:  
 
1. The relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading system and trade 
measures for environmental purposes, including those pursuant to multilateral environmental 
agreements;  
2. The relationship between environmental policies relevant to trade and environmental 
measures with significant trade effects and the provisions of the multilateral trading system;  
3. The relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading system and (a) charges 
and taxes for environmental purposes; (b) requirements for environmental purposes relating to 
products, including standards and technical regulations, packaging, labeling and recycling;  
4. The provisions of the multilateral trading system with respect to the transparency of trade 
measures used for environmental purposes and environmental measures and requirements 
which have significant trade effects;  
5. The relationship between the dispute settlement mechanisms in the multilateral trading 
system and those found in multilateral environmental agreements;  
6. The effect of environmental measures on market access, especially in relation to 
developing countries, in particular to the least developed among them, and the environmental 
benefits of removing trade restrictions and distortions;  
7. The issue of exports of domestically prohibited goods;  
8. The relationship between the environment and the relevant provisions of the Agreement on 
Trade in Services;  
9. The relationship between environment and the relevant provisions of the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS); and  
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10. Relations between the WTO and other organizations, both non-governmental and inter-
governmental.39  
 
The CTD, apart from dealing with issues such as SDT, aid for trade and notification of 
regional trade agreements among developing countries, has under Paragraph 51 of the Doha 
Declaration been mandated to identify and debate the developmental aspects of the 
negotiations, in order to help achieve the objective of having sustainable development 
appropriately reflected.40  
 
Many of these issues, while affecting trade and WTO policy, are very hard to deal with within 
the umbrella of the WTO. In a report analyzing the multitude of issues involved in building a 
‘sustainable development roadmap’ for the WTO and making its commitment to this principle 
effective, the IISD lists a number of issues which should in fact fall within the mandate of the 
WTO and be pushed further into the framework of the Doha Negotiations, and others in 
which the WTO should be involved but not take the lead. According to the abovementioned 
study, regarding the Trade and Environment issues, the WTO should take the lead in i) 
liberalizing trade in environmental goods and services; ii) reducing or eliminating perverse 
subsidies (such as fisheries and fossil fuel subsidies), and in any cases of necessary 
amendments to the TRIPS Agreement, to make them compatible with obligations under the 
CBD; iii) granting observership to MEAs in WTO Committees. The WTO should also 
attempt, in an exercise to include environment Ministry officials, amongst others, to negotiate 
agreed understandings or guidance on the rule of WTO law on the subject of discrimination of 
production and process methods (PPM), and on the precautionary principle. It should ensure 
that others act to address at least two other items on the trade-environment agenda, but not 
take a lead role in: i) the cluster of issues that include market access, standards and labeling; 
and ii) assessing the broad impact of trade on the environment. Regarding Trade and 
Development, the report considers that the WTO should be an active leader in the areas of 
trade-related technical assistance, capacity building and trade facilitation. It should spearhead 
a collaboration that has others surpassing this, engaging in efforts designed to build up trade-
related infrastructure, to build productive capacity and to strengthen the domestic institutions 
that are key to a healthy investment climate (bureaucracy, judiciary, regulatory bodies, etc.). 
The WTO should explore the development of a system of indicators that would link 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/wrk_committee_e.htm. 	  
40 See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d3ctte_e.htm. 	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successful aid for trade to related trade law commitments.41 Nevertheless, as the majority of 
those issues are part of the stalled Doha negotiations, their development is technically blocked 
at the multilateral level. In this regard, considering alternative ways of negotiating these 
issues, such as at the regional level, has gained even more importance.  
 
3.4 Remarks 
 
As can be seen, the organizations outlined above form a governance system that deals with 
development, and relies on legal and political arrangements to provide both development 
assistance and development through trade liberalization. The system of development 
cooperation relies on the commitments made by states at the international level, such as the 
goal of providing 0.7% of GDP as ODA by 2015, which are often made through soft-law 
instruments, and are delivered through international agencies whose role is to coordinate 
governmental action and propose best practices. It is, in this regard, a system much less 
dependent on legal arrangements than it is on the political decisions of states, even if 
coordinated by international agencies, and thus the development idea that is promoted is often 
viewed as politicized. In addition, this system is lagging severely behind on the delivery of its 
goal of alleviating poverty, amongst others.  
 
The international trade regime is more rule-based and has a clearer developmental vision, 
which is to support the integration of developing countries into the international trading 
system and thus promote their economic growth and welfare. Nevertheless, the ambiguous 
provisions regarding classification of development and the non-binding nature of the 
provisions of SDT also render this system vulnerable to political influence, as the negotiations 
of the Doha Round clearly show. Furthermore, its character as a negative integration system, 
while allowing for social and environmental measures to be adopted, is also proving 
insufficient to actively promote the contribution that trade could make to sustainable 
development.42 As argued by Pertersmann, much more would have to be done to render the 
international economic regime truly supportive of development, such as defining the WTO 
objective of ‘sustainable development’ in terms of human rights and empowering ‘WTO 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 A Cosby, op cit. 	  
42 For a thorough study of the integration principle and its application in the WTO system, see C. Voigt, 
Sustainable development as a principle of international law: resolving conflicts between climate measures and 
WTO law, Martinus Nijhofff, 2009.	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citizens’ as legal subjects and democratic owners of the WTO legal system.43 Furthermore, 
policies for promoting positive liberalization of sectors that are relevant for sustainable 
development and the transition to a green economy, such as the liberalization of 
environmental goods and services (further discussed in Chapter 5), are required with urgency 
in order to make trade work for sustainable development. 
 
4. Regional integration agreements: the rationale and the development component 
 
Considering the implementation challenges of the existing rules concerning the promotion of 
development and the ineffectiveness of the regimes discussed above in fulfilling this role, this 
thesis now aims to discuss another governance level which might fill this gap: the regional 
sphere. As one commentator points out, “new forms of region-building are now an 
inescapable feature of the global political economy. Once viewed primarily as a regulatory 
frame through which state actors pushed the progressive liberalization of trade and 
investment (Gamble and Payne 1996; Grugel and Hout 1999), regionalism is increasingly, 
and more fruitfully, conceptualized as a broader project of governance which aims to 
refashion the norms and the networks that underpin policy-making and the ways in which 
authority and legitimacy are exercised in bounded but post-sovereign spaces (Payne 2000; 
Phillips 2004).”44 
 
The rationale of explaining how regional blocs can be tools to promote development is 
threefold: regional integration agreements (RIA) are the most institutionalized form of 
regional cooperation scheme, and are in this regard part of the international economic regime 
as a sub-form of the international trade framework; the rationale in this case is the promotion 
of free trade and thus economic development through economic integration, as wider markets 
and broader scope of competition and innovation resulting from market integration are some 
of the main engines for economic growth. Moreover, from a legal/policy perspective, the 
regional sphere of governance is increasingly seen as a means of going beyond the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 E.U. Petersmann, Constitutionalism and the Regulation of International Markets: How to Define the 
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multilaterally agreed objectives of the international community, which is expressed through 
the pursuit of deeper levels of economic integration regarding what is achieved at the WTO, 
but also the pursuit of goals beyond free trade, including ‘positive integration’ policies and 
rules on environmental and social areas. Finally, regions are increasingly being seen as 
relevant actors of global governance, promoting relations not only with other actors but also 
amongst themselves, in a phenomenon known as interregionalism. Thus, regional integration 
can be a promising tool in promoting the goals of sustainable development, and the legal 
aspects of this idea will be briefly discussed below.  
 
4.1 The legal aspects of Regional Integration Agreements in the GATT 
 
i) Rationale  
 
As stated above, economic growth is one of the main ways of promoting development, and 
many countries have pursued the objective of trade liberalization. Although the GATT began 
with less than 50 member countries, the WTO had 159 members by 2013. Since GATT and 
WTO agreements commit all member nations to reducing trade barriers simultaneously, this 
is referred to as a multilateral approach to trade liberalization. An alternative method to 
achieve trade liberalization includes the formation of preferential trade arrangements, free 
trade areas, customs unions and common markets. Since many of these agreements involve 
geographically contiguous countries, these methods are referred to as a regional approach to 
trade liberalization. Section XXIV of the original GATT allows signatory countries to form 
free trade agreements and customs unions, despite the fact that preferential agreements violate 
the principle of non-discrimination. When a free trade area or customs union is formed 
between two or more WTO member countries, they agree to lower their tariffs in relation to 
each other but maintain their tariffs against other WTO countries. Thus, the free trade area 
represents discriminatory policies.  
 
Article XXIV of the GATT specifies the conditions under which countries may violate the 
MFN clause by forming Regional Integration Agreements. It imposes three principal 
restrictions: RIAs must not “on the whole” raise protection against excluded countries; must 
reduce internal tariffs to zero and remove “restrictive regulations of commerce” other than 
those permitted by other GATT articles; and must cover “substantially all trade.” According 
to Alan Winters and Maurice Schiff, “the GATT’s logic is essentially mercantilist—stressing 
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the rights of trading partners to market access—rather than economic, with a focus on the 
economic costs and benefits of policy. From the mercantilist perspective, the first two 
conditions make sense. The rule against increasing protection against excluded countries 
preserves tariff bindings by ensuring that forming an RIA does not provide a wholesale way 
of dissolving previous bindings. It is supplemented by the requirement that compensation is 
due to individual partners for tariff increases induced by the RIA if other reductions to keep 
the average constant do not maintain a fair balance of concessions. Together with the 1994 
Uruguay Round Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV, which deals with how 
to measure tariff barriers for RIAs, these provisions offer reasonable assurances about the 
barriers facing nonmembers. The condition on reducing internal tariffs to zero helps defend 
the MFN clause by making it subject to an ‘all-or-nothing’ exception. If countries were free to 
negotiate different levels of preference with each trading partner, binding and 
nondiscrimination would be fatally undermined. No member could be sure that it would 
receive the benefits it expected from negotiating and reciprocating a partner’s tariff reduction. 
(…)The third condition reinforces this interpretation by requiring a serious degree of 
commitment to an RIA in terms of sectorial coverage.”45 
 
Special measures also address developing countries: the Enabling Clause of 1979 relaxed the 
conditions for creating RIAs that include only developing countries. It drops the conditions on 
the coverage of trade and allows developing countries to reduce tariffs on mutual trade in any 
way they wish and to employ non tariff measures in accordance with criteria which may be 
prescribed by the GATT members. It then supplements the first condition with the 
nonoperational requirement that the RIA not constitute a barrier to MFN tariff reductions or 
cause ‘undue difficulties’ for other contracting parties. The arrangements are based on a 
contractual relationship between the parties and are required, according to WTO law, to 
observe reciprocity in trade concessions, whereas the ‘enabling clause’ rationale is based on a 
unilateral, non contractual basis, in which the preference-giving country is free to select the 
beneficiaries and no reciprocity is required. This is an important point which has several legal 
consequences as will be seen, for example, in Chapter 5 in the analysis of the EU trade and 
development policies, which faced several ‘trade wars’ regarding the instruments developed 
within these policies.  
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In this regard, in 1996 the WTO General Council established a Committee on Regional Trade 
Agreements (CRTA) with the function of analyzing the regional agreements and their 
systemic implications for the multilateral trading system (WT/L/127). Its objective is to 
ensure the transparency of RTAs and allow members to pose questions about the consistency 
of these agreements with WTO rules. The CRTA has the duty to elaborate a report after a 
factual assessment based on the information provided by the parties to the agreement and on 
the debate with the other WTO members. However, due to the lack of consensus on the 
interpretation of WTO rules and the lack of WTO rules concerning RTAs, no report has been 
finalized under this system.46  
 
ii) Types of economic integration 
 
Based on these rules, different types of economic integration can be achieved, which are 
progressive in their complexity:47  
 
a) Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA): perhaps the weakest form of economic integration. In 
a PTA countries would offer tariff reductions, though perhaps not eliminations, to a set of 
partner countries in some product categories. Higher tariffs, perhaps non-discriminatory 
tariffs, would remain in all remaining product categories. This type of trade agreement is not 
allowed among WTO members, which are obliged to grant most-favored nation status to all 
other WTO members. Under the most-favored nation (MFN) rule, countries agree not to 
discriminate against other WTO member countries. Thus, for example, if a country's low tariff 
on bicycle imports is 5%, then it must charge 5% on imports from all other WTO members. 
Discrimination or preferential treatment for some countries is not allowed. The country is free 
to charge a higher tariff on imports from non-WTO members.  
 
b) Free Trade Area (FTA): occurs when a group of countries agree to eliminate tariffs 
between themselves, but maintain their own external tariff on imports from the rest of the 
world. The North American Free Trade Area is an example of a FTA. When the NAFTA is 
fully implemented, tariffs on automobile imports between the US and Mexico will be zero. 
However, Mexico may continue to set a different tariff to the US on auto imports from non-
NAFTA countries. Because of the different external tariffs, FTAs generally develop elaborate 
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‘rules of origin’. These rules are designed to prevent goods from being imported into the FTA 
member country with the lowest tariff and then shipped to the country with the highest tariffs. 
Of the thousands of pages of text that make up the NAFTA, most of them describe rules of 
origin. 
 
c) Customs Union: occurs when a group of countries agree to eliminate tariffs between 
themselves and set a common external tariff on imports from the rest of the world. A customs 
union avoids the problem of developing complicated rules of origin, but introduces the 
problem of policy coordination. With a customs union, all member countries must be able to 
agree on tariff rates across many different import industries. 
 
d) Common Market: establishes free trade in goods and services, sets common external tariffs 
among members and also allows for the free mobility of capital and labor across countries. 
The European Union was established as a common market by the Treaty of Rome in 1957, 
although it took a long time for the transition to take place. Today, EU citizens have a 
common passport, can work in any EU member country and can invest throughout the union 
without restriction. 
 
e) Economic Union: typically will maintain free trade in goods and services, set common 
external tariffs among members, allow the free mobility of capital and labor, and will also 
relegate some fiscal spending responsibilities to a supra-national agency. 
 
f) Monetary Union: establishes a common currency among a group of countries. This involves 
the formation of a central monetary authority which will determine monetary policy for the 
entire group. Perhaps the best example of an economic and monetary union is the United 
States. Each US state has its own government which sets policies and laws for its own 
residents. However, each state cedes control, to some extent, over foreign policy, agricultural 
policy, welfare policy, and monetary policy to the federal government. Goods, services, labor 
and capital can all move freely, without restrictions among the US states and the nation sets a 
common external trade policy. 
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4.2 RIAs as a consolidated trend 
 
Based on this framework, several regional blocs have been established over the last few 
decades, and the increasing number of them has been one of the major developments in 
international relations in recent years; virtually all countries are now members of at least one 
bloc. Regional agreements vary widely, but all have the objective of reducing barriers to trade 
between member countries—which implies discrimination against trade with other countries. 
At their simplest, these agreements merely remove tariffs on intra-bloc trade in goods, but 
many go beyond that to cover non-tariff barriers and to extend liberalization to investment 
and other policies. At their deepest, they have the goal of economic union and involve the 
construction of shared executive, judicial, and legislative institutions. In addition, the past 
decade has also witnessed qualitative changes in RIAs. There have arguably been three major 
developments:48 
 
(i) The move from ‘closed regionalism’ to a more open model, in line with prevailing views 
about national economic policy. Many of the trade blocs that were formed between 
developing countries in the 1960s and 1970s were based on a model of import-substituting 
development, and regional agreements with high external trade barriers were used as a way of 
implementing this model.  
 
(ii) New-wave RIAs (some of which are old agreements which have been resurrected) are 
generally more outward looking and more committed to boosting rather than controlling 
international commerce, and recognize that effective integration requires more than simply 
reducing tariffs and quotas. Many other types of barrier have the effect of segmenting markets 
and impeding the free flow of goods, services, investments and ideas, and wide-ranging 
policy measures—going well beyond traditional trade policies—are needed to remove them. 
Such ‘deep integration’ was first actively pursued in the Single Market Program of the 
European Union, but its elements are now finding their way into the debate on other regional 
agreements. 
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(iii) The advent of ‘North-South’ trade blocs in which high-income countries and developing 
countries are equal partners, such as the NAFTA or the EU Agreements with its neighbors, as 
well as the Economic Partnership Agreements signed with African countries.  
 
In addition, two further developments can be highlighted, the increasing number of South-
South Agreements, and the phenomenon of ‘interregionalism’, discussed in further detail in 
Chapters 5 and 6 respectively, in the context of case studies.  
 
4.3 The rationale for regional integration and sustainable development 
 
From an economic point of view, the incentives for creating regional blocs are ambiguous. As 
one report of the World Bank highlights, “whether regional agreements are building blocks 
or stumbling blocks to open global markets—the terms Jagdish Bhagwati (1991) used—
remains a central question”. Proponents of the stumbling block theory emphasize that:  
(1) RTAs may promote costly trade diversions rather than efficient trade creation, especially 
when sizable MFN tariffs remain—these tariffs create vested interests to maintain preferential 
margins in ‘their’ markets;  
(2) the proliferation of regional agreements absorbs scarce negotiating resources (especially in 
poorer WTO members) and crowd out policy-makers’ attention;  
(3) competing RTAs (especially different North-South combinations) may lock in 
incompatible regulatory structures and standards, and may result in inappropriate norms for 
developing country partners; and  
(4) by creating alternative legal frameworks and dispute settlement mechanisms, RTAs may 
weaken the discipline and efficiency associated with a broadly recognized multilateral 
framework of rules.  
The Building block proponents stress that moving forward in smaller steps is often easier to 
accomplish, and that it creates a certain reform momentum:  
(1) regional/bilateral agreements can help sensitize domestic constituencies to liberalization 
and keep the stakes lower to allow for incremental progress on trade;  
(2) expanding the number and coverage of RTAs can erode vested opposition to multilateral 
liberalization because each successive RTA reduces the value of the margin of preference, 
thereby reducing the discriminatory impact;  
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(3) RTAs are often more about building strategic and/or political alliances or locking in 
domestic reforms than about actual trade liberalization, and so are not necessarily competitive 
with multilateral efforts;  
(4) regional arrangements can act as incubators for developing countries’ firms/producers to 
learn to trade with RTA partners without facing full global competition; and  
(5) for some issues, such as regulatory cooperation, RTAs may be a viable and more 
manageable alternative to the WTO, where ‘lowest common denominator’ outcomes tend to 
prevail.49 
 
The report analyzed the influence of regional agreements.50 Among the observed trends, it 
states that while the number of preferential agreements has increased rapidly, their trade 
coverage is substantially less than their official span of influence, because many tariffs have 
come down close to zero, rules of origin restrict preferential access, and many products within 
agreements are excluded. Nonetheless, RTAs are leading to a more complex trading system 
and inefficiencies in customs administration; high tariffs in certain regions still risk significant 
trade diversion. In addition, there are notable differences emerging between North-South 
bilateral agreements and South-South arrangements. North-South agreements are 
considerably more ambitious in their content and coverage than South-South arrangements 
and reach deep beyond the border to include services, protection of investment rules and 
intellectual property rights. Some conclusions of the report state that (i) there is no strong 
evidence to support the claim that a preferential trade agreement will be net trade creating or 
that all members will benefit. Positive outcomes depend on design and implementation. (ii) 
when embedded in a consistent and credible reform strategy, the key determinant of regional 
trade agreements’ success is low levels of external trade barriers. While many developing 
countries have reduced tariffs, they remain high in many countries and regions, and the risk of 
trade diversion remains significant. Further reductions in applied MFN tariffs will be required 
to ensure that regional agreements are beneficial for those participating in them and to 
minimize the impact on the countries that are left out. (iii) trade agreements that provide for 
comprehensive liberalization of trade across all major sectors and nonrestrictive rules of 
origin are more likely to be successful. Agreements that devote considerable resources to 
negotiating limited positive lists or large negative lists and detailed product-specific rules of 
origin limit the scope for gain. (iv) effective implementation is crucial to positive outcomes, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 World Bank, Global Economic Prospects: Trade, Regionalism and Development, 2005, p. 133.	  
50 Ibid. 	  
Chapter	  2	  	  
	   98	  
yet implementation is compromised by proliferation. If different agreements have different 
product coverage, different liberalization schedules, and different rules of origin, the ability of 
agencies such as customs to apply the agreements is severely undermined. The capacity to 
effectively implement is a crucial issue that countries should consider before signing an RTA. 
(v) monitoring can play an important role in providing for effective implementation, but often 
there is insufficient monitoring carried out. Technical reviews are frequently not done, and 
when reports are made, senior officials fail to act on their recommendations. 
 
Furthermore, the Report concludes that there are several advantages in regional preferential 
trade arrangements, as they create opportunities to lower trade costs in areas other than tariffs 
and non-tariff barriers to trade. (i) The potential to expand trade by lowering trade costs other 
than policy border barriers is great—and it may have a higher payoff for cooperative 
governmental efforts than reciprocal reductions in border barriers. (ii) Using RTAs as a lever 
to liberalize services has several advantages. (iii) A corollary lesson is that multilateral 
liberalization in goods markets is essential for reaping any gains from RTAs that contain new 
rules. (iv) Finally, RTAs—and other regional cooperation agreements—do offer some 
important opportunities for countries to collaborate, especially in South-South agreements. To 
stimulate investment, particularly in services, they might adopt common standards that 
facilitate cross-border competition in services and investment.  
 
Thus, from an economic point of view, in order to produce gains RIAs must assure (i) 
effective market access to members, which should represent zero tariffs but often in practice 
represent lower tariffs regarding the multilateral sphere; (ii) that transactional costs are 
reduced, and promote integration of infrastructure and logistics and common regulatory 
frameworks in order to maximize intraregional trade. The development of infrastructure with 
a regional outlook to improve physical connectivity in its various modalities is today a key 
aspect for regional integration and global competitiveness, especially in developing regions 
such as Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), where there is strong empirical evidence to 
show that transport costs have a greater impact than tariffs for the region’s countries.51 
 
Apart from its overall economic effects, from a legal/policy perspective there are incentives to 
promote regional integration as a means of promoting development. In fact, the success of 
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regional trade liberalization and market integration is at times considered to be dependent on 
embedding it into a broader legal, institutional, social and political framework supported by 
citizens and other non-governmental constituencies as socially ‘just’ and supportive of 
development in a broad sense.52 According to UNCTAD,53 ‘regional cooperation among 
developing countries has the potential to support national development strategies, and to some 
extent fill the gaps in the global economic governance system. But in order to do so it has to 
extend beyond trade liberalization to include policy areas that strengthen the potential for 
growth and structural change in developing countries. Recognizing that multilateral 
disciplines could lead to a narrowing of national policy space for developing countries, 
regional economic cooperation can provide some means to help countries cope well with 
globalization. From this perspective, regional institutions could fill gaps in global economic 
governance structures. The form that such cooperation takes will depend not only on the 
specific historical, geographical and political circumstances in a region, but also on the 
relative weight given to market forces and State intervention – a choice that can influence 
economic policies at national and global levels.  
 
In addition, UNCTAD highlights that regional blocs have increasingly included provisions 
aimed at ‘deep integration’, which involves additional elements for harmonizing national 
policies in line with a reform agenda. A developing country’s motivation for concluding a 
bilateral agreement with a developed country partner would be to obtain concessions that are 
not granted to other countries, particularly better market access for its products. Indeed, 
bilateral North-South FTAs have the potential to provide the developing country partner with 
considerable new trading opportunities. Such FTAs may also attract more FDI to the 
developing-country partner. But there can also be potential disadvantages for developing 
countries, because such FTAs generally demand far-reaching liberalization of foreign 
investment and government procurement, new rules on certain aspects of competition policy, 
stricter rules on intellectual property rights, and the incorporation of labor and environmental 
standards. Moreover, many FTAs oblige developing countries to undertake much broader and 
deeper liberalization of trade in goods than that agreed under WTO arrangements. Some also 
involve a form of liberalization of services that differs from what is envisaged in WTO 
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agreements, thus exerting pressure on developing countries to make greater liberalization 
commitments in this area. However, because they involve reciprocal commitments, FTAs 
between developed and developing countries eliminate the special and differential treatment 
that may be granted to developing countries in the context of other agreements.  
 
Globalization and the trend towards greater interdependence as a result of internationalization 
of investment and production decisions present new challenges. Many of these challenges 
cannot be dealt with exclusively at the national level and may require similar adaptation in 
regional institutions, especially as multilateral institutions and policies have failed to adapt. 
From this perspective, UNCTAD’s report concludes that regional cooperation involves a good 
deal more than the search for common ground on external policies; it also involves the 
provision of regional public goods and a reconfiguration of policy space. At the same time, 
new political challenges, including the unequal influence of members, and in particular the 
ability of stronger members to bypass collective agreements, have to be dealt with.  
 
From a legal perspective, RIAs can be used as a tool to promote more sustainable-oriented 
action regarding what has been done in the multilateral sphere. In fact, regionalism is 
pinpointed as a privileged forum for international law-making, since the regional context and 
the relative homogeneity of the interests or outlooks of actors could ensure a more efficient or 
equitable implementation of the relevant norms, and the presence of cultural commonalities 
better ensures the legitimacy of the regulations and that they are understood and applied in a 
coherent way.  Koskenniemi highlights that closeness to context better reflects the interests 
and consent of the relevant parties, stating that in a matter of legal policy, it may often be 
more efficient to proceed by way of a regional approach, as is the case with human rights and 
economic integration regimes.54  
 
Marie Claire Cordonier-Segger suggests a list of legal areas in which the establishment of 
RIAs could support the objective of sustainable development, including procedural and 
substantive legal provisions. Among the procedural innovations, she lists: (i) environmental, 
development, human rights or sustainability impact assessments and reviews of trade 
liberalization policies and draft treaties; (ii) consultations between economic, environmental 
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and development authorities; (iii) mechanisms to ensure transparency, including in 
negotiations; (iv) capacity-building and financing mechanisms for social and environmental 
cooperation related to negotiation and implementation of RTA regimes. In terms of 
substantive measures that could be included in RTAs in order to promote sustainable 
development, apart from preambular commitments which favor interpretation of further 
provisions of the agreement, she lists: (i) provisions which create windows or exceptions from 
trade rules and thus prevent economic objectives to trump all others, where trade obligations 
might otherwise constrain regulators and policy-makers, such as general exceptions related to 
conservation of natural resources, general interpretative statements, specific exceptions in 
sections of the agreements where trade rules on issues such as SPS, TBT, IPR, services and 
public procurement might constrain the use of environmental and social measures, and 
explicit reservations on socially or environmentally sensitive sectors; (ii) provisions which 
develop ‘value-added’ but parallel social and environmental cooperation strategies, such as 
parallel agreements or chapters for cooperation on environmental and social matters, 
development of institutions and common work programs for cooperation in these areas, and 
report/complaint mechanisms to provide recourse when these rules are violated; (iii) 
constructive ‘sustainable development’ oriented trade rule enhancement initiatives, such as 
SPS provisions which improve levels of protection, TBT provisions to improve certification 
processes and promote mutual recognition, IPR provisions which support biodiversity 
protection, recognize traditional knowledge and public access to essential medicines, 
liberalization of environmental services and promotion of investments which deliver on 
international environmental and social priorities.55   
 
In this regard, even though RIAs might have an uncertain economic impact, regional rules 
might also promote the objectives of sustainable development, particularly by helping to 
integrate the objectives of economic development with environmental protection and social 
justice in a more specific and homogeneous context. This might allow states to move beyond 
the difficulty of establishing binding rules at the multilateral level, and the need to promote 
concerted action from the national perspective. 
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5. Concluding remarks 
 
The analysis undertaken above demonstrates that the global governance framework for 
sustainable development is based on a system of international norm-setting, producing rules 
and standards of conduct, some binding and others representing political commitment and 
thus with weak enforcement power. The system set up for the implementation of these 
measures is decentralized and relies primarily on national implementation of agreements and 
promotion of rights.  
 
The international institutions and regimes do not seem to be responding to the pressing issues 
that challenge the international community nowadays: the international economic institutions 
-the IMF and the WB- still fail to carry out reforms that have been on the agenda for a long 
time, to allow the inclusion of more representativeness of developing countries; furthermore, 
the levels of ODA are still far below the 0.7% of GDP threshold. In the social sphere, the 
level of progress which has been made towards the MDGs makes their achievement by 2015 
seem impossible at this stage. Finally, in the environmental sphere, the most pressing issue, 
climate change, is also at a crossroads, with the Kyoto Protocol having expired in 2012 and no 
consensus for a successor regime seeming likely anytime soon. On the other hand, the 
reliance on the national sphere for implementation is also problematic, as economic, social 
and environmental problems are largely transboundary in many ways, given the effects of 
globalization and interdependence on the former, and the increasing global effects on local 
environments and vice versa, on the latter.  
 
At the multilateral level though, advancing this integration between regimes with different 
rationales has been proving difficult: the approach regarding environmental and social issues 
and the virtual impossibility of reaching an agreement regarding the Doha Development 
Round show how complex global agreement can be. In this regard, the hypothesis to be 
developed here is: what role can the legal framework of regional integration agreements play? 
RIAs are a part of the international trade system – even if not all of them have trade 
liberalization as the main goal, such as seems the case of the EU (as will be seen in the next 
Chapter), where the single market was to be a tool towards maintenance of peace and 
development, and in this regard one of the features of these agreements is, in almost all cases, 
to promote the integration of the markets through the liberalization of trade. Nevertheless, 
RIAs are increasingly encompassing issues other than trade, such as social and environmental 
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policies, and thus creating legal frameworks which embrace a more modern vision of the 
development process – often explicitly adopting the concept of sustainable development as a 
guiding principle and even as an ultimate goal.  
 
The sections above have outlined the theoretical framework regarding the establishment of 
regional integration agreements and the benefits that are considered to arise from it. This 
thesis is more concerned with providing a legal perspective of the effect of regional 
integration towards the promotion of development, namely the creation of regional legal 
frameworks which provide binding norms establishing obligations between the countries 
concerned, providing governance modes that tend to adapt to regional specificities and needs, 
while theoretically being compatible with the multilateral trade regime as regards trade and in 
some cases incorporating notions of development that were established multilaterally. In 
addition, these legal arrangements might go beyond the promotion of trade liberalization, 
which is proving to be a difficult task within the WTO and the multilateral trade system, as 
the debates regarding the inclusion of environmental and human rights as clear objectives of 
the WTO show.  
  
This section of the chapter has introduced some of the key concepts related to regional 
agreements. The following section continues by introducing the two regional blocs studied in 
the thesis, the European Union and MERCOSUR, by briefly describing their evolution, their 
objectives and the institutional structures of the process of integration. The justification of the 
choice of these case studies is that these two blocs represent interesting accomplishments and 
challenges related to the central argument of the thesis, that regional blocs can be a way of 
promoting development through the formation of legal arrangements that pursue this 
objective, both by economic integration and by positive measures that go beyond the 
economic sphere. The EU is an obvious choice for any study on regional integration, as it is 
considered nowadays to be the most advanced project of integration in force, and has 
advanced towards the deepest levels of economic integration, achieving political and 
monetary union, has created several positive policies that promote different goals such as 
environmental protection and external relations, and has created a solid legal framework that 
regulates these policies. In these ways, it constitutes a benchmark of what a regional bloc can 
accomplish, and an analysis of these policies provides both analytical data to evaluate the 
achievements of these goals, and insights regarding the analysis of other regional blocs.  
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MERCOSUR is still in the early stages of integration however, as its name suggests, it aims to 
create a common market. So far, and in spite of the recent crises, this supranational 
association seems successful, at least compared with the previous initiatives that have been 
adopted by Latin American countries over the past five decades. As this process of integration 
advances, the need for other policies in addition to economic integration will arise, and in this 
regard it also offers an advantage for this research in the differences it has vis-à-vis the EU. 
Indeed, the EU can be characterized as a large supranational association of twenty-seven 
members, whereas MERCOSUR is comprised of only four members and two associated 
countries, all of them emerging economies. Moreover, whereas the EU possesses institutional 
structures which are competent in a number of fields at adopting common policies which are 
automatically implemented in member countries, the MERCOSUR institutions are for the 
time being very light and have no autonomous decision-making procedures. All its policies 
are decided during inter-ministerial meetings and are applied by each state according to its 
own national rules. A final reason for choosing these two supranational associations is the fact 
that, since the creation of MERCOSUR in 1991, its members have often been inspired by the 
previous experiences of the EU, and the latter has also supported MERCOSUR institutions by 
sharing its know-how on diverse problems in relation to integration. Thus, the approach of the 
thesis is also to examine whether the EU can provide insight for the further development of 
MERCOSUR, not necessarily in its institutional structure, but rather in the way it created its 
framework to make the integration project work for the promotion of sustainable 
development.  
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Chapter 3 - Regional integration and development: one common goal, two different models 
 
Considerations made in the previous chapter allow the inference that the rationale of creating 
RIAs is on the one hand, to establish trade liberalization agreements that are, in a way, a sub-
product of the international trade regime – even if they are not always compatible with it in 
practice. Notwithstanding, this rationale has gradually encompassed the objective of providing a 
wider regulatory framework allowing the creation of regional governance schemes that also 
address other regional public goods. From a legal perspective, this thesis aims to analyze whether 
RIAs establish regimes that address these issues, as well as the role they might play in promoting 
an objective that is both connected with liberalization of trade and other public goods, namely 
sustainable development.  
 
In this regard, this chapter introduces the framework of the two RIAs that will be further analyzed 
in the next chapters. Here, the aim is to provide an overview of these regional blocs, based on 
their historical development and the establishment of their objectives, legal and institutional 
framework, giving particular emphasis to how this framework relates to the promotion of 
development.  
 
I. The European Union’s model of regional integration 
 
1. Background of the European integration process 
 
In the post-WWII period, there was a prevailing spirit of internationalism that led to the creation 
of international organizations such as the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund. In 
addition, within Europe countries were compelled to cooperate in order to benefit from the 
financial aid offered by the USA’s Marshall Plan. In this context, on May 9th 1950, the French 
Foreign Minister Robert Schuman made a declaration inviting Germany and other European 
countries to form a common market in coal, iron and steel. The reasons underlying this 
declaration were both political and economic: the aim was to stimulate economic growth through 
heavy industries as well as to safeguard peace. In his declaration, Schuman considered that 
European integration should be progressive and might include other areas of production, as well 
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as other members. On April 18th 1951, France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and 
the Netherlands signed the Treaty of Paris instituting the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC), which came into force on the 25th of July 1952. This Treaty instituted a supranational 
administration called the ‘High Authority’, which was to control the customs union that had been 
created for these products. The general policies and objectives of the High Authority were 
defined by a Council of the Community, composed of a representative from each member state, 
and by what can be seen as an embryonic European Parliament. There was also a European Court 
of Justice which was to operate in cases of legal problems arising from the implementation of the 
laws of the Community. 
 
After the establishment of the ECSC, in 1955 negotiations began with the intention of forming a 
common market and an atomic energy community, leading to the signature of the Treaty of Rome 
on March 25th 1957 by the six ECSC members, which came into force on the 1st of January 1958. 
The Treaty of Rome led to the existence of three separate but parallel communities: the ECSC for 
coal and steel; the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) for atomic energy; and the 
European Economic Community (EEC) for the creation of a common market among the six 
Member states, which agreed to progressively reduce their internal tariffs on all goods in order to 
reach duty-free trade within the customs union. Here interest will be devoted to the EEC.  
 
1.1 A common market 
 
The Treaty creating the EEC (TEC) laid the foundations of what would later become the EU, and 
the aim to promote development was already clear. The preamble of the Treaty included a recital 
stating among the essential objectives of parties “the constant improvement of the living and 
working conditions of their peoples”. Other mentions in the preamble included the “need for 
concerted action in order to guarantee steady expansion, balanced trade and fair competition, 
the wish to strengthen the unity of their economies and to ensure their harmonious development 
by reducing the differences existing between the various regions and the backwardness of the less 
favored regions and the aim to protect the values of peace and liberty”. These provisions 
underlined the aim of creating a community that would also have a rationale of promoting 
development, understood as the improvement of living standards of the people and the balancing 
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of levels of development of regions. The Community was designed to be a common market, but 
this was portrayed in an instrumental way: Article 2 declared that “the Community shall have as 
its task, by establishing a common market and progressively approximating the economic 
policies of Member states, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of 
economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an 
accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the States belonging to 
it”.  
 
The policies formally enshrined in the Treaty in order to achieve the objective of Article 2 were a 
common agricultural policy (Articles 38 to 47), common trade policy (Articles 110 to 116) and 
transport policy (Articles 74 to 84). In addition, a provision envisaged the creation of other 
policies depending on needs, as specified in Article 235, which stipulates that “if action by the 
Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the common 
market, one of the objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary 
powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after 
consulting the Assembly, take the appropriate measures”. After the Paris Summit of October 
1972, recourse to this Article enabled the Community to develop actions in the field of 
environmental, regional, social and industrial policy. The development of these policies was 
accompanied by the creation of a European Social Fund, the aim of which has been to improve 
job opportunities for workers and to raise their standards of living, and also of the European 
Investment Bank, to facilitate the Community's economic expansion by creating new resources.  
 
In addition, the fact that the Community would also have an external dimension was already 
present. The preamble stated the “desire to contribute, by means of a common commercial policy, 
to the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade, and also the solidarity which 
binds Europe and the overseas countries and (the desire) to ensure the development of their 
prosperity, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations”, which was 
complemented with a provision for association with overseas countries (this issue will be further 
developed in Chapter 5).  
 
Chapter	  3	  
	  
	  
108	  
The Treaty provided for the creation of a large institutional structure with a number of powers. In 
the beginning each Community was administered separately, until the Brussels Treaty of 1965 
merged the three executive bodies. Consequently, after 1965 there were only four institutions. 
Firstly, the Council of Ministers, which was the policy-making body, composed of 
representatives of the member governments, and was responsible for deciding the main political 
guidelines for the action of the European Communities. Secondly, the European Commission, 
which succeeded the High Authority, the executive organ responsible for the implementation of 
policies decided at the European level, composed of independent administrators nominated by the 
Council of Ministers. Thirdly, the European Parliament, which represented the interests of the 
people but had very few powers. Finally, a Court of Justice was to solve legal problems arising 
from the implementation of European decisions. In the early 1970s, the EC went through a first 
wave of enlargement. In 1973 three member states of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) 
joined the ‘original six’: England, Ireland and Denmark.  
 
1.2 A Single Market 
 
The early 1980s saw a pause in the process of European integration. National economies were 
still stagnating after the two oil shocks of the 1970s, and the representatives in the Council of 
Ministers were more concerned with national problems. Moreover, the process of integration 
itself seemed stalled since the achievements were less considerable than the aspirations aroused 
by the Treaty of Rome. To counter this trend, the European Commission, which was more 
independent from local concerns, began to reflect on the need to renew integration. In a ‘White 
Paper’ produced in 1985, Commissioner Lord Cockfield proposed a program aiming to complete 
the European internal market by the end of 1992, including a larger transfer of sovereignty from 
national to European institutions. In addition, the ‘second wave’ of enlargement took place to 
include Mediterranean countries: Greece acceded in January 1981, followed by Spain and 
Portugal in January 1986. This new enlargement had a different impact in the Community, since 
it concerned relatively poor and newly democratic countries and, as will be discussed further in 
Chapter 3, impacted on the later establishment of a regional development policy.  
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In this context, the Single European Act (SEA) was signed in February 1986, and entered into 
force the following year. This treaty revised the existing dispositions in relation to the European 
Communities, creating one European Community, and included new resolutions for the creation 
of more political cooperation among member states. The main aim of the SEA was economic: to 
complete the European internal market, defined as “an area without internal frontiers in which 
the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the 
provisions of this Treaty”. It therefore confirmed the necessity to remove all barriers which 
hindered the ‘four freedoms of movement’, those of goods, services, capital and people. Indeed, 
in 1985 there were still a considerable number of obstacles to such movement. Non-tariff 
barriers, such as internal customs formalities and different technical standards, limited the 
movement of goods. There were distortions in competition because of state aids to industry and 
protectionism in public procurement practices. The SEA provided for the increased 
harmonization of national regulations. Each member state was to recognize the others’ rules and 
to eliminate all contradictions. It also aimed to improve the decision-making procedures within 
European institutions, abandoning unanimity voting, which had until then prevailed within the 
Council of Ministers, in favor of a system of qualified majority or normal majority voting for 
most decisions. 
 
In addition, the SEA introduced several policy changes:  
i) It included provisions on monetary capacity.  
ii) Social policy was already regulated by the EEC Treaty, but the act introduced two new articles 
in this area, Article 118A, authorizing the Council to act by a qualified majority in the framework 
of the cooperation procedure to take the minimum requirements with a view to "encouraging 
improvements, especially in the working environment, as regards the health and safety of 
workers", and Article 118B of the EC Treaty entrusting the Commission to develop dialogue 
between management and labor at the European level.  
iii) It established a Community economic and social policy, which will be discussed further in 
Chapter 3. 
iv) Research and technical development provisions (Article 130F) were included to strengthen 
the scientific and technological basis of European industry and to encourage it to become more 
competitive at the international level. 
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v) Concern for environmental protection at Community level was already reflected in the Treaty 
of Rome, but the SEA added three new articles (Articles 130R, 130S and 130T of the EC Treaty) 
which committed the Community “to preserve, protect and improve the quality of the 
environment, to contribute towards protecting human health, and to ensure a prudent and 
rational utilization of natural resources”. These provisions only authorized the Community to 
intervene in environmental matters under the principle of subsidiarity, at times when action could 
be more effectively achieved at Community level than at the level of member states. 
vi) Finally, Article 30 provided that member states must endeavor jointly to formulate and 
implement a European foreign policy.  
 
1.3 A European Union 
 
The Community went through another revolution with the signature of the Maastricht Treaty in 
1992, which entered into force in 1993, and came as result of both external and internal events. 
Externally, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the reunification of Germany led 
to a commitment to reinforce the Community's international position. Internally, the Member 
states wished to supplement the progress achieved by the SEA with other reforms. The Treaty 
was innovative in a number of ways, as it stated that the final aim was to create a European 
Political Union. To facilitate this political integration, two new pillars were added to the earlier 
European Community, a common policy for external relations and security matters (the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy(CFSP)), as well as the harmonization of judicial and home affairs 
(Community of Home and Judicial Affairs(CHJA)). In addition, it introduced the objective of 
creating an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which later led to the establishment of the 
Euro, the single currency which has been used since 1st of January 1999 in the countries which 
joined the EMU, although national currencies were definitively abandoned for the Euro only in 
mid-February 2002.  
 
From an institutional perspective, the Maastricht Treaty also expanded the role of the European 
Parliament, extending the scope of the cooperation procedure to new areas and creating a new 
codecision procedure allowing the Parliament to adopt acts in conjunction with the Council. As 
regards the Commission, the duration of its term of office has been extended from four to five 
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years with a view to aligning it with that of the European Parliament. Like the SEA, this Treaty 
extended qualified majority voting within the Council to cover most decisions under the 
codecision procedure and all decisions under the cooperation procedure. The Treaty on European 
Union also established the principle of subsidiarity as a general rule, which was initially applied 
to environmental policy in the SEA. This principle specifies that in areas not within its exclusive 
powers, the Community shall only take action where objectives can best be attained at 
Community rather than at national level.  
 
The Maastricht Treaty also brought the first reference, although indirect, to sustainable 
development in the EU legal framework– coinciding with the UNCED 1992. The new Treaty on 
the European Union (TEU) stated in Article B that “the Union shall set itself the following 
objectives: to promote economic and social progress which is balanced and sustainable, in 
particular through the creation of an area without internal frontiers, through the strengthening of 
economic and social cohesion”. In addition, the amendments to the Treaty on the European 
Community (TEC) included among the EC’s objectives in Article 2, “to promote throughout the 
Community a harmonious and balanced development of economic activities, sustainable and 
non-inflationary growth respecting the environment”, and the precautionary principle was 
written into the article on which environmental policy is founded (Article 174, ex Article 130r, of 
the EC Treaty). Beyond that, it upgraded action on the environment to the status of a ‘policy’ in 
its own right and made qualified majority voting in the Council the general rule. The only 
exceptions are matters such as environmental taxes, town and country planning and land use, 
where unanimity remains the norm. Furthermore, the Treaty provided for Community policies in 
six new areas: trans-European networks; industrial policy; consumer protection; education and 
vocational training; youth; and culture. 
 
The EU went through a new phase of enlargement in January 1995 with the accession of three 
other EFTA countries: Austria, Finland, and Sweden. Following this event, the EU was once 
again revised through the signature of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. The negotiations which led 
to the signature of the Treaty aimed to create political and institutional conditions to enable the 
EU to face the challenges of the future, such as the rapid evolution of the international situation, 
the globalization of the economy and its impact on jobs, the fight against terrorism, international 
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crime and drug trafficking, ecological problems and threats to public health. They led to the 
amendment of both the TEU and the TEC, introducing reforms in four main areas:1  
 
i) freedom, security and justice, related to the rights, interests, and well-being of individual 
citizens, such as the development of the concept of European citizenship, with additions to the 
list of civic rights enjoyed by citizens of the Union and a clarification of the link between 
national citizenship and European citizenship, and a chapter on employment in the TEC; 
ii) effectiveness and coherence of external policy in two sections, an economic one dealing with 
extending the scope of the common commercial policy to include international agreements on 
services and intellectual property rights, and a political one on the reform of the common foreign 
and security policy (CFSP), creating the instruments of the common strategy and improved 
decision-making thanks to greater use of qualified majority voting in the Council; 
iii) the creation of the post of High Representative for the common foreign and security policy to 
give the CFSP greater prominence and coherence;  
iv) finally, institutional areas.  
 
1.4 Current outlook: the Lisbon Reform 
 
An initial attempt to review the EU took place with the drawing up of the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe. The aim was to replace the founding Treaties of the EU with a European 
Constitution, which was signed in Rome on 29th October 2004, but did not enter into force since 
the ratification process failed in several Member states. The most important background event to 
this reform was the accession of the Eastern countries to the EU in 2004. In July 2007, a new 
intergovernmental conference was convened in Lisbon to find an alternative to the constitutional 
Treaty and to proceed with the reforms. The idea of a European Constitution was therefore 
abandoned and further negotiations took place with the aim of drawing up an amending Treaty. 
On 13th December 2007, the 27 EU Heads of state or government signed the new amending 
Treaty in Lisbon, which entered into force on 1st December 2009. The TL introduced reforms in 
several areas, among which were:2 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/amsterdam_treaty/a09000_en.htm.  
2 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/lisbon_treaty/ai0033_en.htm.  
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i) institutional aspects: among many issues, the decision-making process within the Council was 
changed, abolishing the old system of weighted voting and introducing a new definition of 
qualified majority voting for decisions. Furthermore, two new functions were introduced in the 
EU institutional architecture: the President of the European Council; and the High Representative 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Finally, it also abolished the old pillar structure, unified 
now in the EU, and introduced a new distribution of competences between the EU and Member 
states.  
 
ii) the introduction of new competence on energy policy, and clarified EU powers in the areas of 
economic, social and energy policy. It also set as a new objective the creation of a European 
Research Area. 
 
iii) finally, EU action at international level was increased. Above all, the Treaty of Lisbon aimed 
to achieve greater coherence and visibility to the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, and 
the EU acquired legal personality, enabling it to negotiate and be a contracting party in 
international Treaties. In addition, the EU has since been represented globally by the High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 
 
2. Specific features of the EU as an integration project 
 
2.1 The EU as an autonomous legal order 
 
Considering the institutional framework and the policy areas outlined above, it is important to 
highlight another feature which is fundamental to the EU: the fact that it is a RIA founded on a 
solid legal framework, and constitutes an autonomous legal order notwithstanding the importance 
of its political dimension. The EU is driven by a framework of treaties which create rules 
governing the legal personality, competences and actions of the supranational organization itself, 
taking many competences from member states, and also rules creating obligations of action by 
them, either by direct action or through coordination and cooperation. This legal order was 
established by legislation but was further developed by judicial interpretation. Regarding its legal 
base, there are currently three sources of European Union law:  
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i) primary law: the TEU and TFEU, the amending EU Treaties, the protocols annexed to the 
founding Treaties and to the amending Treaties, and the Treaties on new Member states’ 
accession to the EU; 
ii) secondary law: Unilateral acts that can be divided into two categories: those listed in Article 
288 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU -regulations, directives, decisions, opinions and 
recommendations; and those not listed in Article 288 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU 
i.e. ‘atypical’ acts such as communications and recommendations, white and green papers. 
Conventions and Agreements group together: international agreements signed by the EU and a 
country or outside organizations; agreements between member states; and interinstitutional 
agreements, i.e. agreements between EU institutions. It is important to highlight that while 
regulations are binding in their entirety and directly applicable in all Member states, directives 
must be transposed, notwithstanding the fact that Member states are under obligation to do so and 
can be held liable for failure in this regard;  
iii) sources of supplementary law: Besides the case law of the Court of Justice, supplementary 
law includes international law and the general principles of law. It has enabled the Court to 
bridge the gaps left by primary and/or secondary law. 
 
The central role played by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) should be highlighted. The ECJ’s 
case law has shaped market and political integration, the balance of power between the organs of 
the EU, the ‘constitutional’ boundaries between international, supranational and national 
authority, and the interpretation of community law favoring the objective of the integration 
project. Comparatively, the ECJ’s impact on its legal and political environment rivals the 
significance of that of the world’s most powerful national supreme and constitutional courts. The 
treaty system has been ‘transformed’ through judicial rulings, characterized as the 
‘constitutionalization’ of the regime. This transformation proceeded with the consolidation of the 
‘constitutional’ doctrines of direct effect and supremacy of EU legal rules, first announced by the 
Court in the 1960s in the judgments given on the affairs of Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse 
Administratie der Belastingen, a case in 1963 in which the ECJ recognized the direct effect of 
Community law on national legislative systems; and a further case in 1964, Costa v. ENEL, 
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which established the principle of inherent supremacy of Community law over national law.3 The 
importance of the ECJ to the development of EU law has again been apparent in the recent and 
notorious ‘Kadi Case’, in which it stated that the EU has formed an autonomous legal order.4  
 
2.2 The EU as a Community of values and a global actor 
 
More than an organization based on a legal framework, the EU has become also a community 
founded on values, which it aims to promote not only within its borders, but also in the wider 
world. In this regard, it is considered that the EU exerts a growing normative influence. As one 
commentator puts it, “refocusing away from debate over either civilian or military power, it is 
possible to think of the ideational impact of the EU’s international identity/role as representing 
normative power. (…) Conceptions of the EU as either civilian or military power, both located in 
discussions of capabilities, need to be augmented with a focus on normative power of an 
ideational nature characterized by common principles and a willingness to disregard 
Westphalian conventions. (...) The constitution of the EU as a political entity has largely 
occurred as an elite-driven, treaty based, legal order. For this reason, its constitutional norms 
represent crucial constitutive factors determining its international identity. The principles of 
democracy, rule of law, social justice and respect for human rights were first made explicit in the 
1973 Copenhagen declaration on European identity, although the centrality of many of these 
norms was only constitutionalized in the TEU. As Alston and Weiler have argued, ‘a strong 
commitment to human rights is one of the principal characteristics of the European Union (1999, 
p.6). Von Bogdandy, Lenaerts and de Smijter support this argument when they observe that a 
‘most prominent piece of evidence is the European Council’s decision at its Cologne Summit that 
a human rights charter should be drafted for the European Union because ‘protection of 
fundamental rights is a founding principle of the Union and an indispensable prerequisite for her 
legitimacy’ (…)[and] that ‘some thirty years before this decision, the Court of Justice had 
already confirmed that ‘fundamental rights [are] enshrined in the general principles of 
Community law and protected by the Court (…). This combination of historical context, hybrid 
polity and legal constitution has, in the post-cold war period, accelerated a commitment to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 E. Stein, “Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution.” American Journal of International 
Law, 75: 1981. 
4 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, ECJ Press Release 60/08. 
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placing universal norms and principles at the center of its relations with the Member state and 
the world. The EU has gone further towards making its external relations informed by and 
conditional on, a catalog of norms which come closer to those of the ECHR and the UDHR than 
most other actors in world politics” (emphasis added).5 Manners adds that it is possible to 
identify, in the EU’s normative basis, five core norms:  
 
i) peace, found in key symbolic declarations and the TEC preamble;  
ii) liberty, found in the TEC preamble and in the TEU, Article 6; and 
iii) democracy, rule of law and human rights, all found among the founding principles in the TEU 
preamble and other provisions in the treaties.  
 
In addition, four minor norms within the constitution and practice of the EU can be added, even if 
these are more contested:  
 
iv) social solidarity, found throughout the acquis communautaire et politique and particularly in 
the preambles of the TEU and TEC, the objectives of TEU Article 2 and TEC Article 2;  
v) anti-discrimination, found in Article and Title XI of TEC;  
vi) sustainable development, enshrined in Article 2 TEU, Article 2 and 6 TEC; and 
vii) good governance, found more in policy strategies than in legal rules.  
 
Furthermore, he highlights that a normative basis alone does not make the EU a normative 
power, but rather that this stems from six ways in which the EU diffuses these norms: 
unintentional contagion to other political actors, both informational contagion such as policy 
initiatives, or procedural, such as through a cooperation agreement; transference of these norms 
in the form of financial rewards, economic sanctions or ‘carrots and sticks’ in relationships with 
other actors; over-diffusion as result of the physical presence of the EU, such as through its 
delegations in third parties; and cultural filters based on construction of knowledge and the 
creation of social and political identity in third parties. He concludes that not only is the EU  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 I. Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: a contradiction in terms?’ JCMS 40, 2002, pages 235-58.  
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constructed on a normative basis but that it has also predisposed itself to act normatively in world 
politics.6  
 
This feature of the EU distinguishes it from other regional blocs and shapes its identity, making it 
a sui generis type of international organization, as a supranational union of partially sovereign 
nations -but not a federation as such- which nevertheless increasingly aims to have an identity 
and act as a global player, going much further in shaping both its internal governance and also 
international relations. In this regard, Marise Cremona discusses the roles that the EU can be 
considered to play, highlighting five particular examples:7  
 
i) the EU serves as a laboratory and model of regional integration, which “exemplifies not only 
the potential substantive scope of regional integration but also its character or depth, in 
particular the rule-oriented nature of its legal order”;  
ii) an active player in the global market, both in securing the defense of its own markets and 
producers, and in offensively using its economic power as a lever to open up markets, offering 
market access in return for reciprocal advantages;  
iii) a generator and exporter of rules and regulatory models, both in introducing its own 
regulatory norms to specific third countries as part of market-opening or integration strategies, as 
well as in its participation in multilateral rule-setting within the WTO and other forums; this role 
is particularly interesting here, as the EU was an active participant in several of the multilateral 
conferences referred to in Chapter 1, such as the UNCED, and has recently been granted 
enhanced status of participation within the UN General Assembly: in addition to its former 
observer status, the EU shall now present the positions of the European Union and its member 
states as agreed by them, and shall be (a) allowed to be inscribed on the list of speakers among 
representatives of major groups, in order to make interventions; (b) invited to participate in the 
general debate of the General Assembly, taking into account the practice for participating 
observers; (c) permitted to have its communications relating to the sessions and work of the 
General Assembly and to the sessions and work of all international meetings and conferences 
convened under the auspices of the Assembly and of United Nations conferences circulated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 I. Manners, op. cit.  
7 M. Cremona, The Union as a Global Actor: roles, models and identity, Common Market Law Review 41, 2004 
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directly, and without intermediary, as documents of the Assembly, meeting or conference; (d) 
permitted to present proposals and amendments agreed by the member states of the European 
Union; (e) allowed to raise points of order but not to challenge decisions of the presiding officer; 
(f) also allowed to exercise the right of reply regarding the positions of the European Union. The 
right to vote has not been granted though, but still this is an innovation regarding the status of 
regional organizations within the UN, and might open the way to similar requests by other RIAs, 
which has already been envisaged in the relevant UN declaration.8  
iv) a ‘stabilizer’ in foreign policy both within Europe and internationally, by exporting values 
such as democracy, by defending international law and multilateral solutions to problems, by 
promoting a regional approach both in terms of regional integration and of political stability, such 
as the case of its relationship with MERCOSUR, discussed further in Chapter 6; 
v) finally, as a neighbor which uses enlargement as a tool of foreign policy.  
 
As another commentator argues, by performing these roles the EU ultimately seeks both to 
legitimize its role as a global player and to promote a model of international relations in which 
RIAs are recognized as relevant actors.9 These ‘normative’ influences that the EU attempts to 
exert and its supposed roles will be discussed further in the next chapters through analysis of the 
EU’s policies and how they integrate sustainable development.  
 
3. Sustainable development in the EU legal framework 
 
3.1 Treaty basis and EU strategies 
 
The Amsterdam Treaty also gave greater prominence to sustainable development.10 In the TEU 
preamble, the 7th recital was amended to include that the Member states were “determined to 
promote economic and social progress for their peoples, taking into account the principle of 
sustainable development and within the context of the accomplishment of the internal market and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 UNGA A/65/L.64/Rev.1, April 2011.  
9 F. Söderbaum et al, ‘The EU as a global actor and the dynamics of interregionalism: a comparative analysis’, 
Journal of European Integration, 27:3, 2005. 
10 In this regard, it should be noted that this impetus to promote sustainable development has been influenced by 
Finland and Sweden, two Nordic countries with strong environmental concerns that acceded to the EU in 1995. 
L. Kramer, ‘Sustainable development in EC Law’, in H. C. Bugge and C. Voigt, Sustainable development in national 
and international law, Europa Law Publishers, 2008, p. 377-96. 
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of reinforced cohesion and environmental protection, and to implement policies ensuring that 
advances in economic integration are accompanied by parallel progress in other fields” 
(emphasis author’s own); Article B was also amended (and renumbered article 2) to include a 
direct link to sustainable development: “The Union shall set itself the following objectives: to 
promote economic and social progress and a high level of employment and to achieve balanced 
and sustainable development, in particular through the creation of an area without internal 
frontiers, through the strengthening of economic and social cohesion”. A direct mention of 
sustainable development thus replaced the earlier indirect reference to ‘sustainable growth’ and 
emerged as both an objective and a guiding principle of the whole Union. More amendments 
were made in the TEC: Article 2 stated that “the Community shall have as its task, by 
establishing a common market and an economic and monetary union and by implementing 
common policies or activities referred to in Articles 3 and 4, to promote throughout the 
Community a harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic activities, a high 
level of employment and of social protection, equality between men and women, sustainable and 
non-inflationary growth, a high degree of competitiveness and convergence of economic 
performance, a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment, the 
raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and 
solidarity among Member states” (emphasis added). The previous reference to “harmonious and 
balanced” was thus replaced by a direct mention of sustainable development and its three pillars; 
in addition, the new Article 6 stated that “environmental protection requirements must be 
integrated into the definition and implementation of the Community policies and activities 
referred to in Article 3, in particular with a view to promoting sustainable development”. This 
provision internalized the principle of integration within the EU legal framework. 
 
The innovations introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty show that sustainable development became 
a guiding principle of EU policies in general, being granted a place in its charter. Nevertheless, 
no definition of the meaning of sustainable development has been provided in primary law, being 
found only in policy documents drafted afterwards. A first ‘Sustainable Development Strategy’ 
for the EU was presented in 2001, complemented in 2005 by the 'Declaration on the guiding 
principles for sustainable development',11 which reiterated the commitment to sustainable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Council document 10255/1/05, available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu.  
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development as a key principle governing all policies and activities. The declaration set key 
objectives and guiding principles to “serve as a basis for the renewed sustainable development 
strategy, comprising targets, indicators and an effective monitoring procedure, to be adopted 
before the end of 2005”:  the promotion and protection of fundamental rights;  – “placing human 
beings at the centre of the European Union’s policies”; solidarity – intra and intergenerational 
equity; democracy and access to justice; public participation in decision-making; involvement of 
social dialogue, corporate social responsibility and private-public partnerships to foster 
cooperation and common responsibilities to achieve sustainable production and consumption; 
precaution - preventive action to avoid damage to human health or to the environment; the 
‘polluters pay’ principle; coherence between all policies and good governance; and integration of 
economic, social and environmental considerations in all policies by using instruments such as 
balanced impact assessment. The document also expressed a commitment to ensure “that the 
EU’s internal and external policies are consistent with global sustainable development and its 
international commitments”, implying that the EU should promote it internally, integrating 
sustainable development into all its policies, but also externally, by improving coherence between 
internal and external policy objectives, and providing development aid and cooperation at the 
international level; in addition, recognizing that the concept of sustainable development should 
be consistent in relation to international declarations and agreements.   
 
In 2006 the Council adopted a renewed Sustainable Development Strategy (SDS), proposing 
seven key challenges and corresponding targets, operational objectives and actions that should 
guide policy design and implementation: to limit climate change; to ensure a sustainable transport 
system; to promote sustainable consumption and production patterns; to improve management 
and avoid overexploitation of natural resources; to promote good public health; to create a 
socially inclusive society by taking into account solidarity between and within generations; and 
to promote sustainable development worldwide and ensure that the EU’s internal and external 
policies are consistent with global sustainable development and its international commitments – 
meeting the commitments of the EU regarding internationally agreed goals and targets, in 
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particular those of the Millennium and Johannesburg declarations and related processes such as 
the Monterrey Consensus, the DDA and the Paris Declaration on Aid Harmonization.12 
 
The Lisbon Treaty also reinforced the status of sustainable development within the EU. The 
preamble of the new TEU maintained the determination to “promote economic and social 
progress for their peoples, taking into account the principle of sustainable development”. In the 
common provisions part, Article 3(3) states that the “Union shall establish an internal market. It 
shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and 
price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social 
progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. It 
shall promote scientific and technological advance. It shall combat social exclusion and 
discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality between women and 
men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child” (emphasis added). 
On the external dimension, Article 3(5) states that, “in its relations with the wider world, the 
Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its 
citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity 
and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection 
of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the 
development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations 
Charter.” Moreover, in Title V, covering the general provisions on external action, Article 21.2 
determines that the Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work 
for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to, among other 
issues: (d) foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing 
countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty; (f) help develop international measures to 
preserve and improve the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global 
natural resources, in order to ensure sustainable development; and (h) promote an international 
system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Council document 10917/06. In the context of the follow up procedures established, the Commission published a 
report, COM(2007) 642, available as Council document 14238/07, in which it evaluates progress of the 
commitments established at the SDS as showing “relatively modest progress on the ground”, but more encouraging 
initiatives at EU and member state level. 
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This treaty reform was complemented in 2009 when the Commission presented a review of the 
2006 SDS, assessing the stage of implementation of the strategies on the seven keys areas and 
proposing new focal points. As regards the external agenda, the external dimension of sustainable 
development was cited amongst other new challenges which are not or are only marginally 
covered in the SDS, and which should concentrate on climate change and the promotion of the 
MDGs. Particular areas where attention should be focused include the contribution to a low-
carbon and low-input economy and a shift towards sustainable consumption patterns, as well as 
the strengthening of the international dimension of sustainable development and efforts to combat 
global poverty. Among the highlighted policies was the mainstreaming of sustainable 
development externally through tools such as impact assessments of trade agreements - which 
will be further discussed below.13  
 
The solid legal framework and broad strategies have granted the EU a legal basis to pursue 
sustainable development through a series of different policies. This shows that sustainable 
development is nowadays both an objective and a guiding principle and that the bloc aims to 
integrate it into all policy fields. Nevertheless, the definition of sustainable development is 
provided in policy statements that represent political commitment, but on the other hand are not 
legally binding and thus might leave space for political bargaining in the implementation phase. 
 
3.2 The EU procedural tools of sustainable development: Impact Assessment procedures  
 
One innovative instrument developed within the EU as a reflex of the introduction of a legal basis 
and strategies addressing development has been the creation of a procedural instrument 
understood as being one of the main practical expressions of this principle, the ‘impact 
assessment’ procedure. ‘Impact assessment’ (IA) is a procedure which produces a statement to 
guide decision-making, providing decision-makers with information about likely consequences of 
proposed activities and requiring decisions to be influenced by such findings, while also 
providing a mechanism of participation for potentially affected stakeholders in the decision-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Parliament, the Council, the ECOSOC and 
the Committee of the Regions, Mainstreaming sustainable development into EU policies: review of the 2006 SDS, 
COM (2009) 400. 
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making process.14 This type of procedure first emerged in regard to environmental concerns 
related to pollution control, and was intended to offer a different form of environmental 
protection in its procedural requirement of analysis before authorization for public or individual 
projects, instead of substantive measures relying on regulation and compliance. The main idea 
behind this instrument is to direct change or reorient decision-making towards more 
environmentally favorable outcomes, essentially contributing to political planning procedures 
used as a precautionary tool, encouraging consideration of the likely outcomes in advance, being 
thus an example of the principle of integration of environmental protection.15 
 
The ‘environmental impact assessment’ (EIA) is regarded as ‘first generation procedure’, 
concerned with mitigating the impact of major development projects rather than maintaining the 
integrity of the environment. A second generation of assessment came in the form of ‘strategic 
impact assessment’ (SEA), which extended the scope of analysis to plans and programs of public 
authorities, and aiming to address both the sources and effects of environmental damage. 
Nowadays a ‘third generation’ procedure is being developed in international environmental law 
in the form of ‘sustainability impact assessment’ (SIA), extending the scope to full analysis of 
social, economic and environmental impacts of proposed measures.16  
 
This shift in international environmental law, influenced by the concept of sustainable 
development, was reflected in the scope and functions ascribed to IAs in two main ways: firstly, 
facilitating the balancing of competing interests - economic, social and environmental - rather 
than favoring absolute environmental protection, so that environmental concerns are taken into 
account in decision making but do not necessarily predominate - the idea of environmental 
management, instead of preservation, is in line with the more efficiency-oriented vision of the 
ecological agenda nowadays.17 In addition, the ‘procedural’ aspect indicates the development of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 P Sands, Principles of international environmental law (Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
15 J Holder and M Lee, Environmental Protection, Law and Policy: Text and Materials, Cambridge University Press, 
2007. The principle of integration of environmental concerns on decision making can be seen in several international 
documents, i.e., Principle 4 of the Rio Declaration and Article 6 of the Treaty of the European Community (now 
Article   
16 J Holder, op. cit. 
17 J Holder, op. cit. 
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new forms of governance that rely less on command-and-control regulation and more on 
education, persuasion and social learning as means of achieving (sometimes unforeseen) results.18 
 
This form of assessment was mentioned in the UNCED in 1992 and the ILA New Delhi 
Declaration of 2002 as a tool for the promotion of sustainable development, and has been 
developed in different ways by different actors in the international scenario, being present in 
several multilateral organizations, as regards their own activities or in the form of non binding 
guidelines for national policy, or by national states in varying degrees and scopes.19 The EU had 
a relevant role in its implementation and further development, in two important steps: firstly, the 
EU enacted two Directives which created forms of IA directed at its Member states: the 
‘Environmental Impact Assessment’ Directive enacted in 198620 was the first binding 
international instrument to provide details on the nature and scope of EIAs, their use, and 
participation rights in the process, being considered as a first generation process concerned with 
mitigating the impact of major development projects. Following, in 2001 the Directive 
establishing a ‘Strategic Environmental Assessment’ procedure was enacted, representing a 
second-generation process that extended the scope of assessment to include public plans and 
programs.21  
 
A second step was taken when the Commission of the EU established an IA procedure for its 
own activities, as the fact had been recognized that it was untenable to require Member states’ 
compliance with the EIA and SEA procedures when the Commission itself did not apply these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 J Holder and M Lee, op cit. 
19 A form of ex-ante impact assessment was first established in the 1969 National Environmental Protection Act in 
the United States of America (at the national level), and afterwards emerged in a series of non-binding instruments, 
such as the UNEP Guidelines of 1978 and 1982 and other International Organizations such as the 1985 OECD 
Council recommendation C(85)104, and the World Bank. The 1987 ‘Brundtland Report’ identifies EIA as an 
emerging principle of international law, and the 1992 UNCED (Rio Declaration, principle 17) recognized that EIA, 
“as a national instrument, shall be undertaken for proposed activities that are likely to have a significant adverse 
impact on the environment and are subject to a decision of a competent national authority”, while public 
participation was also referred to in principle 10; Agenda 21 also makes several references, and endorses the need for 
individuals, groups and organizations to participate in EIA procedures (para. 23.2); the 2002 WSSD confirmed 
UNCEDʼs requirements (para. 18e, 34c and 36i of Plan of Implementation). It also appears in international treaties 
aside from the EU’s, such as 1982 UNCLOS, Article 206; the 1991 UNECE Espoo Convention which focuses on 
transboundary environmental effects; the 1998 UNECE Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters; and the 2003 UNECE Kiev 
Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment to the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a 
Transboundary Context. 
20 Directive 85/337/EEC, OJ L175, July 1985. 
21 Directive 2001/42/EC, OJ, June 2001. 
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measures to its own actions.22 In this regard, in 2002 a new procedure was introduced, with two 
innovative aspects: it was to be applied to all policy and legislative proposals of the Commission, 
thus having in theory a considerably more far-reaching scope and impact; moreover, it was based 
on a ‘sustainable development’ rationale, meaning that it included the economic and social 
spheres in addition to the environmental one, and created a mechanism for public participation in 
the procedure.23   
 
The legal development of the Commission’s IA procedure followed a different path than the EIA 
and SIA Directives - which had as legal basis Article 175 of the EC Treaty (the environmental 
policy) - as it was based on the idea of sustainable development as a guiding principle and 
objective of the whole Union, and was further developed on the basis of policy guidelines rather 
than legal instruments. Two main policy documents were behind this idea: the first SDS in 2001, 
determining the consideration of the effects of policy proposals in their economic, social and 
environmental dimensions;24 and the 2002 ‘Better Regulation Action Plan’25, setting out 
initiatives to promote effective and efficient regulation as part of the efforts of the European 
Institutions and Member states to fulfill the objectives of the Lisbon Strategy set in 2000.26   
 
Based on these two policy plans and their requirements, and following up on a model that was 
being developed by the Commission’s Directorate General for Trade regarding external trade 
policies since 1999,27 in 2002 the Commission issued a communication establishing a “new 
impact assessment method [that] integrates all sectoral assessments concerning direct and 
indirect impacts of a proposed measure into one global instrument, hence moving away from the 
existing situation of a number of partial and sectoral assessments”, and being “developed after 
examining established procedures in Member states and other OECD countries... to combine the 
best features of Impact Assessment systems in use elsewhere.” The communication stressed that 
the IA was a response to the call for regulatory and sustainable development tools, but that it was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Five years report on the effectiveness of the EIA, European Commission, DG for Environment. 
23 COM (2002)276. 
24 COM (2001)264.  
25 COM (2002)278. 
26 European Council in Lisbon (March 2000). 
27 DG for Trade had since 1999 been developing a ‘sustainability impact assessment (SIA) for major trade agreement 
negotiations, mainly the Doha Round of the WTO. See http://ec.europa.eu/trade/analysis/sustainability-impact-
assessments.  Trade SIAs will be further discussed in Chapter 5. 
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“an aid to decision-making, not a substitute for political judgment”, which would “not 
necessarily generate clear-cut conclusions or recommendations, but provide an important input 
by informing decision-makers of the consequences of policy choices”, being “an integral part of 
the process of designing policy proposals and making decision-makers and the public aware of 
the likely impacts.”28 
 
In this regard, some important observations should be made: firstly, in relation to the coverage of 
the procedure, the aim is to allow decisions to be taken based on “sound analysis of the potential 
impact on society and on a balanced appraisal of the various policy instruments”, and thus “all 
Commission legislative and all other policy proposals proposed for inclusion in the Annual 
Policy Strategy or the Commission and Work Program (…) will be subject to the impact 
assessment procedure, provided that they have a potential economic, social and/or 
environmental impact and/or require some regulatory measure for their implementation. A 
second principle is that of the proposals submitted (…), impact assessment will only be required 
for: regulatory proposals, such as directives and regulations, and in an appropriate form, other 
proposals such as white papers, expenditure programs and negotiating guidelines for 
international agreements that have an economic, social or environmental impact. (…) However, 
certain types of proposal will normally be exempt from the impact assessment procedure” 
(emphasis added). For this purpose, the Communication determined a two-step filtering 
procedure, based on a short preliminary assessment of all work program proposals, and second an 
extended assessment of the selected proposals.29 Analyzing these points, it can be concluded that 
in spite of the aim of submitting all proposals to an IA procedure, the criteria determined that a 
proposal would be assessed if it had a significant impact and listed possible exemptions, showing 
a flexibility of application which could lead to political influence on the decision as to whether or 
not to submit a proposal for assessment.  
 
Secondly, regarding the impact of the findings of the procedure, the Communication stresses that 
the IA is an aid to the final policy choice, not a substitute for political judgment. In this regard, 
the procedure should, firstly, make a recommendation regarding “a preferred basic approach and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 COM (2002)276.  
29 COM (2002)276, section 3.  
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the optimal policy instrument” to adopt the proposed measure, and focus on improving the 
effectiveness of the proposal. Finally, the impact assessment reports will be adopted by the 
Commission as supporting working documents of the services and transmitted together and in 
parallel with the proposal to the other institutions.30 It can thus be inferred that the findings of the 
assessment, while stressing the impact of the proposed measure and searching for the best way to 
implement it within the available options, are not binding on the concerned decision-making 
authority, but should rather be taken into account in the final decisions.31    
 
The technical procedural aspects were determined through guidelines issued by the Commission, 
creating an Impact Assessment Board that each year, with the Secretariat-General and 
Commission departments, screens all forthcoming initiatives and decides on those for which an 
Impact Assessment is needed, and determines the key analytical and procedural steps to be taken 
during the process.32 In addition, the Commission issued a Communication specifically on the 
public participation dimension, determining a clear element of the consultation process to be 
carried out, including a summary of the context, scope and objectives of consultation, and steps 
for the definition of the target groups to be consulted.33 Since the start of the activities of the IA 
procedure, a large number of assessments has been carried out and can be consulted on the 
website created by the Commission.34 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 COM (2002)276, sections 4 and 5.  
31 As explicitly stated in the guidelines, “the IA work is a key element in the development of Commission proposals, 
and the College of Commissioners will take the IA report into account when taking its decisions. The IA supports and 
does not replace decision-making – the adoption of a policy proposal is always a political decision that is made only 
by the College.”  
32 SEC(2005)791, renewed in 2009, SEC(2009)92. The analytical steps are: identify the problem; define the 
objectives; develop main policy options; analyze the impacts of the options; compare the options; outline policy 
monitoring and evaluation. The procedural steps are: 1. plan impact assessment roadmap, set up an Impact 
Assessment Steering Group and involve it in all IA work phases; consult interested parties, collect expertise and 
analyze the results; carry out the IA analysis; present the findings in the IA report; present the draft IA report 
together with the executive summary to the Impact Assessment Board (IAB) and take into account the possible time 
needed to resubmit a revised version; finalize the IA report in the light of the IAB's recommendations; IA report and 
IAB opinion(s) go into Inter-Service Consultation alongside the proposal; submission of IA report, executive 
summary, IAB opinion(s) and proposal to the College of Commissioners; transmission of the IA report and the 
executive summary with the proposal to the other Institutions; final IA report and IAB opinion(s) published on EU 
website by SG. 
33 COM (2002)704. 
34 See the Commission Impact Assessment Program website, where a list of all impact assessments carried out to this 
date is available, including all preparatory documents and reports: 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/key_docs/key_docs_en.htm. 
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IA procedures are welcomed by literature as providing integrated analysis and public 
participation, both crucial to democratically legitimate and more sustainable decision-making. 
There are, however, several concerns and pitfalls which have been identified by scholars in this 
move from representative to participatory forms of governance. Firstly, their ‘power to seduce’, 
namely the chance for the developer to present the project with ‘environmental gloss’, or merely 
giving the impression of balancing sustainability aspects without being accountable for the 
outcome of the project/plan, as IAs can also be used as a tool to legitimize a project or program 
through increased public consultation and participation.35 Moreover, two main challenges are 
faced in bringing relevance to the process: firstly, the question of determining which proposals 
should be assessed, and the scope of the assessment itself; secondly, the fact that the final 
findings are not binding but have only to be taken into consideration in the final decision, which 
might undermine their practical effectiveness.  
 
In addition, some issues are raised regarding the public participation aspects of the IA. Firstly, it 
is highlighted that participation might actually generate exclusion, given the difficulty in creating 
institutions and situations in which meaningful public participation can take place: for instance, 
how to choose and limit the public to be involved? Would inviting only major sensible 
environmental groups with plentiful resources be truly representative of the ‘public interest’? On 
the other hand, there are also concerns about the predominance of interest groups like industry, to 
which environmental groups can be a good counterbalance. Secondly, regarding the choice of the 
place of the discussion, which should be accessible, and the possibility of using internet-based 
mechanisms providing online participation, thus having a broader reach. Thirdly, assuring that 
the framing of the debate is done in language which is clear and accessible to the wider public, 
since a very technical framing could undermine participation in the discussion. Fourthly, a 
tension in the sense that public participation can make decision-making and regulatory activity 
more time consuming and complex, and might lead to incompatible solutions, which in turn 
simply strengthen the status quo by delaying the proposed measure. Finally, the tendency to rely 
on quantitative analysis about the baseline, existing conditions, and to thus model possible 
scenarios, which could mask the subjective opinions and values of those working on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 J Holder and M Lee, op. cit. 
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assessment procedures, while a more a more qualitative approach could more fully reflect the 
values and cultures of those affected.36  
 
Impact assessment seems like a well established procedural tool within the EU’s institutional 
framework. Nevertheless, its influence seems ambiguous given that there are critical questionable 
aspects regarding its functioning, and also that the results of the assessment are not binding for 
the Commission. Therefore, it will ultimately be the political will of authorities to make effective 
use of IA which will make it a more or less relevant tool, above all taking serious consideration 
of the impact identified, as opposed to the original idea of the measure envisioned, and also 
taking on board the recommendations and proposed mitigation measures to be implemented 
alongside. These issues will be discussed further through the case study presented in Chapters 5 
and 6, which will analyze the IA procedure carried out for the negotiations of the EU trade 
agreements.   
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
The EU has come a long way as a project of regional integration. It started with the idea of 
creating a common market, but even in its initial stage the project had two important features: 
being based on a strong legal framework, a supranational set of institutions and set of values 
which influenced its evolution and its actions; and the fact that it always had both an internal and 
external dimension, even if the latter became further developed as the project evolved. The EU 
today is a regional bloc that has the achievement of a set of policy goals and having the internal 
market as one of the instruments as its objectives, and these policies cover a substantial range of 
issues, both internally and externally. It is a project based strongly on a legal framework, which 
sees itself as independent from international law, while also interacting with it in several ways, 
both in incorporating the goals of the international community, but also playing a role in defining 
the goals of international law and international relations. There are tensions between the legal 
principles and the political strategies of the bloc and its member states are still present and affect 
the functioning of the EU and the achievement of its goals. It is a sui generis international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 M Lee, ‘Public Participation, Procedure and Democratic Deficit in EC Environmental law (2002), Yearbook of 
European Environmental law. 
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organization, based on a supranational framework having direct effect on member states, which 
nevertheless retain sovereignty and competences in a wide range of fields, making its functioning 
a complex task. Finally, it is deemed as an international actor and plays a strong normative role, 
promoting issues such as sustainable development both internally and through its external 
relations.  
 
Within this framework, sustainable development achieved a highly relevant place, both as a 
principle guiding EU action in all spheres of action, but also as an objective of the project itself. 
The EU has developed a considerable number of provisions that allow it to pursue sustainable 
development goals within substantive measures, such as integrating environmental considerations 
into all policy areas, and also to implement it through procedural instruments such as the SIAs. 
The question remains as to what extent this legal framework basis is in fact being implemented in 
the practice of relevant EU policies. Answering this question –partially at least- will be the object 
of the second block of chapters of this thesis, devoted to case studies of regional policy and the 
common commercial policy.   
 
Given all these features, the EU is considered nowadays to be the most advanced project of 
regional integration. Thus, it is often portrayed as a model to similar initiatives, such as was the 
case with the bloc presented in the next section, MERCOSUR.  
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II. The MERCOSUR model of integration 
 
1. Background and main goals of the establishment of MERCOSUR  
 
The establishment of MERCOSUR only took place in 1991, but regional integration had been on 
the agenda of Latin America for a long time. Since WWII there had been many attempts at 
economic integration between the different countries on the continent, the most important ones 
being the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) in 1960, replaced by the Latin 
American Integration Association (LAIA) in 1980, which still works as an umbrella organization 
for RIAs. In addition, three other RIA had been already established before MERCOSUR: the 
Central American Common Market (CACM), the Andean Pact and the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM).37 These events, together with the creation of the EU, inspired and paved the way 
for the creation of MERCOSUR. 
 
In addition, MERCOSUR was a product of the particular socio-political environment in South 
America in the 1980s, also influenced by the general changes occurring in the international 
sphere. Firstly, the processes of re-democratization after decades of dictatorship in many of the 
region’s countries, and the need for economic cooperation due to the changes in the economic 
scenario were determinant factors. The option to create an association founded upon their 
political systems was one of the reasons why economic integration could not be achieved in the 
region previously, as the existence of democratic regimes is considered a basic presumption of a 
new and dynamic phase of the regional process. A debate about the model of integration to be 
adopted was started, firstly between Argentina and Brazil, the two main players in the Southern 
Cone, and the choice was made to construct a common economic space that would promote 
competitive benefits in order to achieve an insertion more adaptable to the international markets. 
This type of association was the one that responded best to the ambition of those who participated 
actively in the negotiations.38 This context was significantly different from the context in which 
the EU was created, and this is reflected both on the values on which MERCOSUR was founded 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 The LAFTA treaty was signed on the 18th of February 1960 and was later replaced by the Latin American 
Integration Association (LAIA) on the 15th of August 1980. The CACM was created on the 13th of December 1960; 
the Andean Pact on the 26th of May 1969; and the CARICOM agreement was signed on the 4th of July 1973. 
38 A Dreyzin de Klor, ‘The Legal/Institutional Structure of MERCOSUR, in Lixinski et all (eds.), The Law of 
MERCOSUR, Hart, 2010.  
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-support for democracy and strict intergovernmentalism- and the goals that were envisaged -
basically economic integration, although other concerns were also expressed as relating to it. 
 
1.2 A common market 
 
In this context, MERCOSUR was created in 1991 by the Treaty of Asunción (TA) signed by 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. MERCOSUR has the nature of a regional trade 
agreement, created as an exception to the MFN principle under the discipline of GATT Article 
XXIV. However, it was first notified to the GATT in 1992 under the ‘enabling clause’, even 
though the Committee on the Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) has to this day not issued an 
official approval. The TA is also registered by the LAIA as the 18th Economic Complementarity 
Agreement (ACE n°18).39 
 
The rationale of MERCOSUR was inspired by the success of other regional integration 
initiatives, mainly the European Union (a more advanced and complex project of integration), as 
it aimed not only to establish a free trade area, but to form a common market. In addition, an 
underlying development rationale can be observed in the wording of the TA preamble, which 
stated that the parties considered that “the broadening of the current dimensions of national 
markets through integration is a fundamental condition to accelerate economic development with 
social justice”; “this objective should be achieved through more effective use of available 
resources, the preservation of the environment, improving physical interconnections, the 
macroeconomic policy coordination and complementarity of the different sectors of the economy, 
based on the principles of gradualism, flexibility and balance”; “taking into account 
international developments, particularly the consolidation of large economic spaces and the 
importance of ensuring adequate international insertion for their countries and expressing that 
this integration process is an appropriate response to such events”; “aware that this Treaty 
should be regarded as a further step in the effort towards the progressive development of Latin 
American integration, according to the objective of the Montevideo Treaty of 1980”; “convinced 
of the need to promote scientific and technological development of States Parties and to 
modernize their economies to expand the range and quality of goods and services to improve the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 LAIA webpage: http://www.aladi.org/.  
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lives of its inhabitants”; finally affirming “political will of establishing the basis for ever closer 
union among its peoples in order to achieve the above objectives”.  
 
The common market was envisioned in the first articles of the TA. Article 1 stated the objective 
of the treaty: “The States Parties hereby decide to establish a common market, which shall be in 
place by 31 December 1994 and shall be called the ‘common market of the southern cone’ 
(MERCOSUR). This common market shall involve: The free movement of goods, services and 
factors of production between countries through, inter alia, the elimination of customs duties and 
non-tariff restrictions on the movement of goods, and any other equivalent measures; The 
establishment of a common external tariff and the adoption of a common trade policy in relation 
to third States or groups of States, and the co-ordination of positions in regional and 
international economic and commercial forums; The co-ordination of macroeconomic and 
sectoral policies between the States Parties in the areas of foreign trade, agriculture, industry, 
fiscal and monetary matters, foreign exchange and capital, services, customs, transport and 
communications and any other areas that may be agreed upon, in order to ensure proper 
competition between the States Parties; The commitment by States Parties to harmonize their 
legislation in the relevant areas in order to strengthen the integration process.” Article 2 stated 
that “the common market shall be based on reciprocity of rights and obligations between the 
States Parties”, but this provision was softened by Article 6 which recognized the need to grant 
differential treatment to the two smaller economies in the bloc, stating that “certain differentials 
in the rate at which the Republic of Paraguay and the Eastern Republic of Uruguay will make the 
transition. These differentials are indicated in the trade liberalization program (Annex 1).”  
 
Thus, it can be said that the logic in creating MERCOSUR was very similar to the EU’s 
objectives in the Treaty of Rome, and inspired by the achievements of the EU – the indirect 
reference in the preamble was clear. Nevertheless, in contrast to the broad and ambitious 
objectives stated in the Preamble, with references to issues such as social justice and 
environmental protection, the actual scope of the legal competences attributed to the bloc was 
drafted in a more limited way, with the establishment of the common market as the main 
objective/task expressed in order to achieve such progress. In this regard, although many authors 
have attempted to trace parallels with the European Union, the simplicity of the provisions in the 
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founding treaties of MERCOSUR offer a considerable contrast to the European project which 
cannot be taken for granted and which has severe consequences for the functioning and rationale 
of the bloc. From the European Union’s inception, the creation of the common market was seen 
as an instrument for the achievement of “a harmonious development of economic activities, a 
continuous and balanced expansion, an increased stability, an accelerated raising of the standard 
of living and closer relations between its Member states”, to which several policies were 
assigned, while in MERCOSUR these other goals remained limited to the extent that they related 
to the common market goal. 
 
1.3 The institutional structure 
 
An interim institutional framework was created to start building the regional integration process, 
establishing parts of the administration and executive organs necessary to perform their functions 
in this period.40 During the transitory phase, the regulation of issues by the members of 
MERCOSUR reflected on their own positions in international relations with respect to the 
independence and sovereignty of each state, corresponding to a traditional intergovernmental 
organization. This first period41 developed into an integrated model of the two political bodies 
with decisive power, the Common Market Council- the governing body, and the Common 
Market Group- the executive body, as well as a third body without decision-making capacity: the 
Joint Parliamentary Commission. As an auxiliary body, an Administrative Secretariat was 
established with the purpose of supporting the GMC. Likewise, one of the TA annexes included 
ten Subsidiary Working Groups of the GMC. 
 
In 1994 the Ouro Preto Protocol (POP) was signed,42 further developing the institutional structure 
of the bloc, but without advancing towards supranationality, rather establishing expressively the 
model upon which MERCOSUR was to be based in its intergovernmental model. The POP 
granted legal personality to MERCOSUR to “practice all the necessary acts for the development 
of their objectives, in particular to contract, acquire, or transport immovable and movable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 TA, Article 9. 
41 The transition emerges from Article 18, but can also be seen in Arts. 3 and 14 of the TA, and numeral 3) of Annex 
III. 
42 Approved on 17/12/94. In force since 15/12/95. 
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goods, compare in discretion, conserve funds and make transfers”, and also to celebrate 
agreements of seat.43 The structure of MERCOSUR after the POP was comprised of the 
following organs: The CMC and the GMC, mentioned above; The MERCOSUR Trade 
Commission (CCM); The Joint Parliamentary Commission (JPC); The Socio-Economic 
Consultative Forum (SECF); and the Administrative Secretariat of MERCOSUR. 
 
MERCOSUR has thus from the outset been a highly political organization and after initial 
success during the early 1990s, the process started to face difficulties in moving on.44 
Nevertheless, it was not abandoned, and in the year 2000 the member states decided to re-launch 
efforts on the bloc,45 committing themselves to the achievement of the initial goals, such as 
macroeconomic policy coordination and adoption of a common trade policy. Since then, 
significant progress has been made: the conflict resolution system has been improved with the 
creation of the ‘Permanent Court of Appeals’;46 the institutional structure has been reformed, 
with the addition of new bodies, such as the ‘Commission of Permanent Representatives 
(CRPM)’47 and the recently created Parliament; furthermore, an enlargement process began in 
2006 for the accession of Venezuela, which was completed in 2012. 48 
 
1.4 MERCOSUR as a legal order 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 See POP, Cap. II, Article 35. 
44 In this regard, it can be pointed out that currently MERCOSUR has only achieved the status of a customs union, 
with exceptions and non-tariff barriers still hindering trade flows between Member states, aggravated by the recent 
financial crisis and the threat of a new protectionist wave.   
45 Series of decisions of the ‘Common Market Group’ signed in Buenos Aires on June 29th 2000. See more details in 
the Institute for the Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean -  INTAL Report on MERCOSUR No 6, Buenos 
Aires, 2000, available at http://www.iadb.org/Intal/aplicaciones/uploads/publicaciones/i-MERCOSUR_Report_6.pdf  
46 Established by the ‘Olivos Protocol’, signed in 2002. 
47 Created by CMC Decision 11/2003, this body is a subdivision of the Council and performs the role of being a 
permanent representation of Member states in the seat of MERCOSUR in Montevideo; it is composed by one 
representative of each Member state and has among its functions to advise the Council on matters related to the 
institutional functioning of the bloc and also on its external relations; the president of the commission may also play 
the role of representative of the bloc in its relations with third parties. 
48 For an extended analysis of the negotiation process of Venezuela’s accessing, see F de Andrade Correa and L 
Lixinski, ‘The Legal Future of MERCOSUR’, in L Lixinski et all, The Law of MERCOSUR, Hart Pub., 2010. In 
addition, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Bolivia are associate countries, and the latter is being considered for full 
membership. 
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The establishment of MERCOSUR represented the formation of a legal order.49 The TA included 
the basis for this, and over the years the legal personality of MERCOSUR was reinforced, with 
important changes introduced to the legal framework. As in other integration processes, in 
MERCOSUR the primary law consists of the founding treaties. These are formally international 
treaties which must be ratified by the Member states to enter into force, and frequently are called 
‘Protocols’ (article 41 POP). MERCOSUR primary law treaties perform a dual function: on the 
one hand, these agreements have a public international law nature and thus impose obligations on 
member states. On the other hand, these agreements are also internally applicable to citizens. In 
addition to that, it must be acknowledged that parallel agreements have been concluded with the 
associate countries.50 Among the key instruments integrating the MERCOSUR Primary Law are 
The Treaty of Asunción and its five Annexes (1991); The Ouro Preto Protocol (1994); The 
Brasília Protocol on the Resolution of Disputes (1991);51 The Olivos Protocol for the Resolution 
of Disputes (2002);52 and the Protocol establishing the MERCOSUR Parliament (2005).53 
MERCOSUR secondary law is comprised of norms created by the main bodies of the bloc, and it 
can be said to derive from primary law, in the sense that the allocation of legislative competences 
and the form that these acts may take are defined in the founding treaties.  
 
The competence to adopt legal acts is shared by different bodies. According to the POP, the three 
bodies with legislative power are:54  
 
i) The CMC: has a clear role with regard to MERCOSUR Primary law, because it has “to 
supervise the implementation of the Treaty of Asuncion, its protocols, and agreements signed 
within its context”.55 Among its legislative functions, it is supposed to rule on proposals 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 J.A. Vervaele, ‘MERCOSUR and regional integration in South America’, in International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, Volume, 54 Issue, 2, 2005. 
50 MERCOSUR and Chile signed the ‘Acuerdo de Complementación Económica MERCOSUR-Chile’ on 25th June 
1996 and MERCOSUR concluded the ‘Acuerdo de Complementación Económica MERCOSUR-Bolivia’ with 
Bolivia on 17th December 1996. 
51 The Brasilia Protocol is available at: http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/MRCSR/brasilia/pbrasilia_e.asp. 
52 The Olivos Protocol is available at: http://untreaty.un.org/unts/144078_158780/5/7/13152.pdf. 
53 MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC. Nº 23/05. Protocolo Constitutivo del Parlamento del MERCOSUR. The Protocol is 
available (in Spanish) at: http://www.parlamentodelMERCOSUR.org. 
54 Apart from the three bodies mentioned, the institutional setting-up of MERCOSUR is completed by the Economic 
and Consultative Forum (Forum), the Administrative Secretariat (Secretariat), the Parliament and the Permanent 
Court of Review. 
55 POP, article 8. 
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submitted to it by the CMG. Besides, it exercises the legal personality of MERCOSUR and can 
conclude agreements with third countries or international organizations. Legislative acts 
emanating from the Council “shall take the form of Decisions which are binding upon the States 
Parties.”56 
ii) the CMG: roles include57 to propose draft Decisions to the CMC; to approve or reject 
MERCOSUR norms as proposed by the CMC. The decisions of the CMG shall take the form of 
Resolutions that are binding upon the States Parties.58 As executive functions, the Common 
Market Group must take the measures necessary to enforce the Decisions adopted by the Council. 
It is also necessary to mention that in the international sphere, the CMG can also negotiate 
agreements on behalf of MERCOSUR with third countries, groups of countries and international 
organisations when such duty is expressly delegated to it by the Council of the Common Market 
and within the limits laid down in special mandates granted for that purpose. In these cases, the 
Common Market Group shall sign the aforementioned agreements. Also when authorised by the 
Council of the Common Market, the Common Market Group may delegate these powers to the 
MERCOSUR Trade Commission.  
iii) The MTC: Article 20 POP states that decisions of the MTC shall take the form of Directives 
or Proposals, also binding upon the States Parties. 59 
 
Therefore, MERCOSUR secondary law consists of these various acts lay down by MERCOSUR 
bodies, as well as agreements with third countries and international organizations. Similarly to 
the framework in the EU, within MERCOSUR there are also ‘atypical acts’ or, in other words, 
acts which originated at different levels, the legal nature of which is not clear,60 such as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 POP, article 9. 
57 POP, article 14. 
58 POP, article 15. 
59 Article 16. III of the Ouro Preto Protocol stipulates: “It shall be the task of the MERCOSUR Trade Commission, a 
body responsible for assisting the Common Market Group, to monitor the application of the common trade policy 
instruments agreed by the States Parties in connection with the operation of the customs union, as well as to follow 
up and review questions and issues relating to common trade policies, intra-MERCOSUR trade and third countries. 
To take decisions connected with the administration and application of the common external tariff and the common 
trade policy instruments agreed by the States Parties; VI. To report to the Common Market Group on the 
development and application of the common trade policy instruments, on the consideration of requests received and 
on the decisions taken with respect to such requests”. 
60 In the European Union, atypical acts are “legal instruments which do not feature in the nomenclature of Article 
249 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (EC Treaty)” (See: European Union 
http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l14535.htm). Some of these acts are mentioned in the Treaty, such as Rules of 
Procedure, while others have emerged in practice. 
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Socio-Laboral Declaration, which was adopted by the Member states as a programmatic 
document, but was nevertheless frequently interpreted and applied by national courts.61 Whereas 
the MERCOSUR primary law is undoubtedly binding and there is no need for the Member states 
to undertake internal measures, Decisions, Resolutions, and Directives, must be internalized by 
each individual member state according to their legislative procedures.  
 
The institutional innovation introduced after the re-launching of the process in 2000 can be taken 
as an additional incentive for the improvement of MERCOSUR’s legal system. With the 
introduction of the Permanent Court of Review through the Olivos Protocol in 2002, the dispute 
settlement system gained in certainty. Apart from solving disputes between the parties, the Court 
also has an advisory function, as the Supreme Courts of member states can request legal opinions 
concerning interpretation of MERCOSUR rules. These opinions, while still relatively few in 
number, might contribute to the harmonization of the rules and exert influence upon the national 
laws of member states regarding the application of MERCOSUR law. 
 
Furthermore, the establishment of the MERCOSUR Parliament must also bring modifications to 
the MERCOSUR legal system.62 According to the Protocol establishing the Parliament, this body 
will have advisory as well as normative functions. Article 19 of the Protocol stipulates that the 
acts that the Parliament can adopt are: opinions; statements; recommendations; reports; and 
provisions. In this list it is necessary to distinguish between the acts adopted by the Parliament in 
the legislative process and the drafting of rules to be subsequently adopted by other bodies.63 
Moreover, in an advisory role, it is expected that the Parliament will give advice, prepare reports, 
and adopt statements and recommendations. With regard to the procedural aspects, the regulation 
of the MERCOSUR Parliament determines the participation of this legislative body in the law-
making process. The Protocol also regulates the procedure to follow when dealing with the 
intervention of the Parliament and is prescriptive on decisions, resolutions and directives issued 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 H.R. Mansuetti has examined in detail the implications of the Socio-Laboral Declaration, available (in Spanish) at: 
http://200.16.86.50/digital/34/Tesis/Mansueti1-1.pdf. H. R. Mansueti, Naturaleza jurídica y proyección institucional 
de la declaración sociolaboral del MERCOSUR. Tesis (doctorado) - Universidad Católica Argentina (Buenos Aires). 
Facultad de Derecho y Ciencias Políticas, 2002.  
62 The European Union provided funding for the installation and functioning of the Parliament. See: European 
Commission. MERCOSUR Regional Strategy paper, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/MERCOSUR/rsp/07_13_en.pdf.  
63 See the details of the functions of the Parliament of MERCOSUR at: http://www.parlamentodelMERCOSUR.org. 
The internal organization of the Parliament is regulated by the MERCOSUR/PM/SO/DISP. 07/2009. 
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by the CMC, the CMG and the MTC, respectively, in the event that they require involvement of 
national parliaments in the implementation of standards. In addition to these legislative functions, 
the Parliament may also request an advisory opinion to the Permanent Court of Revision.64 
 
Despite these innovations, MERCOSUR’s legal framework represents a construction of public 
international law, differing substantially from the EU model that has formed an autonomous legal 
order. In addition to the nature of MERCOSUR law, the case law emanating from MERCOSUR 
bodies has not taken the same approach as the ECJ towards supremacy and direct effect. 
Nevertheless, two awards in particular are noteworthy. The first, issued in 2005 by the ad hoc 
Tribunal, underlined the different norms to be taken into account in solving a dispute between 
two different Member states (in light of Article 19 of the Protocol of Brasilia). The Tribunal 
clarified (on the basis of previous awards) that, apart from MERCOSUR norms, tribunals should 
apply the norms and principles of Public International Law, but always in accordance with the 
MERCOSUR legal system. This implicitly recognized that the MERCOSUR legal system is 
something more than a typical public international legal order.65 The second, delivered in the case 
related to the Prohibition of the importation of remolded tires from Uruguay in 2005, emphasised 
the idea of the law of MERCOSUR as an autonomous legal order. In this case, the Court stated 
that “notwithstanding the fact that the principles and provisions of international law are included 
in the Olivos Protocol as one of the laws to be applied (Article 34), its application must be only 
on a subsidiary (or in the best case supplementary) basis and only where applicable to the case, 
and never as a direct and first choice, as in the case of a law on integration (MERCOSUR law) 
or a Community law (such as a recommendation), which is not yet the case with MERCOSUR 
law due to the absence of supranationality”.66  
 
These awards show that MERCOSUR law has a degree of autonomy from other branches of law. 
Nevertheless, at its current stage of development, it is difficult to perceive the MERCOSUR legal 
system as a communitarian law according to the founding treaties (the integration and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Protocol establishing the Parliament of MERCOSUR, Article 13. 
65 The award Nº 1/2005 is available at: http://www.sice.oas.org/Dispute/MERCOSUR/laudo10_s.pdf. 
66 Award issued by the Permanent Review Tribunal constituted in the Appeal Review presented by the Republic of 
Uruguay to a previous award by the Arbitral Tribunal ad hoc adopted on October 25, 2005. See F. Morosini, ‘The 
MERCOSUR and WTO Retreated Tires Dispute: rehabilitating regulatory competition in international trade and 
environmental regulation’, Society of International Economic Law, working paper 42/2008, available at: 
http://www.ssrn.com/link/SIEL-Inaugural- Conference.html 
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harmonisation of the internal legislations) in a broader sense. In addition, the POP contains a 
forum choice clause in Article 1.2, according to which a member state can always choose 
whether to resort to the MERCOSUR system for dispute settlement or to a different mechanism 
to which it is a party, such as the multilateral dispute settlement system of the WTO; once the 
choice has been made and the procedures started, the party cannot resort to a second forum. 67 
 
In addition to the formal legal order, MERCOSUR also works on the basis of different 
governance mechanisms, which often function as coordination meetings for national authorities 
in order to promote development of common policies and approximation of national laws. These 
mechanisms are known as ‘Working Groups’, Meetings of Authorities, ad hoc groups and others, 
comprising a complex structure which is outlined below:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 For a more detailed analysis of the MERCOSUR legal order, see B. Olmos Giupponi, ‘The sources of Law in 
MERCOSUR, analysis of the current situation and improvements for the future’, in L Lixinski et al, The Law of 
MERCOSUR, Hart, 2010.   
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Thus, it can be said that MERCOSUR as a legal order is much weaker in comparison to the EU, 
given that its norms  have neither supremacy nor direct effect over its Member states, that 
implementation is delegated to states without a strong mechanism of control and that, in addition 
to the fact that there is no MERCOSUR Court in the model of the ECJ, with authority to make 
bold interpretations of communitarian law so as to advance the objectives of the bloc, the 
Member states are allowed to recourse to the WTO DSB instead of MERCOSUR. All this leads 
to the conclusion that MERCOSUR’s legal order, despite existing as a (quasi) autonomous order, 
is much weaker than the EU’s legal order, and this leads the bloc to be a highly political 
organization.  
 
1.5 A community of values? 
 
Despite the formal legal structures’ focus on the economic aspects of integration, it can be argued 
that MERCOSUR is also a community of values. The references to development and social 
justice in the TA are more general, but one value at least can be cited as fundamental: democracy. 
The importance of democracy had already been stated in the TA, but this connection became 
even more evident in 1996 as the bloc played a crucial role in overcoming the first serious 
attemptted coup d’etat in Paraguay. That incident led to approval of the Ushuaia Protocol on 
Democratic Commitment in 1998, which contained a ‘democratic clause’ conditioning 
membership in MERCOSUR to the existence of fully democratic institutions. This clause 
stipulates that “any change in the democratic regime constitutes an unacceptable obstacle to the 
continuation of the process of integration underway with respect to the affected member state”. 
For such cases, the clause provides for consultations among member countries and the adoption 
of measures, including the suspension of rights and obligations for the country whose democratic 
process has been interrupted.  
 
Nevertheless, the Ushuaia Protocol is criticized for the political character of its provisions, since 
its clauses do not specify the criteria by which to identify a threat to or rupture in democratic 
order, leaving this to be determined by the Member states.68 While this political character is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 ML Olivar Jiménez, ‘La Adhesión de Nuevos Miembros AL MERCOSUR: una cuestión fundamental para la 
evolución de la organización’ in E Accioly (ed), Direito no século XXI (Curitiba, Juruá, 2008); the author discusses 
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typical of MERCOSUR arrangements, an example of the controversy it could generate is the 
recent suspension of Paraguay from membership in 2012 in the concomitant accession of 
Venezuela.69  
 
2. Current challenges in MERCOSUR 
 
Having explained the current legal and institutional structure of MERCOSUR, it is also important 
to highlight that the bloc is facing important challenges which might change these structures and 
its functioning in the future. In this regard, three main challenges should be mentioned: the 
challenge of institutional deepening, regarding the role and functioning of the MERCOSUR 
Parliament; the task of deepening the level of integration of non-economic objectives which -
despite the rhetoric- are still stalled, such as environmental protection; and the more important, 
structural challenge of repositioning, concerning the creation of other governance structures in 
the continent, chiefly the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR, Unión de Naciones 
Suramericanas) and the Community of Latin American States (CELAC, Comunidad de Estados 
Latino Americanos y Caribeños).  
 
2.1 The Challenge of institutional deepening of MERCOSUR: The Parliament 
 
The operation of the Parliament aims in many ways to bridge the ‘democratic deficit’ in 
MERCOSUR, bringing the bloc and its policy- and law-making closer to the national polities. 
The objective to be achieved is thus representation, which is intended to happen through direct 
elections of representatives for positions in PARLASUR. At present, the ‘MERCO-
parliamentarians’ are still drawn directly from national parliaments (in the proportion of 18 
parliamentarians per Member State), with the exception of Paraguay, which elected its 
representatives in 2008. However, direct elections are scheduled in the near future, and the main 
issue to be resolved concerns representation. Because MERCOSUR is an asymmetric integration 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
whether it should be limited to a threat to the democratic institutions of the country, or also include situations such as 
breach of fundamental rights obligations by that country. 
69 See, in this regard, D. Ventura, J.Onuki and M. Medeiros, ‘Internalização das normas do MERCOSUL’, Série 
Pensando o Direito, vol. 45. Brasília: Ministério da Justiça, 2012. For a more comprehensive examination of the 
need to embed other values into MERCOSUR, see D. Ventura and M. Rolim, ‘Os Direitos Humanos e o Mercosul: 
Uma Agenda (Urgente) para além do Mercado’, in P. Borgers and L. Pires Ferreira Junior, Direitos Humanos e 
Direito Internacional, Juruá, 2006. 
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process, and there is great disproportion in size and population among its Members, it was not 
possible to make the number of parliamentarians for each Member State proportional to their 
corresponding population. A suggestion for simple proportionality would have led Brazil to have 
well over 50% of the seats in the Parliament, which could have had disastrous political 
consequences, jeopardizing Brazil’s efforts to prove that its size, population and economic power 
would not undermine the role of other Member states. In the end, the agreed proportions were as 
follows: 18 parliamentarians each for Paraguay and Uruguay, 26 for Argentina and 37 for Brazil, 
in the first phase of the institution’s functioning; in 2014, the number of parliamentarians for 
Argentina and Brazil will be increased to 43 and 75 representatives, respectively. This means that 
no single Member State ‘controls the majority’ of the Parliament (as Brazil will have 75 
parliamentarians out of a total of 154). Even though the idea behind PARLASUR is precisely to 
prevent the formation of ‘national interest blocs’, and instead to represent the people of 
MERCOSUR, there was clear care taken in avoiding one Member State having a majority of 
seats, addressing any concerns regarding this arrangement. 
 
Furthermore, a second issue to be clarified is its role, as the Parliament is slowly developing into 
the voice of MERCOSUR, not only inwardly (that is, towards its citizens), but also outwardly. In 
this sense, it is noteworthy that the Parliament is organized around five Secretariats, and that one 
of these aims specifically to develop MERCOSUR’s ‘external relations’, be it with third 
countries, international organizations such as the Organization of American States or the United 
Nations, or other regional integration schemes, including the EU – there is a EURO-LAT 
Parliamentary Assembly which gathers representatives of Parliaments of the two regions, and 
PARLASUR now sends its representatives.70 Regarding the internal dimension of its activity, the 
Parliament has already started to fulfill its mandate to become the main forum for MERCOSUR 
debates. It has established Commissions on the following topics: legal and institutional affairs; 
economic, financial, commercial, fiscal and monetary affairs; international, interregional and 
strategic planning affairs; education, culture, science and sports; labor and employment policies, 
social security and social economics; sustainable development, territorial planning, housing, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/eurolat/default_en.htm. The last meeting was held in Brussels in 
October 2011, and among the issues taken for discussion was the signature of association agreements between the 
regions and how these constituencies can act in order to solve the impasses often reached, as it is the case regarding 
the EU – MERCOSUR negotiations.  
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health, environment and tourism in the region; citizenship and human rights; internal affairs, 
security and defense; infrastructure, transportation, energy resources, agriculture, cattle breeding 
and fisheries; budgetary and internal affairs. The Parliament has thus become a hopeful agent of 
transformation in MERCOSUR, but the challenge remains to create the conditions which will 
allow this new institution to meet all of these expectations.  
 
2.2 A challenge of substantive deepening: the integration of sustainable development 
considerations and the incipient and environmental agenda 
 
The Asuncion Treaty included the protection of the environment in the preamble, and in 1992 a 
‘special environmental meeting’ was created to work on this issue. In 1995 this was converted 
into a working group of the Common Market Council (SGT6) in which Member states inform 
and evaluate their positions on environmental concerns in the international scenario, aiming to 
make proposals to safeguard the environment in the context of the bloc, making environmental 
concerns compatible with the economic and commercial policies.  
 
In this regard, a Framework Agreement on the Environment was signed in 2001, reinforcing the 
commitments of the parties to the Rio Declaration of 1992 and aiming to promote environmental 
cooperation and sustainable use of natural resources. In addition, in 2004 a Meeting of the 
Environmental Ministers of Member states was established in order to create a political channel 
to the environmental program of the bloc, resulting in, amongst other things, the signature of an 
‘Additional Protocol to the Framework Agreement on Cooperation and Assistance on 
Environmental Emergencies’. Also within the framework of the Meeting of Environmental 
Ministers, a ‘Declaration on Cleaner Production Processes for MERCOSUR’ was signed in 2003, 
leading to the issuance of Decision 26/2007 of the Common Market Council regarding a ‘Policy 
of Promotion of Sustainable Production and Consumption on MERCOSUR’. Based on these 
documents, the SGT6 created a working plan focused on two axes: promoting sustainable 
production and consumption measures in priority sectors, especially SMEs, and providing 
information about those measures to production sectors and consumers.  
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In spite of these initiatives, environmental protection is still weak at the regional level, and much 
more effort must be made in order to create stronger levels of regulation, especially considering 
that the region has one of the greatest biological diversity and natural resources on the planet. The 
implementation of the Framework Agreement through more specific conventions on important 
issues for sustainable development, and also the creation of a regional strategy on this issue with 
both internal and external axes, similar to what has been done at the European Union, would be 
important and urgent steps to take in order to further integrate an environmental dimension to 
MERCOSUR. 
 
2.3 The Challenge of relevance within a multilayered integration system 
 
Another important challenge concerns the creation of other governance structures in Latin 
America recently, namely The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States 
(Comunidade de Estados Latino-Americanos e Caribenhos – CELAC) in 2010, and the Union of 
South American Nations (UNASUR) in 2008. These new experiences of integration, while still 
quite recent and not completely developed, might have important outcomes in the configuration 
of regional integration in Latin America. The creation of these organizations is significant to the 
extent that, in addition to the ‘spaghetti bowl’ effect in trade agreements, it can be argued that 
Latin America seems to be moving towards a multilayered scheme of regional integration, with at 
least three identifiable layers: political, policy, and trade/economic integration: 
 
i) The CELAC 
 
The CELAC was created in 2010 as an integration of the two main forums of political 
consultation in the region, the Rio Group and the Latin American and Caribbean Summit on 
Integration and Development (CALC). It is made up of all 33 countries in Latin America, and 
that is where its relevance lies: all the countries of the region are involved, including Cuba, but 
the North American countries -USA and Canada- are excluded, as well as the dependencies of 
France, the Netherlands, the UK and Denmark. In this regard, it can be said that it aims to reduce 
the influence of the United States and other ‘northern’ actors on the politics and economics of 
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Latin America, and to strengthen the influence of relevant regional players, such as Brazil, in 
what would be an alternative to the Organization of American States (OAS).  
 
The official establishment of CELAC took place in December 2011 at a summit in Venezuela, 
where a Declaration was approved containing the parties’ commitment to the new organization 
and stating that “CELAC must move forward in the process of political, economic, social and 
cultural integration, based on a wise equilibrium between the unity and diversity of our peoples, 
so that the regional integration mechanism can become the ideal space to express our rich 
cultural diversity and also the forum to reaffirm the Latin American and the Caribbean identity, 
our common history and our ongoing struggles for justice and liberty” (para. 21). In addition, an 
Action Plan (Caracas Action Plan for 2012) was approved, containing actions to be taken in the 
following areas: (i) financial crisis and new financial architecture; (ii) complementarity and 
cooperation between the regional and subregional integration schemes: actions in order to 
enhance complementarity and avoid overlapping in relation to activities, and enhance dialogue in 
four main axes: economic/commercial -including trade facilitation, transport and customs 
procedures, production, social and institutional, and cultural; (iii) energy; (iv) infrastructure and 
physical integration, telecommunications, and cross-border integration; (v) social development, 
including promotion of the MDGs at the regional level; (vi) environment, including coordination 
for Rio+20; (vii) humanitarian assistance; (viii) migration; (xix) culture; (x) technology and 
communications. All the initiatives have strong political connotations, being based on the 
formation of groups of experts or ministerial unions, aiming to make recommendations and 
coordinate policy. 
  
Despite the ambitious action plan, and typically of Latin American integration initiatives, the 
functioning of the CELAC is still uncertain and is to be observed over time. Nevertheless, the 
most likely scenario is that, inheriting the competences of its predecessors, the Rio Group and the 
CACL, CELAC will be a forum of political concertation and cooperation among its members, 
with the novel element of gathering all Latin American countries, which, despite their diversity, 
are all developing countries and thus supposedly have common interests to promote through joint 
initiatives. Furthermore, despite strong criticism from media and some sectors of civil society as 
yet another integration initiative, CELAC has received support from the governments of the 
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region, including Brazil, so that it will perhaps establish itself in the future as the upper layer of 
the new framework of regional integration in the region, the political layer – one commentator 
having argued that in years to come it could be the Latin American equivalent of the Council of 
Europe.71   
 
ii) The UNASUR 
 
On 23rd May 2008, the Heads of State of the 12 South American countries signed the treaty 
creating the Union of South American Nations. UNASUR was created to fulfill several 
objectives, included in Articles 2 and 3 of the founding Treaty, which state the general and 
specific aims of the organizations respectively: Article 2: “The objective of the South American 
Union of Nations is to build, in a participatory and consensual manner, an integration and union 
among its peoples in the cultural, social, economic and political fields, prioritizing political 
dialogue, social policies, education, energy, infrastructure, financing and the environment, 
among others, with a view to eliminating socio-economic inequality, in order to achieve social 
inclusion and participation of civil society, to strengthen democracy and reduce asymmetries 
within the framework of strengthening the sovereignty and independence of the States”(emphasis 
added).  
 
Article 3 lists extensive specific objectives, including almost all possible types of issue:  
(a) the strengthening of the political dialogue among Member states;  
(b) the achievement of inclusive and equitable social and human development in order to 
eradicate poverty and overcome inequalities in the region;  
(c) the eradication of illiteracy, with universal access to quality education and the regional 
recognition of courses and titles;  
(d) energy integration for the integral and sustainable use of the resources of the region;  
(e) the development of infrastructure for the interconnection of the region;  
(f) financial integration;  
(g) the protection of biodiversity, water resources and ecosystems, as well as cooperation in the 
prevention of catastrophes and in combating the causes and effects of climate change;  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 J.A. Sanahuja, GGP Seminar on Comparing Models of Regional Integration, EUI October 2011. 
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(h) the development of concrete and effective mechanisms to overcome asymmetries, thus 
achieving an equitable integration;  
(i) the consolidation of a South American identity with the aim of attaining a South American 
citizenship;  
(j) universal access to social security and health services;  
(k) cooperation on issues of migration;  
(l) economic and commercial cooperation;  
(m) industrial and productive integration, with particular focus on the important role that small 
and medium size enterprises, cooperatives, networks and other forms of productive organization 
may play;  
(n) the definition and implementation of common or complementary policies and projects for 
research, innovation, technological transfer and technological production, aiming to enhance the 
region’s own capacity, sustainability and technological development;  
(o) the promotion of cultural diversity and the expression of the traditions and knowledge of the 
peoples of the region, in order to strengthen their sense of identity;  
(p) citizen participation;  
(q) coordination to strengthen the fight against corruption, the global drug problem, trafficking in 
persons, trafficking in small and light weapons, terrorism, transnational organized crime and 
other threats, as well as for disarmament, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons 
of mass destruction, and the elimination of landmines;  
(r) the promotion of cooperation among judicial authorities;  
(s) the exchange of information and sharing of experience in matters of defense;  
(t) cooperation for the strengthening of citizen security;  
(u) sectoral cooperation as a mechanism to deepen South American integration, through the 
exchange of information, experiences and capacity building. 
 
Despite the long list of objectives, the promotion of commercial integration is not included, with 
the closest thing being commercial cooperation. In this regard, on the one hand, UNASUR may 
be considered complementary to MERCOSUR, the main goal of which is to achieve a common 
market among its members, as distinct from a replacement or competing integration process. On 
the other hand, as stated above, MERCOSUR has evolved to encompass a series of other goals 
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which were created based on the rationale that they were necessary to achieve the common 
market, and in those areas there would be overlap between MERCOSUR’s acquired competences 
and UNASUR’s stated competences. Therefore, it is necessary to determine how such overlaps in 
activity could be coordinated and which particular policies should be dealt with by one or other 
process. 
 
One criterion would be territorial. With regard to programs that affect states other than those of 
MERCOSUR, competence should immediately be granted to UNASUR. However, it does not 
automatically follow that matters involving only MERCOSUR Member states should be 
addressed by MERCOSUR and not UNASUR. A case must be made for the preference of either 
integration process. On the one hand, UNASUR offers a much broader explicit mandate, whereas 
MERCOSUR has often had to rely on ‘implied’ attributions of competence, or had to justify 
competence by translating areas of activity into commercial goals. This would not happen in 
UNASUR, as its extensive list of objectives gives it the competence to pursue numerous goals. 
Further, programs initiated within UNASUR can much more easily be expanded to the whole 
continent than programs which commenced within MERCOSUR. Therefore, if a program is of 
potential relevance to the entire continent, and does not just address the interests of MERCOSUR 
Member states, there is a persuasive argument for the pursuing of policies and legislation within 
UNASUR, not MERCOSUR. 
 
These two arguments, however appealing, must nevertheless be counterbalanced by consideration 
of the structural deficiencies of UNASUR. Firstly, all decision-making within UNASUR must be 
taken by consensus,72 which can lead to difficulties on important sensitive matters such as 
environmental and human rights issues. UNASUR is constituted as an intergovernmental 
organization, and the lack of any inclination towards supranational competence is yet another 
indication that strong decision-making may be rather difficult within the organization. 
Furthermore, UNASUR lacks a dispute settlement system, and disputes are to be resolved by 
direct negotiations between the parties, or failing that, by referral to the political organs.  
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However, UNASUR’s clearer mandate, along with its more broad appeal, may in time narrow 
MERCOSUR’s field of activity to commercial goals. This may help MERCOSUR overcome 
some of its own difficulties, as it is easier to implement legislation that is merely commercial, to 
become a more effective actor and to regain some of the momentum it has lost due to the 
economic crises that have affected its Member states. On the other hand, MERCOSUR’s pursuit 
of non-commercial goals has led to the realization that commercial objectives cannot be 
successfully separated from their environmental, social and general human implications. This 
means that, while it may be desirable that some of the competences in non-commercial areas 
currently within the scope of MERCOSUR are transferred to UNASUR, it is by no means 
desirable (or advisable) that all such competences should be transferred, as this may lead 
MERCOSUR to lose the broad perspective that trade and commercial policies should be pursued 
only to the extent that they can promote environmental, social and ultimately human goals. 
 
From a pragmatic perspective, the activities carried out so far might allow the conclusion to be 
drawn that UNASUR will, for the time being, be a framework for the coordination and the joint 
development of specific policies. Nine Ministerial Councils (South American Councils) have 
been created so far, uniting the member states’ authorities in specific fields and working towards 
common policy initiatives in the following areas: Social Development; Fight Against Drugs and 
Traffic; Health; Education, Culture, Science, Technology and Innovation; Defense; Energy; 
Economy; Infrastructure and Planning; Elections. Among these, four policy areas seem to have 
made the most progress:  
 
i) Security: the South American Defense Council was the first to be established and quickly had 
to deal with a threat of democratic disruption in Bolivia in 2008, its ability to deal with the 
situation without the interference of outside actors, chiefly the USA, showing that the region is 
evolving in safeguarding its declared values -like democracy- and that major powers such as 
Brazil are emerging as effective regional leaders.   
 
ii) Economic and Financial Cooperation: the initiatives developed so far include the creation of a 
regional development bank, the Banco del Sur, and studies to establish a system of payments in 
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local currency, discussions in order to create a fund of reserves and coordinate macroeconomic 
policies in order to avoid capital volatility. 
 
iii) Infrastructure:  The first Meeting of the Steering Committee for the South American Council 
on Infrastructure and Planning (COSIPLAN) was held in April 2011 at Palácio Itamaraty, in Rio 
de Janeiro. COSIPLAN was established in August 2009, during the UNASUL presidential 
meeting, when it was decided that the Executive Committee of the South American Regional 
Infrastructure Integration Initiative (IIRSA) would be replaced by a Ministerial-level Council 
within UNASUR’s institutional structure. With this measure, the Member states aimed to assign 
greater political support to activities carried out in the infrastructure sector so as to secure 
necessary investments to execute priority projects. The meeting opened a new stage for the 
debate on the region’s physical infrastructure integration. Progress was achieved in outlining a 
Strategic Action Plan for the next 10 years and in shaping an Agenda of Priority Projects, which 
is hoped to induce development. Regional integration of physical infrastructure is one of the 
priorities of Brazilian foreign policy and one of the most important issues in the multilateral 
agenda of South American countries since IIRSA was established in 2000. IIRSA was planned as 
a venue for coordination and exchange of information on infrastructure among the governments 
of the 12 countries in the region and over the course of 10 years it developed relevant work, with 
a portfolio of 520 projects, organized along Integration and Development axes.73 Further 
considerations on this specific issue will be seen in Chapter 4, regarding the functioning and 
future of the Fund for the Structural Development of MERCOSUR – FOCEM. 
 
iv) Energy: negotiations are ongoing for the establishment of a South American Energy 
Integration Treaty under the auspices of the UNASUR’s South American Energy Council.74  
 
In this regard, while UNASUR has a wide list of competences, including economic cooperation, 
one possible outcome is that it could, for the meantime, be an organization focused on the 
creation of common policies within South America. It would thus form a second, more specific 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at: http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/sala-de-imprensa/notas-a-
imprensa/conselho-de-infraestrutura-e-planejamento-cosiplan-da-unasul-rio-de-janeiro-28-de-abril-de-
2011/?searchterm=iirsa.  
74 http://unasursg.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&catid=81:consejo-energetico-
suramericano&id=320:plan-tratado-energetico-suramericano.   
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layer of integration in the region. Some of these policies might overlap with those of 
MERCOSUR, as can be the case with infrastructure, and as will be discussed further in Chapter 4 
concerning the FOCEM, which is strongly focused in the development of infrastructure, thus 
posing a challenge to coherence and complementarity. Nevertheless, as discussed above, there are 
some criteria such as territoriality and specificity which might help to guarantee that UNASUR 
and MERCOSUR policy initiatives can be complementary instead of concurrent, at least until 
greater attention can be devoted to solving this problem.75  
 
iii) MERCOSUR: the third layer 
 
MERCOSUR would be a third layer in the multilayered scheme of regional integration in Latin 
America, being the most specific and complex, and having the core aim to achieve deep 
economic integration – a common market, with several accompanying policies and governance 
structures, focusing on the basis of a weak but semi-autonomous legal order and institutional 
structure, as compared to the wholly political character of CEPAL, and the more political and 
intergovernmental/international law based system of UNASUR. The legal challenges and 
possible overlaps that might arise from the functioning of this complex -and possibly incoherent- 
system of layered regional integration will emerge over time, as these initiatives are rather recent 
and the approach adopted by member states seems to follow the pragmatic/learn-by-doing 
method that usually characterizes integration initiatives. One can only hope that the governments 
of the region seize upon the current momentum of growth and stability -in the midst of the 
financial crises taking place elsewhere- to make the most out of these initiatives, coordinating 
political action at the broader level, creating valuable and necessary policy integration initiatives 
at the South American level and finally advancing in the most specific level of economic 
integration with social justice and environmental protection in the MERCOSUR sphere.  
  
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 For an extended analysis of UNASUR in the South American context, see J.A. Sanahuja, Post-Liberal 
Regionalism in South America: The Case of UNASUR, EUI Working Papers, Rscas 2012/05. 
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4. Concluding remarks 
 
MERCOSUR emerges as a much simpler project in relation to the EU, but is nevertheless quite a 
complex governance structure which, on the one hand, has achieved a great deal of economic 
integration, is organized around a legal framework and comprises different institutions. On the 
other hand, it still depends on a stronger political/intergovernmental sphere which hinders its 
evolution towards deeper levels of integration. As has been said, MERCOSUR often seems 
“more as a permanent negotiation than a convergence of regional standards, that don’t exist”. 
There are no regional institutions to monitor or enforce regional rules decided in the working 
groups. In addition to the legal framework, a more flexible networking way of government can be 
seen, which often acts on the basis of ex-post compliance: solving conflicts when they appear, 
rather than regulating ex-ante. This reflects the fact that MERCOSUR has a weaker normative 
basis, and was not meant to be a rule generator like the EU; the goal was to set up a regional 
common market, but more through national policy coordination than by the creation of ‘top-
down’ decision-making institutions; it was intergovernmental from the beginning, and the 
institutions created reflect that.  
 
Despite these downsides, MERCOSUR is also a project that aims to promote development. At 
the same time, more so than the EU, which embraced the concept of sustainable development -
and its three pillars- as a core values to be promoted, in MERCOSUR the idea of development is 
primarily centered on the economic sphere through market integration, with emphasis on ‘social 
justice’, which is translated into democratic values, and support for intra-generational equity – 
which will be discussed further in Chapter 4. There is a weak social dimension, such as the 
FCES, which represents the economic interests of the private sector and of trade unions, not of 
the people, but the major part of the population is unaware of the on-going changes and of 
MERCOSUR’s impact on their lives. The environmental sphere is not absent, but has played a 
much smaller role and has been much less developed within the legal/institutional structure.  
 
Nevertheless, MERCOSUR is a relatively young organization – and the EU is a good example of 
the amount of time that such a deep level of integration might take to be achieved, and of an 
ambitious project, which is striving between rhetoric and reality.   
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Chapter 4: Regional integration and regional development: the role of regional 
development policies in the European Union and MERCOSUR 
 
Chapter 1 discussed how equity is a central element of sustainable development, particularly 
considering its most pressing challenges, the alleviation of poverty and the principle of intra-
generational equity. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 2, the international development 
cooperation regime, based on the principles of equity and solidarity, still faces many setbacks in 
terms of effectiveness and coherence at the international level. In fact, the ‘Human Development 
Report’ of 2005 highlighted that international aid, one of the most effective weapons in the war 
against poverty, should be thought of as an investment as well as a moral imperative. At the same 
time, it pointed to the need for it to be renovated and reshaped, particularly regarding three 
conditions for effective aid: sufficient quantity; better quality (delivered on a predictable, value 
for money basis, with low transaction costs); and country ownership.1 
 
Regional integration agreements might provide a framework for the implementation of the intra-
generational equity principle, promoting the goals of social cohesion and poverty reduction and 
thus delivering on sustainable development objectives. This chapter makes a case study of the 
policies developed by the European Union (EU) and MERCOSUR related to social cohesion. In 
the beginning of the regionalist movement, there was a belief that promoting trade liberalization 
and, in some cases, establishing deeper forms of integration would deliver development as a 
result of an expanded market and economic welfare. Nevertheless, practice showed that this was 
not true, and some regional blocs began to establish ‘positive integration policies’ in order to 
compensate the effects of trade liberalization within the internal market, and to balance their 
differences in internal levels of development.  
 
The rationale behind the creation of regional development policies is to promote equity among 
the members of the regional bloc as a form of solidarity, taking into consideration the 
interdependence of economies and the need to compensate for the backwardness of the least 
developed regions in order to pursue the bigger objective of securing the proper functioning of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 UNDP, Human Development Report 2005, International Cooperation at a crossroads: aid, trade and security in an 
unequal world, 2005, available at www.hdr.undp.org.  
Chapter	  4	  
	   156	  
the internal market. This rationale was present in both of the regional blocs under analysis in this 
thesis, firstly in the EU and later on in MERCOSUR, as will be seen below. 
 
I. The Regional Development Policy of the European Union 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Europe’s integration process began back in the 1950s, focusing on promoting market integration 
as a tool for the reconstruction of national economies after WWII, and also safeguarding peace. 
Nevertheless, the integration project evolved and became more complex, covering fields such as 
economic and social cohesion and environmental protection, and aiming to promote sustainable 
development. This can be said to result from the conclusion that the establishment of a common 
market alone was not enough to solve the developmental challenges faced by member states, and 
that positive measures had to be taken in order to address internal disparities. This section 
examines the regional policy of the EU, which is a good example of a solidarity mechanism 
created to generate economic convergence and foster development within the backward areas of 
the integration project, minimizing the internal asymmetries and thus strengthening the bloc as a 
whole. The focus of the analysis will be the main instruments of this policy, the structural funds. 
 
Attention should be paid to other EU policies that are not development policies as such, but are 
intrinsically related to or directly affect the regional policy: the competition policy and the 
regulation of the use of state aid by member states, and the common agricultural policy (CAP). 
Competition policy has been present since the origins of the EU and was an important tool in 
assuring the completion of the internal market, in the sense that it established rules preventing the 
grant of state aids that would distort competition, but on the other hand, it had another effect in 
that it caused greater exposure of regions that had previously been protected economically by 
such aids. Thus, this policy was in a sense balanced by the regional policy, which aimed to 
compensate for this greater exposure of regions due to the liberalization of trade and the 
regulation of state aids.2 The CAP, on the other hand, is one of the mainstream ‘positive’ EU 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 A. Evans, The law of EU regional policy, Richmond 1999. The author discusses the rationale of community 
policies according to different conceptions of the principle of equality: while the competition policy aims to remove 
obstacles to the completion of the internal market, being a form of ‘negative integration’ and following a rationale of 
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policies, which played a role similar to the regional policy and is considered in fact as a ‘de facto 
development policy’, with a target is similar to that of the European Regional Development 
Fund.3 The CAP had also a financial instrument, the European Agriculture Guarantee Fund 
(EAGGF), which was for some time part of the ‘structural funds’. Although these policies won’t 
be analyzed specifically due to length constraints, it is important to consider their existence and 
effects when addressing the development and the functioning of the regional policy. 
 
2. Background of the establishment of the regional policy 
 
The aim to promote development within the Community was a declared objective of the EC since 
its creation by the Treaty of Rome (TR) in 1957. Two main provisions of the treaty certify this 
aim: the fifth recital in the preamble stated the will of the contracting parties “to strengthen the 
unity of their economies and to ensure their harmonious development by reducing the differences 
existing between the various regions and the backwardness of the less favored regions”; in 
addition, Article 2 stated that “it shall be the aim of the Community, by establishing a Common 
Market and progressively approximating the economic policies of member states, to promote 
throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and 
balanced expansion, an increased stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and 
closer relations between its member states”. It was clear that, in establishing the EEC and a 
common market, the project was expected to stimulate the development of member states by 
reducing internal asymmetries and raising living standards within the community.  
 
However, no specific provisions regarding such measures were included. The policies of the EEC 
as envisaged by the TR, apart from those policies related to the establishment of the common 
market – including the competition policy, were the CAP, the common transport policy, the 
creation of the European Investment Bank, the association of overseas countries and, more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
liberal equality, the regional policy is a ‘positive measure of integration’ which aims to correct the negative effects of 
integration, following a rationale of interventionist equality. 
3 J. Scott, Development Dilemmas in the European Community: rethinking regional development policy, Open 
University Press, UK, 1995, pages 101-103. According to Article 39 TEC, the CAP shall have as objectives: (a) to 
increase agricultural productivity by developing technical progress and by ensuring the rational development of 
agricultural production and the optimum utilization of the factors of production, particularly labor; (b) to ensure 
thereby a fair standard of living for the agricultural population, particularly by the increasing of the individual 
earnings of persons engaged in agriculture. 
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interestingly for this section of the paper, the creation of a ‘European Social Fund (ESF) in order 
“to improve the possibilities of employment for workers and to contribute to the raising of their 
standard of living” (Article 3(i)).4 It was not until the 1970s that Community measures were 
adopted in order to implement a regional development policy. It was expected that the growth 
associated with the establishment of the common market would be enough to ensure distribution 
of the benefits of integration and balance regional asymmetries. Practice showed that this did not 
happen, as the liberalization of trade and the elimination of protectionist instruments -which had 
previously been used to foster regional growth- made member states more vulnerable to foreign 
competition, and thus the use of state aid became common, with one country trying to beat the 
others to attract mobile investment. This posed a risk to the undistorted competition sought 
through the establishment of the common market, and the need arose for some kind of 
community assistance to balance different regional policies adopted by member states.5 
 
In 1972, at the Conference of Heads of State and Government held in Paris, in the 5th point of the 
final Communication of the session, the parties agreed “that a high priority should be given to the 
aim of correction, in the Community, the structural and regional imbalances which might affect 
the realization of Economic and Monetary Union”, and requested the European Commission to 
prepare a report assessing the regional problems and putting forward a proposal to correct them. 
In response to this, the Commission published in 1973 a ‘Report on the Regional Problems in the 
Enlarged Community’ (the ‘Thomson Report’), a comprehensive document which studied the 
regional imbalances of the Community, recognizing “agricultural problem areas” and “areas 
suffering from industrial change” as areas that should receive assistance.6 In addition, the 
political context had the accession of the UK, Denmark and Ireland as a background, and in the 
latter, above all, there were severe economic imbalances. These factors led to another proposal 
made by the Commission in 1973, which ultimately led to the adoption of Regulation 724/75 
establishing the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) in 1975.7  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Article 123 stated that “In order to improve opportunities of employment of workers in the Common Market and 
thus contribute to raising the standard of living, a European Social Fund shall hereby be established in accordance 
with the provisions set out below; it shall have the task of promoting within the Community employment facilities 
and the geographical and occupational mobility of workers”. 
5 A. Evans, ‘EU Regional Policy’, Richmond Law and Tax Ltd., 2005, pages 19-21. 
6 COM 73, May 3rd 1973. 
7 Regulation (ECC) 724/75, OJ L073, 21/03/1975. 
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As there was no specific legal basis concerning a policy on regional development, the measure 
was justified under Article 235 TEC, which provided for the adoption of Community measures 
regarding the objective of establishing the common market (Article  2 TEC): “If any action by the 
Community appears necessary to achieve, in the functioning of the Common Market, one of the 
aims of the Community in cases where this Treaty has not provided for the requisite powers of 
action, the Council, acting by means of a unanimous vote on a proposal of the Commission and 
after the Assembly has been consulted, shall enact the appropriate provisions”. The general 
objectives for the ‘regional policy’ and the creation and regulation of its implementation tools - 
the structural funds and other financial instruments - were done afterwards through the adoption 
of regulations by the Council, under a proposal by the Commission and the approval of the 
Parliament. The regulations were reviewed on a periodic basis, often coinciding with the 
enlargement processes that took place or other major institutional reforms carried out in the EU, 
adapting the general goals of the policy in order to align it with the overall aims of the integration 
project itself, both as the idea of development to be promoted, and as one of the tools envisaged 
to implement these policy goals. 
 
3. Evolution and functioning of the funds 
 
The rationale for the implementation of the ERDF was that the correction of regional imbalance 
was considered to be one of the conditions for continuing economic integration.8 Regulation 
724/57 designed the fund to initially be a tool to help member states to develop policies fostering 
the convergence of poorer regions and permitting, in conjunction with national aids, the 
progressive realization of economic and monetary union. The most significant aspects, in this 
sense, were the ideas of complementarity and additionality, expressed in the preamble of the 
Regulation, according to which “the Fund’s assistance should not lead Member States to reduce 
their own regional development efforts but should complement these efforts”. 
 
There were two categories of projects that could be financed: industrial handicraft and service 
activities and infrastructure investments. Even though there was no definition of criteria for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Some authors argue, however, that the purpose of the Fund was not just (or not even principally) about regional 
development, but also, as noted by Evans (EU Regional Policy, op. cit, p. 13 – 17) a form of compensation to 
member states for completing the internal market.  
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eligibility to assistance, Article 3 provided that “regions and areas which may benefit from the 
fund shall be limited to those aided areas established by member states (…). When aid from the 
fund is granted, priority should be given to investments in national priority areas”. Moreover, 
there was a determination of quotas to each member state in Article 2, and even though Article 5 
stated that the Commission bore responsibility for deciding the fund’s assistance, member states 
had a great amount of discretion to submit proposals of projects which were not necessarily 
reflective of the needs of the least favored regions, but rather of their own political bargaining 
interests. Consequently, the ERDF met with much criticism and skepticism regarding its 
functioning and the argument was made that the fund was ‘nationalized’, representing an 
informal instrument of national policy making.9  
 
The ERDF Regulation determined the re-examination of its terms before 1978. Thus, Regulation 
214/7910 was soon passed, slightly changing the scenario by amending Article 3 to enable that 
“the fund may also, where appropriate, give assistance in regions or areas other than those 
referred to in paragraph 1, for the solution of problems forming the subject of community action, 
if the Member State concerned has also given assistance or does so at the same time”. It was a 
first step towards a horizontal development policy, further improved in Regulation 1787/8411 
which brought more innovations, the first of these being the end of the quota system, replaced by 
‘ranges’ of fund assistance from which member states could benefit. This implied that a Member 
State was no longer necessarily entitled to receive the whole the amount of its quota, “depending 
on the implementation of the priorities and criteria laid down in this regulation” (Article 4). In 
addition, the idea of community programs to be financed by the ERDF alongside the national 
programs was introduced; these community programs should provide “a better link between the 
community's objectives for the structural development or conversion of regions and the objectives 
of other community policies”, and should have priority regarding the fund’s resources (Article 7). 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 J Scott, op. cit. 
10 Council Regulation 214/79, OJ L 35, 9.2.1979. 
11 Council Regulation 1787/84, OJ L 169, 28.6.1984. 
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3.1 From a ‘regional development fund’ to a regional development policy 
 
The institutionalization of a true regional policy was given impetus in the late 1980s, coming out 
of context of important changes happening within the Community: firstly, the accession of the 
poorer Mediterranean countries (Greece (1982), Spain and Portugal (1986)) highlighted the 
regional question in the community context as, for the first time, entire states with large 
populations were labeled as underdeveloped;12 secondly, the process of institutional reform for 
the completion of the internal market reviewed the rationale and the commitment to regional 
development. The ‘Single European Act’, in force since July 1st 1987, introduced a series of 
reforms. The TEC was amended, creating a new section on “economic and social cohesion” and 
adding Article 130a, which established a specific legal base for a policy on “economic and social 
cohesion”: “In order to promote its overall harmonious development, the Community shall 
develop and pursue its actions leading to the strengthening of its economic and social cohesion. 
In particular the Community shall aim at reducing disparities between the various regions and 
the backwardness of the least-favored regions.” Thirdly, this policy became a goal that should be 
observed in the implementation of the common market, as stated by Article 130: “Member States 
shall conduct their economic policies, and shall coordinate them, in such a way as, in addition, to 
attain the objectives set out in Article 130a. The implementation of the common policies and of 
the internal market shall take into account the objectives set out in Article 130a and in Article 
130c and shall contribute to their achievement. The Community shall support the achievement of 
these objectives by the action it takes through the structural Funds (European Agricultural 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund, Guidance Section, European Social Fund, European Regional 
Development Fund), the European Investment Bank and the other existing financial 
instruments”. Art 130c laid down the goal envisioned for the ERDF: Article 130: “(…) intended 
to help redress the principal regional imbalances in the Community through participating in the 
development and structural adjustment of regions whose development is lagging behind and in 
the conversion of declining industrial regions”. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 J Scott, op. cit., page 20. The accession of these countries to the EC came along with a promise of allocation of 
funds. See, in this regard, the treaties of accession, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm. In 
addition, in 1985 Regulation 1787/84 was amended by Regulation 3641/85 to include Portugal and Spain in the 
‘ranges’ of the ERDF. 
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Thus, a new Regulation was passed in 1988 establishing a general framework for the operation of 
all of the structural funds.13 The main innovation introduced was a list of objectives to be pursued 
by the funds towards the implementation of a true regional development policy, laying down 
horizontal criteria for implementation and for the definition of the regions that were eligible for 
each of the objectives. A ‘coordination Regulation’ was also passed in order to assure the 
coordinated functioning of the funds.14 Five objectives were envisioned: 
(1) to promote the development and structural adjustment of the regions whose development was 
lagging behind. This objective counted for the majority of the available funds, and the Regulation 
defined regions that could benefit from the assistance as “administrative level NUTS II (4) 
regions15 where per capita GDP measured in terms of purchasing power parity is less than 75 % 
of the Community average, and other regions whose per capita GDP is close to that of regions 
under 75 % and whose inclusion is justified by special circumstances”. 
(2) to convert the regions, frontier regions or parts of regions (including employment areas and 
urban communities) seriously affected by industrial decline; 
(3) to combat long-term unemployment; and (4) to facilitate the occupational integration of 
young people;  
(5) (a) to speed up the adjustment of agricultural structures, and (b) to promote the development 
of agricultural and rural areas. 
 
Some years later, the new process of reform that led to the establishment of the European Union 
also impacted on regional policy. The Maastricht Treaty signed in 1992 introduced, apart from 
political union, other policy competences for the EC, among which the environmental policy, 
which had an impact on the regional policy. The preamble of the Treaty highlighted the principle 
of solidarity among member states (4th recital), and the amended Article 2 TEC then stated that 
“the Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and an economic and 
monetary union and by implementing the common policies or activities referred to in Articles 3 
and 3a, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious and balanced development of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Council Regulation 2052/88, OJ L 185, 15.7.1988. 
14 Council Regulation 4253/88, OJ L 374, 31.12.1988. 
15 The Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) was established by the ‘EUROSTAT’ Agency more 
than 30 years ago in order to provide a single, uniform breakdown of territorial units for the production of regional 
statistics for the European Union. The NUTS classification has been used in Community legislation since 1988, but 
it was only in 2003, after three years of preparation, that a Regulation was adopted specifically for this issue: Council 
Regulation 1059/2003, OJ L 1 54/1, 21.6.2003. 
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economic activities, sustainable and non-inflationary growth respecting the environment, a high 
degree of convergence of economic performance, a high level of employment and of social 
protection, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and economic and social 
cohesion and solidarity among member states” (emphasis added).   
 
Although the Treaty Articles regulating the policy on economic and social cohesion did not suffer 
from significant changes, this new treaty structure also marked a new stage in the integration 
project as a whole. In this regard, a new fund was established by Article 130(d), ‘a Cohesion 
Fund’ (ECF) which had the objective to help the poorest member states - Spain, Portugal, Greece, 
and Ireland – providing “financial contribution to projects in the fields of environment and trans-
European networks in the area of transport infrastructure”. In addition, a new body was created, 
the Committee of the Regions, consisting of representatives of regional and local bodies, with 
advisory status, which should be consulted by the Council or by the Commission where this 
Treaty so provided and in all other cases in which one of these two institutions considered it 
appropriate, and could issue an opinion “where it considers that specific regional interests are 
involved” (Article 198).  
 
Furthermore, the new treaty framework was also complemented by another policy initiative, The 
Fifth Environmental Action Program, set up in February 1993, which determined the EU’s 
environmental agenda for the decade, with two major principles: integration of the environmental 
dimension in all major policy areas, and replacing the ‘command-and-control’ approach with 
shared responsibility between public and private stakeholders. The strategy ‘Towards 
Sustainabilty’ required a range of instruments, among which support from the available financial 
instruments of the Union, including the structural funds, was envisaged. In this regard, the 
regional policy was also seen as a means of promoting the environmental goals of the bloc. 
Following these changes, the Regulations were revised in 1993 for the 1994–99 period, and their 
objectives were slightly modified. A new framework Regulation16 was passed. It is interesting to 
note that the principle of sustainable development was at this point incorporated into the regional 
policy documents: the preamble of the Regulation stated that “[w]hereas the principles and goals 
of sustainable development are set out in the Community program of policy and action in relation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Council Regulation 2081/93, and Council Regulation 2082/93, OJ L 193, 31.7.1993.  
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to the environment and sustainable development (…); whereas Community policy in the field of 
the environment is designed to ensure a high level of protection while taking account of the 
variety of situations in the various regions of the Community; whereas the requirements of 
environmental protection should form part of the definition and implementation of other 
Community policies; whereas the member states should therefore supply, in the plans submitted 
under Objectives 1, 2 and 5 (b), an appraisal of the state of the environment and the 
environmental impact of the operations envisaged, in accordance with the provisions of 
Community law in force, as well as the steps they have taken to associate their environmental 
authorities with the preparation and implementation of the plans”. In this regard, for the 
mentioned objectives, the Regulation introduced a requirement that the member states concerned, 
when applying for assistance from the funds, “shall submit to the Commission their regional 
development plan. These plans shall include: a description of the current situation with regard to 
disparities and development gaps, the financial resources deployed and the main results of 
operations undertaken in the previous programming period, in the context of Community 
structural assistance received and with regard to the evaluation results available; a description 
of an appropriate strategy to achieve the objectives (…), the regional development priorities 
selected and specific objectives, quantified where they lend themselves to quantification; a priori 
appraisal of the expected impact, including that on jobs, of corresponding operations with a view 
to ensuring that they yield medium-term economic and social benefits in keeping with the 
resources deployed; an appraisal of the environmental situation of the region concerned and an 
evaluation of the environmental impact of the strategy and operations referred to above in terms 
of sustainable development in agreement with the provisions of Community law in force; the 
arrangements made to associate the competent environmental authorities designated by the 
Member State in the preparation and implementation of the operations envisaged in the plan and 
to ensure compliance with Community environmental rules” (emphasis added).   
 
Notwithstanding, no substantive innovations regarding the scope of the policies were introduced, 
apart from the inclusion of the newly created ECF and the creation of another financial 
instrument for the fisheries sector.17 In 1994, following the accession of Austria, Sweden and 
Finland, an amendment to Regulation 2081/93 was made in order to include these new members  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Financial instrument for fisheries guidance, "FIFG " established by Regulation (EEC) No 2080/93.  
Chapter	  4	  
	   165	  
in the policies, as well as introducing a new objective: “Until 31 December 1999, the Structural 
Funds, the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG) and the European Investment 
Bank (EIB) shall each contribute in an appropriate fashion to a further priority Objective […] to 
promote the development and structural adjustment of regions with an extremely low population 
density ('Objective 6`)”.18 
 
3.2 Regional policy as part of the Lisbon Agenda 
 
The next revision came with more substantive alterations as part of important institutional and 
political changes within the EU: the completed accession process of the Nordic countries; the 
envisioned enlargement to include the eastern countries to be completed within the following 
years; the signature and entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty; and the launch of ‘Agenda 
2000’ in 1999. These events impacted on regional policy in two important ways: in the stronger 
environmental dimension and the concern regarding acceding countries with strong 
developmental inequalities. The new TEC as amended by the Amsterdam Treaty emphasized the 
overall principle of sustainable development as a goal of all policies and went further, stating that 
the Union’s financial instruments should work simultaneously and in the long term interest 
towards economic growth, social cohesion and environmental protection. In addiction, Article 6 
now required that environmental protection be integrated into the definition and implementation 
of all policies and activities. This represented an important shift in highlighting the importance of 
sustainable development in all policies, even thought no substantial alteration was introduced to 
the wording of the provisions on the cohesion policy, apart from the renumbering of articles, 
from 158 to 162.  
 
Agenda 2000 introduced proposals to “modernize and strengthen the Union” based on three 
central challenges, among which were the narrowing of “gaps in wealth and economic prospects 
between regions”, together with the modernization of the agricultural model and changes in the 
optimization of resource spending. These gaps were a concern given the enlargement process to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Act 11994N/PRO/06, OJ C 241, 29.8.1994, Article  1 (concerning the conditions of accession of the Kingdom of 
Norway, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden and the adjustments to the 
Treaties on which the European Union is founded, Protocol No 6 - on special provisions for Objective 6 in the 
framework of the Structural Funds in Finland, Norway and Sweden) 
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include poorer countries, and the priority given to regional policy grew stronger in this regard. 
Within this framework, the funds’ regulations further strengthened the requirements for the 
inclusion of the two horizontal themes of environmental sustainability and equal opportunities in 
the 2000-06 programs, making them more systematic and extensive.  
 
Regulation 1260/1999 was passed laying down the regulations of regional policy for the period. 
The wording of the Regulation’s preamble showed the influence of sustainable development as a 
goal of the EU: “Whereas in its efforts to strengthen economic and social cohesion the 
Community also seeks to promote the harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of 
economic activities, a high level of employment, equality between men and women and a high 
level of protection and improvement of the environment; whereas those efforts should in 
particular integrate the requirements of environmental protection into the design and 
implementation of the operations of the Structural Funds and help to eliminate inequalities and 
promote equality between men and women; whereas the Funds' operations may also make it 
possible to combat any discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnic origin, disability or age by 
means in particular of an evaluation of needs, financial incentives and an enlarged partnership”. 
The most important change in the framework was the reduction of the number of objectives to 
three, in order to increase the level of concentration and simplify the operation of the funds.19 The 
‘structural funds’ should so pursue three objectives as stated in Article 1:  
 
Objective 1: to promote the development and structural adjustment of regions whose 
development is lagging behind, understood as those which average per capita GDP was less than 
75% of the European Union average; also covering remote regions and areas eligible under the 
former Objective 6 (areas with low population density) created by the Act of Accession of 
Austria, Finland and Sweden. This objective now encompassed 70% of the resources in order to 
concentrate action on the least developed regions.  
 
Objective 2: unified former Objectives 2 and 5(b), to contribute to the economic and social 
conversion of regions with structural difficulties other than those eligible for the new Objective 1; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Council Regulation 1260/99, OJ L 161, 26.6.1999. 
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and other areas facing the need for economic diversification, areas undergoing economic change, 
declining rural areas, depressed areas dependent on fisheries and urban areas in difficulty;  
 
Objective 3: (replaced the former Objectives 3 and 4) to gather all the measures for human 
resource development outside the regions eligible for Objective 1; this objective became the 
reference framework for all measures taken under the new Title on employment inserted in the 
EC Treaty by the Treaty of Amsterdam and under the European employment strategy. Moreover, 
as enlargement was already envisioned towards Eastern Europe, these reforms were also expected 
to “ensure that structural policy plays a continuing role in the Union's future enlargement, 
bringing in the countries of central and eastern Europe”.20  
 
Furthermore, Article 1 stated that “[i]n pursuing these objectives, the Community shall contribute 
to the harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic activities, the 
development of employment and human resources, the protection and improvement of the 
environment, and the elimination of inequalities, and the promotion of equality between men and 
women.” It can be perceived that the inclusion of sustainable development as a cross-cutting 
objective of the EU had an impact on the regional policy, which should now also work towards 
the achievement of this objective. The integration of environmental issues as a horizontal theme 
was articulated around a comprehensive framework, with environmental considerations featuring 
under most of the main headings addressed by the Regulations: program preparation, content, 
monitoring, evaluation and information. Thus many programs during this period included 
projects that related explicitly to environmental sustainability, such as projects promoting eco-
industries. This is indicative of a more holistic vision of the EU towards the promotion of 
development.  
 
At the same time, while the integration of environmental concerns into the regional policy was 
envisaged as a goal, the concentration of structural funds remained focused on regions lagging 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council of 16 July 2003 on the 
implementation of the commitments undertaken by the acceding countries in the context of accession negotiations on 
Chapter 21 - regional policy and coordination of structural instruments [COM(2003) 433. 
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behind in economic development, as Objective 1 still received the majority of resources. In a 
report, the Commission published the implementation of the programs in the 2000-2006 period:21 
  
Objective 1: focused on basic infrastructure projects (40.2%), with almost half of all investment 
in this category spent on transport infrastructure (49.9%). More than a third (34.9%) of Objective 
1 resources were invested in the productive environment and projects geared at human resources 
accounted for 22.5% of resources. 
 
Objective 2: the main focus of programs in Objective 2 regions continued to be productive 
investments, with over half of all financial resources devoted to this category (55.4%). The 
second most supported field was basic infrastructure, accounting for 29.2% of all Objective 2 
resources. In the category of human resources (10.5%), workforce flexibility, entrepreneurial 
activity, innovation, information and communication technologies were the main fields of 
investment (31.6%). 
 
Objective 3: ESF program implementation in 2009 continued to focus on the European 
Employment Strategy, particularly on measures aimed at improving employability in the labor 
market (30.6% of certified expenditure), lifelong learning (actions developing educational and 
vocational training represented 22.8% of certified expenditure), social inclusion (20.8%) and 
equal opportunities (6.5%). 
 
These figures show that, despite the efforts to integrate sustainable development considerations 
into regional policy, the vast majority of funds still found their way into infrastructure projects. 
This is not to say that infrastructure is not a relevant issue, on the contrary, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, infrastructure integration and the ability of countries within a regional project to form 
value chains among themselves is a fundamental condition for the success of an internal market. 
In this regard, it must be considered that the regional policy’s major efforts were still 
concentrated in building the foundational conditions for regional development via the internal 
market and economic integration. The subsequent integration of social and environmental 
considerations is a gradual step that should follow the economic one.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 COM(2010) 587: 21st annual report on implementation of the structural funds (2009). 
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3.3 The regional policy nowadays 
 
In 2006 the regulation of the regional policy was renovated, both as part of the requirement for a 
new programming period, and to adapt the policy to the new policy strategies of the EU. Firstly, 
after the inclusion of sustainable development as a cross-cutting goal in Amsterdam, the 
definitions and objectives thereof were expressed through ‘Sustainable Development Strategies’ 
released in 2001 and reviewed in 2006.22 Furthermore, as part of the political process leading to 
the signature of the Lisbon Treaty, in 2005 the EU released the renewed Lisbon Agenda, 
establishing new priorities focused on ‘growth and employment’, and determined that the 
structural funds were to support these new priorities as part of an overall ‘cohesion policy’.23  
 
Thus, a new set of regulations was passed in July 2006 in order to set out the guidelines for the 
period within the 2007–2013 framework. A framework Regulation was passed laying down the 
general provisions for the regional policy and the available funds for its promotion,24 and its rules 
expressed changes envisioned for the regional policy, among which five important alterations can 
be highlighted. The first of these is a greater synergy between the objectives of the regional 
policy and the other political strategies of the EU, which can be seen in the express mention in 
preamble of the Regulation that the cohesion policy should “contribute to increasing growth, 
competitiveness and employment by incorporating the Community's priorities for sustainable 
development as defined at the Lisbon European Council of (…) March 2000 [Lisbon strategy] 
and at the Göteborg European Council of (…) 2001”( the first SDS) (second recital).  
 
Secondly, the resources available for the policy have been significantly increased, now totaling 
approximately €310 billion for the period between 2007 and 2013 (nearly one third of the EU’s 
total budget, being the second item on budget allocation), which testifies to the importance that it 
has achieved within the EU agenda (Article 18.1). In addition, the financial instruments designed 
to support the regional policy were changed: the preamble stated that “the Cohesion Fund should 
be integrated into the programming of structural assistance in the interest of greater coherence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 See chapter 3.  
23 COM(2005) 330, OJ L 291, 21.10.06.  
24 Council Regulation 1083/2006OJ L 210, 31/07/2006. 
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in the intervention of the various Funds (fifth recital). The role of the instruments providing aid 
for rural development, namely the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (…), and 
for the fisheries sector, namely a European Fisheries Fund (EFF), should be specified. Those 
instruments should be integrated into the instruments under the common agricultural policy and 
the common fisheries policy and coordinated with those under the cohesion policy. The Funds 
providing assistance under the cohesion policy are therefore limited to the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF) and the Cohesion Fund” (sixth and 
seventh recitals). In this regard, specific Regulations were passed complementing the framework 
Regulation in specifying the scope of assistance for each of the three funds.25   
 
Thirdly, the objectives of the policy were maintained at three, but were again changed, as was the 
way of determining the regions eligible for assistance. Article 3 provides that “the action taken by 
the Community under Article 158 of the Treaty shall be designed to strengthen the economic and 
social cohesion of the enlarged European Union in order to promote the harmonious, balanced 
and sustainable development of the Community. This action shall be taken with the aid of the 
Funds, the European Investment Bank (EIB) and other existing financial instruments. It shall be 
aimed at reducing the economic, social and territorial disparities which have arisen particularly 
in countries and regions whose development is lagging behind and in connection with economic 
and social restructuring and the ageing of the population. The action taken under the Funds shall 
incorporate, at national and regional level, the Community's priorities in favor of sustainable 
development by strengthening growth, competitiveness, employment and social inclusion and by 
protecting and improving the quality of the environment” (emphasis added). To this end, it 
announces the three objectives to be pursued under the policy: 
 
1) the Convergence objective, which shall be aimed at speeding up the convergence of the 
least-developed member states and regions by improving conditions for growth and 
employment through increasing and improving the quality of investment in physical and human 
capital, the development of innovation and of the knowledge society, adaptability to economic 
and social changes, the protection and improvement of the environment, and administrative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Council Regulation 1080/2006 for the ERDF,1081/2006 for the ESF and 1084/2006 for the ECF, OJ L 210, 
31/07/2006. 
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efficiency. This objective shall constitute the priority of the Funds (Article 3). Article 5 defines 
regions eligible for funding under this objective:  
 
5.1 Regions corresponding to level 2 of the NUTS classification whose GDP per capita, 
measured in purchasing power parities and calculated on the basis of Community figures 
for the period 2000 to 2002, is less than 75 % of the average GDP of the EU-25 for the 
same reference period. 
 
5.2 The member states eligible for funding from the Cohesion Fund shall be those whose 
GNI per capita, measured in purchasing power parities and calculated on the basis of 
Community figures for the period 2001 to 2003, is less than 90 % of the average GNI of the 
EU-25 and which have a program for meeting the economic convergence conditions 
referred to in Article 104 of the Treaty.  
 
In addition, Article 8 establishes ‘transitional support’ for regions in transition of classification 
due to the enlargement process: 
 
8. 1. The NUTS level 2 regions which would have been eligible for Convergence objective 
status under Article 5(1) had the eligibility threshold remained at 75% of the average GDP 
of the EU-15, but which lose eligibility because their nominal GDP per capita level will 
exceed 75% of the average GDP of the EU-25, measured and calculated according to 
Article 5(1), shall be eligible, on a transitional and specific basis, for financing by the 
Structural Funds under the Convergence objective. 
8.3 The member states eligible for funding from the Cohesion Fund in 2006 which would 
have continued to be eligible had the eligibility threshold remained at 90% of the average 
GNI of the EU-15, but which lose eligibility because their nominal per capita GNI will 
exceed 90% of the average GNI of the EU-25 measured and calculated according to Article 
5(2), shall be eligible, on a transitional and specific basis, for financing by the Cohesion 
Fund under the Convergence objective. 
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Article 4 defines the instruments that should provide financial support, and specific possibilities 
of funding are determined by the specific regulations for each fund:  
 
i) the ERDF: shall focus its assistance on supporting sustainable, integrated regional and local 
economic development and employment, through the following headings: 1. research and 
technological development (R&TD), innovation and entrepreneurship; 2. information society, 
including development of electronic communications infrastructure, local content, services and 
applications, improvement of secure access to and development of on-line public services; aid 
and services to SMEs to adopt and effectively use information and communication technologies 
(ICTs) or to exploit new ideas; 3. local development initiatives and aid for structures providing 
neighborhood services to create new jobs; 4. environment, including investments connected with 
water supply and water and waste management; waste-water treatment and air quality; 
prevention, control and fight against desertification; integrated pollution prevention and control; 
aid to mitigate the effects of climate change; rehabilitation of the physical environment, including 
contaminated sites and land and brownfield redevelopment; promotion of biodiversity and nature 
protection, including investments in NATURA 2000 sites; aid to SMEs to promote sustainable 
production patterns through the introduction of cost-effective environmental management 
systems and the adoption and use of pollution-prevention technologies; 5. prevention of risks, 
including development and implementation of plans to prevent and cope with natural and 
technological risks; 6. tourism, including promotion of natural assets as potential for the 
development of sustainable tourism; protection and enhancement of natural heritage in support of 
socio-economic development; aid to improve the supply of tourism services through new higher 
added-value services and to encourage new, more sustainable patterns of tourism; 7. investments 
in culture; 8. transport investments; 9. energy investments; 10. education investments; 11. 
investment in health and social infrastructure which contribute to regional and local development 
and improve quality of life. 
 
ii) the ESF: (a) increasing adaptability of workers, enterprises and entrepreneurs with a view to 
improving the anticipation and positive management of economic change; (b) improving access 
to employment and the sustainable inclusion in the labor market of job seekers and inactive 
people, preventing unemployment -in particular long-term and youth unemployment, 
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encouraging active ageing and longer working lives, and increasing participation in the labor 
market; c) reinforcing the social inclusion of disadvantaged people with a view to their 
sustainable integration in employment and combating all forms of discrimination in the labor 
market; (d) enhancing human capital and (e) promoting partnerships, pacts and initiatives through 
networking of relevant stakeholders, such as the social partners and non-governmental 
organizations, at the transnational, national, regional and local levels in order to mobilize for 
reforms in the field of employment and labor market inclusiveness. 
 
iii) the Cohesion Fund: (a) trans-European transport networks, in particular priority projects of 
common interest as identified by Decision No. 1692/96/EC; (b) the environment within the 
priorities assigned to the Community environmental protection policy under the policy and action 
program on the environment. In this context, the Fund may also intervene in areas related to 
sustainable development which clearly present environmental benefits, namely energy efficiency, 
renewable energy and, in the transport sector outside the trans-European networks, rail, river and 
sea transport, intermodal transport systems and their interoperability, management of road, sea 
and air traffic, clean urban transport and public transport. 
 
Article 19 defines the resources available for this objective: 81.54% of the total (i.e. of €251 
billion), to be distributed between the different components as follows:  
 
(a) 70.51% (€177 billion) for the financing referred to in Article 5(1), using eligible 
population, regional prosperity, national prosperity and unemployment rate as the criteria 
for calculating the indicative breakdowns by Member State; 
(b) 4.99% (€12 billion) for the transitional and specific support referred to in Article 8(1), 
using eligible population, regional prosperity, national prosperity and unemployment rate 
as the criteria for calculating the indicative breakdowns by Member State; 
(c) 23.22% (€58 billion) for the financing referred to in Article 5(2), using population, 
national prosperity and surface area as the criteria for calculating the indicative breakdowns 
by Member State; 
(d) 1.29% (€3.25 billion) for the transitional and specific support referred to in Article 8(3). 
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According to the principle of complementarity, the funding provided under this objective is 
restricted to established ceilings which apply to co-financing rates: 75% of public expenditure co-
financed by the ERDF or the ESF. This ceiling can be raised to 80% where the eligible regions 
are located in a Member State covered by the Cohesion Fund, and even to 85% in the case of the 
outermost regions; 85% of public expenditure co-financed by the Cohesion Fund; 50% of public 
expenditure co-financed in the outermost regions (a new additional allocation from the ERDF to 
compensate for excess costs). 
 
2) The Regional competitiveness and employment objective, which shall, outside the least-
developed regions, be aimed at strengthening regions' competitiveness and attractiveness as 
well as employment by anticipating economic and social changes, including those linked to 
the opening of trade, through increasing and improving the quality of investment in human 
capital, innovation and the promotion of the knowledge society, entrepreneurship, the protection 
and improvement of the environment, and the improvement of accessibility, adaptability of 
workers and businesses, as well as the development of inclusive job markets. 
  
Article 6 defines regions eligible for funding under this objective: those not covered by Article 
5(1) and Article 8(1) and (2), meaning those covered under Objective 1, above. In addition, 
transitional support under this objective is also envisaged by Article 8. 2: The NUTS level 2 
regions totally covered by Objective 1 in 2006 under Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 
whose nominal GDP level per capita, measured and calculated according to Article 5(1), will 
exceed 75% of the average GDP of the EU15 shall be eligible, on a transitional and specific 
basis, for financing by the Structural Funds under the Regional competitiveness and employment 
objective. Recognizing that, on the basis of revised figures for the period 1997 to 1999, Cyprus 
should have been eligible for Objective 1 from 2004 to 2006, Cyprus shall benefit between 2007 
and 2013 from the transitional financing applicable to the regions referred to in the first 
subparagraph. 
 
Article 4 defines the instruments that should provide financial support: 
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i) ERDF: shall focus its assistance in the context of sustainable development strategies, while 
promoting employment, primarily on the following three priorities: 1. innovation and the 
knowledge economy, including through the creation and strengthening of efficient regional 
innovation economies, systemic relations between the private and public sectors, universities and 
technology centers which take into account local needs; 2. environment and risk prevention; and 
3. access to transport and telecommunication services of general economic interest; 
 
ii) ESF: same as in previous objective. 
 
Article 19 determines the resources: 15.95 % of the resources referred to in Article 18(1) (€49 
billion) to be distributed between the different components as follows: (a) 78.86 % (€39 billion) 
for the financing referred to in Article 6, using eligible population, regional prosperity, 
unemployment rate, employment rate and population density as the criteria for calculating the 
indicative breakdowns by Member State; and (b) 21.14 % (€10 billion) for the transitional and 
specific support referred to in Article 8(2), using eligible population, regional prosperity, national 
prosperity and unemployment rate as the criteria for calculating the indicative breakdowns by 
Member State. Under this objective, measures can be co-financed up to 50% of public 
expenditure. The ceiling is 85% for the outermost regions. 
 
(iii) The European territorial cooperation objective, which shall be aimed at strengthening cross-
border cooperation through joint local and regional initiatives, strengthening transnational 
cooperation by means of actions conducive to integrated territorial development linked to the 
Community priorities, and strengthening interregional cooperation and exchange of experience at 
the appropriate territorial level. 
 
Article 7 defines regions available under this objective: 1. NUTS level 3 regions of the 
Community along all internal and certain external land borders and all NUTS level 3 regions of 
the Community along maritime borders separated, as a general rule, by a maximum of 150 
kilometers shall be eligible for financing taking into account potential adjustments needed to 
ensure the coherence and continuity of the cooperation action. (…). 3. For the purpose of 
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interregional cooperation, cooperation networks and exchange of experience, the entire territory 
of the Community shall be eligible. 
 
Article 4 determines that only the ERDF is to support this objective, in the following areas: 1. the 
development of cross-border economic, social and environmental activities through joint 
strategies for sustainable territorial development; 2. the establishment and development of 
transnational cooperation, including bilateral cooperation between maritime regions not covered 
under point 1, through the financing of networks and of actions conducive to integrated territorial 
development; 3. reinforcement of the effectiveness of regional policy by promoting: (a) 
interregional cooperation focusing on innovation and the knowledge economy and environment 
and risk prevention in the sense of Article 5(1) and (2); (b) exchanges of experience concerning 
the identification, transfer and dissemination of best practice including on sustainable urban 
development as referred to in Article 8; and (c) actions involving studies, data collection, and the 
observation and analysis of development trends in the Community. 
 
Article 21 defines the resources available: 2.52 % of the resources referred to in Article 18(1) (€7 
billion) and, excluding the amount referred to in paragraph 22 of Annex II, this shall be 
distributed between the different components as follows: (a) 73.86 % for the financing of cross-
border cooperation referred to in Article 7(1), using eligible population as the criterion for 
calculating the indicative breakdowns by Member State; (b) 20.95 % for the financing of 
transnational cooperation referred to in Article 7(2), using eligible population as the criterion for 
calculating the indicative breakdowns by Member State; (c) 5.19 % for the financing of 
interregional cooperation, cooperation networks and exchange of experience referred to in Article 
7(3). The ceiling for co-financing is 75% of public expenditure. 
 
Based on these objectives and funding specifications, the Regulation also sets the principles of 
assistance from the funds: complementarity to national actions, consistency with Community 
priorities and coordination among the financial instruments (Article 9); Programming: the 
objectives shall be pursued in the framework of a multiannual programming system organized in 
several stages comprising the identification of priorities, the financing, and a system of 
management and control (Article 10) and in ‘partnership’ or close cooperation between the 
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Commission and each Member State covering the preparation, implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation of operational programs. Member states shall involve, where appropriate, each of the 
relevant partners, and particularly the regions, in the different stages of programming within the 
time limit set for each stage (Article11); Territorial level of implementation: the implementation 
of operational programs is the responsibility of member states at the appropriate territorial level 
(Article 12); Proportional intervention, meaning proportional employment of financial and 
administrative resources by the Commission and member states according to the proportion of 
expenditure allocated to an operational program (Article 13); Shared management (Article 14); 
Additionality: contributions from the Structural Funds shall not replace public or equivalent 
structural expenditure by a Member State, which may vary in the different objectives (Article 
15); Equality between men and women and non-discrimination (Article 16); Sustainable 
development: the objectives of the Funds shall be pursued in the framework of sustainable 
development and the Community promotion of the goal of protecting and improving the 
environment as set out in Article 6 of the Treaty (Article 17).  
 
In addition, according to Article 25, the Council should established the ‘strategic guidelines’ 
through a policy document defining an indicative framework for the intervention of the Funds, 
taking account of other relevant Community policies. For each of the objectives of the Funds, 
those guidelines shall “give effect to the priorities of the Community with a view to promoting 
the harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of the Community referred to in Article 
3(1).” In this regard, in 2006 these guidelines were established, representing “a single framework 
which member states and regions are invited to use when developing national, regional, and 
local programs, in particular with a view to assessing their contribution to the Community's 
objectives in terms of cohesion, growth and jobs”26 They concentrate on three priorities that 
should be the targets of resources to be allocated by the funds to the programs presented by 
member states:  
 
(i) improving the attractiveness of member states, regions and cities by improving accessibility, 
ensuring adequate quality and level of services, and preserving the environment;  
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(ii) encouraging innovation, entrepreneurship and the growth of the knowledge economy through 
research and innovation capacities, including new information and communication technologies; 
 
(iii) creating more and better jobs by attracting more people into employment or entrepreneurial 
activity, improving the adaptability of workers and enterprises and increasing investment in 
human capital.  
 
The guidelines also stress that member states and regions should pursue “the objective of 
sustainable development and boost synergies between the economic, social and environmental 
dimensions. The renewed Lisbon strategy for Growth and Jobs and the National Reform 
Programs emphasize the role of environment in growth, competitiveness and employment. 
Environmental protection needs to be taken into account in preparing programs and projects 
with a view to promoting sustainable development”. The guidelines are thus indicative policy 
objectives and principles to orient the implantation, and based on these guidelines, member states 
adopt a national strategic reference framework. This framework serves as the basis for 
programming actions financed by the Funds, and has the purpose of ensuring that interventions of 
the funds are in line with the strategic guidelines.  
 
Based on these principles, the Regulation designs the functioning of the funds based on the 
elaboration of national frameworks and operational programs by member states that are entitled 
to funding under the different programs, including, among other requirements, environmental 
impact assessments of the proposed measure. These operational programs are then reviewed by 
the Commission and implemented by the States at the appropriate level of governance. Member 
states also have to report on the implementation to the Commission, which is responsible for the 
evaluation and is entitled to eventually suspend the funding. 
 
The current operational regulations are in force until 2013, but after the release of the Europe 
2020 agenda, a Communication was issued in order to stress the role of Regional Policy in this 
strategy, based on a two-pillar approach to increase its contribution to sustainable growth during 
the current programming period:  
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(i) Investing more in sustainable growth: encouraging greater strategic focus in investments on 
sustainable growth with emphasis on resource efficient and low-carbon economy; and  
 
(ii) Investing ‘better’ in sustainable growth: improving policy delivery mechanisms by 
reinforcing the application of sustainable development principles in the operational programs.  
 
While major changes in the way Regional Policy operates can only be envisaged in the next 
multiannual financial framework, this Communication sets out how managing authorities can 
realign current Regional Policy programs with the Europe 2020 sustainable growth objectives. 
These actions should be seen in the context of -and are complementary to- the ‘Resource 
Efficient Europe’ flagship initiative and the climate and energy targets of Europe 2020.27 Once 
more, not only has the regional policy aimed to address the regions that are lagging behind in 
economic development, as stated in the convergence objective, but it has also adapted to function 
as an instrument of the wider policy objectives of the EU.  
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
The regional policy has moved from being an “accompanying policy designed to offset the 
regional perverse effects of other Community policies”28 and to provide additional support to 
member states in overcoming their own backwardness, to become a comprehensive and 
mainstream policy, seen not only as an objective but also as a means of completing the 
integration project itself. The policy nowadays encompasses approximately one third of the EU 
budget, has a complex set of objectives defined at the supranational level, and has proven to have 
an impact on regional development, while also being both highly contested and ambiguous in its 
effects and the coherence of its goals. Based on the analysis provided in this section, some 
conclusions can be drawn.  
 
Firstly, the scope of the regional policy has evolved significantly and in parallel to 
transformations taking place in the EU itself. Tackling regional imbalances was seen at the time 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 European Council Conclusions of 17.06.2010 
28 J. Scott, ‘Environmental Compatibility and the Community’s Structural Funds: a legal analysis’, in Journal of 
Environmental Law 8, 1996, Oxford Univ. Press.  
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of the creation of the ERDF as necessary for the achievement of the common market. 
Nevertheless, as the evolution continued, the idea of cohesion was introduced into the treaties as 
a goal of the EC to be achieved by way of the implementation of the common market and the 
Community’s policies. This led to the establishment of a regional development policy, as an 
instrument based on solidarity between member states and designed to induce not only 
convergence in economic development among different regions, but also the implementation of 
the different overall policy strategies of the bloc.  
 
It is important to note, in this regard, the equal constitutional status of the EC’s tasks, according 
to Article 2 TEC: (i) harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic activities; 
(ii) high level of employment and of social protection; (iii) equality between men and women; 
(iv) sustainable and non-inflationary growth; (iv) competitiveness and convergence of economic 
performance; (v) protection and improvement of the quality of the environment; (vi) raising of 
life quality and living standards and (vii) economic and social cohesion and solidarity among 
member states – the Lisbon Treaty added ‘territorial’ to this last goal, reflecting the existence of 
this objective in the Structural Funds Regulation. In addition, policy documents such as the SDS, 
the Lisbon Agenda and Europe 2020 introduced new cross-cutting objectives to be pursued 
through all policy instruments, with sustainable development, above all, as a mainstream goal. 
Nevertheless, achieving coherence between these goals is a complex task, given the wide range 
of issues comprised in those targets and the difficulty in defining concrete objectives – 
sustainable development is not defined in the Regulations, its meaning coming from the SDS.  
 
From the legal instruments analyzed above, it can be perceived that the majority of the resources 
(81%) is allocated to the Convergence objective, which aims at (i) improving conditions for 
growth and employment through investment in physical and human capital, (ii) the development 
of innovation and of the knowledge society, adaptability to economic and social changes, (iii) the 
protection and improvement of the environment, and (iv) administrative efficiency (Reg. 1083 
Article 3.1). Within this framework, 70% of the resources are allocated according to quantitative 
economic criteria: GDP per capita below 75% of the community average makes a region eligible 
for funding under this objective. Therefore, it can be said that the absolute priority of the regional 
policy as it stands today is to address regions which are lagging behind in development terms, 
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understood as having economic development below the average. The means envisaged to 
promote such a convergence range from infrastructure investments to sustainable tourism and 
water treatment, showing that the cross-cutting policy objectives mentioned above have been 
taken into consideration. On the other hand, it is a bit unclear how these objectives fit together. 
 
This complexity is reflected in the implementation and evaluation of the impact of these 
instruments. For instance, despite the fact of the requirement of environmental integration into 
the ex ante evaluations of the programs to be funded, the ex post evaluation of the programs 
under implementation, and also the overall requirement to work towards the objective of 
sustainable development, the impact of the convergence objective on the social and -primarily-
environmental spheres is more complex. As argued by Joanne Scott in 1996, it is clear that the 
requirements contained in the Regulations alone are not sufficient to assure compatibility 
between the measures funded and the environmental/sustainability goals, as repeatedly measures 
funded under ‘Objective 1’ (as it was once called) were found not to comply with EU 
environmental law and to have negative environmental impacts.29  
 
Later analysis has confirmed Scott’s legal insights with data. In a comprehensive study with a 
twofold aim, namely to analyze the impact of the structural funds towards the promotion of 
sustainable development, and to develop indicators in order to evaluate how the situation would 
be in the absence of the structural funds programs, Paul Ekins presents two interesting 
conclusions. Firstly, acknowledging that there is increasing consistency between regional policy 
priorities and the broader regional development strategies, the case study suggests that the funds 
have made a generally positive contribution to ‘manufactured and human capital’, but that the 
key regional constraints on sustainability in relation to natural and social capital, identified in the 
regional assessments, are not at the center of the structural funds programs, and measures have 
made significant negative contributions to natural capital, as well as contributing to significant 
environmental improvements, especially in Objective 2 regions: “These negative effects occur 
largely in relation to the impacts of new infrastructure investment, especially roads. These 
impacts are generally an implicitly understood and accepted part of a program of development 
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Environmental Law 8, 1996, Oxford Univ. Press.  
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and have been taken to provide higher levels of social welfare, by regional decision-makers. The 
case studies suggest however changes in the relative weight given to natural capital in 
determining trade-offs with a decline in natural capital becoming less acceptable in the current 
period. The evaluations are those of regional (and MS) decision-makers. It is not obvious that 
taking an EU perspective would result in a similar evaluation of the trade-offs, for example in the 
cases where increases in GHG have been accepted. The emergence of potential differences in the 
way in which trade-offs are evaluated is suggestive of the need for clearer EU criteria when 
evaluating SF programs. The evidence from the cases is that resource efficiency measures are 
not specified as a means of managing the inevitable trade-offs.”  
 
Secondly, the study considers the added value of the programs in comparison with a situation 
lacking such interventions: “Whilst a difficult and necessarily speculative analysis, the case 
studies suggest that the SF programs have accelerated ‘conventional’ measures of regional 
development in the form of infrastructure, productive investments and skills development. 
Perhaps more importantly the SF have allowed regions to broaden and ‘modernize’ the policy 
mix to include fuller consideration of ICT and R&D, environmental measures, territorial 
planning and integrated urban and rural development, human resource development and 
measures to combat social exclusion. In doing so, the SF fosters a more comprehensive regional 
development policy and one that has greater co-ordination with other Community policies. 
Finally, in terms of the contribution of the SF to SD, identified in the cases, a common finding 
has been the strong positive impact that the design and operation of SF programs has had on the 
development of institutional capacity at the regional and local levels. The ability to take strategic 
views, adopt coordinated policy approaches, apply methods for policy evaluation and to adopt 
consultative and partnership approaches, has been strengthened. This capacity has taken a 
considerable time to develop, but will remain a permanent benefit in those regions receiving SF 
support.” In concluding, the study suggests that “in order to rise to the challenge the structural 
funds have to be seen as an agent for sustainable development as well as the achievement of 
cohesion. (…) As an EU policy tool, the SF, with due initiative and improvement, has the 
potential to be a constructive motor for sustainable development. The SF provide the opportunity 
to challenge regions to accelerate to a more sustainable development path, to embrace a model 
of development that better addresses the constraints to sustainable development, and which in 
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turn fosters an improved quality of life now and in the future for regional and EU citizens”.30 
Thus, it can be perceived that the regional policy has had several positive impacts in the 
sustainable development of the regions, even if sometimes the trade-offs between the gains are of 
complex nature. 
 
Finally, regarding the management of the funds, it can be said that control over the use of the 
funds has been gradually transferred to the Commission, which establishes the eligible regions -
for the majority of the cases - through specific guidelines in the Regulations. Nevertheless, 
tension has always existed between Community priorities and Member States’ control, which has 
been apparent from the beginning. At the time of its establishment, the policy was officially 
presented as a way of promoting regional development, but was also an instrument of political 
bargaining between stronger and smaller countries and regions within the Community in terms of 
implementing the common goals of the integration project. Since then, the policy has come a 
long way, from being a complementary policy to national development efforts to a complex 
communitarian vision of development, and the majority of the financial resources are applied in 
objectives decided at EU level. The eligibility for structural funds under the convergence 
objective, which accounts for 80% of the funding available, is to be applied based on horizontal 
criteria, which for a long time have been again designated on the basis of GDP per capita, which 
should be less than 75% of the Community average. However, there was no area designation at 
EU level for the regional competitiveness and employment objective; instead, it became the 
responsibility of the member states to determine the eligible NUTS I or II regions to be selected 
for this objective under national planning. While some argue that this culminated a trend of 
increasing national influence on the spatial coverage of the regional policy since 1993, others are 
more cautious in making such claims, given that this policy objective represents only 15% of the 
available resources and that the implementation of such resources is also done according to 
guidelines decided at EU level.31 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 P Ekins, ‘Evaluating the Contribution of the EU Structural Funds to Sustainable Development’, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/rado_en.htm.  
31 Regarding the debate concerning the governing of the funds, see J Bachtler, ‘Who governs EU Cohesion Policy? 
Deconstructing the Reforms of the Structural Funds’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 2007, Volume 45, 
Number 3. 
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In sum, despite the criticism that might be raised regarding its flaws, it seems as though the 
regional policy has been an important instrument of solidarity between member states and a good 
example of a measure designed to promote regional development. It has induced development in 
regions lagging behind; it has included issues that were incorporated into the EU as part of a 
‘sustainable development strategy’ in the regional development agenda, being thus a means of 
promoting sustainable regional development through a legal framework; and it has brought the 
debate and decision-making procedures to the regional level, making it easier to take regional 
specificities and needs into consideration, as well as appropriate ways to tackle them. In this 
regard, considering it as a benchmark, the next section will analyze a similar initiative that has 
been recently established in MERCOSUR.  
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II. The Structural Development Fund of MERCOSUR (FOCEM) 
 
MERCOSUR is another example of a regional integration project where a positive integration 
measure was designed in order to address development imbalances within the common market. 
Despite differences in comparison with the EU, as previously stated the European model of 
integration has always been a model for the South American bloc, and in the case of the structural 
funds, several parallels can be traced and important insights formed.  
 
1. Introduction: background of the establishment of FOCEM 
 
MERCOSUR was founded under the rationale of integrating the regional market in order to 
expand the national economies and promote “regional development with social justice” 
(preamble of the Asunción Treaty). Nevertheless, apart from the market freedoms, few positive 
integration policies were envisaged in the early years of the project, and the goal itself was to 
achieve a common market as a means of economic development.  
 
This scenario slowly began to change, and after the re-launch of the integration project in the year 
2000 and the institutional innovations that followed,32 the idea that a common market was not 
enough to address the development needs of the region began to gain support, and the member 
states came to agree on the need to take positive measures in order to address one of the main 
challenges of the bloc, its internal asymmetries: the four current member states are not only very 
different in size and economic power, but also have different approaches to the project. The 
entrance of Venezuela is also likely to alter this already delicate balance.33 On the one hand, for 
the smaller partners, Paraguay and Uruguay, intra-regional trade corresponds to a very important 
share of their total trade and, given the fact that the completion of the common market has not 
been achieved so far, they claim that they are not reaping enough benefits from the integration 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 See chapter 3.  
33 To illustrate these asymmetries, it’s worth mentioning some indicators of the four current members: Argentina: 
size: 2,780.4 sq. km; population: 40 million; GDP: US$ 328.4 billion; GNI per capita: US$ 7,200. Brazil: size: 
8,514.0 sq. km; population: 192 million; GDP: US$ 1.612.5 billion; GNI per capita: US$ 7.350; Paraguay: size: 
406.8 sq. km; population: 6.2 million; GDP: US$ 16 billion; GDP per capita: US$ 2.180; Uruguay: size: 176.2 
sq.km; population: 3.3 million; GDP: US$ 32.2 billion; GNI per capita: US$ 8.260. Venezuela’s accession change 
the internal balance of the bloc: size: 921.1 sq. km; population: 27.0 million; GDP: US$ 313 billion; GNI per capita: 
US$ 9.230. Source: World Bank database, available online at www.worldbank.com.  
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process and are not being adequately compensated for liberalizing trade and being constrained by 
a common commercial policy.34 On the other hand, for the bigger partners, Argentina and Brazil, 
the situation is the opposite. Particularly in the case of Brazil, the biggest player in the region, 
internal trade is not the only point, and it is argued that MERCOSUR is seen by the Brazilian 
government as an instrument to support its ambitions to become a global actor. MERCOSUR has 
become a declared priority in the Brazilian diplomatic agenda, especially under the 
administration of President Lula (2002-2010) who constantly stressed the importance of 
integration to the development of South America and of the current administration.35 This did not 
prevent difficulties arising in harmonization of positions with the other big partner, Argentina, 
and the bloc’s functioning has faced complications.  
 
In this context, another important initiative was taken: the creation of a ‘structural convergence 
fund’, designed to address the challenge of overcoming the internal asymmetries in the region 
and balancing the weight of member states in the bloc. This fund, said to be inspired by the 
structural funds of the European Union, is regarded as one of the most important achievements in 
recent years, and is especially noteworthy because it is not a ‘negative measure’ taken in order to 
remove barriers to the common market, but rather a ‘positive measure’ taken to strengthen the 
bloc as a whole by addressing the needs of its weaker areas.36  
 
From a legal perspective, the creation of the fund was not determined under any specific 
competence of the bloc, but rather on a pragmatic basis which characterizes many actions 
undertaken and with the discretion allowed to an organization that depends mainly on political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Uruguay particularly has been threatening to sign free trade agreements with third countries due to dissatisfaction 
with the results of MERCOSUR. For more details regarding the economic situation of the bloc, see F Masi, A Hoste, 
Economic Development and Asymetries in MERCOSUR: The prospects of a MERCOSUR Regional Development 
Fund, University of Miami, Dante B. Fascell North South Center Working Paper Series, Paper No 4, 2002. 
35 See B Magalhaes, J Erthal, ‘Brasil: as dificuldades internas da liderança regional’ in MR Soares de Lima, MV 
Coutinho, Agenda Sul-Americana: mudanças e desafios no início do Século XXI, Fundaçao Alexandre de Gusmao, 
Brasília, 2007. In addition, it can be noted that Brazil has been trying to become a leading voice among developing 
countries, using international fora such as the G-20 in negotiations at the WTO Doha Round. This trend could be 
reinforced in the coming years, as the country has been gaining international recognition for economic developments 
achieved under the last administrations, and recently found a substantial amount of oil on its offshore coasts, which 
could boost its importance in the international scenario. 
36 It should be noted that, in terms of ‘negative measures’, the two smaller countries, Paraguay and Uruguay, 
benefited, from the beginning, from differential treatment regarding the accomplishment of the liberalization of trade 
and removal of customs duties, provided for in Article  6 of TA.  
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decisions to function.37 Article 35 of the ‘Ouro Preto Protocol’ authorizes the CMC “to carry out 
all the measures necessary to attain its objectives, according to its competences”, and the idea 
behind the promotion of specific measures supporting the reduction of internal asymmetries 
emerged from the assumption that MERCOSUR “should be a tool to promote the social and 
economic development of the member states with social justice”; thus, if the liberalization of 
trade had proven to be insufficient to reduce such imbalances, positive measures should be taken 
to achieve this objective.  
 
The project of the fund gained momentum in 2003, when the CMC issued Decision 27/2003, 
reaffirming this solidarity idea in its preamble and determining, in Article 1 “that studies should 
be made in order to establish structural funds to enhance the competitiveness of smaller 
countries and less favored regions”. As a result, in 2004 Decision 19/04 created a ‘High Level 
Group’38 formed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of the Economy of member states in 
order to coordinate the steps to achieve this objective, identifying the initiatives and programs to 
be taken and proposing ways of financing their implementation. Afterwards, Decision 45/2004 
officially created the ‘MERCOSUR Structural Convergence Fund’ (FOCEM)39 on December 16th 
2004, aiming to finance programs to promote the competitiveness and social cohesion of member 
states, to reduce the asymmetries of less developed Members and regions and to support the 
structural convergence of the bloc. 
 
The ‘high level group’ kept working until Decision 18/2005, creating the regulation of the funds, 
was passed one year later, stating in its preamble that in order to assure the process of 
convergence towards the common market it was necessary to reinforce the principle of solidarity, 
and that the benefits of the market expansion resulting from integration would not benefit all 
parties while asymmetries still existed. The decision established the programs and priorities of 
FOCEM around four areas: structural convergence; competitiveness; social cohesion; and 
strengthening of the institutional structure and of the integration process as a whole.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 See, in this regard, M.L. Olivar Jiménez, ‘La Adhesión de Nuevos Miembros al MERCOSUR: una cuestión 
fundamental para la evolución de la organización’, in E Accioly (ed), Direito no século XXI, Curitiba, Juruá, 2008, in 
which the author highlights the pragmatic character of the bloc, in which “solutions are adopted as problems come 
up”. 
38 Type of body dependent on the CMC, formed in order to carry out specific tasks. The group was to be coordinated 
by the CRPM and assisted in its work by the Secretariat, and to present its conclusions in the CMC meeting. 
39 In Portuguese, “Fundo para a convergência estrutural do MERCOSUL”. 
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Furthermore, FOCEM appears to play a role that goes beyond structural convergence, but also to 
balance the asymmetries in size and economic power within the bloc, as the functioning of the 
fund, which will be analyzed in the next section, seems to suggest. In this regard, it can be noted 
that the background to the establishment of the structural funds of the EU is similar to the context 
in which MERCOSUR created FOCEM. It is clear that the projects have significant differences, 
not only in their approaches – the EU has always had supranational institutions defending the 
‘European interest’, as opposed to the intergovernmental rationale of MERCOSUR - but also in 
terms of scope – the EU has, from the beginning, had the idea that the common market was not a 
goal, but a tool to promote development, and a broader mandate to pursue and promote common 
policies on trade, agriculture, competition, etc., to achieve this bigger objective. Nevertheless, in 
both cases the projects came to a point where positive measures were deemed necessary in order 
to correct regional imbalances that were not being reduced by the integration project.  
 
2. Functioning of FOCEM 
 
The institutional framework and the regulation of the fund were established by the CMC in 
Decisions 18/2005 and 24/2005, which initially set its functioning over a period of ten years, with 
a budget of one hundred million U.S. dollars per year. FOCEM seems to perform a redistributive 
role among member states, since quotas have been established for each party. Being the biggest 
countries, Argentina and Brazil are responsible for donating 27% and 70% of the budget, 
respectively, and are each entitled to benefit from only 10% of the total amount; Paraguay and 
Uruguay donate 1% and 2% of the budget, and benefit from 48% and 32% of total resources, 
respectively.40 It would thus be a form of compensating the smaller countries for the 
disadvantages of liberalizing trade with bigger Members. Moreover, the fund follows a rationale 
of complementarity to national efforts to promote development, since the resources are 
designated in the form of non-reimbursable donations, but member states should finance at least 
15% of the total cost of approved projects. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Article 8 also allows the contributions of third countries and international institutions and organizations to the 
fund.  
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The development process to be promoted by the fund is carried out through programs which 
finance projects according to four main pillars:41  
 
i) Structural convergence: projects designed to contribute to the development and structural 
adjustment of smaller economies and less developed regions, including the improvement of 
broader integration structures and communication in general. Under this program, projects can 
cover the following areas: construction and improvement of transportation routes which optimize 
the movement of goods and promote the physical integration of member states and their sub-
regions; exploitation, transport and distribution of fossil and bio-fuels; generation, transportation 
and distribution of electric energy; implementation of infrastructure work to contain and conduct 
water systems, sanitation systems and draining;  
 
ii) Development of competitiveness:42 projects designed to contribute to the competitiveness of 
productive processes within MERCOSUR, including projects of production and labor 
improvement to facilitate intra-bloc trade, integration of productive chains and improvement of 
public and private institutions connected with production quality (technical standards, 
certificates, etc.) and research and development of new technologies. Under this program, 
projects can cover the following areas: generation and diffusion of knowledge related to dynamic 
productive sectors; metrology and certification of quality in products and productive processes; 
tracing and control of animal and agricultural products and guarantee of quality and security of its 
sub-products of economic value; promotion of the development of productive chains in dynamic 
and differentiated economic sectors; promotion of companies and productive and exporter 
groups; strengthening the conversion, growth and associability of small and medium companies, 
their links with regional markets and the promotion of new enterprises; professional training in 
management, productive organization in cooperatives and associations and entrepreneurial 
initiatives;  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Articles 2 and 3. 
42 It should be noted, in this regard, that the CMC decided in 2008 to give priority to a ‘productive integration’ 
strategy, as stated in Decision 12/2008, and thus there was a provision making the use of FOCEM resources possible 
for initiatives under this strategy; in addition, a new fund was established to promote this objective, but is still not 
operational.  
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iii) Social Cohesion: projects designed to foster social development, especially in border zones, 
including programs of community interest and health, poverty eradication and employment. 
Under this program, projects can cover the following areas: health care projects aimed at 
reducing child mortality and enhancing living expectations, improving hospital capacity in 
remote zones and eradicating epidemic and endemic diseases resulting from poor living 
conditions; teaching programs for youth and adults and professional training aimed at reducing 
illiteracy, enhancing the coverage of the educational system of the population, covering specific 
needs and reducing disparities in access to education; training and certifying workers, providing 
micro-credit, promoting first employment opportunities and income in activities -particularly in 
regions with lower employment rates, and regarding young people; combating poverty, 
identifying most affected zones, promoting access to housing, health, food and education in 
vulnerable areas of poorer regions and border zones;  
 
iv) Strengthening of the Institutional Structure and of the Integration Project: projects designed to 
improve the institutional structure of MERCOSUR. In addition, in this initial phase, the 
improvement of infrastructure in the bloc was emphasized, since Arts. 12 and 13 determine that 
in the first four years of functioning, priority would be given in assigning the fund’s resources to 
projects under Program I, with the additional possibility of assigning 0.5% to projects under 
Program IV; moreover, resources assigned to Program I should be used in projects to improve the 
intra-bloc infrastructure, in order to facilitate integration. After the fourth year, results shall be 
analyzed and these priorities reviewed. 
 
The institutional structure designed to manage the fund comprises the following bodies:43 
technical units in each Member State (National Technical Unit, NTU), which select the projects 
to be presented to the main technical unit (FOCEM Technical Unit, FTU), and evaluate the 
projects already in force; the FTU also manages the implementation of the projects; an ‘ad hoc 
expert group’ (AHEG) formed by technical personnel assigned by each Member State, which 
provides technical support to the FTU in order to evaluate the projects presented by the NTUs 
and the projects in force; the CRPM, which verifies the admissibility of projects according to the 
established guidelines and requirements; the CMG, which drafts a report to be presented to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 As determined by Decision 24/05. 
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CMC, informing about the projects considered suitable for implementation; and finally the CMC, 
which approves the projects to be carried out, with the corresponding designation of resources.  
 
Under Decision No 24/05, articles 44 to 53, the procedure to present projects commences with 
the submission of proposals by member states to the NTUs; the latter must verify whether the 
projects meet the criteria set out in Decision No 24/05, articles 32 to 39: (1) projects must be 
proposed by the public sector of one Member State (although multinational projects are also 
accepted) which must agree to finance at least 15 per cent of total costs; (2) projects must fit 
within the guidelines of one of Programs I to IV; (3) the total cost must be a minimum of 
US$500,000 (except for projects falling under Program IV); and (4) the rate of socio-economic 
return must meet a minimum amount, set every year by the CRPM. There are also environmental 
and social requirements: projects must optimize the use of natural resources and reduce 
environmental impact, and also respect the geographic, economic, social and cultural specificities 
of the place where it will be implemented. It seems evident that the criteria were drafted in a very 
broad and vague way, leaving a large amount of discretion to member states as regards presenting 
projects to fulfill their quota. 
 
The projects selected by each NTU are presented to the CRPM, which analyzes the fulfillment of 
all the criteria again and, within 30 days, sends the approved projects to the FTU; the FTU, with 
assistance from the ‘ad hoc expert group’, drafts a technical report, specifying the viability, 
technical and financial feasibility and sustainability of the projects, serving as a means of 
comparison with other projects presented; this technical report is sent back to the CRPM, which 
drafts a memo to be presented to the CMG regarding the eligibility of selected projects; the CMG 
presents a final memo to the CMC, which finally analyzes and votes on the approval of selected 
projects, assigning the correspondent resources to finance them. The Secretariat then signs legal 
instruments with the corresponding member states, which are responsible for the implementation 
of the projects with the assigned funds.  
 
The fund started to be implemented in 2007, after the first initial contributions by member states. 
A new regulatory framework was approved in 2012, introducing changes mainly in the technical 
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aspects of the functioning and implementation of FOCEM but not substantively altering its scope 
or programs.44 A decision was also passed in 2012 incorporating Venezuela into the framework.45 
 
According to Decision 18/2005, Article 21, pilot projects with strong impact were to be 
implemented in the first years, and the first projects were approved in 2008.46 So far, forty-three 
projects have been approved, among which four have been assigned Argentina, five to Brazil, 
seventeen to Paraguay, ten to Uruguay, as well as three joint projects and four projects under 
Program VI related to strengthening the institutional structures of the bloc. Projects under 
Program I clearly receive the majority of financial resources.47 The latest project which has been 
approved is called Building an infrastructure for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights 
in the MERCOSUR Public Policy Institute for Human Rights (IPPDH), and is aimed at 
promoting new state coordination mechanisms and social participation in the processes of public 
policy formation of national and regional human rights, increasing technical training instruments 
for policy public agencies and government institutions, social organizations and coordination of 
MERCOSUR for planning and management of public policies on human rights.48 
 
Finally, it is interesting to note that in this initial phase FOCEM has now come to resemble the 
structure designed to regulate the EU’s ERDF: it established a quota system, according to the size 
and economic power of the countries; it has followed a complementarity rationale according to 
which the funds should complement the efforts made by member states to carry out development 
projects; and it did not establish a regional development plan at the initial stage. Nevertheless, the 
evolution of the EU’s regional policy provides important insights for FOCEM: firstly, the 
importance of defining a regional strategy for development, so that the funds can operate as an 
instrument to achieve it; secondly, the need to define clearer criteria for the selection of 
beneficiaries of the funds is crucial if the funds are truly established in order to promote regional 
development, meaning the convergence of regions which are backward, and necessarily assuring 
that those regions are the ones to which the resources will be applied. In the case of the EU, a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 CMC Decision 01/10, revoking Decisions 24/05 and 15/09.	  
45 CMC Decision 41/10, establishing Venezuela’s contribution of US$ 15,000/year. 	  
46 The current budget of FOCEM is US$ 685million, according to Decision 48/12, which established the budget for 
2013. 
47 For more details regarding projects, see document available – in Spanish and Portuguese - at the official website of 
FOCEM, www.MERCOSUR.int/focem/index.php, 
48 COF 01/13, with a budget of US$ 500,000.00 for a period of two years. 	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quantitative economic indicator, GDP per capita, has been used since then for most of the funds’ 
programs – it should be noted that, even though many authors criticize this method, arguing that a 
more comprehensive set of indicators, such as those of the ‘human development index’ created 
by the UN, could be applied in order to truly identify the most underdeveloped regions;49 
nevertheless, it has clear advantages in comparison to the national quota system operating in 
FOCEM.  
 
3. The way forward: integration of FOCEM – IIRSA – UNASUR? 
 
While FOCEM’s resources and projects up to this point have been symbolic, at the same time 
they represent a very modest initiative which will have to find its way into a more comprehensive 
strategy over time. At the same time, as discussed in Chapter 3, when analyzing regional 
integration in Latin America, it is important to bear in mind the ‘multilayered’ system of 
integration initiatives in the continent. In this regard, an important remark should be made 
regarding recent developments in the context of UNASUR, the possibilities of overlap with 
MERCOSUR and the likely scenarios in the years to come. 
 
Within UNASUR’s spheres of competence, the organization is aiming to provide (e) the 
development of an infrastructure for the interconnection of the region and among our peoples, 
based on sustainable social and economic development criteria; (h) the development of concrete 
and effective mechanisms to overcome asymmetries, thus achieving an equitable integration; (m) 
industrial and productive integration, focusing especially on the important role that small and 
medium size enterprises, cooperatives, networks and other forms of productive organization may 
play; (n) the definition and implementation of common or complementary policies and projects 
of research, innovation, technological transfer and technological production, aimed at enhancing 
the region’s own capacity and sustainability (Article 3 of the UNASUR Treaty). The wording of 
these competences suggests several overlapping goals as regards what MERCOSUR aims to 
achieve through FOCEM, and indeed it seems like this might already be happening, at least in 
relation to infrastructure – one of FOCEM’s main goals.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 J Scott, op. cit, pages 29 and 56.  
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At the Third Summit Meeting of UNASUR (Quito, August 2009), the South American presidents 
decided to create, in such an institutional context, the Infrastructure and Planning Council 
(COSIPLAN – Consejo de Infraestructura y Planeamiento), which has been one of the most 
active bodies of the organization up to this point. On the same occasion, it was also decided to 
include the Initiative for the Integration of Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA) as 
COSIPLAN’s infrastructure technical forum. IIRSA was launched in 2000 with the participation 
of the 12 countries of South America, comprising physical integration projects with integrationist 
objectives and seeking to promote this goal via the modernization, expansion or construction of 
transport, energy and telecommunications networks. The financial support for the initiative is 
provided by regional financial organizations such as the Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF), 
the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the River Plate Basin Financial Development 
Fund (Fonplata), as well as from national institutions such as the Brazilian National Development 
Bank (BNDES). IIRSA’s projects have been concentrated in three main areas of action: the 
development of a strategic vision for physical integration in South America, the development of 
ten Integration and Development Hubs linking up the continent, and territorial planning. 
COSIPLAN is the new regional sphere for political and strategic coordination for infrastructure 
issues, in which IIRSA will serve as a mechanism of action coordination and a technical body for 
the planning of new projects in this area.   
  
From several points of view, it might make sense to integrate the infrastructure initiatives under 
FOCEM to COSIPLAN’s framework. A first reason seems to be to avoid the overlap of 
competences between MERCOSUR and UNASUR, above all in order to assure coherence and 
the maximization of resources, chiefly financial resources. Coherence is important given that an 
integrated infrastructure system might benefit not just a smaller regional area but the whole South 
American continent, given that trade relations between most of the countries are integrated 
through a net of trade liberalization agreements – MERCOSUR itself has economic 
complementarity agreements with several south American countries, as seen in Chapter 3. Thus, 
an integrated infrastructure system could benefit an increasingly integrated South American 
market.  
 
Furthermore, the integration of financial resources can be an advantage, especially considering 
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FOCEM’s reduced budget and project portfolio up to this point. IIRSA, on the other hand, has 
significantly higher resources and greater experience in infrastructure projects: to this point, 
IIRSA has a portfolio of 531 projects, among which 74% have advanced significantly (12% are 
concluded, 30% ongoing, 30% are in the pre-execution phase); the remaining are in the stage of 
technical studies; the resources invested in these projects amount to US$ 116 billion. 
Furthermore, a considerable amount of resources are expected to be invested over the next few 
years within COSIPLAN’s framework: the latest meeting of the Council took place in November 
2011, an occasion on which the ‘Agenda of Priority Integration Projects (API) was launched, 
consisting of a set of 31 strategic projects of “high impact for the physical integration and 
regional socio-economic development”. The API includes 88 infrastructure projects that mobilize 
resources estimated at US$ 14billion to be executed within ten years. The works grouped here 
involve ports, logistics centers, border stations, waterways, railways, roads, bridges, tunnels, 
power transmission lines, airports, pipelines and multimodal transport systems. During the 
meeting, UNASUR’s Ministers also approved the 2012-2022 Strategic Action Plan (SAP), which 
establishes a set of actions that will guide the Council's work over the next decade. Additionally, 
it was decided to establish three working groups to support COSIPLAN tasks, in: (i) Integration 
of South American Railway, including the construction of the Bi-Oceanic Corridor Railway, (ii) 
Funding Mechanisms and Guarantees, and (iii) Telecommunications in South America, for the 
implementation of a broadband optical ring.50 In this regard, leaving infrastructure projects to 
COSIPLAN’s framework, FOCEM could make use of its resources serving other priorities, 
especially in the integration of productive chains and human development, which are a 
fundamental part of the development objectives that it aims to promote – and of sustainable 
development from a broader perspective. 
 
Finally, from a sustainable development point of view, another benefit that might arise from  
integrating COSIPLAN and FOCEM is the better use of impact assessment methodologies. 
FOCEM has a requirement for environmental assessments accompanying the projects presented 
by member states, but nevertheless has no guidelines regarding what these studies should consist 
of, relying on member states’ own legislation in the area. It should be noted, in this regard, that 
environmental legislation varies significantly among MERCOSUR’s countries and that this can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 http://www.iadb.org/intal/cartamensual/cartas/Articulo.aspx?Id=4b49cf45-1ee7-4124-8445-076cc009b639.  
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undermine the relevance of this environmental requirement. On the other hand, strategic 
evaluation is IIRSA’s Environmental and Social Planning Instrument. The methodologies were 
developed in 2006 and the first half of 2007 under the guidance of the Initiative’s Technical 
Coordination Committee (CCT). The CCT then submitted them to IIRSA’s National 
Coordinations to be piloted in an -as yet- undetermined number of Project Groups prioritized by 
the IIRSA Executive Technical Groups (GTEs). IIRSA’s Strategic Environmental and Social 
Evaluation (EASE) Methodology aimed to promote the positive social and environmental effects 
in a given project and to minimize the negative effects. This gives IIRSA a conceptual framework 
and practical guidelines for its Project Groups for the specific purposes of improving territories’ 
understanding in order to boost sustainable development and optimize the benefits from the 
project groups; gauging impacts, critical aspects, and vulnerable areas, and identifying socio-
environmental development opportunities of these groups’ territories of influence; establishing 
management guidelines and associated investments to generate more sustainable development 
options, and identifying project group design and implementation recommendations; creating a 
space for participative activities and a constructive dialogue between governments and key actors 
in the project groups’ area of influence.51 Thus, the integration with IIRSA would have the 
benefit of introducing a scheme of impact assessment, one recognized tool for the promotion of 
sustainable development. 
 
In conclusion, in the future it could well be that the authorities in the region see the value of 
integrating FOCEM within UNASUR’s COSIPLAN. This analysis is merely speculative, as no 
plans in this regard have been apparent up to this point. In addition, as discussed above, 
FOCEM’s rationale also has a strong political motivation, which might undermine the incentives 
to dilute the initiative in a larger framework. Nevertheless, from the perspective of the more 
efficient promotion of regional development, this seems to be a possibility that should be taken 
into consideration.  
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
FOCEM is a new and welcome initiative, demonstrating the capacity of MERCOSUR’s member 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 http://www.iadb.org/intal/articulo_carta.asp?tid=5&idioma=eng&aid=418&cid=234&carta_id=725.  
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states not only to liberalize trade, but also to take joint decisions responding to a recognized 
obstacle to the further progress of the bloc. On the other hand, the effectiveness of this initiative 
will be observed in the years to come, even though some conclusions can already be sketched 
regarding the legal/institutional framework and the development goals put forward. 
 
First, as a fund created to promote development and structural convergence within the bloc, 
FOCEM was designed above all to address (at least in its initial stage) the inadequacy of 
infrastructure, which was considered to be an obstacle to the completion of the common market, 
particularly with respect to the smaller partners; in this regard, it has established priority 
guidelines to signal which issues should be tackled first. This shows that, in MERCOSUR, the 
idea of a structural fund is still much more focused on macroeconomic development, and reflects 
the fact that the functioning of the common market is the main goal. Notwithstanding, interesting 
projects, such as the creation of a university with a regional focus, are representative measures of 
efforts to have an impact on the social sphere – both on the education of the people and on the 
promotion of knowledge regarding the integration project itself and general themes pertaining to 
the Latin American continent. On the other hand, the preoccupation with the environmental 
sphere seems to be much less pronounced in MERCOSUR. This might not be surprising if one 
considers that the bloc itself has development with social justice as its main focus, reflecting the 
fact that the region still faces not only inequalities among member states, but also within member 
states, including in the biggest country, Brazil, which has poverty reduction as a major challenge. 
In addition, the bloc has not developed a strong level of environmental regulation and thus the 
pursuit of environmental goals is less pronounced, it being more difficult to integrate 
environmental issues within the as yet embryonic regional policy.  
 
Regarding its functioning, FOCEM establishes quotas for assistance and leaves considerable 
discretion to member states regarding the presentation of projects—they only have to respect the 
vague guidelines of the programs and the (mostly technical) criteria set out in the regulations. 
This can jeopardize the achievement of goals, since it is not necessarily the most backward 
regions that will benefit from these programs, but also those areas which each Member State 
considers to be in its national interest to promote. In the end, it is for each Member State to 
choose which sort of project to propose, and within which region of the country. The quota 
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system underlines the redistributive role played by FOCEM, by compensating for the differences 
in the sizes and economic powers of member states. The decision-making procedure, which 
ultimately falls within the framework of the CCM as responsible for approving the final projects 
and budget, follows the consensus rationale that characterizes the institutions of the bloc, 
favoring this trend. It can be said, then, that FOCEM is a highly political tool, which will 
certainly help MERCOSUR to reduce some of its deficit, but will not necessarily lead to the 
socio-economic convergence of poorer regions. It should be noted, in this regard, that the larger 
partners of the bloc, Argentina and Brazil, also have severe internal asymmetries which will not 
be addressed by the fund’s resources in this initial stage. 
 
Conclusions 
 
As a general conclusion, it can be seen that regional integration may be an important means of 
promoting development, as integration projects such as the European Union and MERCOSUR 
create legal frameworks and policies that interfere in the national programs of member states and 
actively promote intra-regional development, as well as promoting free trade. Analysis of both 
MERCOSUR and EU policies shows that the two blocs have made efforts (at different levels, 
according to their capacity) to actively promote the development of their backward regions. 
 
In comparing the EU funds and FOCEM, many considerations can be highlighted, and the 
lessons learned by the European Union during its long evolution (demonstrated by the various 
reform processes carried out over time) can provide interesting insights in relation to 
MERCOSUR, respecting of course the enormous differences between the two projects. First, 
regarding the scope of the policies, it is clear that, compared to FOCEM, the regional policy of 
the European Union has evolved from being an instrument helping to address the asymmetries 
resulting from the common market, into a broad policy that is now seen as an effective means of 
ensuring harmonious integration, by furthering the convergence of several regions within the bloc 
but also promoting broader regional development strategies. FOCEM is, of course, a new and 
still modest initiative which will need to prove its effectiveness in the South American context 
before it can be expanded, but the need for a regional development strategy is a deficiency within 
MERCOSUR.  
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Secondly, in the EU, a more holistic approach of development with a view to promote sustainable 
development can be observed, despite the ambiguities outlined above. The regional policy is seen 
as a part of a system that has sustainable development as its ultimate goal, and the strategies of 
the policy are defined accordingly. In MERCOSUR, the vision of development is still more 
attached to economic and social development, as the objective of the bloc is envisioned as 
promoting a common market to promote development with social justice, and environmental 
considerations play a very marginal role in FOCEM’s framework. This can pose particular 
problems, if consideration is taken of the fact that the region houses areas with some of the 
world’s greatest natural diversity and resources, and MERCOSUR would benefit from the 
development of a stronger environmental strategy. 
 
Thirdly, in both schemes, the sectors which are considered to need support through the funds are 
selected at the higher regional level, by the determination of programs and areas of action. 
Nevertheless, it can be noted that in the European Union there seems to be a clearer development 
strategy, focused on social cohesion and solidarity, which the funds were adopted to promote. In 
MERCOSUR, this idea is less developed, as programs have been defined, but not a true regional 
development strategy. Moreover, the means to select which regions can benefit from these 
programs differ substantially: in the European Union, there is a quantitative economic criterion 
(GDP per capita, which in most cases must be below 75 per cent of the Community average in 
order to make a region eligible for aid); in MERCOSUR, the fund is still at an initial stage, and it 
is interesting to note that it resembles the EU regional policy at its inception. Member states can 
propose projects which they consider of interest to their national economies and the integration 
project as a whole, within their quotas of the fund’s budget and the framework of the programs 
established. This does not entail that states will not generally choose to address the problems of 
the less developed regions, but stricter criteria, defined at a higher level, would create a legal 
obligation to assign resources to those areas, not only among member states but also within each 
Member State (Argentina and Brazil are countries with severe internal asymmetries). This would 
help to ensure that FOCEM becomes an effective instrument to promote the development of the 
most backward regions, and thus to overcome the challenge of reducing the imbalances within 
the bloc. Nevertheless, it should also be noted from the European case that an integration project 
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involves a great deal of political maneuvering, with tension still persisting in control over the 
allocation of resources. In its initial phase, EU regional policy played a greater role than it does 
currently in the ‘redistribution’ of economic power among the member states, as is presently the 
case with FOCEM. This issue has been the subject of considerable debate in the European Union, 
and to a significant extent the funds are nowadays subject to an overall development initiative 
decided at the regional level, but this remains a sensitive issue. 
 
Another consideration concerns the decision-making procedures in each integration project, 
which certainly play an important role in the functioning of the funds, although these will not be 
compared in detail here given the considerable differences between the two blocs: while the 
European Union functions to a large extent (including in the case of the funds) as a supranational 
system, MERCOSUR works on an intergovernmental basis. It has been argued that one of the 
reasons for the success of the European Union is its supranational structure; while this is very 
likely to be true (although very difficult to measure), it does not mean that a supranational system 
would work just as well in other regional integration projects. In any case, this should not prevent 
a project with an intergovernmental structure such as MERCOSUR from achieving its goals and 
policies through a fund such as FOCEM. The most important thing in such initiatives seems to be 
the establishment of procedures guaranteeing that the resources be assigned to the areas which 
are in greatest need of aid, and this can also be achieved through an intergovernmental method of 
operating. It is political will, in the end, that will make the difference.  
 
All this leads to the conclusion that the European Union’s regional policy can provide important 
lessons for FOCEM. More comprehensive criteria could be used to accurately identify regions 
which are backward in development, and there should be a more precise definition of a true 
regional development plan in MERCOSUR. Nevertheless, as a newly created initiative, FOCEM 
has made its appearance with strategic timing, to help the bloc to overcome its legitimacy crisis 
and to move forward by responding to member states’ differing expectations and needs. 
 
Regional frameworks can provide a promising mechanism to deliver on the objectives of 
development cooperation, mainly for their capacity to replace external aid for an internally 
constructed development agenda. This is fundamental in terms of ownership, given that priorities 
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arise from a regionally discussed agenda which is created and implemented by the same group of 
countries. The challenges consist of linking the regional agenda with the international 
development goals, and above all in this case the transition to a green economy, which should be 
a fundamental part of fighting inequality and promoting sustainable development. In addition, in 
the case of MERCOSUR, the main challenge is to provide sufficient funds for FOCEM to be a 
true development mechanism, and not just a symbolic instrument of wealth transfer.  
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Chapter 5 - Regional integration and development: the integration of (sustainable) 
development into trade policies of the European Union and MERCOSUR 
 
This Chapter aims to analyze the trade policies and instruments developed by the EU and 
MERCOSUR and the extent to which these regional blocs have been integrating sustainable 
development concerns into their trade relations. As discussed in Chapter 2, the international 
trade regime, as part of international economic law, is a fundamental framework for the 
implementation of the principle of integration for sustainable development. The legal 
frameworks of regional integration agreements such as the EU and MERCOSUR can provide 
innovative ways of integrating sustainable development measures beyond the stalled multilateral 
negotiations, while also accounting for more specific regional and national concerns.  
 
In this regard, a historical examination of how these policies have evolved, their scope, legal 
framework and instruments, is presented. The emphasis, however, will be on how these policies 
are related to the promotion of development, be it in the sense that they promote deeper 
economic integration regarding the WTO/multilateral sphere and Special and Differential 
Treatment (SDT) as a development tool, or in the sense that they promote integration of a wider 
scope of issues, including procedural tools such as impact assessment procedures, and 
substantive measures integrating trade and labor/environmental concerns into positive policy 
instruments.  
 
I. The European Union Common Commercial Policy (CCP): between trade, development 
and politics 
 
Trade policy is one of the oldest policies within the EU framework, which emerged with the 
Treaty of Rome (TR) in 1958 and has evolved significantly over the years, both in scope and in 
breadth. Given the wide spectrum of issues involved with EU trade policy, the analysis here will 
focus on the development aspects of some of its instruments, particularly the newest trade 
agreements concluded with a series of partners in the last decade. Nevertheless, brief 
examinations about the general framework and legal aspects of the CCP will also be presented, 
as well as the emergence of a specific ‘development cooperation policy’ independent from the 
trade competence. This will be followed by more specific analysis of two sets of trade 
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instruments that have a development component: i) the Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP), a non-contractual instrument that allows the EU to provide trade preferences unilaterally 
to other parties, and has progressively integrated sustainable development concerns as a 
conditionality for its beneficiaries; ii) contractual instruments, the trade agreements, which are 
the most comprehensive instruments of the CCP and have progressively integrated sustainable 
development concerns, among which two will be analyzed in particular: the ex-ante 
Sustainability Impact Assessments (SIA) undertaken during the negotiation of the agreement; 
and the ‘Trade and Sustainable Development’ Chapters which were gradually included, 
containing specific trade related measures aiming to promote sustainable development between 
the parties.  
 
1. Introduction: Framework of the CCP 
 
Since the TR, the European Communities had a CCP with a link to development. The TR 
preamble mentioned that the parties desired “to contribute, by means of a common commercial 
policy, to the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade” and intended “to 
confirm the solidarity which binds Europe and the overseas countries and desiring to ensure the 
development of their prosperity, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations.” Furthermore, Article 3 of the TR stated that “for the purposes set out in Article 2, the 
activities of the Community shall include, as provided in this Treaty and in accordance with the 
timetable set out therein: (b) the establishment of a common customs tariff and of a common 
commercial policy towards third countries; (k) the association of the overseas countries and 
territories in order to increase trade and to promote jointly economic and social development.” 
Thus, the CCP from the outset provided the EEC with an instrument that could be used for 
development purposes.  
 
The CCP framework included the competence to conclude trade agreements in Article 133 EC, 
which in its original version covered only trade in goods. Nevertheless, the boundaries of the 
CCP evolved significantly over the years, especially in regard to the high number of issues that 
were becoming relevant to trade policy, leading to the expansion of the breadth and depth of its 
scope and the redefinition of the exclusivity of trade competence between the Community and 
member states. As there were no provisions in the EU treaties in this regard, the Court of Justice 
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of the EU (ECJ) had a prominent role in interpreting and stating the extent to which specific 
trade competences were held exclusively by the Community or if shared with member states. 
Among several important cases which helped to set the boundaries of the trade policy, the 
following can be cited as relevant: In Opinion 1/75,1 the ECJ defined the scope of the CCP with 
reference to the external policy of a state, pronouncing that it concerns a broad field that 
develops progressively through a combination of external and internal measures, without any 
one taking priority over the other. Thus, the Court expressed the view that the policy could only 
be built gradually, through the adoption of internal legislation and the conclusion of 
international agreements, and that it should be a principally exclusive competence. This 
rationale was further reinforced in other cases,2 even if member states had some margin of 
discretion such as regarding the establishment of deviating import rules when authorized to do 
so by the EC.3  
 
In the 1980s and 1990s, international trade went through a significant change during the Tokyo 
(1973-79) and Uruguay (1986-94) Rounds of Negotiation, which included several issues in the 
trade agenda - such as technical standards, government procurement, services, intellectual 
property and trade related investments – and led to the creation of a comprehensive organization 
to regulate trade and encompass the GATT: the WTO. In this context, member states and the 
Commission had opposing views as regards the competence to conclude agreements of this 
nature, chiefly the WTO agreement and related agreements such as the TRIPS, TBT and SPS 
agreements, since some of these issues were considered as falling within the national 
competences. The ECJ again was called upon to clarify the issue in Opinion 1/94,4 and 
expressed the view that some of the agreements, such as those addressing trade in goods, would 
fall within the exclusive competence while others, such as services and intellectual property, 
were not considered as relating specifically to international trade, but were affecting it as much 
as internal trade, and thus the competence had to be shared with member states – and the GATS 
and TRIPS Agreements were mixed agreements.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Opinion 1/75, Draft Understanding on a Local Coast Standard.  
2 Opinion 1/78, International Agreement on Natural Rubber, and Case 45/86, Commission v Council (Generalized 
Tariff Preferences).  
3 Such as in Case 41/76, Donckervolke and Schou v Procureur de la République au Tribunal de Grande Instance de 
Lille and Director General of Customs.  
4 Opinion 1/94, Competence of the Community to Conclude International Agreements Concerning Services and the 
Protection of Intellectual Property.  
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The situation changed with the Nice Treaty, which went back to the rationale of Opinion 1/75 
and expanded the ambit of the CCP,5 extending competence to cover trade in services and 
commercial aspects of intellectual property. While the original CCP (trade in goods and ‘GATS 
mode 1’ services6) falls within the exclusive competence of the Community, the newer 
dimensions added by the Treaty of Nice are shared competences, and some types of agreement 
(trade in cultural and audio-visual services, educational services and social and human health 
services) must now be concluded jointly with member states.  
 
Finally, the Treaty of Lisbon added foreign direct investment to Union competence under the 
CCP, and moved the whole of this policy into its exclusive competence.7 The Treaty deals with 
the issue in Part Five, within the external action of the EU, Title II being devoted to the CCP. 
Article 206 (ex Article 131 TEC) states that “[b]y establishing a customs union in accordance 
with Articles 28 to 32, the Union shall contribute, in the common interest, to the harmonious 
development of world trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and 
on foreign direct investment, and the lowering of customs and other barriers”; Article 207  
expanded this scope: “1. The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, 
particularly with regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements 
relating to trade in goods and services, and the commercial aspects of intellectual property, 
foreign direct investment, the achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalization, export 
policy and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in the event of dumping or 
subsidies. The common commercial policy shall be conducted in the context of the principles 
and objectives of the Union's external action. 2. The European Parliament and the Council, 
acting by means of regulations in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall 
adopt the measures defining the framework for implementing the common commercial policy. 3. 
Where agreements with one or more third countries or international organizations need to be 
negotiated and concluded, Article 218 shall apply, subject to the special provisions of this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 H. De Waele, Layered Global Player: legal dynamics of EU external relations, Springer, 2011, Chapter 4, The 
Common Commercial Policy, 2011, p. 67-70. 
6 The GATS establishes four modes of supply of services; mode 1 entails the cross-border provision of services 
without commercial presence or the movement of either provider or recipient; GATS OJ 1994 L 336/191, Art.1. 
7 Arts. 3(1)(c) and 207(1) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). In cases of exclusive 
competence only the Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts; Member States may only do so where 
empowered by the Union or in implementation of Union acts: Art.2(1) TFEU. 
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Article. The Commission shall make recommendations to the Council, which shall authorize it to 
open the necessary negotiations. The Council and the Commission shall be responsible for 
ensuring that the agreements negotiated are compatible with internal Union policies and rules. 
The Commission shall conduct these negotiations in consultation with a special committee 
appointed by the Council to assist the Commission in this task and within the framework of such 
directives as the Council may issue to it. The Commission shall report regularly to the special 
committee and to the European Parliament on the progress of negotiations. 4. For the 
negotiation and conclusion of the agreements referred to in paragraph 3, the Council shall act 
by a qualified majority. For the negotiation and conclusion of agreements in the fields of trade 
in services and the commercial aspects of intellectual property, as well as foreign direct 
investment, the Council shall act unanimously where such agreements include provisions for 
which unanimity is required for the adoption of internal rules. The Council shall also act 
unanimously for the negotiation and conclusion of agreements: (a) in the field of trade in 
cultural and audiovisual services, where these agreements risk prejudicing the Union's cultural 
and linguistic diversity; (b) in the field of trade in social, education and health services, where 
these agreements risk seriously disturbing the national organization of such services and 
prejudicing the responsibility of Member states to deliver them. 5. The negotiation and 
conclusion of international agreements in the field of transport shall be subject to Title VI of 
Part Three and to Article 218. 6. The exercise of the competences conferred by this Article in the 
field of the common commercial policy shall not affect the delimitation of competences between 
the Union and the Member states, and shall not lead to harmonization of legislative or 
regulatory provisions of the Member states in so far as the Treaties exclude such 
harmonization”. Thus the CCP became exclusive in a wide array of competences, and basically 
has two types of legal instruments with which to pursue its goals nowadays: regulations adopted 
on the basis of Article 207.2 TFEU, according to the ordinary procedure of Arts. 289 – 294 
TFEU, and international agreements concluded on the basis of Article 207.3 TFEU according to 
the procedure of Article 218 TFEU.  
 
In addition to competence based on the CCP, the EU can conclude association agreements, 
which may cover (without additional legal bases being necessary) all policy fields covered by 
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the EC Treaty,8 from trade provisions to a wider range of commitments and institutional 
structures that can include the creation of institutions with decision-making powers. After the 
Treaty of Lisbon, these association agreements, which had already been concluded previously, 
remained one of the major pillars of the EU’s external policy. The Treaty distinguishes 
association agreements by a separate legal basis (Article 217 TFEU) and a specific procedure 
(Article 218 TFEU). In the latter case, association agreements differ from other EU external 
agreements by the fact that the decision to conclude an association agreement with a third 
country comes only after a unanimous vote by the Council and the consent of the European 
Parliament.  
 
Having made these brief remarks about the general contours of the CCP’s framework, 
instruments and competences, this section now examines the trade and development aspects of 
this policy. In addition, it presents an overview of how an independent but correlated 
‘development cooperation policy’ emerged over the years, allowing the EU to provide 
development aid targeting the sustainable development of its partners but also the promotion of 
its own policy objectives, without being bound by WTO legality concerns.  
 
2. The evolution of the development rationale in the CCP 
 
2.1 From 1957 to 1963: a colonialist external trade policy 
 
The starting point for the developmental aspects of the CCP was strongly linked to the process 
of decolonization and was concerned with maintaining ties that bound some EC countries to 
their former colonies, and above all, French and German colonies in Africa and the Pacific 
region. Other regions such as Latin America had a low priority, as on the one hand it took time 
for the EC to open up this focus, and on the other hand, Spain and Portugal, the countries with 
the strongest historical ties to LA, only joined the EC in the 1980s. As it is argued, “historical 
ties rather than need” have been the criteria for determining preferential trade and aid relations.9 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Case 12/86 Demirel  [1987] ECR 3719. 
9 M. Holland, The European Union and the Third World, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000. 
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The relationship of the ECC with the overseas territories was regulated by Part IV of the TR, 
which provided for an ‘association’ with these parties on a permanent basis. The core provisions 
concerned free trade, investment, and development aid. As far as trade was concerned, the 
association built on the system of market access established for the EEC member states in the 
TR, which sought to achieve internal free trade within the EEC over a transitional period of 12 
years by gradually reducing duties and quantitative restrictions. The reduction in quantitative 
restrictions was to be achieved by a prohibition on new restrictions and a staged increase in 
restriction-free quotas, a 100% quota being equivalent to the complete elimination of 
restrictions. This system was largely transposed to trade between the member states and the 
overseas territories: on the EEC side, all of these obligations were applied to trade with the 
overseas territories; on the other side, the territories (except those bound to trade on a non-
discriminatory basis) were to reduce duties and open up quotas for EEC imports according to the 
standard transitional timetable, but, by implication, were still permitted to impose quantitative 
restrictions on non-quota imports. There were also some obligations with respect to inter-
territory trade: duties -but not quantitative restrictions- were to be reduced. Finally, there was a 
provision for infant industry protection, allowing the territories to impose “customs duties which 
meet the needs of their development and industrialization or produce revenue for their budgets”. 
This exception was controversial within the GATT, but in fact it was only invoked once during 
the life of these three instruments. This arrangement was completed by a protectionist EEC 
Common External Tariff (CET), which imposed high tariffs on products of interest to the 
associates. These relationships had thus a strong political component, serving also to assure 
market access for European products in the associate territories.10 
 
2.2 From 1963 to 1971: the Yaoundé Conventions 
 
After the entry into force of the TR, most of the African territories covered by Part IV declared 
independence. Reflecting their new status, in 1963 a new five-year international agreement, the 
Yaoundé Convention, was concluded between all of these countries, except for Guinea, and this 
was followed by the five-year Yaoundé II Convention in 1969. For the remaining dependent 
territories, Part IV continued to apply and a decision was taken providing for more or less the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 L. Bartels, ‘The Trade and Development Policy of the European Union’, The European Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 18 no. 4, 2007. 
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same benefits as under the Yaoundé Convention.  
 
The most important difference between these Conventions and Part IV was institutional, but on 
substantive matters they remained similar. The exception concerned products covered by the 
newly established Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which was designed to protect EEC 
agricultural producers. In practice, the associates continued to receive a measure of preferential 
treatment, ranging from equivalent treatment for Member State products to reductions on the 
‘variable levies’ charged at the border. On the other side, there was also a strong measure of 
liberalization. Under Yaoundé I, the associates continued to reduce duties and open quotas for 
EEC products and undertook to abolish all quantitative restrictions within four years. One of the 
main features of these conventions, however, was their reciprocity in trade liberalization. It is 
argued that at the time of the Yaoundé Conventions, the main reasons given for reciprocity were 
ideological, but at the same time hiding a pragmatic effect, which was to benefit the (mainly) 
French exporters, who tended to be monopolists, and therefore able to keep prices high despite 
their low export costs. In reality, with minor exceptions, trade between the Community and the 
associates did not involve products which were competitive in their respective markets.11 
 
Another development in this period was the creation of a European Development Fund (EDF) to 
disburse funds to overseas countries and territories. The initial sum in Part IV of the TR was 
US$581m to be collected and spent over five years, in annually increasing amounts. The fund 
was intended to focus on public investments (in particular on hospitals and educational facilities) 
and other ‘economic’ investments, with only 18% reserved for agricultural production. This 
began to change with the Second EDF under Yaoundé II, when the amount was increased to 
US$730m and understood as compensation for declining preferential margins on duties and the 
abolition of French price support. In total, one third of this fund was spent at this point on 
support for agricultural production. This was with the specific aim of adapting subsidized 
products to world prices, as well as for commodity price stabilization. Yaoundé II endowed the 
Third EDF with US$900m and in general terms continued the same theme.12 
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2.3 From 1973 to 2000: the Lomé Conventions and expansion of the trade policy 
 
The 1970s saw important changes to the CCP, largely in line with the newly developed 
UNCTAD principles. With respect to its associates (now expanded in numbers), the Community 
abandoned the principle of reciprocity; with respect to other developing countries it established a 
scheme of non-reciprocal trade preferences (the GSP, addressed below); and with respect to its 
Mediterranean neighbors it concluded a number of preferential trade agreements. This basic 
structure of the CCP remained stable for 20 years, until it was unsettled by a series of WTO 
legal challenges.13 
 
As regards the ACP countries, negotiations on a successor agreement to Yaoundé II began in 
1973, influenced by the accession of the UK in 1972 and the addition of 21 Commonwealth 
countries and six other African countries to the 19 Yaoundé associates. The principle of 
reciprocity, initially defended by the EEC and Yaoundé associates but strongly opposed by new 
members, was abandoned in the 1975 Lomé Convention, which enshrined the principle of non-
reciprocal trade preferences. The first Lomé Convention (Lome I) was replaced by subsequent 
five-year Conventions – Lomé II (1980-85) and Lomé III (1985-1990) – and the ten-year Lomé 
IV Convention (1990-2000). Each of these negotiating rounds took account of new 
developments in the European Community –successive enlargements among the ACP States, 
more liberal political regimes, and concern about improved management of resources, for 
instance - and in the international scenario, for example, debt reduction efforts. This was 
reflected in the scope of the agreements, which gradually acquired a more political dimension. 
Whereas no human rights provisions were included in Lomé I and II, those included in Lomé 
III,and Lomé IV contained a relatively comprehensive human rights clause - the first agreements 
concluded by the Community that contained such a clause. Furthermore, Lomé III introduced a 
major innovation: policy dialogue, intended to pave the way for mutual commitments that could 
be included in the five-year indicative programs. 14 
 
Although it was still geared towards Africa and, in most cases, the formerly dependent 
territories, the Lomé Convention symbolized a geographical expansion that influenced the 
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Mediterranean countries, Asia and Latin America. Wide-ranging cooperation agreements were 
then concluded with Israel (1975), Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco (1976) as well as with Egypt, 
Jordan, Syria and Lebanon (1977). The agreements, which in contrast to Lomé were concluded 
for an unspecified period, largely contained provisions on trade. Except in the case of Israel, 
which made provision for the progressive creation of a free trade area, these agreements were 
based on the unilateral awarding of trading advantages by the Community and, in particular, on 
the free access of industrial products to the Community market, and an ad hoc system of 
preferences for certain agricultural products. The agreements were supplemented by five-year 
financial protocols, food aid and, at a later stage, appropriations intended to promote regional 
cooperation and structural adjustment.15 
 
Other significant developments in the period included the expansion of non-trade issues within 
the CCP. Firstly, in 1995 it became official EU policy to include human rights clauses in all new 
trade and cooperation agreements negotiated with third countries.16 Furthermore, from this 
period onwards, the Commission started undertaking ‘Sustainability Impact Assessments’ (SIA) 
for all major trade negotiations, a practice which later was expanded to include all major EU 
policies and legislative plans, as discussed in Chapter 3. In addition, a new type of trade 
agreement, the so-called ‘third-generation agreement’, started to be used by the EU, which 
gradually extended to cover a whole range of fields of cooperation, including provisions on 
political dialogue and the promotion of human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, 
highlighting the Community’s shift towards a more political dimension. An early example of 
these new association agreements was the EU – Chile AA, which is analyzed further below.  
 
In the year 2000 the Cotonou Agreement was signed17 as a new framework for the EU-ACP 
relations, replacing the Lomé IV Convention which had expired earlier that year. The agreement 
was based on three pillars: two political and developmental pillars due to expire after 20 years, 
and a trade pillar, which expired at the end of 2007. The ultimate goal of establishing regional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Ibid. 
16 Commission Communication on the Inclusion of Respect for Democratic Principles and Human Rights in 
Agreements between the Community and Third Countries, COM(95)216 and Commission Communication on the 
European Union and the External Dimension of Human Rights Policy: From Rome to Maastricht and Beyond, 
COM(95)567. 
17 Partnership Agreement between the Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, of the one 
part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, Cotonou, Benin, June 2000, OJ 2000 
L317 3.  
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trade agreements between groups of ACP countries and the EU also became a goal, reflected in 
Title II of the Agreement which called the parties to conclude new WTO-compatible 
arrangements, progressively removing barriers to trade between them and enhancing cooperation 
in relevant areas. The Cotonou Agreement was also based on an ambitious agenda to reduce and 
eradicate poverty and to contribute to sustainable development of ACP countries and their 
integration in the world economy. It thus pursued an integrated approach based on political, 
economic, social, cultural and environmental aspects of development, and followed the 
principles of equality of the parties, ownership of development strategies, participation and 
differentiation and regional integration as means of promoting development. It was envisaged 
that until the entry into force of future EPAs, non-reciprocal trade preferences under Lomé IV 
would be maintained, and the ACP countries were granted a waiver from MFN requisites during 
the WTO Doha Ministerial Conference. Despite its commitment to providing a more solid basis 
for the trade and development relationship between the parties, the Cotonou Agreement and the 
negotiation process it put forward faced criticism and challenges in its implementation.18 As will 
be discussed below, the EU has faced and keeps facing legal challenges between its trade and 
development rhetoric and the often ambiguous reality behind its trade policy instruments.  
 
2.4 The trade and development rationale: between development rhetoric and GATT/WTO 
compatibility 
 
The trade and development instruments of the EU were more or less defined up to this point. 
Nevertheless, and although based on a WTO law framework, they have often faced challenges 
regarding their use as development tools according to the objectives and political interests of the 
EU, and conformity with international trade law which regulates these issues broadly. On the 
one hand, it can be observed that regarding development measures implemented through the 
preferential trade dimension based on a PTA/Article XXIV GATT legal base, there is a thin line 
between determining what can be considered as a development measure, and what is merely a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 For critical appraisals of the ‘Cotonou process’, see S. R. Hurt, ‘Co-operation and Coercion? The Cotonou 
Agreement between the European Union and ACP States and the End of the Lomé Convention’, Third World 
Quarterly, Volume 24, Issue 1, 2003, 61-176; S. R. Hurt, ‘The European Union’s external relations with Africa 
after the Cold War: Aspects of continuity and change’ in I. Taylor and P. Williams (eds), Africa in International 
Politics: External involvement on the continent, Routledge, 2004, pp. 155-173; V. N. Koutrakou, ‘New directions in 
the EU’s Third World policy: from aid to trade under the watchful eye of the WTO’ in V. N. Koutrakou (ed) 
Contemporary Issues and Debates in EU Policy: The European Union and International Relations, Manchester 
University Press, 2004, p. 120-133. 
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preferential scheme with a political connotation, which is therefore not justifiable under trade 
law. On the other hand, the attempts to integrate broader development issues attested to the fact 
that the relationship between regional and international law in this field is not always a smooth 
one when it comes to dealing with non-trade issues.19 
The ‘Banana War’ episode serves well to illustrate this case: the market access provisions of the 
four Lomé Conventions and the Cotonou Agreement were based on the principle of non-
reciprocity, and the ACP countries were under no obligation to offer reciprocal market access, 
except for treatment no less favorable than that offered to other non-developing countries. On 
the other side, the EU granted ACP products full duty-free and quota-free access, except for 
products competitive with those falling under the CAP for which the only obligation is that they 
be granted treatment more favorable than non-ACP products. For certain commodities, the 
nature of the Community’s preferential treatment was spelled out in special commodity 
protocols. Among others, a protocol on bananas in the four Lomé Conventions promised that 
“[a]s regards its exports of bananas to the EEC, no ACP State will be placed, as regards access 
to the markets and market advantages, in a less favorable situation than in the past or at 
present”. In practice, this authorized certain EEC Member states (the United Kingdom and Italy) 
to restrict the importation of non-ACP bananas which were otherwise in free circulation in the 
EEC.  
 
A major legal development occurred in 1994, when a GATT panel report (EC – Bananas II)20 
held that the Lomé Convention could not be justified as a regional trade agreement under Article 
XXIV GATT. The reasoning of the panel was that the principle of non-reciprocity in trade 
negotiations set out in Part IV of the GATT did not apply to Article XXIV. The adoption of this 
report was blocked and in the short term the EC (and those of the ACP countries that were 
GATT Contracting Parties) applied and obtained a waiver of the MFN obligation in Article I 
GATT for preferential treatment for products originating in ACP States as required by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 See in this regard See, in this regard, M. Cremona, ‘Neutrality or Discrimination? The WTO, the EU and External 
Trade’ in De Búrca G. & Scott, J. (eds.), The EU and the WTO. Legal and Constitutional Issues, Hart Publishing, 
2001; G. Marceau and C. Reiman, ‘When and How Is a Regional Trade Agreement Compatible with the WTO?’, 
Legal Issues of Economic Integration 28(3), 2001, 297–336; L. A. Winters, ‘The European Union Trade Policy: 
Actually or Just Nominally Liberal?’ in H. Wallace (ed.), Interlocking Dimensions of European Integration, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001; M. Cremona, ‘Rhetoric and Reticence: EU External Commercial Policy in a 
Multilateral Context’, 38 Common Market Law Review, 2001, 359. 
20  WT/DS16 (EC- Regime for Importation, Distribution and Sale of bananas). A full summary of the banana 
disputes can be accessed at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds27_e.htm. See also F. Breuss, 
S. Griller, The Bananas Dispute: an economic and legal analysis, Springer, 2003.  
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relevant provisions of the Fourth Lomé Convention. Identical preferences were included in the 
Cotonou Agreement, with a waiver that expired in 2007.21 Several disputes followed until the 
parties announced a mutually agreed solution to these cases in November 2012.22 The ‘banana 
war’ illustrates that a development rationale cannot justify an exception to the MFN principle 
under Article XXIV GATT, when the parties are not both developing countries, but rather in a 
North-South relationship, in which reciprocity is required under this type of contractual 
arrangement.23 In fact, the new trade agreements concluded by the EU have a reciprocity basis, 
with the SDT treatment addressed through different measures of phased liberalization accorded 
in each case. 
 
Currently a new set of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) is being negotiated between 
the EU and ACP countries, under the Cotonou Agreement’s legal framework. At first glance, the 
EPAs are seen as policy responses to some of the major shortcomings revealed under the 
previous system, from both an internal and an external perspective. Internally, the EPAs seek to 
address core aspects that previously limited the effectiveness of the preferential treatment 
granted by the EU under the Lomé trade regime, providing an opportunity to improve the EU’s 
trade and development package for the ACP: (i) The EPAs aspire to improve the relative quality 
and value of preferential access to EU markets, notably through a revision of the rules of origin 
and greater market access. (ii) The introduction of reciprocity and the comprehensive coverage 
of the EPAs, for their part, make it possible to overcome the restrictive approach of a 
preferential regime focused on tariffs and quotas only. EPAs thus can include all rules and issues 
relevant to building up the economic governance framework of the ACP. Second, externally the 
EPAs are better embedded in the regulatory framework of multilateral trade because of their 
compatibility with WTO rules, and hence can shelter the ACP-EU regime from being legally 
challenged by the wider WTO membership. Furthermore, the key elements appear to have 
strengthened the trade-development nexus by integrating the main points of convergence that 
theoretical considerations indicate are necessary to make trade liberalization supportive of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 L Bartels, op cit. 
22 WTO Document WT/DS364/3G/L/822/Add.1, accessible at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/december/tradoc_150147.pdf 
23 See also, in this regard, J. Bourgeois, O.  Lynskey, ‘The extent to which the EC legislature takes into account 
WTO obligations: jousting lessons from the European Parliament’ in A. Dashwood, M. Maresceau (eds.), Law and 
practice of EU external relations: salient features of a changing landscape. Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 
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development objectives, like a comprehensive regulatory framework; selectivity of products 
(notably through the foreseen asymmetrical and gradual liberalization of ACP trade), which also 
allows for the adoption of flanking policies and accompanying measures or reforms necessary to 
benefit from trade liberalization; capacity-building; and emphasis on the promotion of regional 
integration by EPA – conceived as a stepping-stone towards integration into the world economy. 
This last element is considered more challenging, as there are no clear answers in theoretical 
discussions as to whether parallel North-South and South-South integration can be taken as 
development-friendly, or rather development-unfriendly. EPAs might work, provided there is 
scope for sequencing of the integration processes and adequate support for integration; in 
addition, the regional dimension of the EPAs will have to be reconciled with the national level 
of implementation.24  
 
In this regard, the negotiation of the EPAs has been heavily criticized for being ambiguous and 
negative towards ACP interests. Critics argue that EPAs secure market access for traditional 
exports that form the cornerstone of their economies, but that the ‘reciprocal’ nature of the 
agreements might also represent a threat to their sustainable development.25 As a consequence, 
although EPA negotiations had to be concluded by 31st December 2007, only one has already 
been finalized – the EU-CARIFORUM EPA. Despite the critical aspects raised regarding EPAs, 
the EU-CARIFORUM EPA will be discussed in greater detail below, in the context of the 
analysis of how sustainable development has been integrated into these agreements and how 
these measures might provide windows of opportunity to help gear these relationships to more 
sustainable outcomes. 
 
3. The birth of an independent ‘development cooperation policy’ 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 D. Makhan, ‘Linking EU trade and development policies : lessons from the ACP-EU trade negotiations on 
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A policy for development cooperation, independent from trade issues, began to emerge during 
the 1970s, divided between two political currents: the first, backed by France, advocated 
keeping and extending a policy of association limited, in regional terms, to the former colonies; 
the other, backed by Germany and the Netherlands, wanted to terminate the Yaoundé policy and 
replace it with a policy of worldwide development aid. The Commission intervened in this 
conflict by publishing its first ‘Memorandum on a Community development cooperation policy’ 
in July 1971, with the view that existing development policy measures were no longer in 
keeping with the EC’s growing international importance, especially as an initial enlargement 
was on the horizon, and that, while maintaining and extending the policy of association, it was 
also necessary to offer other developing countries tangible opportunities for cooperation. As a 
result, the Commission paved the way for the decisions taken at the Paris Summit in 1972, 
which resolved the conflict of views stressing the ‘essential importance’ attached to the policy of 
association and to the agreements concluded or to be concluded with the countries of the 
Mediterranean basin, but inviting the Community and members to progressively implement an 
overall policy of development cooperation at the global level. The foundations were thus laid for 
gradually introducing measures for developing countries that had been excluded until then.26  
 
The reform process of the Maastricht Treaty concluded the establishment of such a development 
cooperation policy independent from the CCP. The Treaty on European Union (TEU) was a 
turning point in development policy: Title XVII of the Treaty finally provided this policy with a 
specific legal basis. Article 3(q) was included in the TEC to enshrine among the activities of the 
community a 'policy in the sphere of development cooperation', which was further regulated in 
the newly created chapter on this subject (title XVII, articles 130u to y).  
 
The development policy was designed as a shared competence with member states, aimed to 
foster “the sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries, and more 
particularly the most disadvantaged among them; the smooth and gradual integration of the 
developing countries into the world economy; the campaign against poverty in the developing 
countries”, and also to “contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating 
democracy and the rule of law, and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 D Frisch, The European Union Development Policy. A personal view of 50 years of Development Policy (Policy 
Management Report), ECDPM, Maastricht, 2008.  
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freedoms”. There was also an express provision that “the Community and the Member states 
shall comply with the commitments and take account of the objectives they have approved in the 
context of the United Nations and other competent international organizations”. The express 
mention of sustainable development as one of the main objectives seems to indicate that within 
the EU the meaning of sustainable development should be compatible with that expressed in the 
International Law documents, given the lack of a description of this concept in primary law, as 
discussed in Chapter 3.  
 
Furthermore, a clear mandate to promote policy coherence was provided by the Maastricht 
Treaty: “the Community and the Member states shall coordinate their policies on development 
cooperation and shall consult each other on their aid programs”. Making coherence an 
imperative was intended to turn development policy into a cross-cutting task, meaning that 
measures planned in other policies had to be examined to as regarded compatibility with 
development policy and, where necessary, adjusted. While this provision did not go so far as to 
give development policy primacy over other policies, it did necessitate the harmonization of 
other policies -as far as possible- with its goals. Furthermore, there was an aim to prevent 
centralization of the instruments of development policy at European Union level, but rather, 
through systematic coordination, to gradually make Community policy and the policies of 
member states into a coherent and effective whole, while safeguarding various levels of 
implementation and priorities, and also facilitating coordination of the Community and member 
states in international fora.27  
 
In the year 2000, the Council and the Commission issued a statement declaring their decision to 
concentrate the development action on a limited number of areas selected on the basis of their 
contribution towards reducing poverty and for which they believed the Community could 
provide added value: the link between trade and development; support for regional integration 
and cooperation; support for macroeconomic policies; transport; food security and sustainable 
rural development; and institutional capacity-building, particularly in the area of good 
governance and the rule of law, highlighting the need to mainstream cross-cutting concerns, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Ibid.  
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namely the promotion of human rights, gender, children's rights and the environmental 
dimension.28  
 
This thinking gave impetus to the EU to strengthen its efforts in development cooperation and to 
expand the scope of this policy, which had remained concentrated on the ACP countries, and 
also to make it more coherent and unified with the member states, ultimately leading to the 
adoption of the ‘European Consensus on Development’ (ECD) in 2005.29 The ECD is a joint 
statement adopted by the Council providing a common framework of objectives, values and 
principles that the Union – all Member states and the Community - supports and promotes as a 
“global player and a global partner”, providing for the first time, “a common vision that guides 
the action of the EU, both at its Member States and Community levels, in development 
cooperation”. The document is divided into two parts: the first part presents a common vision of 
the whole EU on development, which includes: (i) a common objective of development 
cooperation, set as the eradication of poverty in the context of sustainable development and the 
pursuit of the MDGs; (ii) a common set of principles to guide all EU action: partnership and 
ownership, political dialogue, civil society participation, gender equality; (iii) a commitment to 
increase development financial aid: one of the mainstream commitments of the ECD, sets a 
target of 0.7% of member states’ GNI by 2015;30 moreover, it makes a commitment to deliver 
more efficient aid, and to reserve at least half of it for Africa; (iv) a commitment to promote 
coherence among all EU policies in order to observe these development cooperation 
commitments – recognizing that other internal policies such as the CAP might have a trade 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Statement by the Council and the Commission of 20th November 2000, summary available at 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/other/r12001.  In this regard, Regulation 2493/2000 (OJ L 288/1, 
15.11.2000) was passed in order to “promote the full integration of the environmental dimension in the 
development process of developing countries”, stating that “the Community shall provide financial assistance and 
appropriate expertise aimed at drawing up and promoting the implementation of policies, strategies, tools and 
technologies for the pursuit of sustainable development”; it provides one definition of sustainable development in 
secondary law, as “the improvement of the standard of living and welfare of the relevant populations within the 
limits of the capacity of the ecosystems by maintaining natural assets and their biological diversity for the benefit of 
present and future generations”. 
29 Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member states meeting within 
the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union Development Policy, Council 
Document 14820/05.  
30 In this regard, it is noted that developing countries have tried for a long time to argue for a legal obligation to 
receive a steady flow of development aid measured as a percentage of the budget of industrialized countries. In that 
respect, the EU made an important political commitment; although not amounting to an acknowledgement of a 
customary law obligation to do so, it nevertheless shows the impact that UN development ‘soft law’ may have on 
the European Union and vice versa. F Hoffmeister, 'The contribution of EU practice to international law', in 
M. Cremona, Developments in EU external relations law, Oxford University Press, 2008. Nevertheless, ODA levels 
remain far below this threshold.  
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distortion impact on developing countries;31 (v) finally, recognizing the interconnection between 
development and security. The second part presents the focal areas and implementation 
strategies specifically to guide EC action on this field: (i) trade and regional integration: 
assistance to developing countries for trade and regional integration and gradual integration into 
the world economy, and linking trade and poverty reduction or equivalent strategies; (ii) 
environment and sustainable management of natural resources; (iii) governance, democracy, 
human rights and institutional reform; (iv) human development through MDG enforcement; and 
(v) social cohesion and employment.  
 
The ECD is not a legally binding document, but represents a political compromise and has been 
influencing EU policy making since its adoption. In 2006, a series of new regulations was 
passed, among which was a new Development Cooperation Instrument,32 providing finance for 
cooperation with developing countries, territories and regions included in the list of aid 
recipients of the OECD/DAC, unifying previous regulations which had a more limited scope. 
Article 2 of the Regulation sets as objectives the eradication of poverty in partner countries in 
the context of sustainable development, including pursuit of the MDGs, as well as the promotion 
of democracy, good governance and respect for human rights and rule of law. The policies are to 
be implemented through geographic - South- and Central America, Asia, Central Asia and South 
Africa - and thematic programs, providing financial resources to develop the cooperation 
measures which carry out the strategic plans guiding relations with external parties.  
 
The development cooperation policy has represented an important step towards the contribution 
that the EU can make regarding sustainable development. As an independent policy, it is not tied 
to the internal and external legal requirements of the trade policy and thus can pursue EU 
external action objectives regardless of legal constraints. At the same time, as a shared 
competence with EU member states, this policy is often criticized as lacking coherence and 
efficiency.33 On the evolution of this policy, Maurizio Carbone notes that, firstly, significant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Regarding policy coherence, see: M Carbone, Policy coherence and EU development policy, Routledge, 2009. 
32 Council Regulation 1905/2006, OJ L 378/41, 27.12.2006. 
33 See B. Martenczuck, ‘Cooperation with Developing Countries and Other Third Countries: Elements of a 
Community Foreign Policy’ in Griller S. & Weidel, B. (eds.), External Economic Relations and Foreign Policy in 
the European Union, Springer, 2002; E. Grilli, The European Community and Developing Countries, Cambridge 
University Press, 1993; J. McMahon, The Development Cooperation Policy of the EC , Kluwer Law International, 
1998; K. Arts and A. K. Dickson  (ed.), EU Development Cooperation. From Model to Symbol, Manchester 
University Press, 2004. 
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emphasis has been placed on efficiency and coherence in external relations over participation 
and ownership, thus altering the nature of the relations between the EU and the developing 
world. Secondly, the will to project a ‘European vision of development’ through the European 
Consensus on Development and the new agenda on aid effectiveness is not just an attempt to 
make aid work better but is consistent with the EU’s overall agenda in external relations, that is, 
to establish itself as a global power. Thirdly, changes made in the EU have strong implications 
for international development more broadly. In fact, not only is the EU the largest aid donor in 
the world, but it also has a number of policies that have direct impact on developing countries 
(e.g. trade, agriculture, fisheries). With the policy coherence for development agenda, he claims 
the EU has thus far achieved less than it had expected, and that the added value of EU 
development policy is not linked to its ‘global presence’, but to its role in the promotion of 
policy coherence for development and aid coordination among the Member States and the 
European Commission. In this sense, since the early 2000s, Member States have shown a change 
of attitude and now seem better prepared to act in a more coordinated fashion. More generally, 
the past decade has shown that development policy offers a significant example of the role that 
the EU aspires to play in the international arena. The Lisbon Treaty represents an important step 
forward for development cooperation by making poverty eradication the central aim of 
development policy and strengthening the principles of policy coherence and requiring that 
Member States’ and EC development policies complement and reinforce each other. However, 
the space for an autonomous development policy in the new institutional settings may be at risk, 
with further potential politicization of development cooperation and instrumentalization of 
development funds for foreign policy objectives.34 
 
4. The EU Generalized System of Preferences: non-contractual preferences between WTO 
legality and sustainable development goals 
 
4.1 The genesis and evolution of the GSP 
 
In 1965, Part IV of the GATT was included and the Enabling Clause was enacted, allowing for 
non-contractual trade preferences from developed countries to developing countries, as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 M. Carbone, ‘Development Policy, the Treaty of Lisbon and the EU’s role in the International Arena’ European 
Union Studies Association Review, Volume 23, Issue 1, 2010. 
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discussed in Chapter 2. In this context, the EU established a GSP scheme as part of trade policy 
in 1971,35 the first one to be created in the world, and gradually modified it in the following 
decades, both due to the impetus to include different schemes for developmental reasons, and 
also due to WTO compatibility challenges.  
 
The most relevant dispute related to the GSP scheme introduced in 2001,36 which provided for 
two types of tariff preferences for goods from developing countries: ‘non-sensitive’ products 
received duty-free treatment, while ‘sensitive’ products received a reduction in the MFN duty 
rate. Moreover, the program provided for ‘special incentives’ in a number of areas: all products 
(except arms) from LDCs received duty-free treatment, and developing countries could apply to 
receive additional preferences on all products if they demonstrated compliance with specified 
labor standards in the production of those products, and on tropical timber products if they 
demonstrated compliance with international standards on the sustainable management of tropical 
timber. There were also additional preferences granted to countries engaged in efforts to combat 
drug production and trafficking. There was no mechanism for a beneficiary country to apply for 
these special preferences, unlike the mechanisms available for the additional preferences for 
countries complying with labor and tropical timber standards (although there was monitoring of 
the effects of the drugs preferences on the beneficiaries’ use of the preferences, and the 
beneficiaries’ efforts in combating drugs), but rather, it was the EC that decided on the 
beneficiaries of these preferences, based on its own criteria.  
 
This scheme led to a dispute concerning the additional tariff preferences combating drug 
production and trafficking. For some time, the EC had been granting these additional ‘drugs’ 
preferences to eleven South and Central American countries, but in 2001 Pakistan was added to 
this list of countries. India requested consultations with the EC in March 2002, arguing to be 
suffering trade diversion to Pakistan as a result of these additional trade preferences, and 
requested the establishment of a panel in December of that year. India’s claim was that the drugs 
regime under the EC’s GSP program was discriminatory, in violation of one of the requirements 
for GSP programs, as the reference to ‘non-discriminatory’ preferences in the Enabling Clause 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Regulations 1308/71 to 1314/71 [1971] OJ L142. 
36 Council Regulation (EC) No 2501/2001 of 10 December 2001 applying a scheme of generalized tariff 
preferences for the period from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004 [2001] OJ L 346/1 (the ‘GSP Regulation’), as 
amended and extended by Council Regulation (EC) No 2211/2003 [2003] OJ L 332/1. 
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meant that no difference in treatment between developing countries was permitted.37  
 
The Appellate Body ruled in favor of India but rejected part of the argument, stating that ‘non 
discriminatory’ does not require identical treatment of all developing countries; rather, 
additional preferences may be made available to developing countries that share the same 
“development, financial or trade need”. Drawing on other provisions of the Enabling Clause, the 
Appellate Body also set out further conditions for any such differential treatment: first, the 
identified “development, financial and trade need” must meet an “objective standard”, and 
added that “[b]road-based recognition [as] set out in the WTO Agreement or in multilateral 
instruments adopted by international organizations, could serve as such a standard”. Second, 
the identified need “must by its nature, be such that it can be effectively addressed through tariff 
preferences”. Third, on the facts of the case, “a sufficient nexus should exist between, on the one 
hand, the preferential treatment provided ... and, on the other, hand, the likelihood of alleviating 
the relevant ‘development, financial [or] trade need’”. It was unnecessary for the Appellate 
Body to determine whether the drugs arrangement at issue met these conditions, because this 
arrangement was operated through a ‘closed list’. On this, the Appellate Body considered “that 
the measure at issue fails to meet this requirement for the following reasons. First, as the 
European Communities itself acknowledges, according benefits under the Drug Arrangements to 
countries other than the 12 identified beneficiaries would require an amendment to the 
Regulation ... Secondly, the Regulation contains no criteria or standards to provide a basis for 
distinguishing beneficiaries under the Drug Arrangements from other GSP beneficiaries.” It is 
still debatable, though, whether the drugs regime would have met the conditions set by the 
Appellate Body, aside from this administrative aspect.38  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 L Bartels, ‘The Appellate Body Report In European Communities – Conditions For The Granting Of Tariff 
Preferences To Developing Countries, and Its Implications For Conditionality In GSP Programs’, in T Cottier et al., 
Human Rights and International Trade, Oxford University Press, 2006.  
38 L Bartles, ‘The WTO Legality of the EU’s GSP+ Arrangement’, Journal of International Economic Law, Oxford 
University Press, 2007, 10 (4): 869-886. See also J. Harrison, ‘Incentives for Development: The EC’s Generalised 
System of Preferences, India’s WTO Challenge and Proposals for Reform’, 42 Common Market Law Review, 2005, 
1663-1689; L. Bartels, ‘The WTO Enabling Clause and Positive Conditionality in the European Community's GSP 
Program’, 6 Journal of International Economic Law, 2003 507; R. Howse, ‘India’s WTO Challenge to Drug 
Enforcement Conditions in the European Community Generalised System of Preferences. A Little Known Case 
with Major Repercussions for ‘Political’ Conditionality in US Trade Policy’, Chicago Journal of International Law 
4(2), 2003, 385-405; G. Marín Durán, E. Morgera, ‘Case Note on the WTO India-EC GSP Dispute: The Future of 
Unilateral Trade Incentives Linked to Multilateral Environmental Agreements’, Review of European Community 
and International Environmental Law 14, 2005, 173-179; N. B. Dos Santos, R. Farias, R. Cunha, ‘Generalised 
System of Preferences in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organisation: History and 
Current Issues’, Journal of World Trade 39 (4), 2005, 637-670. 
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4.2 The GSP framework reforms 
 
i) The renovated GSP  
 
The basic objectives and implementing instruments of the GSP for the period 2006-2015 were 
set out in a Commission Communication in 2004.39 This communication aimed at the 
rationalization and simplification of the GSP regime, having the primary objective of 
contributing to the reduction of poverty and the promotion of sustainable development and good 
governance. On 22nd July 2008 a Council Regulation was adopted for the period from 1 January 
2009 to 31st December 2011 (which was later extended until 2013), providing a legal basis for 
the continuation of the GSP scheme after the expiry of Regulation 980/2005, but not changing 
the substance of the scheme.  
 
The current GSP framework differs from the previous ones in terms of predictability and 
simplicity. It runs for three years as opposed to one year – GSP coverage and country eligibility 
are no longer subject to annual revisions. It is composed of three rather than five separate 
regimes. The three different preference programs under the current GSP are: (a) the basic or 
general GSP for which all 176 developing countries and territories are eligible; (b) the GSP+ 
program which offers additional tariff reductions on top of the general GSP to a selected group 
of developing countries that are vulnerable and are implementing specified core international 
human, labor and environmental standards and with respect to good governance; (c) the 
Everything-but-Arms program offers duty-free and quota-free market access to the 50 Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs). Under the EU‘s GSP scheme, imports to the EU from developing 
countries amounted to €40 billion in 2004.  
 
The EU’s basic GSP provides preferences for which all developing countries are automatically 
eligible and is more favorable for some products than the EU’s MFN tariffs. The EU reports that 
of the 10,300 tariff lines in the EU’s Common Customs Tariff, roughly 2,100 products have a 
MFN duty rate of zero and tariff preferences are not relevant for these. Of the 8,200 products 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social 
Committee on the function of the Community's generalised system of preferences for the ten year period from 
2006-15’ (COM(2004)461 – Official Journal C 242 of 29.4.04). 
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that are dutiable, GSP covers roughly 7,000 -of which about 3,300 are classified as non-sensitive 
and 3,700 as sensitive. Non-sensitive products have duty-free access and sensitive products 
benefit from a tariff reduction. The sensitivity of a product is determined by whether or not it is 
produced in the EU and by how competitive European producers are. The non-sensitive category 
covers most manufactured products but excludes some labor intensive and processed primary 
products such as textiles, clothing and footwear. In addition, agricultural products covered by 
the EU’s CAP are deemed to be too sensitive to be granted duty-free market access by any 
potentially large and competitive suppliers. 
 
ii) The GSP+ 
 
Since 1998, the Community has offered additional preferences for certain non-trade reasons. 
One aspect of this program was a ‘drugs regime’, mentioned above, which the WTO Appellate 
Body considered to violate the Enabling Clause, stating that the drugs regime was necessarily 
discriminatory because it operated through a ‘closed list’ that precluded an assessment of the 
different situations of the potential beneficiaries. Following this ruling, the Community modified 
its special incentives arrangement, providing for greater preferences for vulnerable non-LDCs 
meeting specific, widely recognized criteria including ratification and implementation of 
international conventions on human and labor rights, good governance and the environment. The 
GSP+ provides additional preferences for vulnerable non-LDCs that comply with a list of 16 
international conventions on human and labor rights, and 11 conventions on good governance 
and the environment, with more attractive preferences than the regular GSP preferences. 
 
In order to be eligible for the GSP+ program, a country must first be classified as vulnerable, by 
satisfying the following two criteria: (a) a country cannot be classified as high income and the 
five largest sections of its GSP-covered exports to the EU must account for over 75% of its total 
GSP-covered exports; and (b) GSP-covered exports from the country must represent less than 1 
percent of total EU imports under the GSP. To then qualify for the additional preferences under 
the GSP+ program, a vulnerable country must have ratified and effectively implemented the 
twenty-seven international conventions, and provide comprehensive information concerning 
legislation and other measures to implement them. It must commit itself to accepting regular 
monitoring and reviewing of its implementation record. Finally, the country must make a formal 
Chapter	  5	  
	  
	  
226	  
request to qualify for GSP+. 16 countries were granted GSP+ preferences from January 2009, 
but in mid-2009 Venezuela was deleted from the list of beneficiary countries 
 
The GSP+ program has some limitations. First, the implementation of some of the international 
conventions required for eligibility for GSP+ may not be an immediate development priority in 
many low-income countries and may distract attention and effort from other possibly higher 
priority reforms necessary to accelerate growth and poverty reduction. In addition, it is 
questionable as to whether these criteria meet the conditions set out in EC Tariff Preferences, as 
the temporal condition on applications has the effect of creating a ‘closed list’ of beneficiaries, 
thus replicating the fatal characteristic of the drugs regime. Second, by defining the 
‘vulnerability’ criterion in terms of a country’s share of EU imports, and not in terms of the 
needs of the beneficiary at issue, it is hard to see how this relates to their “development, 
financial or trade needs”. Third, by requiring ratification of certain treaties as a condition of 
receiving benefits, the EU a priori excludes countries with the same objective needs but without 
the desire to ratify the listed treaties, again in violation of the Appellate Body’s criteria. Finally, 
it is likely that at least some of the current beneficiaries of GSP+ preferences are missing at least 
some of the identified ‘needs’ – for instance, those relating to the prevention of apartheid or 
genocide.40  
 
A recent review commissioned by the EU concluded that it is early to tell whether the provisions 
of the GSP+ aimed at promoting sustainable development will in fact lead to the fulfillment of 
its objectives. At the same time, it points to one general conclusion - that the design of the GSP+ 
is relatively robust in providing opportunities for improvements in some countries or in some 
spheres, while the risk of negative effects is very limited. For instance, the GSP+ appears to be 
effective in promoting ratifications of the 27 conventions. Case studies and a literature review 
suggest that de jure implementation beyond ratification already faces several constraints, but no 
evidence of any significant positive effects of GSP+ was highlighted.41 
 
iii) a special arrangement for LDCs 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Ibid.  
41 Mid-term Evaluation of the EU’s Generalized System of Preferences: Final Report submitted by Michael 
Gasiorek, CARIS, University of Sussex, available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/may/tradoc_146196.pdf 
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The WTO Enabling Clause permits donor countries to grant additional preferences to the least 
developed countries without granting the same preferences to other developing countries. The 
EU has granted the least developed countries some form of additional preferential treatment 
since 1977, and over the years this has been steadily improved. In 1998, least developed 
countries were granted ACP equivalent market access, and under the 2001 ‘Everything But 
Arms’ (EBA) program they were granted duty-free access on all products except arms, with full 
liberalization for bananas, rice and sugar, staggered over a number of years. The current GSP 
program repeats this offer for an indefinite duration for 50 LDCs.42  
 
4.3 The current GSP scheme 
 
The EU adopted a new GSP on 31st October 2012, which will apply as of 1st January 2014.43 
The objectives of the EU's new GSP are to strengthen GSP+ as an incentive to good governance 
and sustainable development and to make the scheme more transparent, stable and predictable. 
The three main variants of the scheme (the overall GSP scheme, the ‘GSP+’ incentive scheme 
for the respect of labor, human, environmental and good governance rights and rules, and the 
‘Everything but Arms‘ scheme for least developed countries) are maintained, but preferences 
suffered some re-adjustments, especially in terms of concentration on fewer countries. A number 
of countries would no longer benefit from the scheme, including: countries that have preferential 
access to the EU which is at least as good as under GSP – for example, under a Free Trade 
Agreement or a special autonomous trade regime; countries which have achieved a high or 
upper-middle income per capita according to World Bank classification, such as Brazil, 
Malaysia, Russia and Saudi Arabia; a number of overseas countries and territories (OCTs), 
which have an alternative market access arrangement for developed markets. 
 
The EU GSP provides an interesting example of an attempt to link trade policy to development 
concerns. The basic idea of giving trade preferences in exchange for positive action from the 
counterpart is promising even though, in most cases, it proves difficult to evaluate the real 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 See, for a more comprehensive overview of GSP schemes focused on LDCs, S. Laird, A Review of Trade 
Preference Schemes for the World’s Poorest Countries; ICTSD Programme on Competitiveness and Development; 
Issue Paper No. 25; 2012. 
43 Regulation (EU) 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council.  
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impact of such measures. On the one hand, the incentives for implementation of international 
socio-environmental instruments -a carrot and stick approach- is a basic means of linking trade 
policy to the pursuit of non-trade goals; furthermore, the general preferences for LDCs have a 
traditional development rationale of SDT treatment for developing countries that is also an 
important component of the multilateral trade and development agenda. On the other hand, the 
efficiency of these measures in relation to the goals of sustainable development is uncertain, as, 
regarding the GSP+, the effects of the ratification and implementation of the instruments cannot 
be predicted and thus the real impact of these measures is hard to evaluate; in addition, the 
actual benefits that LDCs might take from the EBA scheme also depend on a series of other 
factors beyond the granting of preferences.  
 
In this regard, the next section turns to the analysis of provisions included in trade agreements, 
which provide a more interesting framework for measures incentivizing positive trade 
instruments on issues that promote sustainability. 
 
5. Case study: the integration of sustainable development in EU trade agreements 
 
This section turns to a case study on how the EU has been attempting to integrate sustainable 
development into trade policy through the inclusion of this issue in its trade agreements.44 The 
EU currently has a wide array of trade agreements:45 twenty eight already in force, nine 
completed but not yet in force (five of which are EPAs under the Cotonou Agreement 
framework), and several others under negotiation (with partners such as MERCOSUR, Canada, 
India, Malaysia, the Gulf Cooperation Council and further EPAs); furthermore, future 
negotiations are said to be starting soon with the USA, Japan, the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Morocco.46  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 While the analysis here will focus on specific issues, a more comprehensive overview can be seen in G. Marín 
Durán & E. Morgera, ‘Towards Environmental Integration in EC External Relations? A Comparative Analysis of 
Selected Association Agreements’, Yearbook of European Environmental Law Vol. 6, 2006, 179-210; J. H. Mathis 
Regional Trade Agreements in the GATT/WTO, TMC Asser Press, 2002. 
45 Agreements that would require notification under either Article XXIV GATT or Article V GATS.  
46 European Commission Memo, The EU's free trade agreements – where are we?, March 25, 2013, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/agreements/#_europe.  
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EU trade agreements have not only become significant in number, but are also one of the most 
sophisticated instruments used both to advance trade liberalization and market access, as well as 
other policy objectives. This expansion of agreements, both in terms of number, depth -referring 
to the way in which the EU seeks to deepen economic integration, extending beyond the 
traditional removal of tariff barriers and quotas into regulatory policy, and beyond trade in goods 
to services and investment- and width -referring to the embedding of economic integration into 
the wider relationship with the partner country or region- is related to the many goals pursued by 
the EU through its trade policy. These agreements can be seen as part of the framework within 
which countries can move towards accession to the EU; they provide the core of EU relations 
with its neighbors who are not themselves candidates or potential candidates; they have become 
a basis to pursue many of the EU’s development policy goals; and also to work for market 
access purposes.47 This last aspect has been emphasized in the DG Trade’s communication 
‘Global Europe: Competing in the World’, which discusses the external aspects of EU 
competitiveness in the context of the EU's broader competitiveness agenda, presented in the 
Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs.48 The Commission, while claiming that “there will be no 
European retreat from multilateralism”, argued the value of trade agreements in furthering the 
EU’s market opening objectives, pointing out that while the WTO provides the basic ground 
rules for trade relations as well as a framework for ongoing negotiation, FTAs can include issues 
not yet covered by the WTO, including investment, public procurement, competition and other 
regulatory issues. In addition, the Commission referred to the stalled Doha Round and while 
recognizing the problems that FTA proliferation can cause for the multilateral system, defended 
the idea that under the right conditions FTAs could ‘build on’ the WTO and ‘prepare the 
ground’ for multilateral liberalization, acting as a stepping stone rather than a stumbling block. 
 
This expansion of depth and width of EU trade agreements takes a variety of forms: the trade 
dimension may form part of a broader agreement, such as an association agreement; the trade 
provisions may be linked to specific conditionalities or ‘essential element’ clauses with a 
security or human rights component; the agreement may also incorporate a sustainable 
development perspective which attempts to integrate development, social, and environmental 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 M. Cremona, ‘The European Union and Regional Trade Agreements’, European Yearbook of International 
Economic Law, 2010, Volume 1, Part 2, 245-268. 
48 ‘Global Europe: Competing in the World: A Contribution to the EU’s Growth and Job Strategy’, communication 
by DG Trade, 4 October 2006. 
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concerns into the trade liberalization and market opening objectives. In fact, as sustainable 
development has become one of the main overarching objectives of EU policy in general, trade 
agreements have progressively integrated the promotion of this goal.  
 
The integration of sustainable development objectives has been carried out through two main 
means: a procedural component, ex-ante SIAs;49 and a substantive element, the inclusion of 
‘Trade and Sustainable Development’ chapters in addition to other related provisions in the 
agreements. The analysis undertaken in this section focuses on five agreements that provide an 
overview of how these issues have been integrated:  
 
1) the Association Agreement (AA) signed with Chile in 2002, the first comprehensive 
agreement of this kind to be concluded by the EU and to go through a SIA procedure;  
2) the EPA concluded with CARIFORUM in 2008, the first to include a ‘Trade and Sustainable 
Development’ chapter;  
3) the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) signed with South Korea, considered the EU’s flagship 
agreement given its deep level of integration and broad coverage;  
4) the AA signed with the Central American countries, the first and only bi-regional association 
agreement concluded thus far and among the most advanced in terms of references to 
sustainable development;  
5) the FTA concluded with the Andean countries, the latest one to include a ‘Trade and 
Sustainable Development’ chapter, with innovative references to climate change and 
biodiversity.  
 
The analysis includes an overview of the SIA undertaken during the negotiations and the later 
position paper of the Commission (but not Chile, as it is not available), and the content of the 
final ‘Trade and Sustainable Development’ chapter in the agreement as signed by the parties. 
This exercise allows for an understanding of how the EU attempts to integrate sustainable 
development into trade policy through contractual instruments – notwithstanding the remaining 
GSP arrangements that also incorporate sustainable development issues on a non-contractual 
basis. Moreover, this analysis provides input for the discussion of the EU – MERCOSUR 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 For an overview of the value of SIAs in the context of trade law, see M. Gehring, ‘Sustainable Development 
through process in world trade law’, in M-C. Cordonier Segger and M. Ghering (eds.), Sustainable Development in 
World Trade Law, Kluwer Law International, 2005. 
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negotiations towards an AA, which will be the focus of the extended case study undertaken in 
Chapter 6.  
 
These agreements represent a more comprehensive and sophisticated form of integration of 
sustainable development objectives within a trade instrument in relation to the GSP schemes. 
The latter are based on the rationale of providing trade preferences in return for a commitment to 
sign and implement a series of international environmental and social/human rights instruments 
(GSP+), or an SDT arrangement for LDCs. It represents, in this regard, a carrot and stick 
approach that, while certainly important, is also questionable as the best approach to induce real 
change in recipient countries. Trade agreements are, on the other hand, progressively including 
trade measures aiming to create positive integration measures, in the sense of using trade to 
promote important goals of sustainable development such as the transition to a green economy 
and the fight against climate change, as discussed in Chapter 1. These measures include 
liberalization of trade in important sectors such as environmental goods and services (EGS), 
renewable energy, transfer of green technologies, support for certification and labeling schemes 
aimed at making the supply chain more sustainable, such as fair trade, certified timber and 
fishing schemes, among others. In this regard, these trade measures go well beyond merely 
committing the parties to implement legal instruments and threatening suspension of trade 
preferences in cases of non-compliance, but rather generate trade in a way that promotes actively 
sustainable development objectives. This is the rationale behind the principle of integration, that 
is, promoting trade policies that contain considerations of environmental and social aspects, not 
only as an allowed exception to general liberalization, but in fact as an integral part of the trade 
or service in question. The fact that these categories of goods and services are liberalized within 
the trade relations of the parties can thus represent an important building block for the 
establishment of a multilateral framework regulating these issues, which is currently lacking, as 
discussed in Chapter 2.  
 
5.1 The Association Agreement with Chile 
 
Background 
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The negotiations for an AA between the EU and Chile officially commenced in 2000, a time 
when the Commission’s DG Trade was focusing on WTO negotiations and had discarded 
bilateral negotiations as too costly and time-consuming for the relatively small rewards offered 
in terms of enhanced trade and investment. Nevertheless, the EU and Chile concluded an AA in 
2002, which entered into force in February 2003 and became the most comprehensive agreement 
the EU had signed up to that point. This might seem surprising, as the EU was involved in other 
negotiations such as with MERCOSUR, arguably more relevant within the context of its 
external relations. However, a combination of factors, such as Chile’s economic openness and 
the structure of its economic relations with the EU, enabled this agreement to go beyond deals 
with other parties, aided by the fact that there were fewer sensitive agricultural products to 
exclude from the negotiations.50 
 
The Sustainability Impact Assessment 
 
The agreement with Chile was the first of this kind to go through the SIA procedure, which 
aimed “to identify the implications of the trade measures of the EU-Chile Association Agreement 
for the long-term economic, social and environmental development of both partners to the 
agreement; (…) to optimize the outcome of the trade measures through the definition of 
measures aimed at mitigating any negative impacts and enhancing any positive repercussions of 
the trade measures.”51 In this regard, the studies undertaken examined the likely impacts of the 
agreement in Chile, both in general terms and in twelve sectors of the Chilean economy, divided 
into five primary sectors: grains, other agricultural products and forestry; processed foods, 
chemicals, non-ferrous metals and mining; fisheries; land transport, electricity and tourism; 
services, foreign direct investment and intellectual property. The potential impact on the EU was 
analyzed from a perspective of sectorial impacts on Member States. The study also included 
broad consultations with civil society and governments.  
 
The final report was presented in December 2002, concluding that the overall economic impact 
of the AA would benefit both Chile and the EU, with wider economic benefits for the latter, by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 M. Garcia, ‘Incidents Along the Path: Understanding the rationale behind the EU – Chile Association 
Agreement’, JCMS Volume 49, Number 3, Blackwell, 2011, p. 501-524. 
51 EU – Chile Association Agreement Sustainability Impact Assessment, Final Report, available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/may/tradoc_146109.pdf. The studies were conducted by a mixed team of 
Luxemburg based PLANSTAT consultants and Chilean consultants from the Universidad de Chile.  
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reinforcing existing economic growth trends, but also that pre-existing social and environmental 
issues would require additional flanking measures to ensure sustainability. The SIA proposed 
mitigation and flanking strategies to address the impacts identified, emphasizing two main issues 
particularly: Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives to support efforts of stakeholders 
and related flanking measures; technology transfer as a mitigating action to provide technical 
means to reduce various forms of pollution that would otherwise result from increased 
production from the agreement.  
 
The Agreement 
 
The EU-Chile AA52 is broad and comprehensive, following a three-pillar model focusing on 
political dialogue, cooperation and trade chapters which would become usual for other AAs 
afterwards. Furthermore, it was one of the first to contain direct references to sustainable 
development. In the preamble the contracting parties highlighted “the need to promote economic 
and social progress for their peoples, taking into account the principle of sustainable 
development and environmental protection requirements” (emphasis added). Despite this 
preambular reference, and the fact that Article 1 stated that the promotion of sustainable 
economic and social development and the equitable distribution of the benefits of the association 
would be considered guiding principles for the implementation of the agreement, no specific 
chapter was included in this regard.  
 
In fact, most of the provisions relating to sustainable development are to be found in the 
Cooperation Chapter, where the parties included among the objectives the promotion of “social 
development, which should go hand in hand with economic development and the protection of 
the environment”. In addition, the “importance of economic, financial and technical 
cooperation, as a means of contributing towards implementing the objectives and principles 
derived from this Agreement” was highlighted. The chapter is long and measures included are 
comprehensive, including issues such as cooperation on sustainable environmental management, 
renewable energy and technology transfer. In terms of trade, the scope of this AA transcended 
that of previous EU FTAs as both parties liberalized 90% of all trade flows from the entry into 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Agreement establishing an association between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, 
and the Republic of Chile, of the other part, 30.12.2002. 
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force of the agreement, surpassing WTO commitments, and most of the 300 pages are devoted 
to trade and issues such as investment promotion (Article 21), science and technology, financial 
services (Article 121), and IP rights (Title V).  
 
The relevance of analyzing this particular agreement is to show that, in this early example of an 
attempt to integrate sustainable development measures, the EU emphasized it as a guiding 
principle of the agreement -thus possibly informing the interpretation of its provisions- and as an 
objective to be pursued through development cooperation. While several other objectives have 
been pointed out as the ‘real’ purposes of this agreement,53 this commitment to sustainable 
development is of greater relevance here. The next cases will demonstrate that a bolder approach 
has been developed to integrate this issue through trade related measures designed to promote 
the creation of markets in goods and services that are relevant to the transition to a green 
economy, instead of relying only on the provision of aid to the counterparty.  
 
5.2 The Economic Partnership Agreement with CARIFORUM 
 
Background 
 
The EPAs, as mentioned in the previous sections, are trade and economic partnerships between 
regional groups of ACP countries and the EU which aim to replace the Cotonou Partnership 
Agreement, which expired at the end of 2007. The objective of EPAs was to establish 
comprehensive trade agreements which included the promotion of sustainable development and 
poverty reduction by helping to integrate ACP regions into the world trading system and 
supporting their own regional economic integration, as well as cooperation in a range of trade-
related areas and improved access to EU markets as part of new goods and services trade 
arrangements compatible with WTO rules. The ACP countries themselves decided on the 
regional groupings for EPA negotiations, and gathered in four negotiating regions in Africa, one 
in the Pacific and one in the Caribbean. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 See, in this regard, A. Dur, ‘EU Trade Policy as protection for exporters: the agreements with Mexico and Chile’, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 2007, Volume 45, Number 4, 833-855, where the author makes the argument 
that the real purpose of these agreements is to secure markets for EU investors. At the same time, a study of the 
CEPAL indicates that the EU-Chile AA has effectively led to increased economic growth and exports in Chile, see 
CEPAL, European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean: Investments for growth, social inclusion and 
environmental sustainability, LC/L.3535, 2012.  
Chapter	  5	  
	  
	  
235	  
 
The Caribbean group of negotiations was made up of the 15 countries of the CARIFORUM: 
Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, 
Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Luca, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Kitts and 
Nevis, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. Cuba is also a member of CARIFORUM but was 
not part of the ACP group and did not participate in negotiations. Negotiations for this EPA 
started in 2004 and the agreement was signed on 15th October 2008, and provisionally applied as 
of 29th December 2008. Haiti signed the agreement on 10th December 2009 but its ratification is 
still pending, delayed due to the earthquake in 2010.  
 
The Sustainability Impact Assessment  
 
A multi-step SIA preceded the EPA. The first relevant report was released on January 30th 
2004,54 as part of an ongoing SIA launched to assess the impacts of the future EPAs between the 
EU and regions of the Africa-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) countries. The report presented the 
preliminary findings for the Caribbean region (CARICOM & Dominican Republic), 
emphasizing that the EPAs, not really as such, but in relation to the impact of some changes in 
EU trade regime (CAP reform, EBA initiative, Doha Development Round negotiations), would 
bring about a different economic and trading environment from that present under the Lomé 
Conventions, with adjustments in the Caribbean ACP countries in terms of the re-orientation of 
their productive base towards less traditional agricultural crops or a greater amount of light 
manufacturing. It also highlighted that the envisaged scenarios would not have absolute negative 
or positive impacts, depending on the adoption of domestic measures to mitigate the impacts of 
change, and thus a preliminary set of recommendations was presented, based on consultations 
held in November 2003. Among these were policies to promote sustainability, such as: 
involvement of non-state actors in the negotiation process; support for development of 
productive capacities and efforts to develop other revenue creating activities; support for 
implementation of effective national regulatory frameworks, including social safety nets, 
measures to maintain and improve the respect of health and other standards, and strong 
environmental regulations to offset the potential negative impacts of tourism development; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Sustainability Impact Assessment of the EU–ACP Economic Partnership Agreements: Regional SA: Caribbean 
Countries Final Report, 30 January 2004, PricewaterhouseCoopers, available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclb/docs/2005/january/tradoc_121202.pdf.  
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transfers of environmentally sound technologies from the EU to Caribbean countries; and 
support for Caribbean efforts to fight against poverty. 
 
A more comprehensive report was released in 2007,55 taking stock of the overall EPA 
negotiations SIA undertaken over four years. This involved developing a methodology and 
undertaking case studies in key sectors throughout the ACP, one in each of the six regional 
negotiating configurations. For each of the six sectors studied, policy recommendations were 
developed in three general categories: policies related to regional integration, policies addressing 
trade-related measures and policies to promote sustainability. In addition, the SIA had broad 
public participation through public consultations, electronic mechanisms, stakeholder meetings 
in the ACP regions, meetings in the EU with stakeholders and negotiators, other expert 
meetings, specialized interviews and field missions. The report concluded that trade 
liberalization alone was not a sufficient condition to guarantee increased levels of trade and/or 
economic, environmental and social sustainability without attention being paid to technical 
assistance and development cooperation including policies and programs to support trade, build 
capacity, and promote sustainable development, and that none of the trade measures discussed in 
the SIA taken in isolation would necessarily lead to sustainability or even to an increase in trade. 
Thus, it highlighted policies to be included in and to accompany the EPAs, to be undertaken at 
the national or regional level. Twelve recommendations were highlighted as relevant for ACP 
regions and countries, among which three priority areas of technical assistance and development 
cooperation should be directed in the short term to help ensure that the EPAs encourage trade 
and sustainable development: priority needs for diversification and increased added-value in 
production; improvement of data collection and analysis of trade and sustainability at the 
national and regional levels; and capacity building to strengthen human and technical support for 
sustainability. 
 
The Commission issued a ‘Position Paper’ on the final SIA report,56 stating that its approach to 
the EPAs was “to change the relationship between the EU and the ACP from one of dependency 
on EU tariff preferences to a WTO-compatible partnership, guided by the need to promote 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Sustainability Impact Assessment of the EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements: key findings, 
recommendations and lessons learned, Pars, PricewaterhouseCoopers, May 2007, available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/.  
56 European Commission, Position Paper, Sustainability Impact Assessment of EU-ACP Economic Partnership 
Agreements, 16th November 2007, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/regions/acp/ndex_en.htm.  
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development that is economically, socially and environmentally sustainable”. The paper reacts 
to each of the twelve recommendations outlined in the SIA. Particularly on the issues related to 
sustainability, the Commission noted that “environmental aspects of the EPAs were highlighted 
in many recommendations”, and declared itself ”fully committed to further pursue its efforts to 
incorporate an environmental dimension into the EPAs”, with “similar efforts [to] be made in 
relation to social and labor issues”. 
 
The Agreement 
 
The EU-CARIFORUM EPA57 was the first to be concluded among the ACP negotiating 
configurations. One of the main changes introduced by the agreement was the reciprocal 
granting of preferences by the two sides, instead of the non-reciprocal, preferential (duty-free) 
market access for ACP States, and encompasses trade in goods, services, trade-related issues and 
development cooperation, with strong emphasis on sustainable development and regional 
integration. At the same time, several criticisms have been raised regarding the effectiveness of 
EPAs as development tools, as commented above.58 
 
The preamble of the EPA contains several references to sustainable development, including “the 
need to promote economic and social progress for their people in a manner consistent with 
sustainable development by respecting basic labor rights in line with the commitments (…) 
undertaken within the International Labor Organization and by protecting the environment in 
line with the 2002 Johannesburg Declaration; (…) commitment to work together towards (…) 
poverty eradication, sustainable development and the gradual integration of the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States into the world economy”; a desire for “strengthening [of] 
the framework for economic and trade relations between them through the establishment of an 
Economic Partnership Agreement which can serve as an instrument for the development of the 
CARIFORUM States”; a commitment “to support the regional integration process among 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM States and the European Community and its 
Member States, OJ L 289/I/3, 30/10/2008. 
58 See J. Nwobike, ‘The Emerging Trade Regime under the Cotonou Partnership Agreement: Its Human Rights 
Implications’, Journal of World Trade 40(2), 2006, 291-314; K. Arts, ‘ACP-EU relations in a new era: The 
Cotonou Agreement’, Common Market Law Review 40, 2003, 95-116; M. G. Desta, ‘EC-ACP Economic 
Partnership Agreements and the Question of WTO Compatibility: An Experiment in North-South Regional 
Integration Agreements?’, Common Market Law Review 43, 2006, 1343-1379. 
Chapter	  5	  
	  
	  
238	  
CARIFORUM States, and in particular to foster regional economic integration as a key 
instrument to facilitate their integration into the world economy (…) and achieve the economic 
growth and social progress compatible with sustainable development to which they aim”.  
 
These preambular references are then reinforced in Part I of the Agreement, titled a ‘Trade 
Partnership for Sustainable Development’. This Part is divided into 8 Articles that cover four 
main issues:  
 
i) Objectives and principles: Article 1 states that the objectives of the agreement are to 
contribute “to the reduction and eventual eradication of poverty through the establishment of a 
trade partnership consistent with the objective of sustainable development, the Millennium 
Development Goals and the Cotonou Agreement” (emphasis added); in addition, it determines 
that, consistent with the respective levels of development of the Parties and WTO obligations, 
the agreement shall establish progressive and asymmetrical liberalization of trade and reinforce, 
broaden and deepen cooperation in all areas relevant to trade and investment. This was an 
important issue in the SIA process, and has thus been taken into account. 
 
More interestingly, Article 3 ‘reaffirms’ that the objective of sustainable development is to be 
applied and integrated at every level of the agreement, which should represent a commitment to 
two issues in particular: (a) the application of the agreement shall take into account the human, 
cultural, economic, social, health and environmental best interests of the populations and of 
future generations; (b) decision-making methods shall embrace the fundamental principles of 
ownership, participation and dialogue. 
 
ii) Support for regional integration: Article 4 determines this issue as an integral element of the 
partnership and stresses it as a mechanism for enabling CARIFORUM to achieve greater 
economic opportunities and enhanced political stability, and to foster their effective integration 
into the world economy. 
 
iii) Continuous monitoring of the agreement through participatory processes and institutions 
formed by representatives of both parties, as well as those set up under the agreement itself. 
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iv) Development cooperation, stressed as a crucial element of the EPA and an essential factor in 
the realization its objectives. The areas of cooperation and technical assistance are set out, as 
appropriate, in the individual chapters of the agreement, but a set of priorities is provided in this 
part: (a) technical assistance to build human, legal and institutional capacity in the 
CARIFORUM States so as to facilitate their ability to comply with the commitments set out in 
the Agreement; (b) assistance for capacity and institution building for fiscal reform; (c) support 
measures aimed at promoting private sector and enterprise development, in particular for small 
economic operators, and enhancing the international competiveness of CARIFORUM firms and 
the diversification of their economies; (d) diversification of CARIFORUM exports of goods and 
services through new investment and the development of new sectors; (e) enhancing the 
technological and research capacity of  CARIFORUM States so as to facilitate development of, 
and compliance with, internationally recognized sanitary and phytosanitary measures and 
technical standards and internationally recognized labor and environmental standards. These 
areas of cooperation largely reflect the recommendations made in the SIA process.  
 
The Provisions in Part I are reinforced in Part II, ‘Trade-related issues’, and Chapters 4 and 5 
deal with environmental and social issues, respectively. These chapters contain, in summary, a 
set of four types of issues: 
 
i) Reaffirmation of international commitments to which the Parties are signatories. Article 183 
on Chapter 4 makes a more general reference to the need to “conserve, protect and improve the 
environment, including through multilateral and regional environmental agreements to which 
they are Parties”. The social equivalent in Chapter 5, Article 191 makes a much more specific 
reference to internationally recognized core labor standards, as defined by the relevant ILO 
Conventions, and in particular to the freedom of association and the right to collective 
bargaining, the abolition of forced labor, the elimination of the worst forms of child labor and 
non-discrimination in respect to employment; the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work and its Follow-Up (1998); the 2006 Ministerial declaration by the UN 
Economic and Social Council on Full Employment and Decent Work. 
 
In addition, recognition of a) the right of the parties to regulate their own level of domestic 
environmental, public health and social protection and sustainable development priorities, and to 
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adopt or modify other environmental laws and policies accordingly, and a commitment to avoid 
application of such measures in a manner that would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between the Parties or a disguised restriction on trade between them, 
while not preventing any Party from adopting or maintaining measures necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health, related to the conservation of natural resources or 
protection of the environment. Further references are made to the precautionary principle in 
environmental matters, and transparency; b) a commitment not to encourage trade or foreign 
direct investment to enhance or maintain a competitive advantage by lowering the level of 
protection provided by domestic environmental, public health and social legislation, or 
derogating from, and failing to apply such legislation. 
 
ii) Commitment to facilitate trade in socio-environmentally friendly goods. Article 183 provides 
for the promotion of international trade in such a way as to ensure sustainable and sound 
management of the environment, in accordance with other undertakings in this area including 
the international conventions to which they are party and with due regard to other respective 
level of development. In this regard, the Parties undertake to facilitate trade in goods and 
services considered to be beneficial to the environment, such as environmental technologies, 
renewable and energy-efficient goods and services and eco-labeled goods. Further, Article 191 
recognizes the benefits and importance of facilitating commerce in fair and ethical trade 
products. 
 
iii) Procedural issues of consultation in the matters arising from these Chapters: a 
CARIFORUM-EC Consultative Committee on environmental and social issues covered by the 
respective Articles of these Chapters, which can submit oral or written recommendations to the 
Parties for disseminating and sharing best practice relating to issues covered by this Chapter. 
The Parties might also request consultations from external experts. 
 
iv) Specific cooperation priorities and mechanisms, as referenced above.  
 
As can be inferred, the specific provisions of this agreement in terms of sustainable development 
evolved considerably in comparison to the Chile AA. This EPA introduced sustainable 
development not as a guiding principle but as one of the main objectives of the agreement itself, 
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and included specific trade-related measures aimed at promoting the commitments to 
international agreements on social and environmental issues, and facilitating trade on socio-
environmentally friendly goods, in addition to specific cooperation measures. 
 
In general terms, the EPA contains considerable flexibility for CARIFORUM to exclude 
sensitive products and industries from liberalization or to ‘phase in’ liberalization. The coverage 
of goods liberalized by CARIFORUM countries amounts to 61% of EU imports in value over 10 
years, 82% over 15 years (85% of tariff lines) and 86% over 25 years (90% of tariff lines). The 
main exclusions from tariff cuts are agricultural and processed agricultural products; some 
chemicals, furniture and other industrial products. The EPA will be supported by financial 
assistance from the EDF, in particular the regional program, which amounts to €165 million for 
the period 2008-2013.  
 
5.3 The Free Trade Agreement with South Korea 
 
Background 
 
The 2006 ‘Global Europe’ strategy mandated the negotiation of a new generation of FTAs 
focusing on countries with high potential for the EU’s economy. These FTAs would be 
ambitious in eliminating tariffs, as well as far-reaching in the liberalization of services and 
investment, and in finding novel ways of effectively tackling non-tariff barriers. In this context, 
the negotiations with South Korea, the EU's fourth-largest trading partner outside Europe, were 
launched in 2007 and concluded in 2009. The Agreement was signed in 2010 and entered into 
force in 2011.  
 
The Sustainability impact Assessment 
 
The negotiations of this FTA were also followed by a SIA, the results of which stated that the 
convergence in development levels and the broad similarity in the distribution of income 
between the EU and Korea would tend to limit significant social impacts on either side. The 
innovation in this study though was related to the recommendations and proposals made in 
relation to sustainable development, in which a suggestion to include a sustainable development 
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section within the trade chapter was made for the first time. This Sustainable Development and 
Trade part of the trade provisions was to include commitments similar to the CARIFORUM 
EPA but concentrated in one single chapter, such as cooperation on core labor standards and 
areas where core ILO conventions have not yet been ratified by the Parties and multilateral 
environmental conventions; complementary efforts to cooperate in response to multilateral 
environmental challenges; liberalization of environmental goods and services; and the 
development of a Sustainable Development Council representing stakeholders in the EU and 
Korea to review the provisions in the agreement and ensure transparency.59  
 
In fact, these recommendations made their way into the agreement. Exceptionally, the 
Commission presented its Position Paper60 after the conclusion of the negotiations, and thus it 
focuses on explaining to what extent the SIA recommendations have been taken into account in 
the text of the agreement. In terms of the sustainability measures proposed, the Commission was 
reported to have engaged actively in negotiating a ‘Trade and Sustainable Development’ chapter 
with South Korea, covering provisions on the implementation and monitoring of, and 
cooperation on, core labor standards and the decent work agenda, multilateral environmental 
conventions and international labor standards and related policy agendas, procedural 
mechanisms and liberalization of environmental goods and services.  
 
The Agreement 
 
The EU- Korea FTA61 is considered the most comprehensive to have ever been negotiated by 
the EU in terms of trade issues, with import duties eliminated on nearly all products and far-
reaching liberalization of trade in services, including provisions on investments both in services 
and industrial sectors, strong discipline on intellectual property (including geographical 
indications), public procurement, competition rules, transparency of regulation and sustainable 
development. The FTA comprises 15 Chapters, several annexes and appendixes, three protocols 
and four understandings. Substantively, the agreement provides for the liberalization of almost 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 EU – South Korea Free Trade Agreement Final Report, available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/december/tradoc_141660.pdf. 
60 Trade SIA of the EU-Korea FTA: Position Paper, June 2010, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-
opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/korea/. 
61 Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of 
Korea, of the other part, OJ L 127/6, 14/05/2011. 
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all trade and covers a broad spectrum of goods and services. Specifically, 99% of European 
tariffs and 96% of South Korean tariffs on imports from the other party will be eliminated over a 
three-year period.  
 
The conclusion of the agreement prompted the launch of polemics, particularly in the European 
Parliament, where the debates over the effects of the agreement were substantive.62 Particular 
concerns were raised regarding the need to include a safeguard clause related to sensitive sectors 
of the EU economy, which was ultimately included. Nevertheless, the FTA is in force since 1 
July 2011, and is reported to have led to cash savings of €350 million, from increases in sales of 
European goods.63 
 
Moreover, the FTA includes several Provisions on sustainable development. In Article 1, the 
Parties “commit, in the recognition that sustainable development is an overarching objective, to 
the development of international trade in such a way as to contribute to the objective of 
sustainable development and strive to ensure that this objective is integrated and reflected at 
every level of the Parties’ trade relationship” (emphasis added). In this regard, a ‘Trade and 
Sustainable Development’ Chapter was inserted, featuring four main types of Provision:  
 
i) Commitments on both sides to labor and environmental agreements and standards. Some labor 
agreements are explicitly mentioned, such as the 2006 Ministerial Declaration of the UN 
Economic and Social Council on Full Employment and Decent Work, general obligations 
deriving from membership of the ILO and the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work and commitment to respecting, promoting and realizing principles concerning 
the fundamental rights, such as freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right 
to collective bargaining; elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor; effective 
abolition of child labor; and elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and 
occupation. On the other hand, a more general reference to MEAs is made, with only the 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol being expressly cited. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 See European Parliament, Committee on International Trade, Draft Recommendation on the proposal of a 
Council Decision concluding the FTA between the European Union and the Republic of Korea, Document 
2010/0075(NLE),  
available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/inta/pr/815/815710/815710en.pdf.  
63 European Commission Memo, op cit.  
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ii) Trade related Provisions: the Parties “shall strive to facilitate and promote” trade and foreign 
direct investment in environmental goods and services, including environmental technologies, 
sustainable renewable energy, energy efficient products and services and eco-labeled goods, 
including through addressing related non-tariff barriers, and “shall strive to facilitate and 
promote” trade in goods that contribute to sustainable development, including goods that are the 
subject of schemes such as fair and ethical trade and those involving corporate social 
responsibility and accountability.  
 
iii) Provisions of a procedural nature: determination of a continuous review of sustainability 
impacts through SIAs, and setting up of institutional structures to implement and monitor the 
commitments between the Parties, including through civil society participation. Furthermore, a 
specific dispute settlement procedure is established, excluding the provisions of this Chapter 
from the general dispute settlement mechanism provided for the rest of the agreement. 
 
iv) Cooperation measures set up in Annex 13 of the FTA, to promote the achievement of the 
objectives of the trade and sustainable development chapter and to assist in the fulfillment of 
their obligations pursuant to it.  
 
The nature of the sustainable development related provisions in this agreement were thus very 
similar to those of the CARIFORUM EPA. The difference here, though, was that all of those 
measures were condensed into a ‘Trade and Sustainable Development’ Chapter, which in 
addition was more specific in listing socio-environmental goods whose liberalization was to be 
facilitated by the Parties.  
 
5.4 The Association Agreement with Central America  
 
Background 
 
The EU and the Central American (CA) region agreed to negotiate an AA in 2004, with 
negotiations launched in 2007 and successfully concluded at the 2010 Madrid Summit between 
the EU and Latin American countries. During the summit, other important decisions regarding 
relations with other actors of the region were taken, among which were the re-launch 
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negotiations for an EU-MERCOSUR AA, and political approval for the conclusion of a trade 
agreement between the EU and the Andean Countries (Peru and Colombia). The EU – CA AA is 
particularly relevant for EU external relations since it is the first ‘bi-regional’ AA to have been 
finalized up to this point within the ‘interregional’ approach to international relations adopted by 
the EU in the 1990s. Nevertheless, this approach seems to be facing difficulties and risks being 
replaced by a more pragmatic strategy, as in the same Madrid Summit negotiations with the 
Andean Community were finally abandoned and the EU signed bilateral agreements with Peru 
and Colombia. At the same time, the flagship interregional agreement, the one with 
MERCOSUR, a more complex agreement -especially regarding its trade effects, has still not 
been concluded.64 These issues will be further explored in Chapter 6. 
  
The Sustainability Impact Assessment 
 
A SIA procedure was also carried out for this agreement, and its results were presented in 
September 2009.65 The study concluded that the AA was “expected to be positive for both the 
EU and all Central American countries and the deeper the integration, the more beneficial the 
effects are expected to be in the long run”. However, the conclusions were also wary of possible 
negative social and environmental impacts on both sides. Therefore, the SIA also suggested, 
among other recommendations, the inclusion of a ‘Trade and Sustainable Development’ chapter, 
as had already been done in the SIA undertaken for the South Korea FTA, addressing specific 
social issues (international labor standards, implementation and monitoring systems, agreements 
on working conditions and sector-specific issues) and environmental issues (MEAs, issue-
specific provisions in relation to forests, fishery, biofuels, organic farming, regional monitoring 
mechanisms and institutional capacity building of environmental agencies), flanked by an 
incentive cooperation structure.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 See, in this regard, F Söderbaum et al., ‘The EU as a Global Actor and the dynamics of interregionalism: a 
comparative analysis’, in F Söderbaum et al., The EU as a global player: the politics of interregionalism, 
Routledge, 2006.  
65 EU – Central America AA Final Report, available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/analysis/Sustainability-Impact-
assessments/assessments/. 
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The Commission presented its Position Paper in June 2012,66 agreeing with the conclusions that 
to ensure an agreement conducive to sustainable development, not only liberalization in trade in 
goods, services and investment should be contemplated but also a strong and coherent set of 
rules covering a wide range of areas to accompany the process of liberalization, including a 
‘Trade and Sustainable Development’ chapter. These views have been taken into account and 
included in the AA, as shown below. 
 
The Agreement 
 
The EU-CA AA67 follows the three-pillar format of political dialogue, cooperation and trade that 
was used in other EU agreements, such as the Chile AA. However, as the two regions signed an 
agreement on political dialogue and cooperation in 2003, the trade pillar constitutes the principal 
change in the bi-regional relations. The AA was approved by the European Parliament on 11th 
December 2012 and, once ratified by both parties, is expected to increase trade in goods between 
Central America and the European Union, which was worth €52.8 billion in 2012.68 
 
Furthermore, the AA has very comprehensive content related to sustainable development issues. 
Article 1 states that “[t]he Parties confirm their commitment to the promotion of sustainable 
development, which is a guiding principle for the implementation of this Agreement” (emphasis 
added), and Article 2 lists among the objectives of the AA to develop a privileged political 
partnership based on values, principles and common objectives, in particular the respect for and 
promotion of democracy and human rights, sustainable development, good governance and the 
rule of law, and enhance bi-regional cooperation in all areas of common interest with the aim of 
achieving more sustainable and equitable social and economic development in both regions. 
Once again, sustainable development is portrayed as a guiding principle and also as an objective 
of the AA, and this is reflected in provisions in subsequent chapters. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Commission Position paper on the SA of the Association Agreement between the EU and Central America, June 
2012, available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/june/tradoc_146262.pdf.  
67 Agreement establishing an Association between the European Union and its Member States, on the one hand, and 
Central America, on the other, OJ 30.05.2010.  
68 European Commission Memo, op cit. 
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The ‘Political Dialogue Chapter’ contains a provision that the Parties commit to a political 
partnership based on respect for and the promotion of democracy, peace, human rights, the rule 
of law, good governance and sustainable development. Therefore, several areas of political 
dialogue are cited in order to pave the way for new initiatives for pursuing common goals and 
establishing common ground, including environmental, social and sustainable development 
issues.  
The ‘Cooperation Chapter’ explicitly states that “promoting economic growth with a view to 
furthering sustainable development, reducing the imbalances between and within the Parties 
and developing synergies between the two regions” should be among the priorities for 
cooperation. In this regard, the chapter comprises nine subchapters, many of which address key 
issues for sustainable development: democracy, human rights and good governance; justice, 
freedom and security; social development and social cohesion; migration; environment, natural 
disasters and climate change; economic and trade development; regional integration; culture and 
audiovisual cooperation; and the knowledge society, and includes innovative measures such as 
support for organic farming and climate change.  
 
The ‘Trade Chapter’ features liberalization on trade in goods and services and other WTO+ 
issues. Among the objectives, the text includes the “promotion of international trade and 
investment between the Parties in a way that contributes to the objective of sustainable 
development through joint collaborative work” (emphasis added). In addition, a ‘Trade And 
Sustainable Development’ Chapter (Title IV) has been included, with the Parties explicitly 
expressing their stance on the “benefit of considering trade related social and environmental 
issues as part of a global approach to trade and sustainable development”. This chapter mainly 
features four types of provisions, which are similar but even more comprehensive than those in 
the South Korea FTA: 
 
i) Commitments on both sides on common objectives and labor and environmental agreements 
and standards. In this AA, the provisions are much more detailed, and Article 284 sets the 
context and objectives, among which is a commitment to achieving sustainable development in 
its three pillars as interdependent and mutually reinforcing, and underlines the “benefit of 
considering trade related social and environmental issues as part of a global approach to trade 
and sustainable development”. Article 285 follows with the affirmation of the rights of the 
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Parties to regulate their own sustainable development priorities and levels of domestic 
environmental and social protection, but also determining that they shall “strive to ensure” that 
their laws and policies provide for and encourage high levels of environmental and labor 
protection, appropriate to their social, environmental and economic conditions and consistent 
with the internationally recognized standards and agreements referred to in Articles 286 and 
28769 to which they are party, and “shall strive to improve” those laws and policies, provided 
that they are not applied in a manner that would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between the Parties or a disguised restriction on international trade. Article 291 
states that the Parties recognize as inappropriate the encouragement of trade or investment by 
lowering the levels of protection afforded in domestic environmental and labor laws, and shall 
not wave or derogate from, or offer to wave or offer to derogate from these in a manner affecting 
trade.  
 
ii) Trade related provisions, which go beyond the facilitation of trade in environmental goods 
and services and fair trade and other labeled goods, as in the Korea-FTA. Article 288 on ‘Trade 
Favoring Sustainable Development’ contains recognition by the Parties of the value of 
international cooperation in support of trade schemes and trade practices favoring sustainable 
development, and determination that the Parties “shall endeavor to”:   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69In terms of social agreements, the AA cites the obligations of the Parties as members of the LO, to respect, 
promote, and realize in good faith the LO principles and Conventions: (a) the freedom of Association and the 
effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; (b) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory 
labor; (c) the effective abolition of child labor; and (d) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment 
and occupation; Convention 138 concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment; Convention 182 
concerning the Prohibition and immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor; 
Convention 105 concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor; Convention 29 concerning Forced or Compulsory 
Labor; Convention 100 concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value; 
Convention 111 concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation; Convention 87 concerning 
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize; Convention 98 concerning the Application of the 
Principles of the Right to Organize and to Bargain Collectively. 
In terms of Multilateral Environmental Standards and Agreements, the AA cites a commitment to effectively 
implement: the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer; the Basel Convention on the 
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal; the Stockholm Convention on 
Persistent Organic Pollutants; the Convention on international Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora (hereafter referred to as ‘CTES’); the Convention on Biological Diversity; the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity; and the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change. Further, it states that the Parties undertake to ensure that they have ratified, by the 
date of entry into force of this Agreement, the Amendment to Article XX of CTES, adopted at Gaborone 
(Botswana), and to ratify and effectively implement, at latest by the date of entry into force of this Agreement, the 
Rotterdam Convention on the Prior informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in 
International Trade. 
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a) Facilitate and promote trade and foreign direct investment in environmental technologies and 
services, renewable-energy and energy-efficient products and services, including through 
addressing related non-tariff barriers;  
b) Facilitate and promote trade in products that respond to sustainability considerations, 
including products that are the subject of schemes such as fair and ethical trade schemes, eco-
labeling, organic production, and including those schemes involving CSR and accountability;  
c) Facilitate and promote the development of practices and programs aiming to foster 
appropriate economic returns from the conservation and sustainable use of the environment, 
such as ecotourism.  
 
Further, Articles 289 and 290 respectively contain specific provisions on: 
 
d) Trade in forest products, including a commitment “to work together to improve” forest law 
enforcement and governance and “to promote trade in” legal and sustainable forest products 
through instruments such as the use of CTES with regard to endangered timber species; 
certification schemes for sustainably harvested forest products; regional or bilateral Forest Law 
Enforcement Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Voluntary Partnership Agreements. 
 
e) Trade in fish products, addressing particular issues and making reference to multilateral 
conventions that the Parties undertake to adhere to and effectively implement, such as the 
Agreement for the implementation of the Provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks; cooperation to prevent Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) 
fishing, to exchange scientific and non-confidential trade data, experiences and best practices in 
the field of sustainable fisheries and, more generally, to promote a sustainable approach to 
fisheries. 
 
iii) Cooperation measures to support Provisions in this Chapter: Article 302 determines that 
cooperation and technical assistance measures related to this Chapter are established in Title V 
(Economic and Trade Development) of the Cooperation Chapter (Part III) of the Agreement. 
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iv) Provisions of a procedural nature: a continuous review of sustainability impacts through 
SIAs; institutional structures to implement and monitor the commitments between the Parties, 
including through civil society participation, government consultation and expert panels, and a 
special dispute settlement mechanism, as Article 284 excludes the general dispute settlement 
mechanism of the agreement from issues in this Chapter.  
 
As can be seen, the broader structure of the AA and its three pillars allowed for a more 
comprehensive set of measures focused on sustainable development. Particularly, the trade 
chapter contains not only the liberalization of environmental goods and services, but also 
windows of opportunity to encourage trade in key areas such as fisheries and forestry products, 
which are of great relevance for the sustainability agenda. This approach has been reproduced 
and enhanced in the next agreement analyzed.  
 
5.5 The FTA with Colombia and Peru 
 
Background 
 
Negotiations between the EU and the Andean Community for a bi-regional AA, including 
political dialogue, cooperation and trade were launched in June 2007, in the context of the 
negotiations with other blocs in the Southern Cone. Nevertheless, they were suspended in June 
2008 after disagreement between the Andean countries on approaches to a number of key trade 
issues, and the weakening of the Andean Community itself. New negotiations for a multiparty 
trade agreement were launched in January 2009 between the EU and Colombia, Ecuador and 
Peru, but an agreement was finally reached in June 2012, excluding Ecuador. This FTA is an 
interesting example in light of the analysis undertaken in this chapter as, although it is a less 
comprehensive agreement in comparison with the broader, three-pillar format of the AAs, in 
relation to sustainable development provisions some of its elements are even deeper than the 
latter.  
 
Sustainability Impact Assessment 
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A SIA process was also undertaken for this agreement, including analysis of impacts within the 
EU and the Andean countries (Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru, as at the time negotiations 
were still done on a bi-regional basis), and public consultations in both regions. The final report 
was presented in October 2009,70 reaching the conclusion that the impacts of the agreement 
would be mixed, bringing economic benefits but also varied socio-environmental results on both 
sides, as was the case with other SIAs. In this regard, in order to promote sustainable 
development a series of measures were recommended to mitigate and flank the impacts of the 
agreement. Among these, a ‘Trade and Sustainable Development’ Chapter in the Trade Pillar 
was recommended, to include: a reference to effective implementation of core labor and 
environmental standards; business practices and sustainable logging in forested areas, 
particularly in regions of greater biodiversity; climate change; considerations in the mining and 
biofuel industries; and sustainability in fishing, organic farming, and other sectors/practices.  
 
The Commission presented a Position Paper in November 2010,71 examining the analysis and 
recommendations made and highlighting the benefits of the agreement. Particularly in the 
recommendation to create a ‘Trade and Sustainable Development’ Chapter, it confirmed the 
intention to include commitments to implement a number of key multilateral labor and 
environmental agreements, in addition to commitments on the effective implementation and 
enforcement of the domestic regulatory frameworks on labor and environmental issues, and also 
provide a basis to address sustainability considerations with respect to the production of trade in 
environmentally sensitive products (forestry and fisheries), as well as general biodiversity 
issues. These matters were in fact reflected in the final text of the agreement, as follows below. 
 
The Agreement 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 The EU-Andean Sustainability Impact Assessment Final Report, DEVELOPMENT Solutions, Centre for 
Economic Policy Research (CEPR) Institute for Development Policy and Management in the School of 
Environment and Development at the University of Manchester, October 2009, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/analysis/Sustainability-impact-assessments/assessments/.  
71 Commission Services Position Paper on the trade Sustainability Impact assessment (SA) of the multiparty trade 
agreement with Andean countries, November 2010, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/analysis/Sustainability-
impact-assessments/assessments/.  
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The Colombia – Peru agreement is an FTA,72 similar in structure to the Korea FTA, but 
following deeper sustainability provisions, like those in the Central America AA. It has been 
provisionally in force since 1st March 2013 for Peru, and Colombia is expected to apply the 
agreement provisionally in the coming months. The EU is the second largest trading partner of 
the Andean region after the US, and it is expected that, once fully implemented, the agreement 
will result in total tariff savings of more than €500 million per year.73 
 
The preamble contains a commitment of the Parties “to implement the objective of sustainable 
development, including, the promotion of economic progress, the respect for labor rights and 
the protection of the environment” (emphasis added). Interestingly, sustainable development is 
not cited as a guiding principle of the agreement, as was the case in the Central America AA. It 
does, however, feature among the objectives of the agreement cited in Article 2, “to promote 
international trade in a way that contributes to the objective of sustainable development”. In 
addition, a ‘Trade and Sustainable Development’ Chapter has also been inserted, featuring four 
main types of Provisions, as in the previous examples above:  
 
i) Commitments on both sides on common objectives and labor and environmental agreements 
and standards. In this agreement, provisions are much less detailed in comparison with the 
Central America AA, more closely resembling those in the Korea-FTA. Article 267 sets context 
and objectives provisions, among which is the promotion of dialogue and cooperation between 
the parties to strengthen the relationship between trade and labor and environmental policies and 
practices, and compliance with the labor and environmental legislation of each party, as well as 
with the commitments deriving from the international conventions and agreements referred to in 
Articles 269 and 270. Article 268 follows with the affirmation of the rights of the Parties to 
establish their domestic policies and priorities on sustainable development, and their own levels 
of environmental and labor protection, consistent with internationally recognized standards and 
agreements, and to adopt or modify accordingly their relevant laws, regulations and policies, 
also stating that each party shall strive to ensure that its relevant laws and policies provide for 
and encourage high levels of environmental and labor protection. Interestingly, in this agreement 
a much shorter list of labor standards is mentioned in comparison with the Central America AA, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Colombia and Peru, of 
the other part, OJ 21.12.2012. 
73 European Commission Memo, op cit. 
Chapter	  5	  
	  
	  
253	  
with only a statement committing the Parties to the promotion and effective implementation in 
their laws and practice and territory of internationally recognized core labor standards as 
contained in the fundamental Conventions of the ILO,74 to exchange information on their 
respective situations and advancements as regards the ratification of the priorities of these 
conventions, and not to use such standards for protectionist trade purposes. The list of 
multilateral environmental agreements the Parties commit to implement is a long one, though, 
stressing a sensitivity to labor issues and emphasis on environmental challenges.75 
 
Article 291 then states that the Parties recognize as inappropriate to encourage trade or 
investment by lowering the levels of protection afforded in domestic environmental and labor 
laws, and shall not wave or derogate from, or offer to wave or offer to derogate from these in a 
manner affecting trade.  
 
ii) Trade related provisions, which go beyond even those of the Central America AA. Article 
271 on ‘Trade Favoring Sustainable Development’ contains recognition by the Parties of the 
value of international cooperation in support of trade schemes and trade practices favoring 
sustainable development, and a determination that the Parties “shall strive to facilitate and 
promote”:   
 
a) trade and foreign direct investment in environmental goods and services;  
b) business practices related to CSR;  
c) the development of flexible, incentive-based and voluntary schemes.  
 
Further, Articles 272-275 contain specific provisions on: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Freedom of Association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; the elimination of all 
forms of forced or compulsory labor; the effective abolition of child labor; and the elimination of discrimination in 
respect of employment and occupation. 
75 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer adopted on 16th September 1987, the Basel 
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal adopted on 22nd 
March 1989, the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants adopted on 22nd May 2001, the 
Convention on international Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora signed on 3rd March 1973 
(CTES), the CBD, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the CBD adopted on 29th January 2000, the Kyoto 
Protocol to the Untied Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change adopted on 11th December 1997 
(hereafter referred to as the ‘Kyoto Protocol’) and the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior informed Consent 
Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in international Trade adopted on 10th September 1998. 
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d) trade in biodiversity products (Article 272), with commitments to: endeavor to jointly 
promote the development of practices and programs aiming to foster economic returns from the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity; endeavor to create conditions to 
facilitate access to genetic resources for environmentally sound uses and not to impose 
restrictions that run counter to the objectives of the CBD; confirm that access to genetic 
resources shall be subject to the prior informed consent of any Party providing such resources, 
unless otherwise determined, and to take appropriate measures, in accordance with the CBD, to 
share the results of research and development and the benefits arising from the commercial and 
other utilization of genetic resources with the Party providing such resources; strengthen the 
capacity of national institutions in relation to the conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity. 
 
e) trade in forest products (Article 273), including a commitment to work together to improve 
forest law enforcement and governance and to promote trade in legal and sustainable forest 
products through instruments such as use of CITES with regard to endangered timber species; 
the development of systems and mechanisms for verification of the legal origin of timber 
products throughout the market chain and voluntary mechanisms for forest certification.  
 
g) trade in fish products (Article 274), addressing particular issues and cooperation in the 
context of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations of which they are parties, to revise 
and adjust the fishing capacity for fishery resources, adopt tools for monitoring and control, to 
ensure full compliance with applicable conservation measures, and adopt actions to combat 
illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. 
 
f) trade and climate change issues (Article 275). There were strong concerns about climate 
change in the SIA, and in this article the parties recall international commitments and agree to 
promote the transition to low-carbon economy, promoting trade and investment measures that 
promote and facilitate access, dissemination and use of best available technologies for clean 
energy production and use, and for mitigation of and adaptation to climate change. Measures 
would include: facilitating the removal of trade and investment barriers to access to innovation, 
development, and deployment of goods, services and technologies that can contribute to 
mitigation or adaptation, taking into account the circumstances of developing countries; 
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promoting measures for energy efficiency and renewable energy that respond to environmental 
and economic needs and minimize technical obstacles to trade. 
 
iii) cooperation measures to support the Provisions of this Chapter in Article 286, covering 
activities such as: evaluation of the socio-environmental impacts of the FTA; implementation of 
socio-environmental commitments in international standards and agreements; adaptation and 
mitigation of climate change, and support to other issues included in the trade measures, such as 
biodiversity, forestry, fisheries and CSR.  
 
iv) provisions of a procedural nature: continuous review of sustainability impacts through SIAs; 
institutional structures to implement and monitor the commitments between the Parties, civil 
society participation, government consultation and expert panels. Finally, a special dispute 
settlement mechanism, as Article 285 excludes the general dispute settlement mechanism of the 
agreement from provisions in this Chapter. 
 
5.6 Assessment of the main provisions  
 
As the measures analyzed in this section show, there has been significant change in the way 
integration of sustainable development in EU trade policy has been implemented, manifested in 
the enhanced level of sustainable development related measures included in the trade 
agreements outlined above. This integration has been undertaken through procedural and 
substantive provisions. 
 
The SIAs 
 
In terms of procedural provisions, the SIAs accompanying the negotiations of these agreements 
can be cited as the main innovation. This type of ex ante analysis is an increasing trend not only 
for trade policies, and the EU model of SIA is considered as the most sophisticated model in 
force, including social and environmental concerns of both parties to an agreement being 
negotiated. Despite the fact that the recommendations of SIAs are not binding on the parties and 
thus that their real added-value and impact are questioned, their main purpose as a procedure is 
to provide information to stakeholders and allow for more informed decision-making output, as 
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well as a channel for the participation of the public in framing future policies, rendering the 
process more transparent and participatory. 
 
In addition, the SIAs analyzed in this chapter consistently emphasized one important issue to 
decision makers and stakeholders: the fact that liberalization alone is insufficient to promote 
trade in a manner favoring sustainable development. The reports, prepared independently by 
different consultancies and university centers, point to the same fact - that development oriented 
SDT measures must not be contemplated in isolation , but must also include consideration of 
measures providing for positive liberalization policies favoring trade on issues that are relevant 
to the sustainability agenda, such as environmental goods and services, technology transfer and 
other issues that can benefit the transition to a green economy, and help mitigate and adapt to 
climate change and foster certification and labeling schemes that aim to make trade in sensitive 
sectors more responsible and sustainable. Moreover, other types of procedural measures have 
been recommended for inclusion in the agreements analyzed, such as procedures for the 
supervision of these agreements by joint bodies and civil society, and continuous SIA processes, 
in line with the understanding that public participation, access to information and a 
precautionary approach are vital for an inclusive and fair sustainable development process. 
Finally, the policy recommendations seem to have been taken into consideration and adopted in 
the cases analyzed here, showing a practical and positive impact in the final negotiation output.  
 
Trade and Sustainable Development chapters 
 
The integration of substantive sustainable development measures has taken place through, 
firstly, preambular and introductory provisions in which sustainable development has been 
portrayed among the objectives of the agreements and, at times, as a guiding principle informing 
implementation. This type of recognition has relevance to trade law, as recognized by the WTO 
in several disputes, indicating the object and purpose of the agreements themselves, providing 
guidance to the parties in interpreting measures, shedding light on the meaning of exceptions 
provided for in the agreement, and informing dispute settlement bodies on how they might 
interpret the agreement in the event of a dispute.76 At the same time, sustainable development, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 See in this regard M Gehring and MC Cordonier Segger, Sustainable Development in World Trade Law, Kluwer, 
2005, 1-24. 
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while at times portrayed as a principle, has never been treated as a concrete obligation in itself, 
but none of the agreements admit the possibility of violating the ‘principle of sustainable 
development’.77 Although this might seem open to criticism, this approach goes in line with the 
general understatement of sustainable development as a guiding principle and summary of 
international goals, rather than a rights based/justiciable approach, as discussed in Chapter 1. 
 
Secondly, provisions on political dialogue, cooperation and trade related sustainability measures 
have been progressively inserted into the agreements. While in the Chile AA these provisions 
were still concentrated in the Cooperation Chapter, after the significant upgrading of sustainable 
development as a guiding principle of the EU, the later agreements feature a more 
straightforward approach, with specific chapters related to sustainable development within their 
trade chapters. These ‘Trade and Sustainable Development’ chapters contain four main types of 
provisions: 
 
1) Cooperation and commitment to ratify, implement and enforce existing agreements and 
standards in social and environmental law regimes. Beyond this, the Parties undertake not to 
lower their levels of protection to encourage trade or investment, or to fail to effectively enforce 
their labor and environmental legislation in a manner affecting trade investment, and to strive to 
ensure that laws and policies provide for and encourage appropriate levels of labor and 
environmental protection. The first of these obligations can be seen as guarantee against 
retrogression, when this relates to trade or investment under the agreement. The second is 
weaker, in the sense that it is only a ‘best endeavors’ provision, but broader in scope in that it 
applies to labor and environmental standards even when trade and investment are not affected. 
There are also clauses aiming to prevent protectionism, such as statements that labor and 
environmental standards should not be invoked or used for protectionist purposes – except in the 
Central America AA, where the environmental clause is not included, despite the strong 
environmental content of the text. These types of measure, while not necessarily novel, can 
provide a first step to link the economic objectives of trade agreements to the socio-
environmental objectives of other international law regimes. In comparison with similar 
measures in the GSP+, which are non-contractual but represent an actual conditionality to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 L Bartels, Human Rights and Sustainable Development Obligations in EU Free Trade Agreements, University of 
Cambridge Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper 24/2012, September 2012, available at 
http://www.law.cam.ac.uk/ssrn/. 
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benefit from trade preferences, the measures here have a softer legal effect. However, they do 
have the purpose of making statements that can encourage the fulfillment of socio-
environmental obligations, avoid discriminatory measures and the prevalence of economic 
objectives over sustainable development concerns, within the framework of an agreement that 
provides for specific dispute settlements between the parties.78 Furthermore, they are in a way 
complemented by the other -more general- human rights clauses present in all EU trade 
agreements nowadays.79  
 
2) More interesting though are the commitments to “facilitate, strive to” and incentivize the 
liberalization of trade in goods and services that might have a beneficial social and 
environmental impact, such as the liberalization of “environmental goods and services (EGS), 
fair trade” products, trade in certified timber and sustainable fisheries. While these 
commitments have been made as soft obligations, without precise definitions of modalities or 
timelines, these provisions represent a starting point that can be used to move forward with these 
issues, which are fundamental to the transition to a green economy and sustainable development, 
but are also still left outside of a multilateral framework. 
 
a) Liberalizing trade in environmental goods and services (EGS) can create new markets and 
export opportunities, and provide access to ‘green’ goods and technologies at lower costs and 
with greater efﬁciency. Increased deployment of cheaper and better-quality environmental goods 
helps countries to pursue their national environmental policy objectives and counter 
environmental degradation and climate change, facilitating the transition to a green economy. 
Further, the market for environmental goods and services represents a significant opportunity for 
development, as in 2006, the global market for environmental goods and services was valued at 
US$690 billion, with the possibility of rising to US$1.9 trillion by 2020, with the greatest 
market potential in developing countries.80 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 See, in this regard, MC Cordonier Segger, ‘Sustainable Development in Regional Trade Agreements’, in L 
Bartels and F Ortino, Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System, Oxford University Press, 2006. 
79 See L Bartels, Human Rights and Sustainable Development Obligations in EU Free Trade Agreements, op. cit., 
for an analysis of the relationship between general human rights clauses and human rights related measures 
included in ‘Trade and Sustainable Development Chapters’ of the EU trade agreements. 
80 UNEP, ITC and ICTSD; (2012); Trade and Environment Briefings: Environmental Goods and Services; ICTSD 
Programme on Global Economic Policy and Institutions; International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development, Geneva, Switzerland, www.ictsd.org.  
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Negotiations on EGS liberalization were part of the WTO Doha Round mandate, and the Doha 
Declaration paragraph 31(iii) called for the “reduction or, as appropriate, elimination of tariff 
and non-tariff barriers to environmental goods and services”. The mandate, however, defined 
neither environmental goods and services, nor the speed or depth of liberalization to be 
achieved, creating a serious barrier, as no international agreement exists on the definition of 
EGS. A number of organizations have proposed definitions, such as the OECD, which deﬁned 
EGS as: “activities which produce goods and services to measure, prevent, limit, minimize or 
correct environmental damage to water, air and soil as well as problems related to waste, noise 
and ecosystems.” However, the lack of agreement on how to define and categorize 
environmental and climate-friendly goods and services has been one of the main barriers to 
progress in negotiations on liberalization of trade in such products at the WTO, and much of the 
debate within the WTO negotiations has centered on the identification of specific environmental 
goods for liberalization. Further, despite the Doha mandate to reduce or eliminate tariff and non-
tariff barriers to environmental goods and services, substantial barriers to trade remain, and it is 
estimated that the average world tariffs on EGS are bound at a level of 8.7%, almost three times 
higher than the average applied rate for all goods – considering full use of preferences – at 3%.81 
 
In light of these challenges, and given the relevance of liberalizing EGS trade for the 
achievement of green economy and climate change objectives in the context of sustainable 
development, liberalization of certain environmental goods and services through other 
frameworks, such as regional or bilateral trade agreements, can be an option. One example is the 
liberalization of trade in environmental goods and services in the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) agreement, whose twenty-one countries82 aim to compile a list of 
environmental goods for tariff liberalization. In 2011, APEC leaders adopted the Honolulu 
Declaration, in which they outlined plans to develop a list of environmental goods that “directly 
and positively contribute to our green growth and sustainable development objectives”. Leaders 
had pledged to reduce the applied tariff rates on such products to five percent or less by the end 
of 2015 and to draw up a list of goods subject to these tariff cuts in 2012. While the Honolulu 
text includes references to environmental services, specifically with regard to other trade 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Ibid.  
82 Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua 
New Guinea, Peru, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, the US, and 
Vietnam. 
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concerns related to local content and government procurement, currently only goods are set to be 
liberalized.83 
 
However, the APEC initiative aims to liberalize EGS within their internal market, while the 
inclusion of these issues in agreements such as those analyzed here goes further, aiming to 
provide a window of opportunity for this issue to be addressed between two different parties – 
and also regions, as in the case of the Central America AA. While the provisions for 
liberalization of EGS are soft, not representing binding commitments or providing timetables, if 
these issues manage to move forward within the trade relationships provided for in these 
agreements, they could represent an important building block for the creation of a global market 
for EGS and an incentive for the transition to a greener, low carbon economy.  
 
b) Promotion of trade in sustainable agriculture: The growth of the global market for 
sustainable agriculture also represents valuable opportunities for developing countries, as global 
trade in organic food, drinks, fiber and cosmetics is estimated to be valued at over US$60 billion 
per year. About one third of the world’s agricultural land (12.5 million hectares) and more than 
80% of producers are in developing countries and emerging markets, and demand for organic 
products is concentrated in North America and Europe, which account for 96% of global 
revenues.84 Thus, incentives for trade in these products can benefit developing countries’ 
producers while also promoting more sustainable practices in the producer countries. 
 
c) Liberalization in biodiversity-based products: Biodiversity-based businesses include 
biodiversity-friendly production of commodities (food, timber, fabrics) or the sustainable use of 
ecosystems (tourism, extractives, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals). These businesses are increasingly 
recognized as a means of providing incentives for the sustainable management of biodiversity, 
while simultaneously creating employment opportunities and livelihoods. The demand for many 
biodiversity-based products such as natural cosmetics, medicines, food and food ingredients has 
grown signiﬁcantly and shows considerable potential for further growth. Consequently, proﬁts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/134813/.  
84 UNEP, ITC and ICTSD, Trade and Environment Briefings: Trade and Green Economy; ICTSD Programme on 
Global Economic Policy and institutions; Policy Brief No. 1; International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development, Geneva, Switzerland, 2012. 
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from these developments can be signiﬁcant: for example, the value of anti-cancer agents derived 
from marine organisms was estimated as being worth up to US$1 billion in 2006.85 
 
d) Sustainable ﬁsheries: While several reports have documented the losses in the ﬁsheries 
sector mainly due to overﬁshing, many others show the potential gains from a transition to 
sustainably managed ﬁsh stocks: the world economy could gain up to US$50 billion every year 
by restoring stocks and reducing ﬁshing capacity to an optimal level.86 
 
e) Certiﬁed timber: The expansion of the market for certiﬁed wood, driven mostly by demand 
in the United States and the European Union, creates export opportunities for many developing 
countries. Certiﬁcation such as Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), the Programme for the 
Endorsement of Forest Certiﬁcation Scheme (PEFC), and the Rainforest Alliance have helped to 
created a reliable market for these products, and by 2009, the global area of certiﬁed forest 
endorsed by FSC and PEFC amounted to 325.2 million hectares, approximately 8% of global 
forest area, and can contribute to the sustainable use of natural resources.87  
 
f) Private trade-related sustainability schemes also offer possibilities for growth and 
sustainable development. The case of ‘fair trade’ products, as one of the several types of 
certification and labeling schemes cited in the agreements analyzed, is perhaps the most 
relevant. Fair trade represents a promising opportunity for poor populations to achieve more 
sustainable economic development. Evidence indicates that poor producers and communities 
have experienced significant social and economic benefits resulting from their involvement in 
fair trade programs.88 Fair trade allows producers to receive higher prices for good quality and 
ethically-made products than they would have otherwise, and also an additional amount known 
as the ‘fair trade premium’, a sum of money paid on top of the agreed price for investment in 
social, environmental or economic development projects, decided upon by producers 
themselves. These additional funds have compounding effects in reducing poverty, as benefits 
extend not only to producers but often to their families and wider communities as well. In this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid. 
88 E Fischer, Introduction: The Policy Trajectory of Fair Trade, Journal of International Development, 2009, 996; 
see also M Raynolds, One cup at a time: poverty alleviation and fair trade coffee in Latin America, Fair Trade 
Research Group, Colorado State University, 2003,19–47.  
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way, fair trade initiatives offer producers and workers a market structure that is more conducive 
to sustainable practices. Furthermore, through being able to bypass traditional intermediaries, 
small-scale producer organizations are sometimes able to reap as much as 40% of the final 
purchase price.89 In addition, fair trade markets have become very attractive nowadays. Fair 
trade sales continue to grow worldwide, and in 2011 sales of Fair Trade International (FLO) 
certified goods, the main fair trade label worldwide, reached €4.9 billon. In the same year, 
producers belonging to the FLO Association received €65 million in fair trade premiums.90 The 
fair trade market is growing in objective terms and also outperforming other ethical (and non-
ethical) markets.91 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
The considerations undertaken in this section allow for the conclusion that the trade policy of the 
EU has gone through a significant evolution over the years. In what concerns the focus of the 
analysis, it is possible to observe an evolution in the development aspects of this policy, moving 
–at least to a certain extent- from a more politics oriented to a more principle based rationale 
(coming from history to principle, as one commentator has observed92). Promoting development 
has been a goal of the EU’s CCP from the outset, but the scope of this policy has come a long 
way from providing some trade preferences to its associated states and former territories – often 
with hidden political agendas- to being a tool to promote the overarching goals of the ‘external 
action’ of the Union.  
 
This shift has taken place not only alongside the overall evolution of the EU and its ever-
expanding policy goals, but also providing for adjustments needed in relation to conflicts with 
international law – as the trade disputes within the WTO exemplify. In any case, the EU has 
become much more engaged in shaping and supporting the implementation of the international 
development agenda, and the implications of this fact for the present study are reflected in its 
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The Future Foundaton (2011). 
92 L Bartels, ‘The trade and development policy of the EU’, op. cit. 
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aim to increasingly integrate non-trade issues into the CCP, such as the promotion of sustainable 
development.  
 
This integration has been analyzed here through two types of measures, the first of them being 
the development aspects of the GSP. This type of scheme, non-contractual and supported by the 
‘Enabling Clause’, is by nature a development instrument in its most traditional sense, allowing 
for the integration of non-reciprocal trade preferences for developing countries, thus supporting 
their economies in integrating into the world market. The EU GSP went beyond this, creating 
two specific schemes that aim to integrate sustainable development considerations. The 
implementation of these schemes has faced challenges, which have in fact been more related to 
procedural aspects than to the core of its objectives. At the same time, this core has also met 
with criticism, to the extent that the main requirement to benefit from the GSP+ is ratification 
and implementation of a series of international instruments related to socio-environmental 
objectives. While encouraging developing countries to sign and implement these instruments 
can certainly contribute to the promotion of sustainable development, the outcome of their 
application in the national contexts of beneficiary countries is hard to predict. In this regard, the 
practical impact of integrating sustainable development through the GSP, while promising in 
theory, is also ambiguous.  
 
The second type of instruments examined, the five recent trade agreements, offer an interesting 
perspective of a more comprehensive way to integrate sustainable development objectives into 
trade policy. While they may be criticized for several of their very broad issues – which could 
not be analyzed in their entirety due to length constraints in this study – as being counter-
productive to development, and serving several internal objectives of the EU apart from 
promoting sustainable development –such as market access, protection for investors and 
positioning the EU as a global leader- these agreements can also be considered to contribute to 
the integration of sustainable development. Firstly, they have been preceded by ex-ante impact 
assessment procedures aimed at anticipating effects on sustainability, informing decision makers 
and stakeholders, and proposing ways to mitigate negative outcomes. Another contribution of 
the SIA reports, perhaps overlooked but of great relevance in practice, is to underline that trade 
liberalization alone does not lead to sustainable development, highlighting this fact based on 
substantive studies of the specific context involved.  
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In relation to their substance, the agreements provide deep trade liberalization of goods, and at 
times also services, being Article XXIV compatible, thus providing for reciprocal concessions 
while also including SDT for developing countries in the form of phased commitments. 
Furthermore, they are WTO+ or/and WTO-extra agreements, dealing with non-trade issues that 
are also a part of the stalled Doha Round negotiations. In this regard, the agreements can be 
considered to be important building blocks for the international trade and development agenda.   
 
The most relevant aspect of the case study, though, has been its demonstration of the significant 
expansion in the breadth of scope of sustainable development measures included in the 
agreements analyzed, which went from being only cooperation measures supporting the 
achievement of sustainable development objectives, as in the case of the Chile AA, to more 
explicit trade related measures targeting specific issues that are considered as important to the 
sustainable development agenda. These measures include commitments to ratify, implement, 
and not derogate from applying various international socio-environmental instruments and 
principles, and not to use them as disguised protectionism. On this point, some of the 
considerations made regarding the GSP+ apply, even though in this case they are not imposed in 
a carrot and stick way but are negotiated. Furthermore, the agreements have shown the 
progressive inclusion of measures aiming to open negotiations of trade schemes benefiting 
strategic issues, such as EGS, renewable energy and fair trade labels.  Most of these measures 
are drafted in ‘soft’ language and represent open-ended obligations, but at the same time, 
introduce a much needed framework that is still lacking at the multilateral level and prevents 
these promising sectors from moving on in terms of creating international markets. A 
multilateral framework would still be important to ensure coherence and effectiveness in relation 
to the wider sphere, and national measures have important roles to play in assuring the 
implementation of these provisions. Nevertheless, these measures go well beyond the negative 
integration approach undertaken by the WTO to date, and have an important role to play in 
advancing green economy objectives in relation to the multilateral framework.  
 
Some more general observations can be made regarding the development cooperation policy. 
Despite the limited analysis undertaken, it is remarkable that from its outset three decades ago, 
development cooperation has become an independent policy that has made the EU, together with 
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its member states, the biggest donor of ODA in the world and thus has achieved significant 
relevance in the international sphere. The relevance of this policy relies on the fact that it 
provides a financial instrument to promote objectives of external relations without being tied to 
the specificities of trade policy, and the boundaries of WTO legality that this implies. The EU 
agenda of development cooperation is criticized as being a form of exporting the EU’s own 
values and policy goals to recipients, but at the same time it is possible to observe that these 
goals are often related to internationally agreed development goals. Even if it is true that the EU 
played a prominent role in defining the international development agenda itself, the 
contributions that the bloc can make in promoting this agenda should not be undermined. This 
has been the case with sustainable development, which has now become the ultimate goal of EU 
development policy.  
 
Criticism might also be leveled regarding the shortcomings of the development cooperation 
policy as regards the rhetoric of its legal framework. Firstly, regarding the target of committing 
0.7% GNI for ODA, the EU is still lagging behind. Total net ODA by all 27 EU member states 
was US$73.6 billion in 2011, representing 0.42% of their combined GNI, down from 0.44% in 
2010. Grants by EU Institutions totaled US$12.6 billion, representing a fall of 6.4% in real terms 
compared with 2010.93 At the same time, the EU kept its position as the largest donor in the 
world, representing around 50% of world ODA. Another issue that proves to be challenging is 
the commitment to achieve increasing levels of policy coherence – not only in the EU and 
member states, but also in EU policies. It may be observed that, as regards trade policy, the 
development cooperation policy has often been used as a supporting instrument to deliver on the 
development-related trade measures of the agreements analyzed. At the same time, as regards 
other policies that are considered to have significant adverse effects on developing countries, 
achieving coherence is a greater challenge. The most relevant example is the conflict of goals 
between development cooperation and issues related to the CAP, such as agricultural subsidies 
and the relative protectionism that still restricts market access in agricultural products -often 
among the main exports of developing countries- which might undermine the potential effect of 
aid, and are often portrayed as mere compensation. It seems that the EU is increasingly more 
conscious of this fact and is committed to tackle it, but the question remains as to whether 
politics and internal dynamics will allow this situation to change. 
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In sum, there has been a considerable level of integration of sustainable development into EU 
trade policy. While there may be much criticism regarding the ways in which this integration has 
taken place, the legal framework developed by the EU currently allows it to pursue policies and 
objectives which have the potential to make a valuable contribution to sustainable development 
goals, such as providing for more informed and participatory decision-making processes and 
fostering the transition to a green and low carbon economy.  
 
 
II - The trade (and development?) policy of MERCOSUR 
 
 
Despite not having a ‘trade and development’ policy as such, MERCOSUR has been an active 
player in the field of external relations, above in in developing trade relations with third parties. 
The bloc was created among the ‘spaghetti bowl’ of trade relations in Latin America, and in this 
regard, has always had an external dimension in the sense that it was considered as a first step of 
economic integration in the region. Furthermore, recent developments in trade instruments have 
expanded the scope of MERCOSUR’s CCP to include development focused measures, such as 
technical cooperation clauses included in FTAs negotiated with third parties, and a common 
GSP system towards developing countries, which might imply some potential for future 
developments of this policy – particularly in the sphere of South-South cooperation.   
 
1. Introduction: the framework of the MERCOSUR Common Commercial Policy 
 
The Treaty of Asunción declares, among its basic postulates, the goal of adopting a common 
trade policy for MERCOSUR. This principle was reaffirmed in Decision CMC 32/00, where the 
bloc reiterated the commitment of partner states to jointly negotiate trade agreements. 
MERCOSUR was formally deprived of legal personality from the time of its establishment in 
1991 until the signing of the Ouro Preto Protocol (POP) in 1994, in which Article 34 finally 
stated that the bloc should possess legal personality in international law. However, between 
1991 and 1994, MERCOSUR had already started to develop external trade relations and had a 
de facto foreign or trade policy, undertaking a pragmatic policy of international recognition and 
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initiated dialogue with the European Community and the United States at a very early stage.94 
With the introduction of the POP, MERCOSUR was granted the generic capacity of possessing 
(and maintaining) rights and duties under international law (Article 34) and of taking whatever 
action may be necessary to achieve its objectives -in particular, signing contracts, buying and 
selling personal and real property, appearing in court, holding funds and making transfers 
(Article 35). 
 
The POP did not make specific mention of the powers to negotiate and conclude agreements, to 
accede to conventions, to become a Member or observer of an international organization, to 
bring international claims or to send or receive diplomatic delegations, but MERCOSUR’s 
approach has been to exercise some of these specific competences under the argument of 
‘implied powers’ in line with its own objectives, purposes and functions as stated in its primary 
law. In order to avoid problems of lack of competence and due to the inter-governmental nature 
of MERCOSUR, all of the agreements signed by the bloc are in principle mixed agreements, 
i.e., signed by all MERCOSUR Member states, mentioning the bloc as a contracting party and 
obeying the domestic requirements of internalization. Regarding the format of agreements and 
the process of their negotiation, the primary law of MERCOSUR does not establish any standard 
procedures. 
 
Furthermore, the primary law does not establish general rules concerning the external 
representation of the bloc. In general, the main actor of MERCOSUR’s external policy is the 
Council of the Common Market (CCM), with responsibility for the political leadership of the 
integration process and composed of the Foreign and Economic Ministers of the member states. 
The POP expressly attributes to the CCM the legal personality of MERCOSUR (Article 8 III) 
and the power to negotiate and sign agreements with other countries, groups of countries and 
international organizations (Article 8 IV). These last functions, however, may be delegated, by 
express mandate, to the Common Market Group (CMG), the executive and technical organ of 
the bloc, coordinated by the Ministries of Foreign Relations and Economy and the Presidents of 
the Central Banks (Article 8 IV). It is evident that, due to the lack of supranationality in the bloc 
and the decisive role exercised by the individual Ministries of Foreign Affairs through the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 M Franca Filho, MERCOSUR External Relations, in L Lixinski et all, ‘The Law of MERCOSUR’, Hart, 2010. 
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coordination of all organs with decision-making power, in practice, the external relations 
function of MERCOSUR remains under the control of the individual member states.95  
 
Delegation from the CCM to the CMG has taken place frequently over the years and has played 
an important role in MERCOSUR’s external policy. According to Article 14 VII of the POP, the 
CMG can negotiate agreements on behalf of MERCOSUR, but only with the participation of 
representatives of all member states and within the limits laid down in the special mandate 
granted for that purpose. When so authorized and mandated by the CCM, the CMG may also 
sign those agreements on behalf of MERCOSUR and/or delegate all those powers to the 
MERCOSUR Trade Commission (Art 14 VII of the Ouro Preto Protocol). In 1995, with 
Resolution 34/95, the CMG created the Ad Hoc Group on External Relations, whose specific 
objective has been the discussion of MERCOSUR's external relations with third party countries, 
groups of countries and international agencies. The importance of this Ad Hoc Group was 
reaffirmed through Decision 59/00. In addition to those functions that can be delegated by the 
CMG, the Trade Commission also has other relevant roles relating to the bloc's external 
relations: in general terms, the body is responsible for following up and reviewing questions and 
issues relating to common trade policies, intra-MERCOSUR trade and commerce with third 
party countries (POP Article 16). 
 
The Commission of Permanent Representatives of MERCOSUR constitutes another important 
organ with representative functions in the bloc’s external relations. Officially, the main function 
of this Commission is to submit to the Common Market Council new initiatives relating to the 
development of the external negotiations and the empowerment of the process of regional 
integration (Article 4 b of the Decision CMC 11/03). In reference to MERCOSUR’s external 
relations, the Chairman of the Commission of Permanent Representatives has been the most 
visible face and main voice of the external policies, given that he acts as the contact person for 
the international dialogue on political and commercial matters – comparable with the European 
High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).96 Article 5 of the 
Decision CMC 11/03 states that the President of the Commission of Permanent Representatives 
of MERCOSUR, when mandated by the Council, may represent the block in relations with third 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 D Ventura, Las Asimetrías entre el MERCOSUR y la Unión Europea: Los Desafíos de una Asociación 
Interregional, Montevidéo, Fundación Konrad-Adenauer, 2005, at 154. 
96 Ibid at155. 
Chapter	  5	  
	  
	  
269	  
countries, groups of countries and international organizations. Due to the pro tempore nature of 
the MERCOSUR presidency, with changes every six months, the presence of a permanent 
negotiator (i. e. with a two year fixed appointment) could have a very positive influence by 
providing continuity in lengthy and complex negotiations.  
 
Based on this framework, MERCOSUR nowadays has an extensive list of external trade 
relations, as discussed below. The most important negotiation underway, the EU-MERCOSUR 
Association Agreement, however, will be discussed more deeply in Chapter 6.  
 
2. MERCOSUR external relations: an embryonic development component? 
 
2.1 Relations of MERCOSUR with other economic blocs or international organizations 
 
MERCOSUR is currently at several different stages in its relations with other organizations: 
agreements already signed; agreements signed but in part pending for additional negotiations; 
negotiations ongoing; negotiations yet to be initiated based on framework agreements already 
signed; dialogue processes practiced with some regularity; dialogue processes more vague in 
nature; and finally, proposals for the opening of new negotiation processes, not yet answered by 
MERCOSUR.97  
 
On 16th December 2004, following a previous framework agreement towards the creation of a 
free trade area between MERCOSUR and South Africa, the South American bloc and the 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU) – composed of the Republic of Botswana, the 
Kingdom of Lesotho, the Republic of Namibia, the Republic of South Africa and the Kingdom 
of Swaziland – signed a preferential trade agreement as a first step toward the creation of a free 
trade area. The PTA contains a main text and five annexes, which create a legal basis to govern 
SACU and MERCOSUR trade relations. In April 2008 in Buenos Aires, Argentina, both parties 
concluded a final round of negotiations and decided that a free trade agreement will replace the 
agreement signed in December 2004 in Belo Horizonte, Brazil.98 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 EHF Araújo, O Mercosul: Negociações Extra-Regionais (Brasília, Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2008) 66. 
98 All agreements and trade documents can be found on the MERCOSUR website (www.MERCOSUR.int), 
ALADI’s website (www.aladi.org) or in the Foreign Trade Information System (www.sice.oas.org) created and 
maintained by the Organization of American States. 
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Other agreements of this nature that can be cited are: a Framework Agreement on Economic 
Cooperation signed between the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (CCG)99 
and MERCOSUR in May 2005, at the South America-Arab countries Summit held in Brasilia, 
Brazil. Further, MERCOSUR and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), composed of 
Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway and Switzerland, signed a Declaration on Trade and Investment 
Cooperation and Action Plan, recognized as a first step towards a free trade agreement, in order 
to enhance economic relations, in particular concerning trade in goods and services, as well as 
investments. MERCOSUR has also initiated trade talks with the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),100 the Australia-New 
Zealand Closer Economic Relationship Treaty Agreement,101 the Community of Portuguese 
Language Countries (CPLP)102 and the Central American Integration System (SICA).103 
 
Regarding international organizations, MERCOSUR as such is not yet a formal member or 
officially recognized observer of any international organization. Nevertheless, there have been 
many occasions when the Member states of the bloc have had common positions on issues 
before multilateral bodies such as World Trade Organization, International Labour Organisation, 
International Telecommunications Union, World Customs Organisation and Universal Postal 
Union. On the other hand, MERCOSUR maintains some specific accords of cooperation with 
entities like the FAO, the Inter-American Development Bank, UNESCO and the Organization of 
the Convenio Andrés Bello.104 
 
2.2 Relations of MERCOSUR and ALADI member states 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 The GCC is made up of the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the 
Sultanate of Oman, Qatar and Kuwait.  
100 A memorandum of understanding signed in August 2007, creating a mechanism for dialogue on ASEAN-
MERCOSUR trade issues. The ASEAN members are Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 
Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. 
101 A dialogue process started in 1994 relating to trade topics and other common interests. 
102 The CPLP is formed by Portugal, Brazil, East Timor, Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and 
São Tomé and Príncipe. A proposal to negotiate a free trade agreement made by MERCOSUR in July 2004 has, 
until now, only received positive responses from São Tome and Príncipe and Cape Verde. 
103 In October 2004 MERCOSUR initiated formal contact with the Central American Integration System (SICA), 
made up of Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama. In February 2005, it 
launched a Joint Declaration recognizing the initial steps taken towards integration. 
104 The Organization of the Convenio Andrés Bello is an international organization with headquarters in Bogotá, 
Colombia, which since 1970 has worked in processes of educational, scientific, technological and cultural 
integration in Ibero America. 
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The ALADI was created in 1980 around the general principles of pluralism and flexibility in the 
political and economic convergence towards the formation of a future Latin American common 
market. These principles have allowed the signature of multiple forms of trade instruments, 
generally called Acuerdos de Complementación Económica (Economic Complementation 
Agreements, or simply ACE). Under the ALADI umbrella, up to this point, MERCOSUR has 
signed eight ACE, with the following partners:  
 
(i) Chile (ACE-35), signed on 25th June 1996 in Potrero de los Funes, Argentina. The agreement 
aims at the establishment, in the near future, of a free trade zone between the parties. The 
process of reducing tariffs is currently at an advanced stage. The text of the agreement is 
supplemented by a number of additional protocols, and entered into force on 1st October 1996. 
 
(ii) Bolivia (ACE-36), signed on 17th December 1996 in Fortaleza, Brazil, and entered into force 
on 28th February 1997. This is another free trade agreement with a fixed timetable and lists of 
some exceptions. 
 
(iii) Mexico (ACE-54 and ACE-55). The ACE-54 is a framework agreement that establishes a 
legal basis for trade relations between Mexico and the Member states of MERCOSUR and aims 
to lay out the groundwork for a possible free trade area in the future. It was signed during the 
MERCOSUR Presidential Summit that took place on 5th July 2002 in Buenos Aires, Argentina, 
and came into force on 5th January 2006. On the other hand, the ACE-55, signed on 27th 
September 2002 in Montevideo, Uruguay, establishes a mutual reduction of import duties 
exclusively on products of the automotive sector (bilateral import quotas for tariff-free entry of 
automobiles). The agreement entered into force on 1st January 2003. 
 
(iv) Members of the Andean Community (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru) (ACE-56, 
ACE-58 and ACE-59). These three agreements were signed on 6th December 2002, 30th 
November 2005 and 18th October 2004 respectively, and establish a free trade arrangement with 
special timing and some lists of exceptions in trade liberalization. 
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(v) Cuba (ACE-62), signed in July 2006. The Agreement consolidated as multilateral the 
preferred nation status negotiated in the four bilateral agreements between MERCOSUR 
member states and Cuba. 
 
All of these negotiations have variable geometry and constitute, firstly, a deepening of an 
existing integration process -the ALADI- with arrangements based on history and models known 
to the parties. Secondly, these trade talks are -or may be- part of the MERCOSUR efforts 
towards expansion.105 
 
2.3 Relations of MERCOSUR and non-ALADI member states 
 
i) Framework Agreements 
 
A framework agreement was signed between MERCOSUR and India on 17th June 2003, aiming 
above all to create conditions and mechanisms for increasing trade (specifically by the mutual 
granting of tariff preferences) and, in a second stage, to negotiate a free trade area between the 
two parties. As a follow-up to the framework agreement, a Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) 
was signed in January 2004, aiming to grant reciprocal fixed tariff preferences and also to 
consolidate a political relationship. Closer ties between MERCOSUR and India would arguably 
bring indirect political benefits, for instance, fostering the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue 
Forum  (IBSA). 
 
In November 2004, MERCOSUR signed a framework trade agreement with the Kingdom of 
Morocco, aiming to establish conditions for the negotiation of a free trade agreement. The first 
round of negotiations was held in Rabat, Morocco, on 11th April 2008.  
 
Beyond these agreements, MERCOSUR also has initiated exploratory dialogues with Panama, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Singapore, Dominican Republic, Russia, Jordan, Turkey, 
Lebanon, Iran, South Korea, China, Japan, United States and Canada. MERCOSUR has been a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 EHF Araújo, O Mercosul: Negociações Extra-Regionais (Brasília, Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2008) 239. 
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key player in initiating these processes, a clear indicator of the pro-activity of the bloc in terms 
of external relations.106 
 
ii) Free Trade Agreements  
 
As part of the South American efforts towards deepening of South-South diplomacy, 
MERCOSUR has also signed trade agreements with India, Egypt, Morocco, Israel and Pakistan 
in recent years.107 These extra-regional negotiations have contributed to diversify and expand 
trade opportunities, reinforce the capacity to attract international investments and strengthen 
economic and political relations with non-traditional partners of the South American bloc.108 
 
FTA with Israel 
 
Negotiations for the MERCOSUR-Israel FTA began in 2005 when a framework agreement was 
signed, and were completed in 2007, creating the first FTA between MERCOSUR and a partner 
outside the region. The FTA, which is already in force, primarily focuses on trade in goods, 
providing a scaled program of tariff reductions in the following categories, which are called 
‘baskets’: basket A - immediate; basket B - four years; basket C - eight years; basket D - 10 
years; and basket E - preferred quotas or margins. These baskets have since then become a 
pattern for the further FTAs of the bloc. In addition to the goods section, the agreement has 
chapters dealing with: rules of origin, based on WTO rules on this matter; safeguards; technical 
regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures; sanitary and phytosanitary 
standards; technical and technological cooperation; countervailing duties; customs cooperation, 
and dispute settlement, establishing a forum choice clause between the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Body and the MERCOSUR-Israel FTA.  
 
Despite the estimated low economic impact of this agreement, its relevance relates to the fact 
that it is the first trade agreement of this nature outside of South America.  In this regard, it 
represents a valuable precedent for MERCOSUR member states, enhancing the bloc’s EP 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 M Franca Filho, op. cit. 
107 For an economic analysis of these agreements, see E. Guimarães, ‘Acordos do Mercosul com terceiros países’, 
Textos para Discussão CEPAL-IPEA, 23,CEPAL. Escritório no Brasil/IPEA, 2010.  
108 M. Franca Filho, op. cit. 
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external relations seeking new markets and reallocating its negotiations with third countries 
outside the region. At the same time, as the agreement is still recent and its liberalization will 
only be completed in 2018, it is still too early to evaluate its real impact.109  
 
FTA with Egypt 
 
The second FTA signed by MERCOSUR was completed with Egypt in 2010. It is mainly a trade 
agreement, which aims at opening markets for goods, with an evolutionary clause on possible 
future negotiations on market access to services and investments, and follows the progressive 
tariff reduction scale used with Israel, with products divided in 4 groups: basket A - immediate; 
basket B - four years; basket C - eight years; basket D - 10 years; and basket E - preferred quotas 
or margins to be renegotiated once the FTA comes into force. Interestingly, Egypt’s offer to 
MERCOSUR covers 97% of tariff items in baskets A to D, among which 46% are in A or B, 
while MERCOSUR’s offer covers 99% of tariff items in baskets A to D, with 32% in A or B; it 
is thus a quite comprehensive agreement, achieving a deep level of free trade among the parties. 
Access to the text of the Agreement was not possible to verify any form of cooperation provided 
among the parties.  
 
FTA with Palestine 
 
The MERCOSUR-Palestine Free Trade Agreement was signed on 20th December 2011, 
concluding the negotiation started with the signature of the Framework Agreement on Trade and 
Economic Cooperation in December 2010. The instrument signed with Palestine reaffirms the 
MERCOSUR countries’ willingness to enhance their relationship with partners in the Middle 
East and in the Arab World – together with the Israel and Egypt FTAs. This FTA aims to open 
markets for goods, also with an evolutionary clause on possible future negotiations on market 
access to services and investments. It is divided into chapters, one of which concerns trade in 
goods: this also includes ‘baskets’ for duty elimination divided into eight categories: basket A - 
immediate; basket B - four years; basket C - eight years; basket D - 10 years; and basket E - 
preferred quotas or margins. In Basket A, MERCOSUR offered products that Palestine is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 A Dreyzin de Klor, ‘MERCOSUR: en movimiento?’, in A. Dreyzin de Klor and C. Harrington (Eds.), El 
derecho en movimiento: en homenaje a Elena Highton, Rubinzal – Culzoni, 2012. 
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interested in exporting, such as olive oil, food products, stones and marble. Other chapters 
include: rules of origin; bilateral safeguards; technical regulations, standards and conformity 
assessment procedures; sanitary and phytosanitary measures; technical and technological 
cooperation; institutional provisions and dispute settlements. In addition, the Agreement 
expresses support from MERCOSUR Member states for the establishment of an independent 
and democratic Palestinian State, geographically contiguous and economically viable, that may 
co-exist in peace and harmony with its neighbors, having thus a political element also.110 
 
2.4 MERCOSUR in the GSTP 
 
Another recent development which is significant within MERCOSUR’s trade policy is the 
decision to enter the GSTP as a bloc and a joint commitment has been made recently under the 
CET in the context of the Sao Paulo Round. The bloc joined the GSTP as a bloc in 2006, being 
the first regional actor to do so. The Round was launched in 2004 on the occasion of the 
quadrennial conference of UNCTAD (‘UNCTAD XI’) in São Paulo, Brazil. After years of 
negotiations, the parameters of the tariff-cutting formula were agreed at a ministerial meeting 
held in Geneva in December 2009, consisting of reducing applied tariffs by 20% on at least 70% 
of dutiable products, thereby combining effective tariff cuts (as tariffs are cut from applied rates, 
rather than WTO bound rates) with policy space and flexibilities. The modalities provided for 
some differential and more favorable treatment, including for those in the process of WTO 
accession. The Round was concluded at a ministerial meeting in December 2010 in Foz do 
Iguaçu, Brazil, and the resulting tariff concessions have broadened product coverage to 47,000 
tariff lines (2), compared to some 650 products included in the previous two rounds.  
 
Of the forty-three GSTP members, twenty-two participated in the São Paulo Round, and eleven 
agreed on tariff concessions, signing a Protocol concluding the Round. These countries are: 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay (together forming MERCOSUR), the Republic of 
Korea, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Egypt, Morocco and Cuba.  Some of the remaining eleven 
countries are also expected to join the Protocol at a later date. The changes will enter into force 
with the ratification of at least four countries. As of June 2011, India and Malaysia have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/sa http://ictsd.org/i/news/tni/113063/la-de-imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/acordo-de-
livre-comercio-mercosul-palestina-montevideu-20-de-dezembro-de-2011. 
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completed the ratification procedures. Beyond tariff concessions, GSTP participants will also 
further examine the possibility of modifying the existing GSTP rules of origin that are based on 
value-added methods (i.e. the requirement that foreign contents of a product should not exceed 
50% of its value), including the option of complementing them with other origin determination 
methods, such as the ‘change in tariff heading’ method. 
 
The GSTP is considered as a significant contribution for its beneficiaries. Collectively, the 43 
GSTP economies represented a market of US$9 trillion in 2009, having grown at a rate of 5.5% 
during the 2000s (nearly twice the world average), and some are among the most dynamic 
emerging economies. These economies generated an import demand of about US$2.2 trillion in 
2009, or nearly 20% of total world imports. Imports by the eleven countries signing to the São 
Paulo Round results alone were around US$1 trillion, of which 10 percent was intra-group trade. 
UNCTAD’s estimates find that, despite the reduced number of countries exchanging tariff 
concessions, the São Paulo Round results will have a significant positive welfare effect. Eleven 
participants will see welfare gains of US$2.5 billion with associated increases in exports and 
employment, and these gains could be further increased to US$5.8 billion if all countries that 
participated in the Round undertake tariff reduction. LDCs did not participate in the Round, but 
in the future, GSTP could provide an important trade opportunity for them.111 
 
3. Concluding Remarks 
 
The trade policy of MERCOSUR has expanded over the past decades, which might seem 
surprising, as the bloc has been facing general overarching obstacles to progress. The analysis 
above shows that the MERCOSUR CCP policy has followed the pragmatic approach that 
characterizes the actions of the bloc, as it had started to develop external relations with the aim 
of establishing trade partnerships even before it had the necessary legal frameworks to do so. 
Several features can be highlighted in this regard, such as a lack of unified selection criteria to 
guide the approach to individual countries or regions, objectives and methodology in 
negotiations with varying arrangements, and of explanation of the reasons for the choices of 
different formats (fixed preferences, free trade areas or broader cooperation agreements). 
Furthermore, the agenda of MERCOSUR’s trade relations seems to indicate a progressive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Source: ICTSD, http://ictsd.org/i/news/tni/113063/.  
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increase in actors’ isolated initiatives, such as the momentum of each Presidency Pro Tempore 
(PPT) for MERCOSUR member states, as in the case of the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives of MERCOSUR (CPMR) organizing joint trade missions, among others.112 
 
In addition, this policy has focused more on the economic spheres of development: opening 
markets for economic growth, providing SDT for weaker parties and some forms of cooperation 
-above all technical cooperation- in addition to an embryonic GSP system. It is interesting to 
note, at the same time, some similarities with the EU ‘trade and development’ policies in its 
origins. Firstly, MEROCOSUR trade relations principally focus on maintaining a level of trade 
relationships with its neighboring countries, as is the case with the ACEs signed with other 
ALADI members. Secondly, some of the trade agreements signed to date have a strong political 
component, as is the case with those signed with Israel, Egypt and Palestine. These countries are 
clearly not among MERCOSUR’s major trading partners, but political reasons might help to 
justify the signature of these agreements, such as enhancing presence and opening markets in the 
Middle East and Muslim regions – a major interest for Brazil. Similar reasoning was found with 
regard to the EU’s relations with associate and overseas territories, although the political 
background was different in that case. Furthermore, these agreements occasionally provide for 
SDT for the counterparties, in the form of phased liberalization schemes – a form of 
development-related trade measure that is also WTO-compatible. Thirdly, as the bloc moves 
forward, and the economies of its member states become more developed, the creation of a 
system of preferences for least developed countries is an opportunity to incentivize trade and 
development, and potentially allows for the promotion of specific regulatory objectives, 
provided that is done on a non-discriminatory basis. Finally, some form of development 
cooperation has slowly started to appear as an accompanying measure to trade agreements. 
 
Thus, the EU CCP could provide inspiration for MERCOSUR, in the sense that in order to 
become a development instrument, apart from just providing trade liberalization and SDT to 
chosen partners, a specific development mandate must back these policies, incentivizing the 
creation of measures that promote other specific objectives in addition to that of liberalization. 
Linking trade policy to sustainable development might prove beneficial not in the sense of 
imposing one bloc’s particular regulatory frameworks or policy objectives onto its trade 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 A. Dreyzin de Klor, ‘MERCOSUR: en movimiento?’, op. cit.   
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partners, but actually to use the power of trade, and the more specific regional legal frameworks, 
to provide windows of opportunity to promote and support the transition to a greener, low 
carbon economy, which is a fundamental objective for sustainable development.  
 
If regional integration agreements are going to be supportive of this goal, their legal and 
regulatory systems must pave the way for the construction of regional frameworks, as a first 
stage, leading to a global system of markets that provide economic growth opportunities while 
supporting social justice and environmental protection. Creating policies based on principles and 
not just on politics is the fundamental challenge to be overcome in this regard. 
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Chapter 6. The relationship of the European Union with MERCOSUR: regional integration 
and sustainable development, or unsustainable rhetoric? 
 
This concluding chapter aims to present an extended case study of the implementation of 
sustainable development in regional integration agreements. Taking stock of the discussions in 
the previous chapters, it undertakes an analysis of how the relationship between the EU and 
MERCOSUR has been encompassing sustainable development, both in cooperation and trade 
instruments. Furthermore, the analysis addresses the political issues that circumvent the 
relationship between the parties, and whether this bi-regional relationship might indicate that the 
EU’s interregionalist approach has been supportive of this process. Taking these points into 
consideration, a historical overview of the evolution of the relationship between the EU and 
MERCOSUR and the context in which it is embedded is presented, followed by an examination 
of the negotiations of an association agreement between them.  
 
These two blocs are among the most advanced projects of integration in force, and while the EU 
represents a far more mature and comprehensive example, the similarities in their scope and 
objectives have allowed their relationship to be, at the same time, focused on trade and market 
access, as well as on cooperation and institutional development, with particular focus on 
expanding the EU’s regional approach. In this regard, concluding this agreement was for some 
time a high priority for the EU, but the negotiation has not yet come to an end. The discussion 
presented is based on the current framework agreement that provides a basis for the relationship 
between the blocs, and also the SIA carried out by the EU Commission and the ‘Regional 
Strategy Paper’ 2007-2013. This allows for discussion of the likely format that the agreement 
would have, and how sustainable development could be integrated in this context. 
 
1. Introduction: contextualizing the subject matter 
 
The EU pursues several goals through its external relations, not only in relation to the 
achievement of its internal objectives, but also to promoting its values in the international sphere, 
shaping international relations according to its vision, and strengthening its position as a relevant 
global player. During the 1990s and 2000s, there was increasing emphasis placed on 
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interregionalism as a foundation for EU’s external relations. The Commission, which has clearly 
acknowledged its support for other integration projects around the world, emphasizes the link 
between regional integration and development. The EU supports multilateral trade liberalization 
as key to promote sustainable development and equality in the world, and one crucial component 
is to integrate developing countries into the world economy. Furthermore, regional integration 
has become one of the six focal areas through which the EU promotes development around the 
world, together with support for trade and development; macroeconomic policies and promotion 
of access to social services; transport; food security and sustainable rural development; and 
institutional capacity building. Regional integration thus plays a double role for the EU: it helps 
to spread the EU’s own values within the international scenario, and helps to create entities with 
which it can interact as regions, supporting and legitimizing its identity as a global actor, as well 
as strengthening the legitimacy of other regional actors. The ‘interregional policy’ does not 
consist of a set of guidelines, but is rather subject to adaptation according to the partner, being 
multifaceted and comprehensive in nature. Furthermore, different issues and themes receive 
varying degrees of attention in different regions, including trade, development cooperation, 
political dialogue, security and culture. This differentiation also implies the relative power of the 
partner regarding the EU, as the stronger the partner is, the more concession is given.1 
 
Such is the case of the EU relations with MERCOSUR, which date back to the very early years 
of the South American bloc, and should be analyzed within two important contextual issues: the 
EU’s interregionalist approach, and the more general relationship of the EU with Latin America. 
These two regions are strongly linked, not only from a historical perspective - taking into account 
the colonial past and the shared cultural heritage that resulted from it - but also considering their 
current relations in terms of trade, investment, cooperation and political dialogue on different 
issues; in addition, on both sides of the Atlantic the period after WWII witnessed different 
experiences of regional integration. In this regard, the European initiative is considered to be the 
most successful model of integration to date, and similar initiatives that emerged in Latin 
America have always had the EU as a benchmark. Moreover, given these similarities and links, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 F Söderbaum et al, ‘The EU as a Global Actor and the dynamics of Interregionalism: a comparative analysis’, in F 
Söderbaum et al, The EU as a global player: the politics of interregionalism (Routledge 2006); the author notes that 
interregionalism, or the establishment of relations between regions, is one of the main trends in EU foreign relations 
nowadays, through which it seeks to incentivize the creation of other projects of integration which resemble its own, 
thus helping to shape an international scenario in which regions are recognized actors. 
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Europe has seen in Latin America a region with the potential to develop regional integration 
projects that resemble its own.2 Furthermore, the relations of the EU with Latin America exist 
amid a ‘spaghetti bowl’ of trade agreements in the continent and a complex net of different policy 
strategies: several EU member states have historical relations with MERCOSUR member states 
and with MERCOSUR itself; on the EU level, the bloc also has relations with MERCOSUR 
member states,3 a general strategy towards the whole of Latin America4 and finally a strategy 
specifically targeting MERCOSUR, which will be the object of the analysis here.  
 
2. Background and framework of the relationship of the EU with MERCOSUR 
 
When MERCOSUR was created, the EU was considered a benchmark, even though its goals as a 
project were less ambitious compared with the European counterpart, being based on 
intergovernmental institutions instead of a supranational structure.5 Despite the institutional 
differences, the EU saw potential in MERCOSUR to be modeled after its own image,6 and as 
early as 1992, even before MERCOSUR had completed its institutional setting and acquired legal 
personality,7 the parties signed an Inter-institutional Cooperation Agreement through which the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 R Seidelmann, ‘EU-Latin American biregionalism as object and subject of global change’, in W. Grabendorff and 
R. Seidelmann, Relations between the European Union and Latin America : biregionalism in a changing global 
system (Nomos 2005). 
3 Such is the case with Brazil, for instance, which was declared as a strategic partner in the region in the II Summit 
Brazil  - EU in December 2008. See ‘Brazil – European Union strategic partnership and joint action plan’ available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/brazil/index_en.htm. The partnership has mainly a political symbolism, but 
“places Brazil, the MERCOSUR region and South America high on the EU’s political map” and among the central 
topics are multilateralism, climate change, sustainable energy, the fight against poverty, MERCOSUR’s integration 
process and Latin America’s stability and prosperity.  
4 EU - LA Strategy paper 2007-13, in which the main objectives are to promote regional integration and negotiations 
to establish Association Agreements with sub-regions in Latin America, steer development cooperation towards the 
reduction of poverty and social inequality and improve educational levels.  
5 MERCOSUR was established through the Treaty of Asunción in 1991 between Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and 
Paraguay, aiming to create a common market, an ambitious agenda that resulted from the momentum the region was 
going through at that point, with the reestablishment of democracy after decades of dictatorship regimes and new 
policies of openness to the external market.  Nevertheless, it followed an intergovernmental model, being given 
institutions that represent the interest of member states. See, in this regard, J. Grugel, 'Citizenship and governance in 
Mercosur: arguments for a social agenda', Third World Quarterly, 2005, 26: 7, 1061 – 1076. 
6 S. Santander ‘The European Partnership with MERCOSUR: a relationship based on strategic and neo-liberal 
principles’ in Söderbaum et al (1 above).   
7 The Asunción Treaty is a framework agreement which established the objectives and institutional structures of the 
bloc; the actual functioning of the institutions and activities was determined through subsequent protocols, the most 
important of them being the ‘Ouro Preto Protocol’ of 1994, which officially created the institutional bodies and 
allowed MERCOSUR to sign agreements and thus to pursue external relations, even though it had a pragmatic 
approach on the issue from the beginning. See, in this regard, M. Toscano Franca Filho, ‘MERCOSUR External 
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EC committed to provide technical assistance, training for personnel and institutional support for 
the newly created bloc.8 Three years later, after MERCOSUR had established its institutional 
framework, an Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement (IFCA)9 was signed, with the 
ambitious plan of establishing “a political and economic interregional association founded on 
greater political cooperation and progressive and reciprocal liberalization of all trade”.   
 
The Agreement was founded on three main pillars: the first one was the establishment of an 
official framework for political dialogue, creating a ‘Cooperation Council’, responsible for the 
implementation of decisions and formed by members of the Council and the Commission on the 
EU side and of the Common Market Group and Council on the MERCOSUR side (Article 25). 
The dialogue was also considered in a ‘Joint Declaration on political dialogue between the 
European Union and MERCOSUR’ annexed to the main agreement, in which the influence of 
sustainable development as a goal and guiding principle stands out: the preamble stated that the 
parties shared “an interest in regional integration as a means of enabling their citizens to achieve 
sustainable and harmonious development predicated upon social progress and solidarity between 
their members” (6th recital); this was reinforced among the objectives, in which they reaffirmed 
that “regional integration is one means of achieving sustainable and socially harmonious 
development, and a tool for ensuring competitiveness in the world economy”.  
 
The second pillar was concerned with the trade relations between the two blocs, which should 
guide the preparation for the future association agreement, forging “closer relations with the aim 
of encouraging the increase and diversification of trade, preparing for subsequent gradual and 
reciprocal liberalization of trade and promoting conditions which are conducive to the 
establishment of the Interregional Association, taking into account, in conformity with WTO 
rules, the sensitivity of certain goods”. The text of the agreement determined cooperation in trade 
matters and the start of negotiations, but didn’t include any binding obligations – it was rather an 
obligation of means, not of results, fixing no timetable for its conclusion.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Relations’ in L Lixinski M Toscano Franca Filho, and M.B. Olmos Giupponi (eds.), The Law of MERCOSUR, Hart 
Publishing, 2010. 
8  Interinstitutional Cooperation Agreement, 29th of May 1992. 
9 Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and its Member states and 
MERCOSUR and its Party States, 15th of December 1995, Official Journal of the European Union L 069, 
19/03/1996. Technically, it was a mixed agreement on both sides: EU: legal base: Article 133, 181, 310, TEC; 
MERCOSUR: 8 ‘Ouro Preto Protocol’. 
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Finally, the third chapter established an official channel for cooperation, which should be “as 
wide as possible” in order “to help [the parties] to expand their economies, increase their 
international competitiveness, foster technical and scientific development, improve their 
standards of living, establish conditions conducive to job creation and job quality and diversify 
and strengthen economic links between them”, and “encourage the conferring of a regional 
character on any aspect of cooperation which, by virtue of its scope or economies of scale, 
results in what they consider to be a more rational and efficient use of available resources and a 
better outcome” (Article 10). Cooperation was provided in several areas, including institutional 
and technical assistance for the integration project itself. In addition, Article 17 stated that “with 
the aim of achieving sustainable development, the Parties shall encourage awareness of the 
issues of environmental protection and the rational use of natural resources in all fields of 
interregional cooperation”.  
 
The EU policy vis-à-vis MERCOSUR nowadays is based on the IFCA and carried out through 
‘Regional Strategy Papers’ (RSP) prepared by DG RELEX, whose programs are funded by the 
‘Development Cooperation Instrument’, thus falling under the ‘development cooperation policy’. 
The current RSP covers the period 2007 – 2013,10 having as its main goal the preparation for the 
future association agreement. In this regard, three main priority areas have been determined: 
firstly, providing support for MERCOSUR institutionalization, establishing cooperation measures 
to improve decision-making processes and internalization of rules in member states; secondly, 
support for the deepening of integration, aiming to foster measures to create better conditions for 
the final implementation of the common market provisions, which in turn would support the 
implementation of the future association agreement; finally, the third priority is to strengthen 
civil society participation, knowledge of the regional integration process, mutual understanding 
and mutual visibility, not only enhancing civil society understanding of MERCOSUR, but also of 
the EU as a trade partner, political actor and model of regional integration - which could “create 
aspirations to emulate and imitate the EU”.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 This is the second RSP after the IFCA entered into force in 1999; the first covered the period 2000 – 2006. 
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While the negotiations of the association agreement have not been concluded, some progress has 
been achieved. The political cooperation chapter has been active through the organization of 
summits at Heads of State, Ministerial and Senior Official levels, in the framework of the 
European and Latin American Summits,11 in which the EU and MERCOSUR gather in separate 
sessions. The VI EU-LAC Summit of Heads of State and Government took place in Madrid, 
Spain in May 2010, having as its central theme ‘Towards a new phase of the bi-regional 
association: innovation and technology for sustainable development and social inclusion’, and the 
EU’s contribution to the Summit is primarily based on the 2009 Commission Communication on 
Latin America, ‘The European Union and Latin America: Global Players in Partnership’, which 
stresses the link between regional integration and sustainable development and focuses on issues 
such as climate change and poverty reduction.12  
 
The Summit resulted in some interesting developments. First of all, it institutionalized the 
relationship of the EU with the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), 
which became the EU's counterpart for the bi-regional partnership process, including at summit 
levels. On this occasion, a number of specific thematic dialogues and initiatives were launched, 
including:  i) a ‘Joint Initiative on Research and Innovation’ focused on sustainability and social 
inclusion through a targeted focus on science, research, technology and innovation; ii) the ‘EU-
CELAC Structured Dialogue on Migration’, to provide a framework for the exchange of best 
practices and capacity building; and iii) a ‘Coordination and Cooperation Mechanism on Drugs’, 
to provide a  dialogue structure aimed at tackling the world drug problem. It is interesting to note, 
in this regard, the discussion undertaken in Chapter 3 regarding MERCOSUR’s challenge of 
orientation amid the ‘spaghetti bowl’ of regional arrangements in Latin America. The extent to 
which CELAC will become the official framework for dialogue in other policy areas in the future 
is still to be determined over the next decade. 
 
At the margins of the Summit, a series of bilateral meetings with specific countries and sub-
regions were held, among which was one with MERCOSUR, resulting in an official decision to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The EU – Latin American Summits took place for the first time in 1999 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, focused on 
strengthening relations and cooperation on political, economic/trade, cultural, educational and human issues; 
Subsequent meetings took place in 2002, in Madrid; 2004, in Guadalajara; in 2006, in Vienna and in 2008, in Lima. 
The documents related to the summits can be accessed at: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/lac/index_en.htm.  
12 COM(2009) 495/3. 
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re-launch negotiations for the EU-MERCOSUR association agreement which had been 
suspended since 2007. Other relevant outcomes of the Summit were the political approval for the 
conclusion of trade agreement between the EU and the Andean Countries (Peru and Colombia), 
and most importantly, the conclusion of the negotiations of the first bi-regional association 
agreement, between the EU and Central American Integration System (SICA).13 These outcomes 
show the importance of the system of summits in terms of political coordination; on the other 
hand, the specific outcomes regarding the negotiation of the association agreements with South-
American blocs show that interregional relations are facing a stalemate, considering the 
difficulties in staying faithful to this policy objective instead of following a more pragmatic 
approach. While with Central America the negotiations were successful, in the case of the 
Andean countries bilateral agreements were finally preferred, given the difficulties in finalizing a 
bi-regional one. The case of MERCOSUR is perhaps the most representative of this dilemma, 
considering the proportions of its market and the presence of several sensitive issues, as will be 
seen below. 
 
The cooperation chapter has also been active in the framework of the RSP, of which sustainable 
development is a “cross cutting issue”.14 In this regard, one of the most significant outcomes has 
been the signature of a cooperation agreement between the EC and MERCOSUR in November 
2009, framed in the 2nd pillar of the RSP and aiming to finance the deepening of the economic 
integration process and the sustainable development of MERCOSUR. The agreement provides 
funding for a project called ‘Eco-norms’, founded on pre-existing projects within MERCOSUR 
and based on four areas of action: the promotion of sustainable production and consumption 
patterns; the fight against desertification and the effects of drought; the implementation of the 
‘global harmonized system of labeling and classification of chemical products’; and finally the 
convergence of norms and regulations on quality and security of selected production sectors and 
development of regional capacity on evaluation. The general objective of the program is to 
strengthen product quality in MERCOSUR and its capacity to conciliate economic and 
commercial growth with sustainable management of natural resources and strengthened 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 EU DG Trade website. 
14 Regional Strategy Paper 2007-13, available at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/MERCOSUR/index_en.htm.  
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environmental protection, fostering the integration process of the bloc and its insertion in the 
international market.15  
 
3. Negotiations of the future agreement  
 
While the two previous chapters showed more progress, the trade chapter has been problematic. 
The goal has remained that of preparing an ambitious agreement, which would cover not only the 
liberalization of trade in goods, but also in other issues such as services, government procurement 
and intellectual property. Several rounds of negotiation have been undertaken so far, as well as a 
SIA process, analyzed below. 
 
3.1 The SIA Process 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, in 1999 the EU started to apply ‘Sustainability Impact Assessment’ 
(SIA) to the negotiation of its trade agreements. Under the initiative of former Trade 
Commissioner Pascal Lamy, in the preparations for the WTO Seattle Round, the SIA was a tool 
aiming to integrate sustainable development into trade negotiations by developing a new 
assessment to identify the potential economic, social and environmental impacts of a trade 
agreement on both the EU and the partner in the negotiations, thus extending the scope of other 
models of IA.16 This assessment model is now enshrined in a broader commitment made by the 
Commission for all policy areas,17 but trade SIAs remain the most sophisticated form of impact 
assessment, being prepared for all of the EU’s major trade negotiations. The EU requests studies 
from external experts on the likely outcomes of a trade agreement and, considering their findings, 
a position paper is prepared by the Commission identifying points of agreement and responding 
to disagreements. The position paper considers what further analysis should be undertaken and 
what policy action should be implemented, and is discussed with member states at the Trade 
Committee. At the same time, it does not bind the EU’s negotiating position, which is based on a 
separate, confidential analysis. Thus, despite the fact that it provides information about expected 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Covenant DCI-ALA 2009/19707, available (in Spanish) at the website of MERCOSUR www.MERCOSUR.int.  
16 P. Ekins and T. Voituriez, Trade, globalization and sustainability impact assessment: a critical look at methods 
and outcomes, Earthscan, 2009. 
17 Commission Communication 2002/276 on the integrated impact assessment.  
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outcomes and creates a channel for public participation on both sides, its relevance for the final 
outcome is uncertain. 
 
i) The SIA Report  
 
The SIA prepared for the EU – MERCOSUR association agreement assessed how trade 
liberalization could affect the sustainable development of both regions, and proposed measures 
for avoiding, preventing or mitigating adverse impacts and enhancing beneficial ones. The 
assessment was made considering a scenario of full trade liberalization between the parties, 
covering tariffs as well as non-tariff barriers, and the expected outcomes that would arise from it, 
taking into account a set of criteria based on the three spheres of sustainable development.18 The 
Final report of this SIA was issued in 2009,19 consisting of an overview report and five sectorial 
studies on agriculture, forestry, automobiles, financial services and trade facilitation. The SIA 
also encompasses a series of preventative, mitigation and enhancement proposals aiming to 
define initiatives to maximize the effects of trade liberalization and economic growth while 
promoting other components of sustainable development, preventing or reducing potential 
negative impacts. 
A number of proposals for mitigation and enhancement measures have been put forward in the 
three categories: (1) measures that relate to the trade pillar of the EU MERCOSUR Association 
Agreement; (2) measures that relate to the political and cooperation pillars; and (3) domestic 
measures. The most important aspects of the report in terms of impact and proposed measures 
are:  
 
a) Economic: Overall, the economic impact of an FTA is estimated to be positive both for the EU 
and for MERCOSUR countries. Given that the MERCOSUR region is economically smaller than 
the European Union, this naturally implies that the relative effects on real income for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 In order to evaluate each of the pillars, core sustainability indicators are used: for the economic pillar, Real income; 
Fixed capital formation; Employment; Environmental: Biodiversity; Environmental quality; Natural resource stocks 
Social: Poverty; Equity; Health and Education. In addition to the nine core indicators for sustainability outcomes, the 
methodology uses two process indicators which influence the long term economic, social and environmental impacts 
of trade liberalization: consistency with sustainable development principles and institutional capacity for effective 
sustainable development strategies. 
19 European Commission/DG Trade, Final report of the SIA EU-MERCOSUR, March 2009;  
See also: European Commission/DG Trade, ‘Handbook for Trade SIA’, available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/march/tradoc_127974.pdf.  
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MERCOSUR are expected to be larger. In the EU, the assessment finds that the economic 
impacts are likely to be positive overall, and that full liberalization would give an economic 
welfare gain in the order of 0.1% of GDP in the manufacturing and services sectors, which are 
predicted to benefit most from an FTA. There would be important adjustment costs for 
agriculture, particularly in the short term, which would require suitable transition periods and 
mitigation measures. However, the EU could reap some benefits from better market access to 
MERCOSUR for some vegetable products, as well as from better protection of Geographical 
Indications.  
 
In MERCOSUR, economic benefits are expected throughout the whole economy and particularly 
in the agricultural sector. Economic gains are expected to increase over time as increased 
exposure to competition is predicted to raise efficiency and productivity. Moreover, the report 
highlighted that gains from science-driven innovation may be higher than direct trade-related 
benefits. The increased exposure to competition in the manufacturing and services sectors could 
however generate some adjustment costs in the short term unless they are appropriately addressed 
by mitigation measures. 
 
In order to balance those issues, the following preventive, enhancement and mitigation measures 
were proposed: 
 
Trade Pillar Measures 
 
- Establish a timetable for phased reduction in tariff and NTM reductions to allow for an 
adjustment period in sectors that are expected to experience significant adjustment costs. In 
MERCOSUR, these sectors include motor vehicles and parts, transport equipment, textiles 
and clothing, machinery, financial services and distribution and retailing. In the EU, most of 
the adjustments will have to be made in agriculture.  
- Agree a program of trade facilitation measures to improve the trading environment, aiming 
to reduce the costs of doing business: (i) establish a joint Customs and Trade Facilitation 
committee; (ii) de facto harmonization of customs procedures through adoption of 
international standards; (iii) improvement of single window systems for both exports and 
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imports, with particular attention paid to countries with less developed systems; (iv) extend 
the use of risk management techniques; (v) provide up-to-date information on all trade and 
customs procedures from a single source  
 
- Include a ‘Trade and Sustainable Development’ chapter in the Trade Pillar of the agreement, 
including issues such as: the requirement that both parties commit to the effective ratification 
and implementation of core labor standards and other basic, decent work components, as 
well as multilateral agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol; the establishment of a EU-
MERCOSUR Trade SIA Forum with responsibility for monitoring the social and 
environmental impacts of the agreement; voluntary or mandatory certification for forest 
products and biofuels; cooperation on the development of measures to reduce particulate and 
CO2 emissions from automobiles, focusing particularly on technology development and 
transfer opportunities in the areas of biofuels, engine design and emission control 
technology; a joint committee to report on the environmental consequences of increased 
production of biofuels; cooperation in promoting trade in environmental goods and services. 
The content of such a chapter would thus be very similar to those already included in the 
CARIFORUM, South Korea, Central America and Colombia/Peru agreements discussed in 
Chapter 5. The emphasis here on biofuels is significant, though, as MERCOSUR, and 
particularly Brazil, is one of the largest biofuels producers in the world, thus effective 
measures guaranteeing that it would benefit the economy, while not leading to increased 
pressure on the environment, are of great relevance. 
 
Cooperation Measures 
 
- Support for the establishment of an EU MERCOSUR Automotive Sector Forum with the 
aim of strengthening public-private cooperation. 
- Support for a detailed assessment of the impact on the international competitiveness of the 
automotive sector in both regions in light of the replacement of regional-level regulations 
by international automobile technical standards (UN-ECE). 
- Promote joint development of guidance on the implementation of the Basel principles on 
finance. 
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- Implement the European Commission’s Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) 
recommendations for strengthening international and cross-sector co-operation, particularly 
in monitoring cross-border financial institutions.  
 
Domestic Measures 
 
- Implementation in both parties of the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking 
Supervision, and implementation of any revisions to the Basel Principles that may be 
agreed in response to the current global crisis. 
- Research in both regions into the barriers to trade facilitation reforms beyond those to 
which commitments are made in the trade agreement. 
 
b) Social: The social impacts predicted are mixed, but overall, positive. In the EU the only sectors 
where social impact would be felt is in agriculture and rural areas where short to medium term 
social adjustment costs could occur during a transitional period and could add to the underlying 
downward trend in baseline agricultural sector employment in the EU. At the same time, the 
report highlights that appropriate support programs or other policy measures could mitigate this 
adjustment process. This is extremely relevant, as agricultural groups are among the fiercest 
political objectors to the agreement, and despite the support of the Commission, the agreement 
has been facing opposition from some EU member states, above all from France, whose 
agricultural sector fears the opening of the market to competition from MERCOSUR agricultural 
exports. In MERCOSUR, the social impacts are expected to be positive in the long term, while 
some adjustment costs in the short term could occur in the manufacturing sector. The SIA also 
stresses that the expansion of agriculture in MERCOSUR, which follows an internal trend in this 
region, could cause social problems in ‘traditional agriculture’. Transitional adverse effects could 
impact on employment, and result in "loss of livelihoods for indigenous people". It is also 
mentioned that small-scale farmers could be the main losers in that process, including women, 
thus careful consideration was recommended regarding this issue. Mitigation measures proposed 
included: 
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Trade Pillar Measures 
 
Measures cited above within the ‘Trade and Sustainable Development’ chapter. 
 
Cooperation Measures 
 
- Support for capacity building in regulatory and public policy analysis and design, through 
the provision of training in (Regulatory) Impact Assessment, drawing on the EC’s 
extensive experience in the use of IA methods for better regulation design. 
- Technical support and training for the development of improved systems for evaluating the 
suitability of collateral offered by SMEs. 
 
c) Environmental: the report highlighted that both positive and negative environmental impacts in 
the EU and MERCOSUR countries could arise depending on the policy measures that are taken 
to accompany the Agreement. Increased imports of raw materials could potentially result in land 
abandonment in the EU. In MERCOSUR, full trade liberalization in the agricultural and the 
forestry sectors could result in added pressure and potentially significant adverse impacts on 
natural resources, forest coverage and biodiversity, which would require adequate response 
measures. On the positive side, MERCOSUR is expected to benefit from increased access to 
environmental services. 
 
Trade Pillar Measures 
 
- Timing of reductions in tariffs and quota restrictions for environmentally/biodiversity-related 
sensitive products to be conditional on compliance with a set of sustainability criteria.  
 
Cooperation Measures 
 
- Support for regulatory policy capacity building in MERCOSUR, particularly in 
environmental regulation, public utility regulation (water and electricity sub-sectors) and 
financial sector regulation. 
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- Provision of development assistance including education and training in sustainable forestry 
practices and alternative skills.  
- Technical assistance measures and cooperation to strengthen institutions, the legislative 
framework and enforcement in relation to environmental protection and safeguarding areas 
of natural forest.. 
- Strengthening systems to help MERCOSUR exporters to comply with REACH 
requirements, particularly by improving the provision of information and technical assistance 
through the WTO enquiry point and the European Chemicals Agency. 
 
Domestic Measures 
 
- Strengthening environmental regulation in MERCOSUR countries to offset adverse impacts 
of forest conversion and expansion in agricultural production, while exploiting potential 
gains. 
 
ii) The Commission Position Paper 
 
Based on the SIA report, the Commission issued a position paper supporting the importance of 
integrating sustainable development as one of the agreement’s overarching objectives, to be 
reflected both in the general trade and cooperation chapters, and also through the inclusion of a 
specific ‘Trade and Sustainable Development’ chapter. Among the possible measures to 
implement, the Commission highlighted market access for environmental goods and services, 
investment, trade facilitation, commitment to implementation of core ILO labor standards and 
fundamental conventions and multilateral environmental agreements to which they are parties, 
and to establish a bi-regional forum to monitor the social and environmental impacts of the 
agreement. The Commission also stated its support for the determination of the strategic 
objectives of promoting sustainable development elements at a regional level, while also 
recognizing each party's right to regulate and set it own sustainable development priorities. 
Finally, while stressing the importance of the SIA, the Commission frequently recalled that the 
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results of the report are also available to MERCOSUR national authorities, which have the direct 
responsibility to implement these measures.20  
 
3.2 Current status of the negotiations and future outlook  
 
The EU policy vis-à-vis MERCOSUR is thus currently focused on the signature of a bi-regional 
association agreement, which would create the largest free trade area in the world. Despite these 
concerns regarding sustainable development, not all the regional trade agreements focus on 
policy objectives such as sustainable development, as is the case of the Association Agreement 
with MEROCUR, which rather has as it main focus the trade pillar and market access for the 
EU.21 This is precisely what makes it so complicated to conclude, since there are several sensitive 
issues on both sides in terms of market access. Technically, it would be a mixed agreement on 
both sides, maintaining the current structure of three main chapters. While the policies in terms of 
political dialogue and cooperation would probably remain the same, the trade chapter would 
include not only a Free Trade Agreement in goods and services but also cover, amongst other 
things, rules on government procurement, investment, intellectual property rights, competition 
policies, sanitary and phytosanitary issues, technical barriers to trade, protection of geographical 
indications, business facilitation, trade defense instruments, and a dispute settlement 
mechanism.22 In addition, it would also include a ‘Trade and Sustainable Development’ chapter, 
following the model of the agreements analyzed in Chapter 5, perhaps particularly the EU-
Central America AA. 
 
While both EU and MERCOSUR authorities have officially reiterated their willingness to 
conclude the agreement, negotiations face sensitive issues that are not only rooted in problematic 
policy areas for each of the parties, but which also go beyond the sphere of the bi-regional 
relations. The low level of integration in MERCOSUR is considered a primary challenge and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 EU DG Trade, available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/july/tradoc_146386.pdf.  
21 See, in this regard, M. Cremona, ‘The European Union and Regional Trade Agreements’, European Yearbook of 
International Economic Law, 2010, 1, pp. 245-268. 
22 Taking as example the previous agreements of this kind signed by the EU, such as the association agreement with 
SICA, signed at the 2010 EU – LAC Summit.  
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lack of completion of the customs union makes the negotiation more difficult.23 Moreover, while 
for MERCOSUR the trade share with the EU is quite significant, EU’s trade with MERCOSUR 
represents a smaller share of its total trade, which makes incentives asymmetrical for the parties. 
Furthermore, the most sensitive issues for the trade negotiation coincide with difficult issues for a 
final agreement at the WTO Doha Round, since both the EU and MERCOSUR countries, 
especially Brazil, are major players in multilateral trade talks and have conflicting interests in 
sensitive areas. It is reported that, amongst the eleven working groups that are part of 
negotiations, trade in agriculture and intellectual property continue to be the two most 
contentious issues.24 
 
For the EU, opening the agricultural market and reforming the ‘Common Agriculture Policy’ is 
still a controversial issue internally, given the resistance of some member states, and externally, 
deemed by developing countries to be unfair and harmful for the trade system. The exchange of 
agriculture proposals during this sixth round of discussions had to be deferred due to EU 
members still awaiting an agricultural impact assessment report from the European Commission. 
Given the economic recession and deepening euro crisis, the impact of South American 
agricultural products entering the European market is a highly sensitive issue for EU farmers. 
Belgium, France, Ireland, and Poland are four of the EU nations which have exhibited reluctance 
in accepting any trade concessions in certain agricultural sectors. One of these sectors is beef, 
where MERCOSUR is the largest global exporter. These EU countries are demanding that all 
imports be in compliance with EU sanitary and environmental regulations.25 On the 
MERCOSUR side, the industrial sector (automobile, textiles, informatics) and the ‘Singapore 
issues’ (services, investment and government procurement – areas in which liberalization in 
MERCOSUR has not been completed, with protocols signed but not in force and measures not 
fully implemented) are problematic areas.26  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 In practice, MERCOSUR is a customs union to date, with liberalization of trade in goods almost completed but 
many non-tariff barriers and the lack of implementation in other sectors still hindering the functioning of the 
common market. 
24 ICTSD Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, Volume 15, Number 23, 22nd June 2011. 
25 ICTSD Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, Volume 15, Number 26, 13th July 2011.  
26 S Gratius, ‘EU-MERCOSUR relations as a learning experience for biregionalism’ in W. Grabendorff and R. 
Seidelmann, Relations between the European Union and Latin America: biregionalism in a changing global system, 
Nomos, 2005.  
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In this regard, while the multilateral trade negotiations have stalled, the interregional alternative 
is presented as a new means of global governance towards a multilateral system, since it would 
be WTO compatible. For some, it is deemed to be the second best alternative, but since the Doha 
Round has been facing complications, it could also be a step further, promoting the issues at stake 
in the large territory covered by the agreement.27 It is clear that both parties will have to make 
concessions in order to reach a viable agreement, but in spite of these sensitive areas, many 
beneficial aspects can also be highlighted. For the EU, the conclusion of the agreement with 
MERCOSUR would not only provide improved market access in important sectors, but also 
create a better structured environment for investment, especially considering the fact that several 
member states have important investment markets in South America; it would also encourage the 
development of another similar regional integration project which, in spite of its different 
institutional arrangements, itself has the potential to become a global actor like the EU, thus 
helping to legitimize regional integration blocs as global players and interregionalism as a new 
way of governance that is favorable to the EU itself as an international actor.  
 
For MERCOSUR, on the other hand, the benefits would also not be restricted to the trade area – 
which would be favored, especially in terms of agricultural market access, given that its member 
states are important agricultural exporters. The prospect of an agreement with the EU is, for 
MERCOSUR, an incentive for a deepening of the integration project and the completion of the 
common market provisions, both in terms of trade and investment, and also other aspects such as 
cooperation and improved political bondage. Moreover, it would force MERCOSUR to deal with 
issues that would be considered in the agreement, such as harmonization of rules, sanitary and 
phytosanitary standards and, ultimately, environmental and sustainable development concerns.28 
In addition, for both parties the agreement represents a strategic political move, affirming their 
relevance in the region, reducing the influence of the USA and the proposed Free Trade Area of 
the Americas (FTAA).29 Finally, concluding an agreement seems even more relevant now that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 J Faust, ‘The European Union’s relations with MERCOSUR: the issue of trade liberalization’, in M Hänggi and R 
Roloff, Interregionalism and international relations, Routledge, 2006; the author highlights that while 
interregionalism is still more limited than multilateralism in scope, it goes beyond regionalism and presents an 
alternative for global governance given the difficulties of achieving a multilateral solution.   
28 See discussions in Chapter 3 and, for a more detailed analysis, A. Correia Lima Macedo Franca, ‘MERCOSUR 
and Environmental Law’ in L. Lixinski et all, The Law of MERCOSUR (op cit). 
29 S Gratius, op. cit.  
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most of MERCOSUR’s member states will fall out of the EU’s GSP schemes, as highlighted in 
Chapter 5. 
 
Regarding the effects of the agreement on sustainable development, the outcomes are unclear. 
From the difficulties presented in the trade area, one can argue that despite the rhetorical 
commitments of prioritizing the sustainability of both regions, other policy fields still have a 
higher ranking on the political agenda. Moreover, while the SIA process can be a beneficial 
aspect as one of the main tools developed in order to evaluate the premise that trade can work to 
promote sustainable development, two important points can be highlighted in this regard: firstly, 
the studies prepared for the EU – MERCOSUR negotiations show that the effects of trade 
liberalization differ, and that beneficial effects relating to sustainable development will depend on 
how these impacts are weighed against each other in practice. Secondly, the outcomes of the 
study are not binding on the negotiating position of the parties, and thus the extent to which it 
will influence the final text remains to be seen. The SIA process contributes to the information on 
which such value judgments may be based, both in preparation of the negotiating position of the 
EU and in the general negotiation agenda, but in the end it is the political will of the parties that 
will define the real sustainability of the agreement. Notwithstanding, the case studies undertaken 
in Chapter 5 allow the consideration that the SIAs have had an impact on the final texts of the 
agreements, and thus will also be likely to be followed in this case. 
 
The negotiations of the AA, while not yet concluded, are moving forward despite the strong 
opposition openly declared by many European countries, especially France. Since being retaken 
in Madrid, 8 rounds of negotiation were carried out, the last one taking place from 22nd to 26th 
October 2012 in Brasilia.30 More recently, an EU-MERCOSUR ministerial meeting took place on 
26th January 2013, in the margins of the latest EU-CELAC summit in Santiago in Chile. In a Joint 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 While the documentation of the negotiations has not been publicly disclosed, some insights into the status of the 
negotiation were discussed in a meeting of the EUROLAT Parliamentary Assembly in November 2011. According 
to a negotiator from the EU side, progress in the technical rules has been achieved recently in the following areas: 
trade defense and competition were said to be almost finished; progress in rules of origin and DSP and non 
regulatory matters related to trade in services are said to be significant; SPS and customs and trade facilitation, TBT 
and sustainable development; difficult issues: IP and geo indications, especially resistance from MS going beyond 
TRIPS. Examples of rules achieved: common set of regulatory rules for postal and courier services, fair licensing 
procedures; provisions on technical standards for products in MS will be adopted by the 4 countries simultaneously, 
facilitating trade; facilitated customs procedures – fiscal control of products at the border and data for customs 
declaration.  
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Communiqué, the two parties agreed that the exchange of market access offers shall take place no 
later than the last quarter of 2013.31 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
The challenges of global governance require alternative ways of coping with issues of global 
concern. While the outcomes in the multilateral sphere have been proving insufficient - as 
discussed above - regional integration projects have proliferated in the past few years, not only 
aiming to promote regional governance but also playing a role in international relations, 
attempting to fill this gap between weak enforcement of multilateral agreements and the need of 
coordinate action among national states. In this context, sustainable development has become a 
global objective, representing the aim to pursue a development process that is balanced between 
economic, environmental and social concerns and sustainable over time, for present and future 
generations. Nevertheless, as a guiding principle, it has weak binding power, posing a challenge 
to the implementation and observance of the commitments it implies.  
 
As this chapter has tried to show, regional integration can be a way of promoting sustainable 
development and implementing these commitments, as regional blocs create rules and policies 
that can be used to reflect the commitments made in the multilateral sphere. At the same time, the 
implementation of these measures may still face challenges related to effectiveness, policy 
coherence and political will at the regional level. Analyzing the case of the EU, this regional bloc 
has incorporated sustainable development as an overarching objective and a guiding principle in 
its legal order, generating obligations in relation to both its internal policies and external 
relations. Nevertheless, the concept of sustainable development is defined at EU level in policy 
documents, which are also broad and non-legally binding, making its implementation more 
susceptible to interference from other policy objectives and its evaluation more complex.  
 
Considering these observations, some conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, in the field of external 
relations, sustainable development has become one of the major policy objectives of the EU, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 MERCOSUR-EUROPEAN UNION MINISTERIAL MEETING, Santiago, January 26, 2013 Joint communiqué, 
available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/january/tradoc_150458.pdf.  
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generating the obligation to promote measures such as development cooperation while taking into 
account the common but differentiated responsibilities towards developing countries, promotion 
of environmental protection, good governance, and the use of preventive and integrative 
procedural tools such as impact assessment studies – showing consistency with the notion of 
sustainable development agreed in the international sphere. Furthermore, the integration of 
sustainable development has also been undertaken progressively, notably in trade-related 
measures, both procedural -the SIAs- and substantive -soft commitments to positive 
discrimination for environmental goods and services. In addition to this commitment to 
sustainable development, which arises from EU primary law, during the last few decades there 
has been increasing emphasis on interregionalism as a foundation for EU’s external relations, as 
well as recognition of the link between regional integration and sustainable development. 
Nevertheless, this emphasis comes out of a political strategy of the EU, and a tension between 
legal commitments and political objectives can be perceived in the bloc’s external relations, such 
as in the case study presented here.  
 
In this context, the EU’s relations with MERCOSUR focus on opening up access to markets of 
both regions, but framed around the promotion of sustainable development. This aim is translated 
into a ‘regional strategy plan’ that aims to support MERCOSUR’s regional project as a whole, 
and has as its ultimate goal the signature of an association agreement comprising trade 
liberalization, political dialogue and development cooperation. This is to say that the EU’s 
support for regional integration as a means of promoting sustainable development is related to the 
belief that the regional sphere is an important building block towards the goal of achieving 
sustainable development, but also to both its vision of promoting an international system in 
which regional actors are legitimized as relevant players, and its concern to expand market access 
and thus support its own internal market. In theory, there are no tensions necessarily arising from 
these policy goals, but in practice things are more complex.    
 
The analysis of the current status of the relationship between the parties and the negotiations of 
the association agreement show some results of the promotion of sustainable development, while 
also reflecting tensions between policy objectives: the political dialogue channel created provides 
a forum for discussion and political coordination, and has focused on issues related to 
Chapter	  6	  
	  
	  
299	  
sustainability, such as the general theme of the last EU – LAC Summit. This represents an 
important attempt to build political agreement between the regions and could have a positive 
impact on both regional and multilateral decision-making, even though disagreement on several 
international negotiations persist between the two regions – i.e. the Doha Round or climate 
change negotiations – and full evaluation of this impact goes beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
The cooperation chapter has also been active, despite the fact that the amount of aid earmarked 
for the MERCOSUR region is, relatively, very low. Among other outcomes, the cooperation led 
to the signature of an agreement financing the development of ‘eco-norms’ in MERCOSUR, 
which would reinforce the bloc’s overall sustainability strategy, and also facilitate the trade 
relations between the two parties. The final impact of these measures is hard to evaluate, and this 
evaluation goes beyond the scope of this paper, but it can be said that this cooperation measure is 
in line with the idea of promoting regional sustainability.  
 
Finally, the trade chapter shows more clearly the potential for tension mentioned above: on the 
one hand, the difficulty in the negotiation is certainly founded on innumerous factors, but among 
these the internal policies of the two blocs – regarding agriculture on the one side and industry 
sectors on the other side – stand out as a major barrier. In this regard, the EU’s commitment to 
promote sustainable development through regional integration, to maintain strengthened relations 
with other regional parties, and even its own objective to achieve more coherence between all of 
its policies, seem to be jeopardized by internal political influences, such as the agricultural sector 
in some member states and ultimately the reform of the CAP. On the other hand, a -rhetorical at 
least- commitment to achieve a ‘sustainable development oriented’ trade agreement can be 
observed on the EU side, through the analysis provided by the SIA and the proposal to include a 
‘Trade and Sustainable Development’ chapter. Considering the complexity of issues involved in 
the trade relationship, and the need for more policy coherence, the normative content of 
sustainable development can help to balance conflicting goals in economic, environmental and 
social spheres, and the SIA is an example of an attempt to further integrate these areas. The 
outcome of the SIA process seems positive per se, to the extent that it shows that trade 
liberalization does not necessarily lead to the more sustainable development of the parties, but 
rather that important compensating measures must be undertaken on both sides; moreover, it 
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renders the decision-making process more transparent and inclusive towards civil society. 
Nevertheless, the practical influence of this instrument is ambiguous, and the impact that it might 
have on the final outcome will ultimately depend on the political will (or ability) of the EU to 
adopt the recommendations made.   
  
As distinct from the other five agreements analyzed in Chapter 5, the EU-MERCOSUR 
negotiations are wider, given that they concern a bi-regional relationship and not a bilateral one, 
as in the agreements with Chile and Korea, in addition to the fact that MERCOSUR is a 
significantly bigger project than that of Central American integration, which makes the 
compromise more difficult, on the one hand, but on the other hand renders the negotiations more 
balanced, especially given the presence of Brazil, one of the largest contenders at the WTO 
negotiations. Moreover, from a North-South perspective, it is interesting to observe that both 
blocs have been aiming to deepen integration, to go beyond non-trade issues and develop external 
relations as a means of expanding their role as actors and promoting values and goals, respecting 
their differences in scope; in this regard, the relationship between the two blocs can be seen as an 
attempt to compromise between a developed and a developing partner, in which many issues that 
are controversial in the international arena, such as agricultural subsidies, intellectual property, 
trade and sustainable development are being negotiated in the context of the creation of the 
largest free-trade area in the world – which the EU-MERCOSUR FTA would be. In this regard, 
talks on these issues, which are seen as important for the promotion of sustainable development, 
can be agreed and promoted at the regional level, and in a way that balances the different views 
of developing and developed partners, and this would represent an important building block for 
the development of a multilateral framework for sustainable development.  
 
The case study examined has shown that there are links between regional integration projects, 
trade measures and sustainable development concerns. From a legal perspective, the scope of this 
analysis was to see how regional integration can generate rules and policies that can effectively 
translate the political commitments made internationally and how it thus supports the 
enforcement and implementation of those obligations, being in this sense a ‘building block’ 
towards multilateral governance. On the other hand, it can be observed that the political tensions, 
which dominate the multilateral sphere and often prevent the implementation of international 
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commitments, can also be perceived at the regional level.32 The strengthening of political 
commitment to the goals represented by sustainable development, and the enhancement of policy 
coherence allowing the process to be more effective remain the major challenges.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 For an extended analysis of the political background in EU-LAC relations, see J.A. Sanahuja, Towards a  new 
framework of the relations between the European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean, EU-LAC 
Foundation, 2013, available at: www.eulacfoundation.org.  
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Final conclusions 
 
Sustainable development, international law and regional integration: an important but 
overlooked link 
 
This thesis was motivated, above all, by a strong belief in the power of the concept of 
sustainable development, and the fundamental importance of the implementation of its moral 
and pragmatic considerations for our future as an increasingly global society. Moreover, it 
was framed by a curiosity and optimism about regional integration as an effective governance 
model that had been – to a great extent – successfully implemented in Europe, and had also 
been a recurrent objective in South America, the author’s region of origin. As sustainable 
development can be considered the ultimate goal and challenge that the international 
community must deal with nowadays, the thesis undertook to analyze how sustainable 
development could be promoted in the regional governance sphere. The link between regional 
integration as a means to promote sustainable development is strongly supported by policy 
literature, but there was a gap in analysis on the legal side of it, which became the main 
objective of the thesis. In this regard, the aim of this work was to make an in-depth 
examination of the effectiveness of the European Union policies implementing sustainable 
development, followed by considerations on similar initiatives in MERCOSUR, and whether 
the European experience could/should inspire further developments in its southern 
counterpart.  
 
Following from that background, the thesis highlighted the changing rationale of International 
Law (IL) as a body of rules and norms that governs the interaction between states as well as 
between other international actors, being more than ever instrumental to the international 
community in the globalized, interdependent international relations that characterize the 
international scenario, and as a system of norms and procedures that aim to regulate common 
goals and objectives. Within this system, sustainability is emerging as a core value of the 
international community, and the concept of sustainable development provides a normative 
framework promoting the goal of a development process based on economic growth, 
environmental protection and social justice, and working as a guiding principle that orients 
the balancing of these – still competing – objectives. Nevertheless, the implementation of 
these issues remains a challenge from a legal perspective. 
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1. Sustainable development and international law 
 
Sustainable development is a concept that encompasses two main normative dimensions: a 
horizontal/policy dimension represented by the reorientation of the idea of development, 
prescribing that the development process should be focused on the needs of human beings and 
the realization of human rights, rather than solely promoting the economic development of the 
state; in addition, an inter-generational/temporal dimension that determines the need to make 
this process sustainable, allowing for economic development while also assuring 
environmental protection and social justice and ensuring the rights of future generations to 
meet their needs for a decent life just as the current one does. This concept has been 
progressively developed and mainstreamed within the international community, especially 
through a series of international conferences and declarations under the auspices of the United 
Nations (UN),1 and is reflected in the famous definition provided by the World Commission 
on Environment and Development in 1987: “development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs; it contains 
two key concepts: the concept of needs, in particular the essential needs of the world’s poor, 
to which overriding priority should be given; and the idea of limitations imposed by the state 
of technology and social organization on the environment’s ability to meet present and future 
needs”.2 The concept of sustainable development summarizes this idea of promoting a 
balance between economic development, social justice and environmental protection and 
assures the sustainability of the development process, and prescribes a series of substantive 
and procedural measures that aim to guide the decision-making of the international 
community. In fact, its relevance has just been confirmed on the occasion of the recent United 
Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20), in which, despite all the criticism 
regarding the outcomes, the international community has “renewed” the commitment to the 
promotion of an “economically, socially and environmentally sustainable future for our 
planet and for present and future generations”, acknowledging the need to further 
mainstream sustainable development at all levels.3  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The main ones are: Stockholm UN Convention on the Human Environment of 1972; the Rio de Janeiro UN 
Convention on the Environment and Development of 1992 (The Earth Summit); the Johannesburg UN Summit 
on Sustainable Development of 2002. 	  
2 Report of the WCED to the UNGA, recognized by UNGA Resolution 42/187, available at http://www.un-
documents.net/wced-ocf.htm.  	  
3 UNCSD Outcome Document, ‘The Future We Want, UN Document A/66/L.56, UNGA 66th Session, July 24th 
2012. Available at: http://www.uncsd2012.org/thefuturewewant.html. 	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Despite its normative appeal, there is no binding definition of sustainable development in 
international law, as most of the documents referring to its meaning at the international level 
are soft law, leading to a debate regarding its status as a principle of international law and to 
the details of its implications. While the recognition of this concept as a principle still faces 
criticism, it seems more relevant to highlight the impact it has as a guiding norm. In this 
regard, sustainable development has been recognized as a norm operating in international law 
in a twofold manner: firstly, as an emerging area of international law in its own right, given 
the substantive amount of legal instruments that are based on its normative assumptions or 
created in order to implement them (or both). Thus, ‘sustainable development law’ is 
considered to be a set of substantive and procedural norms at the intersection of international 
economic, social and environmental law, which help to reconcile these separate fields. 
Secondly, it can be considered as a ‘meta-principle’ acting upon other existing principles and 
rules, exercising a type of interstitial normativity, requiring the reconciliation and balance of 
the conflicting interests of economic growth, environmental protection and social justice, for 
present and future generations.4 
 
Thus, it is in this guidance capacity that the importance of sustainable development lies, both 
as an objective and a guiding principle recognized by and widely spread within the 
international community, and encompassed by international law – in its capacity as 
instrument to pursue the common goals of the international community. In an attempt to 
clarify the legal aspects of what sustainable development implies, the International Law 
Association (ILA) released the New Delhi Declaration on the Principles of International Law 
Related to Sustainable Development in 2002, highlighting seven legal sub-principles which 
work towards the achievement of sustainable development goals: 1. The duty of States to 
ensure sustainable use of natural resources; 2. Equity and eradication of poverty; 3. The 
common but differentiated responsibilities of all the actors involved in the development 
process; 4. The precautionary approach to human health, natural resources and ecosystems; 5. 
Public participation and access to information and justice; 6. Good governance and 7. The 
principle of integration and interrelationship, in particular in relation to human rights and 
social, economic and environmental objectives. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 M.C. Cordonier Segger, Sustainable development law: principles, practices and prospects, Oxford University 
Press, 2004, pp. 45-50 and 368-71.	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Nowadays, sustainable development and its sub-principles have been extensively incorporated 
into international law, being present in the agenda of regional and multilateral organizations, 
in international treaties and national legislations worldwide, and cited by international dispute 
resolution bodies. Nevertheless, no specific regime or framework has been created to 
implement these goals, which have instead been inserted into other regimes and treaties. Thus, 
among the sub-principles cited above, the ‘Integration Principle’ is of paramount importance: 
it determines the integration of environmental and social concerns into all levels of 
governance and decision-making. The ILA committee has described it “as the very backbone 
of the concept of sustainable development”5 and others have identified it as a core principle 
inherent to that concept6, while the other six principles are considered as expressions of this 
overarching principle. 
 
The international law regimes have faced challenges in putting these principles into practice. 
The governance system represented by UN Conferences, such as Rio/1992 and 
Johannesburg/2002 and Rio+20/2012 developed the principle of sustainable development 
through soft law documents that, despite their non-binding character, set the agenda and path 
for action over the years. As has been pointed out, goals such as sustainable development are 
not achieved by legal rules alone: it is the existence of political will for the implementation of 
the goals that it represents that will secure change and action. Conferences such as Rio+20 are 
now much more than just government meetings, but rather a multitude of parallel events, 
discussions and presentations by various segments of civil society, business sectors and 
subnational governments, like municipalities and states, and actions and commitments made 
by these new actors are both more ambitious, and also fundamental, to the complex process of 
making development a more sustainable process. In this new context, the face of 
multilateralism is continually evolving, and the potential to provide coordination and to 
mainstream issues in the global agenda are fundamental. International law on sustainable 
development provides a foundation to achieve our common challenges.  
 
At the same time, there remains a challenge of implementation, and the real impacts of 
sustainable development will be seen in the measures to translate commitment into action. 
The most important regimes, in this regard, the development cooperation system and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 ILA, op cit. 	  
6 P Sands, ‘International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development’, British Yearbook of International Law 
1994, p. 303- 336; N Schrijver, ‘The Evolution of Sustainable Development in International Law: Inception, 
Meaning and Status’, The Hague Academy of International Law, 2008, p. 217, 362.	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international economic regimes, represent, respectively, the international system created to 
provide aid as a means of promoting equity and solidarity globally, and a regime where the 
integration of sustainable development is more pressing. These regimes have been failing in 
their objectives. The development cooperation system is based on a weak system of 
cooperation and, as a regime aimed at providing equity and solidarity within the international 
community, is still largely influenced by the national priorities of donors, falling short of its 
financial and moral commitments. 
 
The international trade regime allows for sustainable development objectives to be pursued 
through trade measures, but still falls behind in terms of the need to promote a more positive 
approach, incentivizing trade as an instrument for the transition to a green economy in the 
pursuit of sustainable economic development. The WTO law is not unfair. In fact, the 
limitations it imposes on the adoption of measures related to sustainable development, such as 
the GATT Article XX exceptions, are in fact safeguards against disguised protectionism and 
unfair imposition of agendas among member parties, as the case law of the DSB 
demonstrates. At the same time, as negotiations on a more pro-active, positive liberalization 
agenda, as included in the Doha Round, have been stalled for more than a decade now, 
alternative ways are needed to advance the objective of integration of trade and sustainable 
development. Considering the relevance of trade for economic growth and development of all 
countries in the world, and the interrelated relevance of the international trade regime in 
international law, this integration is of the utmost importance for the objective of a more 
sustainable development process and the transition to a greener and low carbon economy. The 
importance of the integration of sustainable development in the trade regime is illustrated, for 
instance, in the prevalence that trade law might have on objectives of multilateral 
environmental agreements, which might be blocked given the strength of the trade regime, its 
institutionalized organization and DSB. Thus, integrating sustainable development into the 
trade regime is not just a matter of living up to the preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement, but 
also to the need for coherence and uniformity of international law itself, of which in the end 
all of these regimes are a part. As discussed in Chapter 1, IL nowadays has as one of its most 
pressing challenges and goals to achieve more fairness in international relations, and allowing 
a pure economic rationale to prevail is not sustainable for the international community over 
time, and thus is not fair. But again, if the advancement of these issues is stalled in the 
multilateral avenue, what are the alternatives? 
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This thesis claims that regional agreements are a promising alternative. Regional agreements 
are, originally, a sub-product of the international trade regime, and must abide by some of its 
rules, even when developing an independent legal order. This has been illustrated in the case 
of the EU and the many conflicts it has entered into regarding some of its policy instruments 
and compatibility with trade law. At the same time, once these compatibility requirements, 
which have as their ultimate goal the avoidance of protectionism and fairness in trade 
relations, are respected, regional agreements have considerable freedom to develop deeper 
and broader policies advancing issues that are stalled in the multilateral sphere.  
 
In this framework, the regional sphere is presented as an alternative for the promotion of 
sustainable development. Regional blocs are fundamentally regional trade agreements that 
aim for the creation of trade liberalization schemes - to deeper or lesser extents, and have a 
development rationale of promoting the increase of trade as a means of economic 
development and welfare. Gradually, as these regional blocs have evolved, other issues have 
been included in their mandate and the regional sphere is also seen as a means of 
implementing the internationally agreed goals of sustainable development. In fact, Agenda 
21, the JPOI and the Rio+20 Outcome Document mention the regional level as an important 
part of their implementation plan, as a fundamental sphere of governance. Given the weak 
capacity of centralized standard-setting and feeble capacity of enforcement at the international 
level, at a regional level regulation might work more easily to fill in this gap, by building 
legal frameworks that encompass these issues from the international agenda and transform 
them into binding goals within the regional sphere.  
 
2. The EU and MERCOSUR: two examples of different RIAs with a common goal 
 
The EU has come a long way as a project of regional integration. It started with the idea of 
creating a common market and safeguarding peace in the European continent, but even in its 
initial stage the project had two important features: being based on a strong legal framework, 
a supranational set of institutions and set of values which influenced its evolution and its 
actions; and the fact that it had always both an internal and an external dimension, even 
though the latter was developed further as the project evolved. The EU is today a regional 
bloc that has as objectives the achievement of a set of policy goals, having the internal market 
as one of the instruments to this end, and these policies cover a substantial range of issues, 
both internally and externally. It is a project strongly based in a legal framework, which sees 
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itself as independent from international law, while also interacting with it in several ways, in 
incorporating goals of the international community, but also in playing a role in defining 
goals of international law and international relations. The tensions which have existed 
between the legal principles and the political strategies of the bloc and its member states are 
still present and affect the functioning of the EU and the achievement of its goals. It is a sui 
generis international organization, based on a supranational framework having direct effect on 
member states, which nevertheless retain sovereignty and competences in a wide range of 
fields, making its functioning a complex task. Finally, it is deemed as an international actor 
and plays a strong normative role, promoting issues such as sustainable development 
internally and through its external relations. Within this framework, sustainable development 
has achieved a highly relevant place within the EU legal framework, both as a principle 
guiding EU action in all spheres of action, but also as an objective of the project itself. The 
EU has developed a considerable number of provisions that allow it to pursue sustainable 
development goals within substantive measures, such as integrating environmental 
considerations into all policy areas, and also to implement it through procedural instruments 
such as the SIAs.  
 
MERCOSUR emerges as a simpler project in relation to the EU, but nevertheless is quite a 
complex governance structure, which on the one hand has achieved a great deal of economic 
integration, has been organized around a legal framework and comprises different institutions. 
On the other hand, it still depends on a stronger political/intergovernmental sphere which 
hinders its progress towards deeper levels of integration. Despite these downsides, 
MERCOSUR is also a project that aims to promote development. At the same time, more 
apparently than in the EU, which embraced the concept of sustainable development and its 
three pillars as one of the core values to be promoted, in MERCOSUR the idea of 
development is primarily centered in the economic sphere, through market integration, with 
an emphasis on ‘social justice’, which is translated into democratic values, and a support for 
intra-generational equity. Nevertheless, MERCOSUR is both a relatively young organization 
-and the EU gives a good indication of the amount of time such a deep level of integration 
might take to achieve- and an ambitious project, which is striving between rhetoric and 
reality.   
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3. Regional policies addressing intra-generational equity 
 
Both EU and MERCOSUR have developed policies addressing equity and solidarity within 
their internal spheres. The EU regional policy has moved from being an ‘accompanying 
policy’, designed to offset the regional perverse effects of other Community policies and to 
provide additional support to member states in overcoming their own backwardness, to a 
comprehensive and mainstream policy, seen not only as an objective but also as a means of 
completing the integration project itself. Regional policy nowadays accounts for 
approximately one third of the EU budget, has a complex set of objectives defined at 
supranational level, and has proven to have an impact on regional development, while also 
being highly contested and ambiguous regarding its effects and coherence among its goals. 
The scope of the regional policy has evolved significantly and in parallel to the 
transformations taking place in the EU itself, as an instrument based on solidarity between 
member states and designed not only to induce convergence in economic development among 
different regions, but also to bring about the implementation of the different overall policy 
strategies of the bloc. Despite the criticisms that might be raised regarding its flaws, regional 
policy has been an important instrument to promote regional development. It has stimulated 
the development of regions lagging behind; it has included in the regional development 
agenda issues incorporated into the EU as part of a ‘sustainable development strategy’, being 
thus a means of promoting sustainable regional development through a legal framework 
within the EU’s internal borders; and it has brought the debate and decision-making 
procedures to the regional level, making it easier to take regional specificities and needs into 
consideration, as well as appropriate ways to tackle them.  
 
A similar policy has recently established in MERCOSUR. FOCEM is a new and welcome 
initiative, demonstrating the capacity of MERCOSUR’s member states not only to liberalize 
trade, but also to take joint decisions responding to a recognized obstacle to the further 
progress of the bloc. On the other hand, the effectiveness of this initiative is still to be 
observed over the years to come, and the lessons learned by the European Union during its 
long evolution can provide interesting insights in relation to MERCOSUR, with respect -of 
course- to the enormous differences between the two projects. Firstly, regarding the scope of 
the policies, it is clear that, compared to FOCEM, the regional policy of the European Union 
has evolved from being an instrument helping to address the asymmetries resulting from the 
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common market, to become a broad policy that is now seen as an effective means of ensuring 
harmonious integration, by furthering the convergence of several regions within the bloc but 
also promoting broader regional development strategies. FOCEM is, of course, a new and still 
modest initiative, which will need to prove its effectiveness in the South American context 
before it can be expanded, but the need for a regional development strategy is lacking within 
MERCOSUR. Secondly, in the EU, a more holistic approach of development with a view of 
promoting sustainable development can be observed. In MERCOSUR, the vision of 
development is still more closely attached to economic and social development, and would 
benefit from the development of a stronger environmental strategy. Thirdly, in both schemes, 
the sectors which are considered to be in need of support through the funds are selected at the 
higher regional level, by the determination of programs and areas of action. Nevertheless, it 
can be noted that within the European Union there seems to be a clearer development 
strategy, focused on social cohesion and solidarity, which the funds were adopted to promote. 
In MERCOSUR, this idea is not so well developed, as only programs have been defined, but 
not a true regional development strategy. Moreover, the means to select which regions will 
benefit from these programs differ substantially: in the European Union, there is a 
quantitative economic criterion (GDP per capita, which in most cases must be below 75 per 
cent of the Community average in order to make a region eligible for aid); in MERCOSUR, 
the fund is still at an initial stage, and it is interesting to note that it resembles the EU regional 
policy in its early stages. More comprehensive criteria could be used to more accurately 
identify regions which are backward in development, and there should be a more precise 
definition of a true regional development plan in MERCOSUR.  
 
Regional frameworks can thus provide a promising mechanism to deliver on the objectives of 
development cooperation, mainly for their capacity to build internally constructed 
development agendas. This is fundamental in terms of ownership, given that priorities arise 
from a regionally discussed agenda, created and implemented by the same group of countries. 
The challenges exist in linking the regional agenda with the international development goals, 
above all in this case the transition to a green economy, which should be a fundamental part 
of fighting inequality and promoting sustainable development. In addition, in the case of 
MERCOSUR, the main challenge is to provide sufficient funds for FOCEM to be a true 
development mechanism, and not just a symbolic instrument of wealth transfer.  
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4. The integration of trade and sustainable development at the regional level 
 
RIAs can also be a valuable means of promoting the integration of trade and sustainable 
development. On the one hand, trade instruments developed at the regional sphere have been 
shown to be more progressive regarding the implementation of sustainable development 
goals. On the other hand, it can be observed that, regarding development measures 
implemented through the preferential trade dimension based on a PTA/Article XXIV GATT 
legal base, there is a thin line between what can be considered as a development measure, and 
a preferential scheme with a political connotation, which is therefore not justifiable under 
trade law. The EU trade and development policy provides interesting insights in this regard. 
This policy evolved from a colonialist, politics oriented approach, to a more pragmatic, 
principle-based one, but not without some difficulties. Episodes such as the ‘Banana War’, for 
instance, illustrate that a development rationale cannot justify an exception to the MFN 
principle under Article XXIV GATT, when the parties are not both developing countries, but 
are rather in a North-South relationship. In this case, reciprocity is required under contractual 
arrangements, and ‘non discriminatory’ treatment does not require identical treatment of all 
developing countries, but does require that preferences can be granted with a clear objective, 
and in a non-discriminatory way, they can provide important incentives.  
 
Furthermore, the EU GSP provides an interesting example of an attempt to link trade policy 
to development concerns through non-contractual arrangements, where the same concerns 
about not unjustified discrimination prevail, but still provide an interesting self-created 
mechanism integrating trade and sustainable development. The EU GSP went beyond this, 
creating two specific schemes that aim to integrate sustainable development considerations. 
While encouraging developing countries to sign and implement these instruments can 
certainly contribute to the promotion of sustainable development, the potential outcomes of 
their application in the national contexts of beneficiary countries are hard to predict. In this 
regard, the practical impact of integrating sustainable development through the GSP, while 
promising in theory, is also ambiguous.  
 
More interestingly, nevertheless, the integration of sustainable development objectives in 
recent RIAs of the EU has occurred through two main avenues: a procedural component, ex-
ante SIAs; and a substantive element, the inclusion of ‘Trade and Sustainable Development’ 
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chapters in addition to other related provisions in the agreements. These SIA reports, which 
are perhaps overlooked but are of great relevance in practice, underline the fact that trade 
liberalization alone does not lead to sustainable development, highlighting this based on 
substantive studies of the specific context involved. Moreover, the SIAs provide important 
data that can guide decision-making towards more informed and targeted outcomes, while 
also helping to avoid unjustified, politically-oriented decisions and biases. Finally, they also 
provide a valuable channel for public participation in these decisions. 
 
As regards their substance, the agreements provide deep trade liberalization of goods, and at 
times also services, being Article XXIV compatible, thus providing for reciprocal concessions 
while also including SDT for developing countries in the form of phased commitments. 
Furthermore, they are WTO+ or/and WTO-extra agreements, dealing with non-trade issues 
that are also a part of the stalled Doha Round negotiations. In this regard, the agreements can 
be considered important building blocks in the international trade and development agenda.  
The most relevant aspect of the case study, though, has been to show the significant 
expansion in the scope of sustainable development measures included in the agreements 
analyzed, which went from being cooperation measures only, supporting the achievement of 
sustainable development objectives, as in the case of the Chile AA, to more explicit trade-
related measures targeting specific issues that are considered important to the sustainable 
development agenda. These measures include commitments to ratify, implement, and not 
derogate from applying various international socio-environmental instruments and principles, 
and not to use them as disguised protectionism. On this point, some of the considerations 
made regarding the GSP+ apply, even though in this case they are not imposed but negotiated. 
Furthermore, the agreements progressively include measures aiming to open up negotiations 
on trade schemes benefiting strategic issues, such as EGS, renewable energy and fair trade 
labels. Most of these measures have been drafted in ‘soft’ language and represent open-ended 
obligations, but at the same time they have opened a much needed framework that is still 
lacking at the multilateral level, preventing these promising sectors from moving on in terms 
of creating international markets. A multilateral framework would still be significant in 
ensuring coherence and effectiveness in relation to the wider sphere, and national measures 
have an important role to play in assuring the implementation of these provisions. 
Nevertheless, these measures go well beyond the negative integration approach undertaken by 
the WTO to date, and have an important role to play in further advancing green economy 
objectives in relation to the multilateral framework.  
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In sum, there has been a considerable level of integration of sustainable development into EU 
trade policy. While criticism might be raised regarding the ways in which this integration has 
taken place, and the underlying hidden objectives behind the trade agreements signed with 
different parties, the legal framework developed by the EU currently allows it to pursue 
policies and objectives which have the potential to make a valuable contribution to 
sustainable development goals, such as providing for more informed and participatory 
decision-making processes and fostering the transition to a green and low carbon economy.  
 
The trade policy of MERCOSUR has been expanding over the past decades, which might 
seem surprising, as the bloc has faced general overarching hindrances to progress. The above 
analysis shows that the MERCOSUR CCP has been following the pragmatic approach that 
characterizes the actions of the bloc, as it has started to develop external relations with the 
aim of establishing trade partnerships even before it has the necessary legal frameworks to do 
so. This policy has focused more on the economic spheres of development: opening markets 
for economic growth, providing SDT for weaker parties and some forms of cooperation – 
above all technical cooperation, in addition to an embryonic GSP system. It is interesting to 
note, at the same time, some similarities with the EU ‘trade and development’ policies in its 
origins. Firstly, MEROCOSUR trade relations focus mainly on maintaining a level of trade 
relationships with its neighboring countries, as in the case of the ACEs signed with other 
ALADI members. Secondly, some of the trade agreements signed to date have a strong 
political component, as is the case with the agreements with Israel, Egypt and Palestine. 
These countries are clearly not among MERCOSUR’s major trade partners, but political 
reasons might help to justify the signature of these agreements, such as enhancing presence 
and opening markets in the Middle East and Muslim regions – a major interest for Brazil. 
Similar reasoning was also present in regard to the EU’s relations with associate and overseas 
territories, although the political background was different. Furthermore, these agreements 
occasionally provide for SDT for the counterparties, in the form of phased liberalization 
schemes – a form of development-related trade measure that is also WTO-compatible. 
Thirdly, as the bloc moves forward, and the economies of its member states become more 
developed, the creation of a system of preferences for the least developed countries is an 
opportunity to incentivize trade and development, and could potentially allow for the 
promotion of specific regulatory objectives, provided that it is done on a non-discriminatory 
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basis. Finally, some form of development cooperation has slowly started to appear as an 
accompanying measure to trade agreements. 
 
Thus, the EU CCP could provide inspiration for MERCOSUR, in the sense that in order to 
become a development instrument, as distinct from just providing trade liberalization and 
SDT to chosen partners, a specific development mandate must back these policies, 
incentivizing the creation of measures that promote these specific objectives in addition to 
that of liberalization. Linking trade policy to sustainable development might prove beneficial 
- not in imposing one bloc’s particular regulatory frameworks or policy objectives onto its 
trade partners, but actually in using the power of trade, and the more specific regional legal 
frameworks, to provide windows of opportunity to promote and support the transition to a 
greener, low carbon economy, which is a fundamental objective for sustainable development.  
 
If regional integration agreements are going to be supportive of this goal, their legal and 
regulatory systems must pave the way for the construction of regional frameworks, as a first 
stage, leading to a global system of markets that provide economic growth opportunities 
while supporting social justice and environmental protection. Creating policies based on 
principles -and not just on politics- is the fundamental challenge to overcome in this regard. 
 
5. The EU and MERCOSUR: bi-regionalism and sustainable development  
 
The EU’s relations with MERCOSUR focus on opening up access to the markets of both 
regions, but this focus is framed around the promotion of sustainable development. The 
analysis of the current status of the relationship between the parties and the negotiations of the 
association agreement show some outcomes of the promotion of sustainable development, 
while also revealing the tensions between policy objectives: the political dialogue channel 
created provides a forum for discussion and political coordination, and has focused on issues 
related to sustainability, such as the general theme of the last EU – LAC Summit. This 
represents an important attempt to achieve political agreement between the regions and can 
have a positive impact on both regional and multilateral decision-making, even though 
disagreements persist in several international negotiations between the two regions – i.e. the 
Doha Round or climate change negotiations – and full evaluation of this impact is beyond the 
scope of this paper.  
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The cooperation chapter has also been active, despite the fact that the amount of aid 
earmarked for the MERCOSUR region is, relatively, very low. Among other outcomes, the 
cooperation led to the signature of an agreement financing the development of ‘eco-norms’ in 
MERCOSUR, which would reinforce the bloc’s overall sustainability strategy, and also 
facilitate the trade relations between the two parties. The final impact of these measures is 
hard to evaluate, and this evaluation is outside of the scope of this paper, but it can be said 
that this cooperation measure is in line with the idea of promoting regional sustainability.  
 
Finally, the trade chapter more clearly shows the potential tensions mentioned above: on the 
one hand, the difficulties in the negotiations are certainly founded in innumerous factors, but 
among these, the internal policies of the two blocs – regarding agriculture on the one side and 
industry sectors on the other side – stand out as a major barrier. In this regard, the EU’s 
commitments to promote sustainable development through regional integration, to maintain 
strengthened relations with other regional parties, and even its own objective to achieve more 
coherence between all of its policies, seem to be jeopardized by internal political influences, 
such as the agricultural sector in some member states and ultimately the reform of the CAP. 
On the other hand, a rhetorical commitment -at least- to achieve a ‘sustainable development 
oriented’ trade agreement can be observed on the EU side, through the analysis provided by 
the SIA and the proposal to include a ‘Trade and Sustainable Development’ chapter. 
Considering the complexity of issues involved in the trade relationship, and the need for more 
policy coherence, the normative content of sustainable development can help to balance 
conflicting goals in economic, environmental and social spheres, and the SIA is an example 
of an attempt to integrate further these areas. The outcome of the SIA process seems positive 
per se, to the extent that it shows that trade liberalization does not necessarily lead to more 
sustainable development of the parties, but rather that important compensating measures must 
be ensured on both sides; moreover, it renders the decision-making process more transparent 
and inclusive towards civil society. Nevertheless, the practical influence of this instrument is 
ambiguous, and its potential impact on the final outcome will depend ultimately on the 
political will (or ability) of the EU to adopt the recommendations made therein.   
  
The EU-MERCOSUR negotiations are broader than those which preceded the five 
agreements analyzed in Chapter 5, given that they concern a bi-regional relationship and not a 
bilateral one, as was the case in the agreements with Chile and Korea, in addition to the fact 
that MERCOSUR is a much bigger project than that of Central American integration, which 
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makes the compromise more difficult, on the one hand, but on the other hand renders the 
negotiations more balanced, especially given the presence of Brazil, one of the largest 
contenders in the WTO negotiations. Moreover, from a North-South perspective, it is 
interesting to notice that both blocs have been aiming to deepen integration, going beyond 
non-trade issues and developing external relations as a means of expanding their role as actors 
and promoting values and goals, respective to their differences in scope. In this regard, the 
relationship between the two blocs can be seen as an attempt to compromise between a 
developed and a developing partner, in which many issues that are controversial in the 
international arena, such as agricultural subsidies, intellectual property and trade and 
sustainable development, are being negotiated in the context of the creation of the largest 
free-trade area in the world – which the EU-MERCOSUR FTA would be. In this regard, 
discussion of these issues, which is seen as important for the promotion of sustainable 
development, could be agreed and promoted at the regional level in a way that balances the 
differing views of developing and developed partners, and this would represent an important 
building block for the development of a multilateral framework for sustainable development.  
 
Concluding remarks 
 
This thesis shows that there are links between regional trade agreements or regional 
integration projects, trade measures and sustainable development concerns. From a legal 
perspective, the scope of this analysis was to examine in what way regional integration could 
generate rules and policies to effectively translate the political commitments made 
internationally and thus support the enforcement and implementation of those obligations, 
being in this sense a ‘building block’ towards multilateral governance. Political tensions, 
which dominate the multilateral sphere and often prevent the implementation of international 
commitments, can also be perceived at the regional level. The strengthening of political 
commitment to the goals represented by sustainable development, and the enhancement of 
policy coherence to allow for a more effective process remain the major challenges.  
 
In the regional sphere, a trend can be observed in actors’ shift in focus away from purely 
economic growth – embodied in the primordial market integration at the beginning of the 
projects analyzed – towards the promotion of other policies in the fields of environment and 
social justice. Thus, it can be stated that there is a growing sense of recognition for this 
holistic approach towards development at the regional level. Nevertheless, in many cases -
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also at the regional level, this integration of recognized goals is very much driven by market 
forces, which form the rationale around which other policies are designed and to which they 
are often subordinate. If regional integration can effectively support the transition towards a 
green economy, both by strengthening efforts to achieve greater equity among member 
parties, and in linking economic measures with social and environmental objectives, it will 
effectively represent a major building block in the evolution of a global governance 
responsive to the greater challenge of our time. 
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